The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp

Actors, Programs and Urban Spaces in Nahr el Bared Refugee Camp 1949-2016

Beatrice Benatti
Sarah Rita Kattan
Abstract

The aim of the research is to provide a multidisciplinary understanding of the urbanization processes of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el Bared, in its evolution from 1949 till today. This is achieved through interweaving the analysis of the history of the discourse on the space of refugees, as developed through the work of the United Nations, with the actions of the humanitarian governance at the refugee camp. The goal of the research is to explore the encounter between policies, programs, models and decisions taken at international level, the actions applied by the specialized agencies in the Palestinian context, and the resulting reactions of the refugees. The history of the development, transformation and urbanization of the refugee camp Nahr el Bared is observed in the main political and socio-economic context through using different disciplinary perspectives. The discourse about refugees is addressed internationally by the United Nations since the late 1940s, as it affects several States simultaneously. The humanitarian governance of refugee camps has a strong impact on the spatiality and temporality of the camps. In opposition to the humanitarian response planned on international standards following global decisions, the local context shapes the evolution of the urban form of the camps. The work of research contributes to enrich the literature in the field through a quite unusual perspective that adopt simultaneously diverse angles to investigate the history of refugee camps, from a macro scale to a micro scale, firstly with the explanation of discourses, secondly with the intermediate level of mapping and survey, and finally with the biography of a case study, that is documented through the combination of diverse sources which are focusing on one particular aspect, either political, socio-economic or urban.
**Riassunto**

Lo scopo della ricerca è quello di fornire una prospettiva multidisciplinare del processo di urbanizzazione del campo profughi palestinese di Nahr el Bared, nella sua evoluzione dal 1949 ad oggi. L’analisi della storia sullo spazio dei rifugiati, analizzata tramite il lavoro delle Nazioni Unite, è intrecciata con le azioni del governo umanitario all’interno del campo profughi. L’obiettivo della ricerca è di esplorare l’incontro fra le politiche, i programmi, i modelli e le decisioni internazionali, le azioni delle agenzie specializzate nel contesto medio orientale e le conseguenti reazioni della popolazione dei campi.

La storia dello sviluppo, trasformazione e urbanizzazione del campo profughi di Nahr el Bared sono i punti cardine della ricerca. L’uso di diverse prospettive disciplinari è stato necessario per comprendere la complessità dei temi principali. L’ambito politico e socio-economico sono strettamente correlati con lo sviluppo urbanistico del luogo. Per questo motivo, il discorso sul profilo dei rifugiati è indirizzato a livello internazionale con lo studio delle attività delle Nazioni Unite a partire dalla fine del 1940. Dalla fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale innumerevoli paesi sono stati colpiti da grandi crisi umanitarie e il numero di rifugiati è aumentato considerevolmente. Il governo umanitario nei campi profughi e la conseguente reazione delle persone ad esso ha un forte impatto sulla spazialità e temporalità dei campi. In opposizione alla pianificazione umanitaria prevista su standard internazionali applicabili a più emergenze, il contesto locale modella e influenza l’evoluzione della forma urbana dei campi profughi. Nel caso dei campi Palestinesi, a causa del corso degli eventi politici, l’azione umanitaria ha gradualmente perso il suo potere di influenza permettendo che gli abitanti creassero un loro proprio “governo” autosufficiente dal 1967 in poi. La conseguenza principale è la creazione di spazi incontrollabili, illustrati attraverso l’analisi delle diverse caratteristiche tipiche dei campi profughi.

Il lavoro di ricerca contribuisce ad arricchire la letteratura esistente attraverso una prospettiva inusuale. Quest’ultima fa contemporaneamente uso di diversi livelli di indagine, da una macro ad una micro scala. Dapprima con la spiegazione delle teorie inerenti, poi con il livello intermedio di mappatura e rilevamento, ed infine, con la biografia di un caso di studio, documentato attraverso la combinazione di fonti diverse, concentrate su aspetti sia politici, socio-economici che urbani. La ricerca ha avuto inizio con il nostro interesse nei confronti della questione dei campi profughi come insediamenti umani attraverso l’analisi della storia di politiche e programmi dei campi, la storia dell’urbanistica Libanese, e la mappatura e analisi territoriale della distribuzione dei campi profughi. Dopo i primi studi, ci siamo rei conto che il profilo dei rifugiati e il loro spazio sono fondamentali per comprendere le dinamiche della complessità di Nahr el Bared. Questo ci ha portato a considerare lo sviluppo del concetto di rifugiato in una dimensione teorica e pratica attraverso l’uso di diversi tipi di fonti sia primarie che secondarie. In particolare durante il racconto della biografia del campo, l’intreccio di prospettive oggettive e soggettive è stato fondamentale. La combinazione di interviste e statistiche fornite da rapporti di NGO hanno dato un’immagine completa della storia del campo e della sua urbanizzazione nel tempo.
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Josiane Khalife from AVSI
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Medair

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Associazione Volontari Servizio Internazionale</td>
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<td>CBRA</td>
<td>Community Based Rehabilitation Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFD</td>
<td>Central Fund for the Displaced</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAM</td>
<td>Congrès internationaux d’architecture modern</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGA</td>
<td>Directorate General of Antiquities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGUP</td>
<td>Directorate General of Urban Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDL</td>
<td>Electricité Du Liban</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>The Global Shelter Cluster</td>
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<td>GSO</td>
<td>Lebanon General Security Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Corporation for Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>United Nations International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>IRO</td>
<td>United Nations International Refugee Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Lebanon Internal Security Forces</td>
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<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>LPDC</td>
<td>Lebanon Palestinian Dialogue Committee</td>
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<td>LWU</td>
<td>Lebanese Wheelchairs Users</td>
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<td>MoSA</td>
<td>Lebanon Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>MPDL</td>
<td>Movimiento por la Paz</td>
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<td>NBRC</td>
<td>Nahr el Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>The Norwegian Popular Aids</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>PAWL</td>
<td>Palestinian Arab Women League</td>
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<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Lebanon Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>Palestinian Red Crescent Society</td>
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<td>PU</td>
<td>Première Urgence</td>
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<td>RELK</td>
<td>Rafik El Khoury and partners</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>United Nations Refugee Fund</td>
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<td>UNRPR</td>
<td>United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the</td>
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Near East

**UNSCOP** United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

**USAID** United States Agency for International Development

**UXO** unexploded ordnance

**WASH** United Nations Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

**WB** World Bank

**WFP** World Food Program

**WHO** World Health Organization

**YMCA** Young Men’s Christian Association

### List of Annexes


*Interviewee Ahmad Loubani, interview by Sarah Rita Kattan and Beatrice Benatti. January 2017.*


*Interviewee ICU, José Antonio Naya Villaverde, interview by Sarah Rita Kattan and Beatrice Benatti. January 2017.*

*Interviewee Mehyeddine Ahamd Loubani, interview by Sarah Rita Kattan and Beatrice Benatti. January 2017.*

*Interviewee Sarah Loubani, interview by Sarah Rita Kattan and Beatrice Benatti. January 2017.*

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Introduction

The aim of the research is to provide a multidisciplinary understanding of the urbanization processes of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el Bared, in its evolution from 1949 till today. This is achieved through interweaving the analysis of the history of the discourse on the space of refugees, as developed through the work of the United Nations, with the actions of the humanitarian governance at the refugee camp. The goal of the research is to explore the encounter between policies, programs, models and decisions taken at international level, the actions applied by the specialized agencies in the Palestinian context, and the resulting reactions of the refugees.

The scope of the research is to map the history of the development, transformation and urbanization of the refugee camp Nahr el Bared observed in the main political and socio-economic context. In order to pursue the aim of the research, the use of different disciplinary perspectives was mandatory. The discourse about refugees is addressed internationally by the United Nations since the late 1940s, as it affects several States simultaneously. The humanitarian governance of refugee camps and the reaction of the refugees to its assistance has a strong impact on the spatiality and temporality of the camps. In opposition to the humanitarian response planned on international standards following global decisions, the local context shapes the evolution of the urban form of the camps. In the case of Palestinian camps, due to the course of political events, the humanitarian governance faded and the population produced its own governance which transforms into a self-reliant one from 1967 and onwards. This results in the creation of uncontrollable spaces, which are explained through the analysis of several characteristics particular to refugee camps.

The work of research contributes to enrich the literature in the field through a quite unusual perspective that adopt simultaneously diverse angles to investigate the history of refugee camps, from a macro scale to a micro scale, firstly with the explanation of discourses, secondly with the intermediate level of mapping and survey, and finally with the biography of a case study, that is documented through the combination of diverse sources which are focusing on one particular aspect, either political, socio-economic or urban. The research started with our interest to address the issue of refugee camps as human settlements through analyzing the camp’s history of policies and programs, history of urban discourses in Lebanon, and mapping and territorial analysis of the refugee camps’ distribution. The selection of the case study of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el Bared was the second step. After the first studies about the camp we realized to which extent the refugee profile and space were fundamental to understand the dynamics of the complexity of Nahr el Bared. This led us to consider the development of the refugee concept in a theoretical dimension in the first chapter. The latter is a review of the state of the art about the definition and characteristics of refugee camps by selected scholars addressing the relevant topics to understand the case study, the fields of sociology, anthropology, town planning and geopolitics.

The second chapter is dedicated to the institutional dimension helps one understand the framework in which the Palestinian refugee profile developed from 1949 to the present day, being the most recurrent unsolved refugee situation mentioned in the UN publications. It is presented by a chronological collection of resolutions and publications produced by the United Nations since 1946. The United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises chapter, analyzed in a historical approach, is divided in two parts, the first one covers the period from 1946 to 1967 and the second from 1968 to the present. This division was enacted for this research due to historical reasons that are explained therein. The United Nations publications studied for the purpose of this research are quantitative and qualitative. The two main categories are: the official results of meetings such as resolutions and annual reports, and the more discursive sources such as the United Nations Weekly Bulletin, the United Nations Review and UN-Habitat. The American University of Beirut gave us the possibility to consult these resources in its library archives. The 1946-1967 period is analyzed through the General Assembly resolutions, Security Council resolutions, annual reports, United Nations Weekly Bulletin (1946 to 1954), United Nations Review (1954 to 1964), UNRWA financial accounts, statistical summaries and other publications about their actions. These expose the United Nations position on refugees in the beginning of the establishment of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East which are reviewed in this section. Consulting these different sources enables an understanding of different perspectives, a very direct one through the conciseness of the resolutions and a more discursive one through the articles of the bulletins. The use of different sources was fundamental to connect the various phases that led to the current situation.
of the refugee camps in Lebanon. On the contrary, the 1968 to 2016 part uses less sources. The main sources used are the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and UN-Habitat resolutions and publications.

The third chapter, maps different international refugee camps located in Lebanon in the urban planning history for the purpose of understanding the context in which Nahr el Bared is set. On a national level, all refugee camps and informal settlements are pointed out on the map of Lebanon, showing their distribution and various densities throughout the territory. In order to assess the extent of urbanization near the settlements, the latter are superimposed on a land use map of the country. Maps of the Lebanese governorates show in a larger scale the relation of these settlements with the local religious affiliations of the surrounding communities. Each type of the international refugee camps is explained through a close up on the common and diverse characteristics of the settlements in both a quantitative and qualitative approach. Both approaches are based on sources leading to draw conclusions regarding demographics, urbanization and integration. Books, articles and journals listed in the bibliography are the principal qualitative sources used, in addition to fieldwork interviews in the case of the Palestinian camp of Shatila and the Syrian camp of Bebnine. Reports and statistical surveys done by NGOs and UN agencies support the qualitative data collected.

The fourth chapter, core of our research, is the biography of Nahr el Bared refugee camp. The intricate case of Nahr el Bared is addressed with various types of sources both quantitative and qualitative. Primary sources such as reports which helped collect statistical and scientific data, journals, original biographical and autobiographical books in Arabic by locals are interwoven with oral biographies, interviews and fieldwork information in order to reconstruct the story of the space. Books and articles issued about the camp and particularly its reconstruction process support the process of narrating the history of Nahr el Bared as secondary sources. Most of the objective publications about Nahr el Bared were issued after its destruction in 2007, which incited us to use subjective sources such as personal stories and hand drawings, due to the lack of literature about the urbanization history of the space. Subjective and objective information, when interlaced together, provide a full image of the urban development of Nahr el Bared. The mix of sources was inspired by references which address biographical narratives for spaces, such as Storie di case, Abitare l’Italia del boom¹, Voci della memoria² and Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara³.

The choice of Nahr el Bared is dictated by some common characteristics it shares with other Palestinian camps and unique features that help understand the involvement of the humanitarian governance in shaping the urban space both in its establishment phase in 1949 and 70 years later by the specialized agency United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Nahr el Bared was subject to a continuous dense urbanization which extended outside the borders of the official camp. The urban element of permeable boundaries translated into an economic integration of the camp in the surrounding Lebanese communities. The self-reliant economy was the base for the creation of independent social hierarchies set in alignment with the political powers inside the Palestinian collective community. The self-reliance governance turned against Palestinian settlements due to the unstable and unsolved political situation of Palestinian refugees as explained in chapter four. This led to the reestablishment of a strong humanitarian and military governance which had faded during the emergence of the self-helped urbanization.

The fieldwork was conducted in two visits, one in September 2016, and the other in December 2016 and January 2017 and constituted a fundamental part of the materials used for the biography of the camp. The information to be gathered required us to plan our visits to the camps of Nahr el Bared, Beddawi, Shatila and Bebnine with the necessary documentation to present at potential checkpoints as well as with establishing contacts with inhabitants, former UNRWA employees and representatives from political factions, when possible, and NGOs who were involved in the humanitarian assistance provided to the displaced population. The criteria for the choice of interviewees varied depending on the historical period we needed to narrate. Former old inhabitants of the camp were selected in order to explain the first phases of settlement, while we targeted a younger generation of inhabitants to explain the situation of Nahr el Bared today. The people cited in the research are the ones that allowed us to record their interviews, other

³ Herz, Manuel. 2013. Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara. Humanity, 1 December
people contributed to their conversation with us, certifying the information they were communicating to us. The challenges we had while conducting the fieldwork were first the difficulty of taking pictures in the military site of Nahr el Bared and Beddawi, especially near political faction’s offices. Due to the recent war which resulted in the destruction of the camp of Nahr el Bared, the recent memories of the conflict and its effect of the inhabitants of the camp led us to show sympathy toward them by not mentioning political opinions and focusing more on the urban and architectural aspects we were surveying. Some interviewees were proud to share their political ideas with us, and used the interview to share messages about the cause of Palestinians or show their gratitude to actors who sustained them best in their difficulties over time. Cultural sensitivity was an important factor essential to conduct interviews and gain the trust of the interviewees, through respecting their traditions and welcoming their hospitality.
Chapter I
Refugee camps as human settlements

The research starts with a review of the state of the arts about the definition and characteristics of refugee camps by selected scholars in fields of sociology, anthropology, town planning and geopolitics who would help understand the scope of the research. The main aspects reflected upon are the humanitarian governance and the self-reliant social organization and the inclusive and exclusive spatiality resulting from the models of urban planning and their development over time. The effects of the prolonged temporary presence of the refugees are connected to their political identity and image perceived by the host community. The integration of the refugees perceived as a labelled group in the host countries is affected by the response of the international humanitarian organizations to mass displacement.
**Definition of a refugee camp**

Scholars differ over the definition of a refugee camp, depending on the characteristics emphasized when determining what makes a settlement a refugee camp. The refugee camp is linked first to the phenomenon of migration, and therefore to the political moment in which people are displaced from one nation to another under specific circumstances. Agier defines refugee camps as “the reproduction of a massive population of undesirables, kept in existence in spaces remote from everything” (Agier 2002). The camp is defined as “an exceptional space that is put in place to deal with populations that disturb the national order of things” by Malkki (S. Turner 2015). The refugees mass displacement is tackled as a problem-solving discourse according to Nyers (Nyers 1998). Being the product of exceptional situations, the language of emergency is used which leads to “emergency measures that are exceptional, temporary and often in legal grey zones” (S. Turner 2015). Refugees, concentrated in masses, are politically determinate beings (Rahola 2010). The camp is a social spatial mechanism created as a response to an emergency situation, providing physical security and primary needs for the displaced, the basis of the new settlements relying often on planning standards (Boano and Floris 2005). Refugee camps attract international aid, expertise and protection (Petee 2015). They are governed by humanitarian governments which seek a non-political environment where the refugee is considered as a human being, a bare life (Agamben 1995). Whereas camps are means to contain displaced people managed by the state, NGOs and other relief agencies, the refugee camps’ perception is also a crucial point for the definition of what characterizes it. “Refugee camps are perceived as exceptional and hence temporary measure to be taken before normality is restored once again in the future.” The uncertainty of this temporary space and the unknown future that might follow it leads to dynamic social changes where “a camp is at once a place of social dissolution and a place of new beginnings where sociality is remolded in new ways” (S. Turner 2015). The camp is the “nomos”1, the permanent exception where order is suspended as described by Agamben (Agamben, Homo Sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita 1995).

1 From Ancient Greek “spirit of laws, statutes, and ordinances”. The nomos is also the making of the human law in the ancient Greek.

Additionally, Agier takes a step forward defining the refugee camp by determining three criteria: extraterritoriality, exception and exclusion (Agier 2014). First, the extraterritoriality is visible when refugee camps are not indicated as cities on maps, as Turner explains in the context of northern Kenya, where camps with huge concentration of people are not even mentioned along with Kenyan cities. Second, the camp is a legal exception, as it follows the laws and regulations of the host society, while it is simultaneously excluded from it. Third, the refugees are perceived and treated as outsiders, not belonging to the host society or culture. The camp is defined spatially, through physical boundaries which are often crossed by insiders and outsiders for economic and social reasons, and temporally, where the temporariness transforms into permanency over time (S. Turner 2005). Although refugee camps begin as formal settlements, there is a turning point when the camp governance is altered and refugees themselves become more involved in the evolution and urbanization of the settlement itself. Illegality and irregularity are common consequences of the urban development of the refugee camp.

A situation is determined illegal whenever the public authority reacts repressively to the precariousness and occupancy of the settlement. Services, infrastructures and urban management are not provided to this settlement, as opposed to the city. However, illegality is sometimes tolerated even if the camp is not abiding by the rules and standards. Settlements considered illegal are either: “settlements formed without a legal land basis”, their occupation being progressive through informal acquisition of land without official rights, “settlements inhabited by people deprived of citizenship rights” because of their origins, as in the case of refugees, “settlements built without authorization from urban planning and land management administrations, settlements built ignoring boundaries lines and official construction norms, settlements built on sites inappropriate for construction settlements on lands intended for functions other than housing” (Durand-Lasserve and Tribillon 2001).

On the other side, Fernandes defines irregular the development patterns which lack public services and are built on lands either public or unfit for housing. Insecurity is linked to the impossibility of registration of ownership, although informal transactions happen. Informal rules for building permits, sale inheritance and registration reflect the culture and traditional practices of the social groups. Unlicensed subdivision of private and public land,
self-construction, irregular housing, occupation of environmentally protected areas and public spaces characterize also irregular settlements as well as the methods of acquiring the lands (Fernandes 2001) (Ababsa, Dupret and Denis 2012). Defined as unregulated activities rather than illegal, the “un-regulation” is a form of regulation (AlSayyad and Roy 2006).

The spread of illegality and irregularity can lead to “uncontrolled urban settlements” as explained by J. Turner. These kinds of settlements expanded historically under specific circumstances, resulting in the production of their “distorted forms”. “Uncontrolled urban settlement is the product of the difference between the popular demand for housing and that demanded and supplied by the institutional society” (J. Turner 1968).

In the refugee camp context, Ababsa notes in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan that only 18% of the refugees live in the UNRWA camps while the rest rent lands and build their homes there, or squat public areas near the official camps (Ababsa, Dupret and Denis 2012). In Lebanon, Palestinian camps present opportunities for low-income dwellers, rural migrants and foreign workers to settle in the camps, and expand outside the limits of the official camp, the urbanization of the camp becomes part of the urbanization of the city, especially in the case of Beirut (Fawaz 2013). In conclusion, the evolution of a refugee camp passes from a formal controlled space to an illegal/irregular settlement where informality in terms of economy, construction and ownership occur constantly and which strongly impacts the urban city.

Sociological perspective

The literature and scholarly approach to refugee camps is much better understood when compared in different fields of study. Sociological sources are the first lens used in order to explain the main structures and social systems in refugee camps. The spatiality of the refugee camp is analyzed first, defining the inside and outside areas. Secondly, the humanitarian system of governance is described. The latter leads towards a self-reliant social organization where social hierarchies are redefined while the economy becomes more interdependent on the surrounding areas and may become self-sufficient. However, the intended depoliticization of the humanitarian governments leads to a hyper politicization. The concept of citizenship conflicts with the permanent temporariness of the refugee camp.

Spatiality of the refugee camp: inclusion and exclusion

Starting from the Latin term “campus” which means open field, level space, as defined by Turner, this originally military term portrays how a refugee camp is actually conceived; far from cities, with a distinct demarcation of the inside and outside “to prevent contamination of the nation and its citizens by outsiders” (S. Turner 2015). In theory, the perimeter defines the lifestyle of the inhabitants of the camp even when invisible. The life and position of the refugees are marked in those limits, being excluded from the host society spatially and legally. However, in practice, the camp boundaries are permeable, people cross them very often for economic reasons, trade and flows of goods, employment and job opportunities and intercultural exchanges (S. Turner 2015) (Jansen 2015). Jansen describes this demarcation line between the inside and the outside as a disconnection initially, emphasizing the exclusion and seclusion mechanisms where refugees are outsiders within the host community and limited to the bare life explored by Agamben. Refugees, assisted by humanitarian operations, are kept out of the society, isolated from public life (Jansen 2015). This purpose explains the dispersion strategies where no integration in the local context, schools, or labor are given to refugees, leading to an extreme isolation, physically, socioeconomically, and culturally; language and economic barrier reduce the opportunities of the refugees. “The sterilized mono functional enclosure minimizes contact with the outer world which is physically behind the fences, refugees cannot touch the outer world” (Diken 2004). The permanent state of exception makes the camp a non-place in Augé’s definition. As the refugee is the ultimate biopolitical subject whose life is stripped of cultural and political forms (Agamben 1995), all meanings, traditions and rituals that characterize places are removed. The person entering the camp is abandoning his political affiliations and subjectivity outside the camp, as the place is indistinctive (Diken 2004).

The word campus comes from the Latin word campus (a plain, open field) that derives from the Greek word campos (bend, turning, curve). It was used in Sicily to describe a plain, level place, an expanse surrounded by woods, higher ground, etc.
Refugees and others related to the camp are at once excluded and marginalized while simultaneously being able to create new identities, communities and political projects (S. Turner 2015). The link between the inside and outside is then challenged individually. Consequently, the limit between the inside perimeter and the outer area of the refugee camp varies through time. The evolution of the refugee camp changes the perception and therefore the reaction of the surrounding populations towards the presence of the refugee camp. The function of the camp alters from an emergency shelter, to a transit point, a center of health and educational facilities, and an economic hub, while being governed by a bureaucratic humanitarian structure. The camp is therefore turning to a “normal” settlement (Jansen 2015). The perception of the outside and inside represent the society surrounding it and how these spaces are included in the cities (Boano and Floris 2005). Diken expresses the concept of legality and illegality by referring to a state of exception where the demarcation lines are not as clear as the fence of a prison, but it reflects an enclosed space in and out of the normal order defined by Agamben. Infrastructures of mobility where access is controlled, contrast with the immobility of the transitory camp which becomes permanent, while “freezing in non-negotiable rigid structures” (Diken 2004). The settlement of the refugees in the host society varies depending on the conditions of the camp. In some cases, the dependency on the humanitarian help provided in the camp increases the willingness of refugees to stay in the camp, whereas in the city, they are labeled as illegal when trying to obtain work permits and properties. Moreover, they do not benefit from the security system and the protection they have while living in the camp. The exclusion/inclusion is controversial here again (Jansen 2015). In this space of exception where the law is suspended (Agamben 1995), where inclusion and exclusion are interchangeable, the camp is “subjected to a strongly moralizing and ethical biopolitical project by humanitarian agencies” (S. Turner 2005). Biopolitics here is as Foucault explains it: solving both a biological problem and a power’s problem.

Humanitarian governance

From the popular discourse, refugees are perceived as biological beings “innocent victims of war, violence and ethnic conflict” inviting humanitarian compassion internationally (Feldman and Ticktin 2010). The situation changes when the attention is not given any more to the emergency of the refugee crisis and their initial poor living conditions. The compassion of the citizens at an international level and at a local level is reduced, almost turning into a negative attitude. Agier discusses also the position of the refugee as a victim of history, enhancing the perception of refugees as bare life, purely human, worthy of humanitarian assistance whenever not having political subjectivity (Agier 2011). This perception of the refugee leads the camp to turn into a controversial space where international regimes of care and protection such as humanitarian programs are present to maintain order and insure that “impurity” is removed from society, rendering refugees invisible, while their status makes them visible in those humanitarian structures. (S. Turner 2015). The camps represent the social condition resulting from wars and humanitarian action. The camps are therefore secluded from the “normal” social and political world, following international standards. The complexity of the space develops over time where the camp becomes a “city-camp”. From an emergency situation, where the camp answers the basic needs of the refugees, the camp grows to accommodate the ever increasing thousands of inhabitants, out of the control of humanitarian organizations (Agier 2002). Nyers described also the humanitarian regime as one of power and knowledge that structures the discourses on refugees and their movements (Nyers 2006). The humanitarian help has certainly a moral base but helps also preserve the regional and global political stability (Jansen 2015). This leads to understand Agier’s point of view: the humanitarian action aims to produce docile beneficiaries by exerting a tight, geographically bounded biopolitical control (Agier 2011).

Humanitarian regimes are based on a collaboration between NGOs and the local refugee population. As described by Agier, the refugee camp is “a device in the global circulation of staff and modes of organizing camps in the global UN and NGO system, a device which creates ambiguities and spaces for new subjectivities” (S. Turner 2015) (Corbet 2015). In the Kenyan context described by Jansen, the UNHCR builds, in cooperation with the NGOs, aid infrastructures in order to provide services and protection (Jansen 2015). The emergency form of governance alters to a governance of care and maintenance where training, development, empowerment, peace and social education are taught aiming at achieving a self-reliant community. However, people in the camp become humanitarianized, and refuse to go back to their country of origin as they become accustomed to be catered for and remain inactive by choice, which makes the camp an option rather than
their only refuge (Jansen 2015). It is expressed by Turner as the dependency syndrome the humanitarian organizations fear. The reliance on humanitarian
government extends outside the camp boundaries, as the economy of the
camp expands towards the surrounding areas. The humanitarian actors and
the beneficiaries of aid relationship evolves through time. While the refugees
try to find their way outside the camp, settling in the city, they still yearn for
the help provided by the humanitarian structure within the camp (Jansen
2015). Locals use the camp also as a place of opportunity where they can
benefit from health care and relief services (Jansen 2015). The encampment
forms of governance and the bureaucratic management established has as
a purpose the prevention of long term settlement. However, these types of
governance do not take into consideration the social dynamics and are based
on external supervision, “an assumption of community” (Corbet 2015). Humanitarian organizations, lacking consideration to internal politics,
are unaware of what actually happens in the camp and see the camp as
a-historic. Their lack of flexibility and humanity does not help the population
to have a smooth transition to an autonomous life. As the humanitarian
regimes deal with the refugee in isolation with their state of provenance
and their cultural background, preferring not to face the controversy of the
refugees’ political identities, new identities are created in a space restricted
for biological survival (S. Turner 2005). The state of exception described by
Agamben, where power is exercised over biological individuals conflicts with
the evolution of the society (Corbet 2015). This informality integrates the
camp, similar to a city governed by international agencies, in the surrounding
areas from a socio-economic perspective, creating more movement between
the inhabitants inside the camp and the locals outside the camp boundaries
(Jansen 2015). While the camp is more associated to informal settlements, it
transforms into a self-reliant city progressively.

Towards a self-reliant social organization of refugee camps

The end of program and emergency in a refugee camp is a crucial turning
point which affects the perception and development of the camp in the
following years. When refugee camps are partially abandoned by humanitarian
organizations due to lack of resources and internal social conflicts, refugees
adapt the place they live in to their own needs, transforming the place into
an informal space. When the NGOs become unable to manage the camp,
individual strategies of survival along with collective forms of solidarity are
deployed. “Unpredictability is the rule, precariousness the norm” leading
to irregular and illegal situations regarding job, trade opportunities and
various activities (Corbet 2015) (Kennedy 2004). Indeed, irregularity and
illegality take different forms and are manifested through the rise of leaders
who try to gain power and become influential. Humanitarians describe
them as community leaders, mobilizers or managers. Some of these leaders
become troublemakers, they blame humanitarians for their difficulties,
creating tension between the relief agencies and the refugees (Corbet 2015).
As a result, politicization, new economies, new identities and processes of
reordering emerges. The excluded camp becomes included by influencing
positively the local economy and creating opportunities of investment of the
host community (Jansen 2015). In conclusion, camps become cities in the
moment they pass the “emergency” phase, the humanitarian organizations
are not working actively in the camp anymore and the “refugee” is considered
an “urban dweller” in the process of urbanization (Boano and Floris
2005). Self-reliant communities are marked when the economy becomes
more and more efficient within the camp and this happens through mostly
illegal entrepreneurial activities happening in the shadows. These activities
increase the interdependence of the surrounding communities with the
camp inhabitants and consequently their relation with each other. The
health care centers and the education provided inside the camp enhances
the conditions of the refugees who become even better than the locals. The
ability of refugees to be resourceful and creative contributes to improve the
urban economy by collaborating with migrants and locals through forming
networks and investing in the local economy. The cosmopolitan lifestyle along
with the humanitarian structure and the self-reliant economy leads the camp
to be a pool of potential employees, having developed in the educational
system skills and languages. The surrounding area benefits from the economic
capacity of the camp and the exclusion of the camp inhabitants is decreased.
They become more and more independent, while keeping the social security
protection of their status as refugees within the camp (Jansen 2015).

As humanitarian organizations see the refugee discourse in a strict problem
solving perspective, the refugees themselves aim to actively adopt the
camp environment to their own needs and benefits, altering their living
space progressively, consolidating social hierarchies within the camp. The
bureaucratic humanitarian structure which aided, assisted and emancipated
the refugees develops into another social and spatial organization depending
on their cultural background (Jansen 2015). Social hierarchies mirroring the “city society” are established inside the “city camp” using the ethnic context of the camp inhabitants, described as an ethnic chessboard by Agier. The camp is therefore an “innovating framework” where society and identity evolve on the basis of collective suffering and interpersonal conflicts in an unpredictable direction. “The hybrid socialization, multi-ethnic and plural” particular of the camp allows for the development of clan strategies that conflict with the humanitarian organizations of the “global sphere” (Agier, Between War and City: Towards an Anthropology of Refugee Camps 2002). This mixed environment, an integral part of the survival system of the camp, is at the origin of a series of opportunities and networks, enhancing its similarity with the complexity of a city (Agier 2002). Referring back to the definition of Turner, the camp being a place where all previous social structures are dismantled and new ones are created, the cosmopolitan aspect of these relatively closed places enriches the innovative ways of internal social structures (Agier 2014).

In contrast with the bird’s eye perspective of nation states and other humanitarian organization such as the UNHCR, through their adaptation to the camp life, the pedestrian perspective of the inhabitants shows how sociality is re-created, social hierarchies are formed and politics are omnipresent (Petee 2005). Among these, women, youth and other marginalized groups are given a chance to rise, remodeling the social life in the camp instead of replicating the old social systems. These renegotiations of norms, hierarchies and status create “localized spaces of sovereignty”, increasing the reluctance to rely on the humanitarian organizations (S. Turner 2005). The community leaders who Turner calls “big men” control these pockets of sovereignty outside the reach of the humanitarian organizations. They play the role of mediators between the latter and the inhabitants, by being allocated roles and positions in the relief agencies, their asset being their knowledge of the rules of the agencies and their ability to adapt. Politics are clandestine, based on mystery, rumors, hints and conspiracies, which makes it even more successful.

From depoliticization to hyper-politicization

Although the camp is supposed to be an apolitical space, as conceived by humanitarian organization, it turns from a space of depolarization to hyper-politicization. The humanitarian organization such as the UN for instance aims as explained before to create a support structure answering the needs of the refugees as biological human beings without any political identity, uprooted from their origin. This concept is described by Diken as post-politics where humanitarian governance is trying to neutralize the citizens, providing services for the wounded victims, the refugees. The aim of politics of asylum is based on risk management, making sure that “nothing disturbing really happens, and that politics do not take place”, the state of exception being a temporary anomaly (Diken 2004). In this context, as every action and event is new, it is possible to interpret and politicize everything. Nothing is taken for granted, therefore no meanings can be fixed, which creates a “gap in the social and symbolic order of life in the camp” with new competing orders and identities emerging. “Depoliticization of life that takes place in refugee camps due to humanitarian government, paradoxically also produces a hyper politicized space where nothing is taken for granted and everything is contested”. The main reason leading the depoliticized camp to create a hyper-politicized camp is the bureaucratic logic of the humanitarian organization which is imposed from above, and fought every day from below with tactics of resistance (S. Turner 2015). Consequently, the politicization of the camp creates constant tension with the humanitarian government which sometimes withdraws its support as Lecadet describes it. The relief agencies acknowledge the political aspirations of participation and representation of the refugees accepting it in practice. The structured politicization challenges and limits the organizations such as UNHCR and other NGOs. One of the solutions would be to help refugees choose their representatives, intervening in their choices, taking into consideration minorities and marginalized groups such as women. The politicization of the refugee camps is beyond the reach of the humanitarian governance and leads to the withdrawal of the governing structures, leaving the refugees to fight for their own survival, the status of refugee being defined legally and politically by international regimes (Lecadet 2016). Standing by political beliefs is one of the means for refugees to believe in an open-ended hope of return, a utopia according to Turner, as opposed to their need to reduce their uncertainty by concrete steps as leaving to cities as individuals. Widening their ideological perspective, refugees “negotiate the suspended, temporary space of the camp while international relief agencies turn them into ahistorical bare life” creating competing sovereignties (S. Turner 2015).
The controversy of political rights of refugees is linked to the notion of citizenship. Full membership in a society has been based on citizenship and nationality since the eighteenth century. The rights of citizens in a territorial nation-state determine whether he is a member of society or not. Nation-states established citizenship as an identity grouping all other affiliations of religion, estate, family, gender, ethnicity, region, all considered in the framework of a uniform body of law. The role of cultural identities, ethnicity and inclusiveness have been problematic (Holston and Appadurai 1996). Indeed, some nation-states aim to make citizenship more exclusive, restricting social services to citizens sharing a common characteristic such as language for instance, consequently excluding non-citizens. On the other hand, in order to gain local powers, urban incorporation is sometimes validated. As a result, the “undesired” will be kept out, increasing the discrimination rates and violence within the nation-state (Holston and Appadurai 1996). Some other nation-states thrive to more inclusive citizenship, giving equal rights to individuals of different national origins and residence or work, widening the understanding of citizenship in a supranational and nonlocal framework (Holston and Appadurai 1996). Immigration is therefore a central issue in the concept of citizenship (L. Malkki 2002). In Malkki’s words, “refugees are matter out of place who need secluding in order not to pollute the national order of things” (L. H. Malkki 1992), referring back to the camp as described by Agamben: “a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended” (Agamben 1995) and where violence in the name of peace and order is applied (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Refugees challenge the link between nation, state and citizen as they don’t belong anywhere. Politics, subject and space are recalibrated in the camp. From a space of bare life, no-law control is mixed with care as death with life. The extra-territoriality of the camp is what makes the suspension of the law feasible in this specific space, making the camp a “post-city” (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). A refugee doesn’t have a home, a nation or a citizenship, he is also “lacking proper agency, proper voice, proper face” (S. Turner 2015). The notion of citizenship impacts also the nation-state as when the refugee is marginalized within the order of the nation-state, the citizen’s relation with his nation is normalized. “While the figure of the refugee threatens the nation state, it also stabilizes it by being the ‘constitutive outside’ of the national order of things” (S. Turner 2015).

Supported by his explanation of state of exception, in a broader context, Agamben demonstrates how the exception explains the general or the rule, as in order to study the general, one looks at the exception. The rule, suspended in the camp, allows the exception to happen (Agamben 1995) (Jansen 2015). The exception covers the membership without inclusion, leaving all ethnic identities and other determinant criteria outside (Jansen 2015).

Referring back to the definition of the refugee camp, temporality is an essential element that keeps the latter unidentified as a city. Temporariness is defined by Turner as an “uncertain life considering the relations to the future in this temporary space” (S. Turner 2015). Agier strengthens this characteristic of temporality by establishing its similarity to the city as the camp is “comparable to the city and yet it cannot reach it” because people think they will not reside there forever. “Even when stabilized, the camp remains a stunted city-to-be-made, by definition naked. Why does it not manage to turn into a genuine space of urban sociability, an urbs, and from there to realize itself as a political space, a polis?” (Agier 2002). The limited and yet indeterminate duration pushes to analyze the camp in a larger perspective than its physical existence, as a “place that evolves over time, constantly being reshaped, whose inhabitants try to build a future for themselves rather than staying in a temporary state that is particular to camps” (Corbet 2015). The endless encampment where there is no hope of return and where the pain and the difficulty in resocialization turns from temporary to permanent. Apart from being a place of “no longer”, the camp is also a place of “not yet” (S. Turner 2005).

Following the notion of citizenship, being excluded from participation in politics, the ethnic background of the refugees becomes fundamental in defining the refugee discourse in an anthropological perspective (Diken 2004). The ethno-nationalism of camp dwellers is an asset to understand the personal identity of the refugees which contrasts with the political image which citizens and nation-states associate to them. The indeterminate
temporariness of their stay in camps shapes their lives and future, having as a base their exclusion/inclusion within the host community.

Ethno-nationalism of camp dwellers

As mentioned by Agier, this “ethnic chessboard” transforms nationalities in ethnicities, understanding the camp as a “mosaic of ethno-nationalities” (Agier 2002). The comparison between the city and the camp is even more developed in that perspective. The cosmopolitanism of city dwellers contrasts with the “purified and hardened ethno-nationalism of the camp”. The ethnic attachment of the refugees living in cities decreases as they are pulled out of their ideological historical roots (L. Malkki 1995). The evolution of the refugees in the camp demonstrates how the environment enhances their attachment to their history, hence the politicization of the camp. In this context, Malkki and Agier present contradicting opinions about the alteration of the camp into a city, but agree on the fact that the city is a norm opposed to the camp (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Moreover, the refugees are bound to stay in camps, forbidden to work in many nation-states, as Jansen describes their situation in Kenya, being excluded from human rights and society, creating insecurities and gender violence in the camps, which are looked upon as “voids of history” (Jansen 2015). This leads again to the exclusion and inclusion concepts. The exception of the camp validates the normality of the city also in the freedoms of the citizens and the “unfreedoms” of the refugees echoing the duality between ethno-nationalism and cosmopolitanism (AlSayyad and Roy 2006).

Identity and political image of camp dwellers

The temporary nature of camps creates “a place of disillusion and a place of new beginnings” (S. Turner 2015). Socialites and identities are recreated when the refugee, a bare life, is transported to a new place without any of his old habits and social structures. The lack of direction of these biological beings allows them to build new identity positions proper to them. Refugees reconstruct their history as people, as they are a nation in exile, they are entitled to recreate their homeland (L. H. Malkki 1992). In fact, the refugee status is valued in itself as refugees do not want to belong to their host community and renounce their claim to their homeland, their right to return and the open-ended temporariness of their exile is attested by the international opinion.

The camp itself becomes a moral community where their attachment to their hope to return is cultivated based on collective memory (L. H. Malkki 1992). The personal identity is however “mobile and processual” as described by Malkki; it is “partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories”. While the camp is seen a pure category, the refugees constitute from the inside a “cosmopolitan impurity” (L. H. Malkki 1992). While the UN structures and other humanitarian organizations treat the refugees as bare life, “as biological beings that simply need to be kept alive and healthy while they wait for the day they will return”, the refugees are also moral beings (S. Turner 2005) thriving to build a new life struggling with their exclusion from the host community and their attachment to their collective memory and hope of return. In the case of Palestinian refugees for instance, camps play an essential role for the development of Palestinian nationalism and identity. The continuous support of the UNRWA confirms their right to return (Sanyal 2011).

The personal identity of the refugees confronts their political image. The displaced persons and refugees constitute a new category of the world population created by wars and exoduses and which is assisted by humanitarian actions in Agier’s understanding (Agier 2002). Malkki develops the notion of displacement, mentioning its result in the creation of an emplacement which she calls a “proper place of belonging”. The refugee camp, as a device, operates according to the standards and rules of the “national order of things”, becoming similar to the city (L. Malkki 2002). On the other hand, the society has controversial opinions about the refugee or asylum seeker as indicated by Dickens, whether he is “the subject of human rights, or a thief who threatens [the society] with abusing [their] welfare system”. Citizens don’t feel any moral obligation towards the refugee in this case. With the lack of social rights and responsibilities, banned from society and living in controlled camps, the refugee becomes an outlaw, suffering from violence whether by the state or the civil society, without any legal basis.” The refugee is excluded from any “ethical responsibility” (Diken 2004). Consequently, the refugee is excluded from legality, having no political rights, while still being subject to it. His life is strictly regulated and restricted by the law in the camp, a zone of indistinction, the order of things in the camp is controlled by the nation-state who thrives to normalize through confinement the “nomadic excess”, the refugee is hence included in the balance of power of the nation-state (Diken 2004). The camp is a device in which refugees are contained and controlled. The human rights discourse is more problematic when applied
to people who are only seen as human being, with no other determinants (Diken 2004). Turner illustrates the refugee, a person out of place, as a “naked accommodated man or unidentified raw material” creating a sense of threat, a symbolic danger to the citizens (J. Turner 1968). Without any citizens’ rights, the refugees are perceived as beings with no subjectivity, nonpolitical presence, bound by a law. Foucault’s concept of biopolitics in “making live and letting die” enhances the fact that refugees are subjects whose life and death are of little importance” (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Malkki emphasizes this idea by defining the camp as an absolute biopolitical space governed by a device of care and control, which opposes it to the city (L. Malkki 2002). The refugees are again “biopolitical” subjects in a “state of exception” (Agamben 1995) (Owens 2009). They question the position of human rights regarding the man or the citizen and the limit between the two, which is why the human being himself cannot be the base of any political order alone in Owens’ perspective (Owens 2009). The humanitarian action conflicts with the education of peace, security and stability as one bases itself on a common human identity and the other on citizenship and ethic-political identity. Refugee camps are complex, multidimensional sites of identity practices. “Refugee identity is not merely the negative, empty, temporary, and helpless counterpart to the positive, present, permanent, and authoritative citizen” (Nyers 1998).

Indeterminate temporariness

In addition, refugee camps are by definition temporary as they are the result of a “protracted refugee crisis”. It is a contradictory situation where the refugees “first, cannot settle where they are because they are supposedly ‘on the move’, on their way home or somewhere else in the future; second, they cannot remain ‘on the move’ as they possibly are not going anywhere, either now or in the near future. The result is that they experience living in a time pocket where time grinds to a halt inside the camp, while normal time continues outside the camp: a limbo with no promise of ending” (S. Turner 2015). The camps, although by definition temporary, become quasi-permanent; no one knows how long the refugees will inhabit the camp, neither themselves nor the humanitarian government or the nation-state (S. Turner 2015). Besides, from the perspective of the refugees themselves, while forced to think of the camp as a present situation, they need to face their uncertain future, plan their life and take the necessary actions in the present to achieve it. It is what Whyte describes as the “subjunctive mode”, navigating on an “indeterminate terrain”. Their lives are lived in preparation for a better fuller one, “a life in the future, beyond the camp (S. Turner 2015).

Urban perspective

Refugee camps are part of the urban discourse as whether excluded or included in cities, they have a great impact on the urban mapping of nation-states. Being a response to an emergency, their construction process begins as punctual and efficient but remains on going for the length of their stay. The immediate construction of refugee camps by nation-states and humanitarian organizations is based on models of urban planning: the modular grid layout and the clustering models. The multiplicity of functions in a refugee camp along with other guideline principles such as the ethnographical divisions are essential to the formation of community life in the camp. Besides, the refugee camp as well as other urban forms of independent citizenship lead to competing sovereignties where visible and invisible regulations are applied within wider urban politics.

Emergency construction processes for the displaced

In an urban discourse, the most striking difference between a refugee camp and a city is the punctuality of construction of the latter. The camp needs to be built in no time as a response to an emergency where people are extremely vulnerable. All town planning decisions should be decided in a very limited time, considering all the possible consequences of those decisions. Efficiency and concern for the refugees’ wellbeing are the main issues taken into consideration (Kennedy 2004). Starting with a study of the available options and the cost of the initial construction, the costs of inhabitation on a given period of time is assumed, based on specific guidelines and planning models. The efficiency of services is then to be added to the balance as well as other long term considerations (Kennedy 2004). Urban planning can differ from military grid to scattered shelters. The main duality is that an individual wants to have a customized home while the “government’s intention is to maintain order and security” (Slater 2014). The main challenge is the
Rapid construction where community spaces are disregarded and built to accommodate the increasing population. The humanitarian organization lose spatial control there (Slater 2014).

Models of urban planning

Urban planning models for emergency housing aim to reduce the costs of the state and humanitarian organization to the maximum, to maximize the user’s responsibility in order to achieve with limited finances a successful social environment. Infrastructure being one of the most important investments in the planning, modular grid layouts are used to lessen the length of roads and use all the spaces, removing all left-over spaces. The blocks are designed based on human dimensions, ensuring human comfort within the community (Kennedy 2004). As a matter of fact, the grid layout is popular in developing countries and in refugee camps as it allows further expansion in unpredictable situations and can be eternally replicated. Families extend their houses in added floors depending on the number of children. This is the case of camps that became quasi-permanent such as the Palestinian camps. In other cases, building materials laws and cultural backgrounds of the refugees do not end in extending the houses vertically and hence Overcrowding and relocation is the outcome (Kennedy 2004). The rigid structure of the grid system does not integrate into the local context and hinders cultural connection among the inhabitants. Environmentally, the straight lines create wind funnels, spreading dirt and increasing erosion (Slater 2014). However, modules of specific dimensions are practical to handle by planners as their placing in a particular spot is the only criteria to be considered in the decision-making process (Kennedy 2004). The modules could vary from tents, wood shelters to concrete block wall enclosures (Slater 2014).

Clustering is another model recommended in refugee camps as it preserves the culture value of a neighborhood by creating inner courtyards among shelters. The enclosed space gives an impression of protection and security. Openings have also a hierarchy, providing different levels of privacy and possibility to encourage activities and trade within the settlement. Those clusters allow for a connection of the cluster inhabitants to the surrounding community while having a defensible private space for themselves. Clustering, contrary to the modular planning, encourages the formation of a community (Kennedy 2004). A true center in each neighborhood instead of a grid layout can also achieve the creation of community life. Houses are distributed in this case in a radial configuration with the efficient use of land areas and low density populated areas. Smaller courtyards common to a few units would then connect to larger ones which are by nature more public. A hierarchy of public spaces is accomplished with a progressive transition from private spaces to public ones, having different activities particular to each one of those common spaces (Kennedy 2004). Infrastructure, roads and electricity spread from the center. Central facilities such as offices, healthcare, warehouses, market and community centers are also located at the center while water points, bathrooms, garbage and schools are decentralized (Slater 2014). Security depends then on community cohesion and “neighborhood watch attitudes” (Kennedy 2004). Freedom and responsibility are fostered by cluster planning. Camps organized in clusters are integrated in the surrounding topography. (Slater 2014).

Another criteria which affects the urban sustainability of a refugee camp is the multiplicity of functions. As economy is a defining element in the survival of refugees, the urban planning principles inflicted on the camp might hinder or encourage economic activity. In many cases, no small open spaces are designated for small scale commercial activity, though the road connecting the camp to the city is the perfect place for hosting those activities. Accommodation being the only concern considered while planning the camp, a monofunctionally of spaces is created looking like a “dormitory existence”. All spaces are used by a replication of the same blocks of housing, endlessly, with no left open spaces (Kennedy 2004). A hierarchy of spaces between the individual and the public areas is essential. Left-over spaces are potential spaces to “grow into”, where small shops or food stalls are set, religious places are built, as they often are not intended to fit into a house plot. Playgrounds for children are safer to form in more private courtyards than the central square, which is difficult to supervise by parents due to its size, distance and invisibility from housing plots. Kennedy describes it as an “abstract geometric design” as opposed to a “living neighborhood” evolving culturally and economically over time (Kennedy 2004).

In addition, other principles are at the base of the guidelines created to solve the emergency of setting a refugee camp in a particular area. Apart from the possibility of expansion in case of new arrivals, the security parameter is crucial: camps should be located away from borders and military observations.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter I

members, are grouped in communities (Slater 2014). As these cultural ties reduce stress through solidarity. The families, up to six their family numbers along with their region, religion and ethnic background, are categorized in wider ethnic groups corresponding to their nationality background, their place of origin or their clan of origin in some cases. They are grouped in wider ethnic groups corresponding to their nationality (Agier 2002). Spatial organization of camps is based on categorizing people by their family numbers along with their region, religion and ethnic background, as these cultural ties reduce stress through solidarity. The families, up to six members, are grouped in communities (Slater 2014).

The urban planning principles group the refugees according to their ethnic background, their place of origin or their clan of origin in some cases. They are categorized in wider ethnic groups corresponding to their nationality (Agier 2002). Spatial organization of camps is based on categorizing people by their family numbers along with their region, religion and ethnic background, as these cultural ties reduce stress through solidarity. The families, up to six members, are grouped in communities (Slater 2014).

Spaces are increased in sizes in cold weather areas whereas in warm climates, people tend to stay outside. Flooding should be prevented as well as fire safety regulations should be implemented (Kennedy 2004) (Slater 2014). Nothing specifies that a river or a water source should be included. Accessibility should allow refugees to buy basic supplies through a road. Being close to a town might be a solution, but it could create tension between the inhabitants and the refugees. Whenever the location of a camp is along the main road leading to a town, economic integration is facilitated offering commercial opportunities close to a city (Kennedy 2004) (Slater 2014). Access to natural resources, such as wood and vegetation, might end up forming an environmental problem, hence the importance of ensuring a durable solution for the refugees and the environment (Kennedy 2004). In the early stages of the settlement, wood would be collected from the surrounding natural terrains to build shelters, making them stronger and more solid over the years (Agier 2002). Services, toilets, water points, should be within the reach of all inhabitants, and distances from various points of the site are to be studied to make sure of the feasibility of the infrastructure (Kennedy 2004). Slater explains while referring to the United Nations publications about tents for humanitarian relief that labor-intensive building methods are much more efficient than prefabricated shelters, in terms of cost, responsibility and the fact that it abides by the local construction norms. Families tend also to join many tents together in order to divide it depending on gender and age in some cases. As individual spaces are limited, it is almost impossible to divide the same house in functional areas, resulting in one single space where cooking, storing goods, sitting and sleeping all happen. Adaptability and privacy of interior spaces are therefore crucial. The inhabitants alter their spaces adapting them to their own culture, improving first the roof, then the floor for insulation and waterproofing purposes (Slater 2014).

The camp is a state of emergency, a state of exception that becomes a rule, transforms into a permanent spatial arrangement. As citizenship is contested in the refugee camps, competing sovereignties appear territorially producing zones of regulation and others of no-law. The multiplicity of sovereignties emerges from an urbanism based on sharpened exclusion versus inclusion and segregation in walled or gated communities. A competition arises in refugee camps among the state, religious institutions, NGOs, and international development institutions. “This excess of power is articulated through fragmentation and multiplicity” (Alsuyad and Roy 2006). Even though citizens are ensured their individual rights from the nation-state, new forms of citizenship emerge in urban enclaves where protection is given to the inhabitants. “These forms of citizenship substitute for or are even hostile to the state” as they produce private systems of governance, spreading rules and norms in opposition to the national law (Alsuyad and Roy 2006). Hence, cities become states within the state. National citizenship is fragmented and decentralized at an urban scale (Pirenne 1923). The emergence of urban forms of independent citizenship is articulated through different spatial formations: the gated communities or fortified enclaves as named by Caldeira (Caldeira 1996), the regulated squatter settlement or informal housing and the refugee camp itself. They are all exclusive, and follow specific rules or norms. Alsuyad and Roy define them all as states of exception (Alsuyad and Roy 2006). Could the gated enclaves be compared to humanitarian government? Gated enclaves are all linked to other megaprojects through networks that separate them from the city creating a segregation vertically and horizontally. This distinctive territorialization of citizenship produces “a new spatial governmentality”. Regulated squatter settlements also reach a point where un-regulation leads to a governmentality based on an organizing urban logic, regulation being the key to informality (Alsuyad and Roy 2006). All these urban forms are spaces of exclusion, “urban spaces of seduction and safety” governed by private bodies, mostly linked by the property value itself, at the base of social organization, which codifies and unifies an envelope (Dear and Flusty 1998). The politics of space have a bigger impact that the urban morphology on the inhabitants (Alsuyad and Roy 2006). Camps in society are therefore divided in two types: “voluntary camps where the entry is blocked but the exit is free, and those where the entry is free but the exit is blocked. Some camps are designed to keep people (outcasts) out, some to keep
people (inmates) in”. The entry and exit, symbol of inclusion and exclusion, as the walls of a city, define the camp’s purpose (Diken 2004).

On the other hand, land ownership is a very complex system as it has historical and legal twists, both formal and informal according to Corbet. While refugees try to adapt to the humanitarian governance system, they form committees to define the land boundaries, build homes and divide the camp into districts (Corbet 2015). The camp establishes some routines, systems and lifestyles that are specific to its inhabitants, “it makes the place a place”. Along with the development of their identity, many refugees improve their financial situations and become self-sufficient while maintaining their refugee status (Jansen 2015). Whether the humanitarian apparatus is blocking the adaptation of the refugee to their new life remains a question. In this case, the camp becomes a place to re-create one’s own life and identity instead of only being a place to take refuge (Corbet 2015). As a result, the process of squatting becomes a fight for an identity, where the camp is an option refugees opt to defend. “Squatting is a claim to citizenship, instead of being a claim to non-citizenship”, a claim to their national identity (Sanyal 2011).

In the discourse of competing sovereignties, refugees struggle to settle their own lives within the framework of the humanitarian governance, formally and informally as well, abiding by visible and invisible regulations. This is manifested explicitly in the expansion of the shop on the streets to display their goods, appropriating the urban public space for private commercial use. Nothing prevents the shop owner from doing so, but it is interfering with the street circulation in the city. He is therefore told to either remove his products from the street or to occupy a part of it only. The other shop owners will observe and adopt the convention. The latter is hence normalized by the city administration and the inhabitants (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Another example is when camp inhabitants add a second floor. To reinforce the structure of the house, elements are added in the public space of the street. The second floor might also overlook neighboring houses. A negotiation with the neighbors is required in order to decide the location of the windows and privacy and with the city administration to decide the airspace that will be occupied above the street, enabling circulation (Akbar 1988) (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). These negotiations, though legitimized, produce irregular forms, or urban informality which is not in opposition to the state as such but an “articulation of a particular form of citizenship involving an alliance between the different groups that constituted the bulk of urban societies” (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Jansen defines those areas as grey areas developed within a corrupted system of public services where refugees are able to practice to maneuver (Jansen 2015).

Zones defined legally as grey areas combine urban informality and urban politics as new forms of governance emerge. Informality is only a nest for religious fundamentalisms as the state and organizations withdraw, refugees are mainly provided services by religious fundamentalist groups (Bayat 2000) (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). One of the examples cited by AlSayyad is the case of the informal settlements in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, where education, health and medical services, infrastructure, sewage systems, water supply and electricity are provided by Hezbollah, a Shiite militant Islamist group. Hezbollah is a “mediator of housing rights for the Shiite poor”. In the civil war, each region was governed by a religious militia, helping and defending the population there, allowing those militias to emerge (Bayat 2000) (AlSayyad and Roy 2006).

**Geopolitical perspective**

In a broader context, the discourse on refugee camps is influenced by the geopolitics specific to each situation. A brief historical overview of the concept of refugee camps is explained here through the mass displacement controlled by the actors involved in refugee camps phenomenon.

**The origin of the refugee camps**

Refugee camps are “spaces to contain and control refugees” as defined by Dicken when referring to World War II in Europe (Diken 2004). Indeed, Agamben elaborates the history of refugees as they appear as a mass phenomenon after the World War I. The fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires, along with the new peace treaties, dismantled the demographic and territorial structure of Central and Eastern Europe. A million and a half White Russians, seven hundred thousand Armenians, five hundred thousand Bulgarians, a million Greeks, and hundreds of thousands...
of Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians left their countries and resettled elsewhere. The racial laws in Germany and the Civil War in Spain led to more refugee flows in Europe (Agamben 1995). Theoretically, Malkki defines the refugee camp in the geopolitical context as a “technology of power, a standard equipment for dealing with mass displacement”. Refugee camps were developed over time as a humanitarian/international solution in Europe after World War II. “Contemporary practices of disciplining movement and segregating people are not newly emergent phenomena, but something much older and established” (L. Malkki 2002). Malkki observes that spatial and social displacement of people legally classified as refugees is enormously increasing in the world nowadays (L. Malkki 1995).

**Mass displacement control**

Quoting Malkki, “camps are signatories to post-war legal instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the United Nations Convention on Refugees (1951). These documents guarantee ‘freedom of movement’ and the ‘right to asylum’ as fundamental rights, but their implementation is not considered ‘rationally possible’, given geopolitical ‘realities’” (L. Malkki 2002). The humanitarian regime being the main actor in helping and assisting refugees and their movements, it is also a tool to control the regional and political stability by exerting a “geographically bounded biopolitical control (Nyers 2006) (Jansen 2015) (Agier 2011). Malkki emphasizes this power held by the humanitarian organization to control the refugees while providing constant care to the camp residents with a refugee status. They are “part of well-established inter-national technologies of power for the control of space and movement” in a socio-political context (L. Malkki 2002) humanitarian emergencies and human rights are however the “overriding rationale” for providing durable solutions (Gil Loescher; James Milner; Edward Newman; Gary Troeller 2008). Seen as a “problem of organization” sometimes, refugee camps are taken charge of by the military forces (L. Malkki 2002). Moreover, in developed and developing countries, refugees, asylum seekers and displaced people, when moving in mass displacement, are universally considered as negative, consuming resources and “a potential threat to stability, identity and social cohesion” (Gil Loescher; James Milner; Edward Newman; Gary Troeller 2008). Refugees are therefore to be analyzed in an economic context of migration and as a political form (L. Malkki 2002).
Chapter II

United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises

Mass displacement of people is a phenomenon that affected many countries after World War II and the United Nations which was created as a mediator regarding this issue was meant to establish international standards for the urgent humanitarian assistance required. This led to the need to define a refugee in 1946 in European countries and three years later in the Middle East. The purpose of this research is to understand the framework in which the Palestinian refugee profile developed from 1949 to the present day, being the most recurrent unsolved refugee situation mentioned in UN publications. In light of historical events which occurred in the Arab region, the position of the United Nations was altered. This is visible through the decisions taken in the General Assembly resolutions and the actions realized by the specialized agencies of the UN at local level. All the emergencies faced by the United Nations can be divided in two phases: the life saving relief assistance and the long-term development assistance. After the first phase the camp communities are empowered through the strengthening of a collective identity to take control of their own space. This turning point is individuated for Palestinian refugees in 1967 as explained in the second chapter. The refugee profile is tightly linked to the human settlements discourse in the 1970s when the relevance of the living conditions of people and refugees becomes eminent.
The formation of the United Nations in 1946 as a successor to the League of Nations was an international achievement to promote international cooperation. The refugee issue is one of the main open questions of the United Nations. Since 1946 “refugee” has been one of the most present words in UN works. In this section we set out how the United Nations shaped the profile of refugees and displaced persons and the way it treated the different emergencies that came about during the last century. Refugees and displaced persons are a problem of international magnitude, thus the impact of the United Nations is at an international level as well. The UN publications related to refugees are based on events that transpired in world and specifically the Middle East as this research analyses the question of Palestine. The historical events which influenced the discourse of the UN on refugees are the post war years of World War II, the expulsion of Palestinians from Palestine in 1948, the 1967 Six-Day war between Arab countries and Israel, the Cairo Agreement in 1969 and the 1982 Second Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. The principles discussed during the main conferences were later transmitted all-over the world, applying the same rules and ideas in uncountable countries. The United Nations’ aim is to find solutions to the problems addressed in the previous part of this research, such as: exclusion, inclusion, citizenship and permanent temporariness. These are common features of many refugee camps around the world that the UN needs to face, together with the participation of governments and international organizations.

1 Refer page n.X
2 The Cairo Agreement signed in November 1969 by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese army commander General Emile Bustani with the help of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The text of the agreement remained officially secret. The agreement established principles under which it apparently granted to the Palestinians the right to keep weapons in their camps and to attack Israel across Lebanon’s border. Under the agreement of 1969, the 16 official UNRWA Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, home for 300,000 refugees, were removed from the Lebanese army's Deuxième Bureau’s jurisdiction and placed under the control of the Palestinian authorities. Basically, the agreement allowed Palestinians residents of Lebanon to control their refugee camps. This was the starting point of “a state within a state” and the turning point as well of all the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

This chapter is divided in two parts, the first one covers the period from 1946 to 1967 and the second from 1968 to the present. This division was enacted for this research due to the magnitude of an event, namely the Six-Day war which will be explained in the chapter. From the historical point of view, the division is dictated by the Six-Day war and its aftereffects and by the change in the UN’s attitude towards the Palestinian situation. The Six-Day war caused a new exodus of Palestinian people towards other Arab countries, causing an overpopulation problem in the refugee camps. The United Nations during the years from 1967 to 1969 had a sort of “break” from the Palestinian issue. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and its work were still mentioned in all the reports of every year but living conditions and refugee camps situation were not described. This caused a lack of perspective on this fundamental period for the history of refugee camps, that this research tries to fill together with the fieldwork. In 1975, the topic of Palestinian refugees was brought to the table again together with the human settlement discourse.

The United Nations publications studied for the purpose of this research are from two main categories: the official results of meetings such as resolutions and annual reports, and the more discursive sources: the United Nations Weekly Bulletin (1946 to 1954) and the United Nations Review (1954 to 1964) which expose the United Nations position on refugees in the beginning of the establishment of Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East which are reviewed in this section. The 1946-1967 period is analyzed through the General Assembly resolutions, Security Council resolutions, annual reports, United Nations Weekly Bulletin and afterwards United Nations Review and UNRWA financial accounts, statistical summaries and other publications about their actions. The possibility to consult these different sources enables an understanding of different perspectives. A very direct one through the conciseness of the resolutions and a more discursive one through the articles of the bulletins. The use of different sources was fundamental to connect the various phases that led to the current situation of the refugee camps in Lebanon that are analyzed in following sections. On the contrary, the 1968 to 2016 part uses less sources. The main source used are the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and UN-Habitat resolutions and publications. As said before, the historical events led the focus on the previous
part, but it is interesting to see how the human settlement discourse developed after the UN-Habitat creation and how the refugee profile, especially the Palestinian refugee, evolved as well.

Sources

Most of the studied documents are those of the UN General Assembly, one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and the only one in which all member nations have equal representation. The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. Its powers are to supervise the budget of the United Nations, appoint the non-permanent members to the Security Council, receive reports from other organs of the United Nations and make recommendations in the form of General Assembly Resolutions. The other five main organs of United Nations are: UN Secretariat; administration, the International Court of Justice; universal court for international law; the UN Security Council; for international security issues, the UN Economic and Social Council; for global economic and social affairs and the UN Trusteeship Council, currently inactive; for administering trust territories. UN actions are portrayed in its bulletins and publications. The United Nations Weekly Bulletin was first published on August 3, 1946 by the UN Department of Public Information in Lake Success in New York and later in London from 1950. The price of each copy of the bulletin was 15 cents until 1949, and in 1950 the price was increased to 20 cents. In the beginning the UN weekly bulletin was published every week, as its title indicates. This continued until 1948, when its publication changed to twice a month on every first and fifteenth day of the month. Every issue of the UN weekly bulletin had a cover and a back-cover showing images of the main UN’s questions or activities and meetings. Until 1949, all the issues displayed evocative images only on the back-cover which represented mainly UN landmark buildings or crucial moments during the meetings. The images usually tried to give an idea of the main problems that the General Assembly and the other main organs discussed during the conferences. In 1949, relevant images were displayed on the covers instead of the back covers. It is interesting to note that even while the refugee problem is one of the principal themes of the UN discourse, refugees did not appear often on the covers or back-covers. One of the few covers representing a refugee is the one of April 15, 1950 subtitled as “Arab refugee and Child have found shelter in a camp outside Beirut.”

From 1946 to 1967

The period from 1946 to 1967 is very peculiar and characterized by different events which changed permanently the understanding of some concepts. One of these concepts is “refugee” which has been shaped by many authors, as discussed in the first chapter, and especially by one of the most important organizations of the world: United Nations. The first way to frame the refugee emergence is to observe this phenomenon from an historical perspective, by looking at the management of their displacement in Europe post World War II.
The second way is to trace an array of different scholarly studies and institutional domains within which “the refugee” and/or “being in exile” have been constituted (L. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things 1995). The domain analyzed in the first chapter are the outcomes of studies developed about refugee camps. The second chapter of the research studies the documentation of the United Nations including the working resolutions that have been produced since 1946 and the United Nations Weekly Bulletin which provided summaries of the actions of the organization.

**From the European Refugee profile of WWII to the next refugee profiles 1946-1967**

1946: First definitions of the term “refugee”

The work of the UN started in 1946 just after World War II, hence the first “refugee profile” is strictly connected with the European people that were displaced during the war. One of the first UN General Assembly resolutions is called “Question of Refugees” (A/RES/8(I) 1946). It is the first official document of the United Nations recognizing that the problem of refugees and displaced persons of all categories was a problem of immediate urgency, and recognizing the necessity of clearly distinguishing between genuine refugees and displaced persons, on the one hand, and war criminals on the other. It is important to note that since the beginning, the UN encourages the refugees to “return early to their countries of origin”. To pursue this intent, the International Refugee Organization was formed in 1946 and the official definitions of refugee and displaced persons were given in its constitution annexed to the resolution “Refugees and displaced persons” (A/RES/62(I) I-II 1946):

“That genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute an urgent problem which is international in scope and character; That as regards displaced persons, the main task to be performed is to encourage and assist in every way possible their early return to their country of origin; That genuine refugees and displaced persons should be assisted by international action, either to return to their countries of nationality or former habitual residence, or to find new homes elsewhere, under the conditions provided for in this Constitution; or in the case of Spanish Republicans, to establish themselves temporarily in order to enable them to return to Spain when the present Falangist regime is succeeded by a democratic regime;

That genuine refugees and displaced persons, until such time ~ their repatriation or re-settlement and re-establishment is effectively completed, should be protected in their rights and legitimate interests, should receive care and assistance and, as far as possible, should be put to useful employment in order to avoid the evil and anti-social consequences of continued idleness; and That the expenses of...
Definitions Refugee
The term “refugee” applies to a person who has left, or who is outside of, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, whether or not he had retained his nationality, belongs to one of the following categories:

Victims of the Nazi or Fascist regimes or of regimes which took part on their side in the second world war, or of the quisling or similar regimes which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not;

Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not;

Persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.

“Refugee” also applies to a person, other than a displaced person as defined in section B of this Annex, who is outside of his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the second world war, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality.

The term “refugee” also applies to persons who, having resided in Germany or Austria, and being of Jewish origin or foreigners or stateless persons, were victims of Nazi persecution and were detained in, or were obliged to flee from, and were subsequently returned to, one of those countries as a result of enemy action, or of war circumstances, and have not yet been firmly resettled therein.

The term “refugee” also applies to unaccompanied children who are war orphans or whose parents have disappeared, and who are outside their countries of origin. Such children, 16 years of age or under, shall be given all possible priority assistance, including, normally, assistance in repatriation in the case of those whose nationality can be determined.

Definition of Displaced Persons
The term “displaced person” applies to a person who, as a result of the actions of the authorities of the regimes mentioned in Part I, section A, paragraph 1 (a) of this Annex, has been deported from, or has been obliged to leave, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to undertake forced labor or who were deported for racial, religious or political reasons.”

The refugee problem and the proposals for an International Refugee Organization were fully debated. One of the principal tasks to be promoted was the return of refugees and displaced persons to their native countries, but also the theme of “resettlement” was very contested during the meetings (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Refugee Debate 1946); many countries, especially USSR did not agree initially to give this right to the refugees and displaced persons; they preferred to permit only the repatriation. USSR defined: “Plans for the settlement of refugees and displaced persons in distant foreign lands are unacceptable and should not be listed among the tasks of the proposed refugee organization” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee Policy Debate 1946). In this way refugees, according to UN, until the time of their repatriation or resettlement and reestablishment is effectively completed, are protected in their rights and should receive care and assistance. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Refugee Debate 1946) Being a refugee in this period is equal to have a sort of temporary nationality that protects and excludes at the same time. According to the outcome of the resolution mentioned before, the condition of “refugee” stopped when those people acquired a new nationality, had otherwise become well established, had unreasonably refused to accept the proposals of the international authorities for their resettlement, made no substantial effort to earn their living when it is possible to do so, or when they exploited the assistance of the new international body, IRO (UN Weekly Bulletin, Who are the Refugees 1946).
Chapter II

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp

PART I

Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Meaning of the Resolution Adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on 16 February 1946

Section A. Definition of Refugees

1. Subject to the provisions of sections C and D and Part II of this Annex, the term "refugee" applies to a person who has left his home, or who is outside of, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, whether or not he had retained his nationality, belongs to one of the following categories:

(a) Victims of the Nazi or Fascist regimes or of regimes which took part in the Second World War, or of the guerilla or similar regimes which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not;

(b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not;

(c) Persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the Second World War, for reasons of race, religion, national or political opinion.

2. Subject to the provisions of sections C and D and Part II of this Annex regarding the exclusion of certain categories of persons, including war criminals, quislings and war criminals, from the benefits of the Organisation, the term "refugee" also applies to a person, other than a displaced person as defined in section 8 of this Annex, who is outside of his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the Second World War, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality.

Section B. Definition of Displaced Persons

The term "displaced persons" applies to a person who, as a result of the actions of the authorities of the regimes mentioned in Part I, sections A, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Annex, has been dislocated from his home, or has been forced to leave his home, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who is outside of his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the Second World War, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality.

Figure 3. General Assembly resolution 1/8, "Question of refugees", A/RES/8(I) (12 February 1946)

Figure 4. General Assembly resolution 1/8, "Question of refugees", A/RES/8(I) (12 February 1946)
Despite the huge effort of UN and IRO to protect and take care of refugees’ condition, in 1947 hundreds of thousands of victims of aggression remained displaced in camps as noted in General Assembly resolution, “International co-operation for the prevention of immigration which is likely to disturb friendly relations between nations” (A/RES/136(II) 1947). The assembly itself, and the Economic and Social Council, discussed the problem at numerous meetings. Repatriation or resettlement was the main point at issue in these debates. The countries of origin demanded repatriation and other Member states insisted that no one having adequate reason and knowing all the facts should be sent back to his country against his will (UN Weekly Bulletin, Two Years After the WWII 1947). It was clear, after World War II and the beginning of a new refugee crisis, that war and its effects stimulated migration, but in one of the Secretariat’s report the problem is tackled as a world-wide concern even in peacetime: a problem with profound economic, social and political effects. Since the war, the attitude of the host countries seemed more tolerant. The two main sources of emigrants in Europe in 1948 were Italy and the displaced persons’ in camps. (UN Weekly Bulletin, World Migration: its Causes and Effects 1948)

1947-1949: IRO and WWII refugees’ situations

During 1949, the refugee problem in Europe was still a very active issue. The United Nations kept working on this problem even while other new emergencies were born around the world. In two main General Assembly resolutions, both called “Discriminations practiced by certain States against immigrating labor and, in particular, against labor recruited from the rank of the same or similar categories.” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Action Concerning Refugees 1949)

IRO stressed one main point in this resolution: countries receiving refugees and displaced persons should accept all members of the family unit in which there was an economically independent person. As a result, IRO would not have difficulties in solving the refugee problem in a short time.(UN Weekly Bulletin, Action Concerning Refugees 1949)

Behind the words “the refugee problem”, one of the most tragic consequences of war and the misery of millions who at the end of 1947 were still living in camps emerges. The origins of the people that were living in the camps are many, including Armenians, Russians (displaced after WWI), Germans and Austrian refugees from Nazi persecution (displaced after 1939) and Spanish republicans. Most of the others were Europeans displaced by WWII: Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Yugoslavs, about a fifth are Jews. Of those in camps, 84 per cent are in Germany. During these post-war years, the IRO was engaged in recruiting cheap labor for capitalist concerns in such countries as the US, UK, France, Canada and certain Latin America States, instead of carrying out its primary mission which was to repatriate displaced persons. Making this charge at the Council’s discussion of the IRO report, on the resettlement of non-repatriable refugees and displaced persons, the USSR, went into considerable detail about conditions in Germany. While British and US authorities were doing their maximum to prevent repatriation to the USSR and the Eastern European countries, the USSR maintained that most displaced persons wished to return home. Far from wanting to be allowed to repatriate its citizens by force, the USSR only asked that refugees should not be forcibly held back and transformed into commodities on the cheap labor market. Following his statement, the USSR representative submitted a resolution which was designed to remove existing obstacles to a solution of the refugee problem. The resolution called for the prohibition of propaganda and agitation in camps which are either hostile to a Member country or designed to impede repatriation. Resettlement of those who do not desire to return to their homelands was to be settled by agreement with the governments of their countries of origin. This process is further analyzed in the third section of this research in the case of Armenian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Figure 5. Refugees: life must go on even though home may be a box car
of refugees” (A/RES/282(III); A/RES/315(IV) 1949), the Polish delegation asked for the help of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to expedite the ratification and application of the Convention by its members, and to promote its observance regarding the social relations of the workers and their families with the inhabitants of the region. Hence, no offensive distinctions would be established in regard to the former and they would enjoy all facilities for accommodation, food, education, recreation and medical assistance, both public and private, which are provided for the community. In the same year, a High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR) was established on January 1, 1951, at the end of a nine-meeting debate. In reaching this decision, the Committee rejected a proposal by the Byelorussian SSR to confine action on refugees to repatriation. When the discussion began on November 4, 1949, the committee had before it a French draft resolution according to which a High Commissioner’s Office would be constituted. The General Assembly would elect the High Commissioner. The main issues of the discussion were the definition of refugee, the question of who should appoint the High Commissioner and the latter’s authority to allocate funds for assistance (UN Weekly Bulletin, A High Commissioner for Refugees 1949).

1950-1951: UNHCR and 1951 Refugee Convention

The creation of the new agency UNHCR led to ambiguities in the refugee’s definition. The existing UN agencies started to have problems of overlap on their relief program. In the 1950s many new refugees’ situations emerged as well as the need for a new “Refugee Convention”. During 1950 the General Assembly prepared a “Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”, (A/RES/429(V) 1950) which started to revise the term “refugee”:

Since 1 August 1914 has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.

It was very important to specify that the new present draft convention didn’t apply to persons who were at present receiving protection or assistance by other UN agencies or organs (UN Weekly Bulletin, Towards New Refugee Convention 1951). The official new “Refugee Convention” was held in Geneva on July 28, 1951. The 1951 Refugee Convention was the key legal document that formed the basis of UNHCR work. It was approved by 145 States and provided a “Plan for Refugee Office”. The High Commissioner provided “international protection” for the refugees within his competence and sought “permanent solutions” to their problems. In detail, the resolution authorized the High Commissioner to promote international conventions and special agreements to improve the situation of refugees, to seek to obtain their admission to new countries and to obtain permission for the transfer of their personal assets, and help to coordinate in a general manner the efforts of organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Plan for Refugee Office Adopted 1951). In spite of the outstanding achievement of the IRO which has succeeded in finding new homes for about 1 million people, it is a most serious misapprehension to believe that the refugee problem has been more or less solved, and from 1951 on it will be UNHCR work. Between 1951 and 1952, IRO shut down. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee Problem not Yet Solved: High Commissioner submits First Report 1951)

1952-1956: Refugee Problem Not Solved Yet

Since WWII, each year, hundreds of thousands of people either voluntarily or through forced circumstances, eradicated their roots and migrated to the

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1 The third committee devoted seventeen meetings in whole or in part, to the discussion of the four items on its agenda relating to refugees and stateless persons: provisions for the functioning of the High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees, a draft resolution and statute proposed by the Economic and Social Council; the definition of the term refugee to be applied by the High Commissioner; the problems of material assistance to refugees; and the draft convention relating the status of refugees.
other side of the frontier of their own country. Many among them, after this
decision, were refugees and displaced persons. One of the resolutions adopted
by the Conference noted the limited mandate and inadequate budgetary
provisions made for the Office of the UNHCR and urged that the 17th
session of the General Assembly made more adequate, comprehensive and
permanent provisions for refugees, particularly in the fields of resettlement
re-establishment and material assistance. NGO’s role in the frame of United
Nations’ work was always more fundamental in terms of cooperation (UN

The refugees’ situation between 1952 and 1953 counted camps’ population at
still around 100 000 persons after eight years from Europe’s liberation. Most
of the people left in camps were either old, sick, and/or disabled persons.
The cost of resettling these people was high and varied from $300 to $1200.
There were probably 15 000 refugees of European origin in and around
Shanghai, perhaps 800 of them were difficult cases. The task was to develop
colonization projects and the voluntary agencies did that. Another in danger
category of refugees was in Trieste. There were around 4 300 refugees from
Yugoslavia and Russia that did not want to go back to their own lands (UN
Weekly Bulletin, The Refugee Problem as the High Commissioner Begins a
New Term 1953). During 1952, considering the size of the refugee issue all
around the world, the use of the words in UN official documents changed.
Indeed, they not only mentioned “repatriation” and “eventual resettlement”,
but started to use other kinds of words like “reintegration” and “permanent
solutions”. The first document containing these new concepts was the
General Assembly resolution “Integration of Refugees” (A/RES/638(VII)
1952) where an assimilation of the refugees in the countries of residence
was advanced and new financial investments in new kind of programs for
integration were adopted. The process required legal assistance, jobs, homes,
learning a new language, all complicated by the fact that the person seeking
integration is a refugee. The integration process continued in 1954 with a new
Refugee and Stateless Persons Convention which established minimum rights
for refugees under Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, the High Commissioner.
These minimum rights included the rights of asylum, work, education,
public relief and freedom of religion. A procedure for the issuance of travel
documents to refugees was also established (UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee

Looking at the main groups of refugees in the world is somehow like
surveying the history of the 20th century. It reveals the extent to which wars
and political changes have made their impact on the daily lives of millions
of ordinary people. There were the Armenian refugees from the Ottoman
Empire, the Russian “Whites” who emigrated after the 1917 revolution,
the Spanish Republicans who fled to France in 1939, and the Germans and
Austrians, particularly Jews, who escaped Nazism. There were also wartime
displaced persons and the German minorities expelled from surrounding
countries, and those who left because of the new regimes in their homelands.
In the Middle and Far East, there were Palestinian Arab refugees, Hindu

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1 The White movement and its military wing the White Army, also known as the White Guard or the
Whites, was a confederation of Anti-Communist forces against the Bolsheviks known as
the Reds in the Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1923 and continued operating as militarized
associations both outside and inside Russia almost until the Second World War.

1957-1967: New humanitarian emergencies around the world, the European crisis decreases

The refugees’ situation around the world were many and the Refugee profile in the middle of the 1950s started to have some variations. One of the most influential issues of these years was the Hungarian refugee problem after the 1956 revolution in Hungary. The emergency is described in the General Assembly resolution “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” (A/RES/1039(XI) 1957) where the UN appealed to the Government of Austria for assistance, considering the heavy impact of the situation on the United Nations Refugee Fund. The United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) reduced the number of non-settled refugees under the program to the point where most countries of asylum would be able to support these refugees without international assistance. In another General Assembly resolution called “International assistance to refugees within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” (A/RES/1166(XII) 1957), the UNHCR asked to intensify the United Nations Refugee Fund program to the fullest extent possible in order to achieve permanent solutions for the maximum number of refugees remaining in camps, without losing sight of the need to continue to seek solutions for the problems of refugees outside camps. The focus is always more on the “permanent solutions” that could be provided for refugees. Another new category of UNHCR mandate were the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. A heavy burden placed upon the Government of Hong Kong as reported in the resolution “Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong” (A/RES/1166(XII) 1957). The problem was of concern to the international community. Together with the Chinese refugees, within a year, “Refugees in Morocco and in Tunisia” (A/RES/1286(XIII) 1958) made their first appearance in the General Assembly resolutions. In view of the increasing number of new emergencies and thus refugees around the world, the United Nations decided to make a further world-wide effort to help resolve the world refugee problem. A “World Refugee Year” was proposed to begin in June 1959. In the General Assembly resolution “World Refugee Year”, (A/RES/1285(XIII) 1958) the main objectives were described:

“To focus interest on the refugee problem and to encourage additional financial contributions from Governments, voluntary agencies and the general public for its solution

To encourage additional opportunities for permanent refugee solutions, through voluntary repatriation, resettlement or integration, on a purely humanitarian basis and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the refugees themselves

Increased co-operation with the programs of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nation Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

Efforts to maintain the public interest aroused by the World Refugee Year in the solution of refugee problems

The Chinese Civil War was fought between forces following the Nationalist Kuomintang led government of the Republic of China, and forces loyal to the Communist Party of China. The civil war began in August 1927 and ended in 1950. It can generally be divided into two stages; from 1927 to 1937, and from 1946 to 1950. The war was a important turning point in Chinese history, where the Communist Party of China gained control of Mainland China and created the People’s Republic of China.
The further encouragement of financial contributions for international assistance to refugees including contributions from non-governmental organizations and the public.

The world refugee year was a tool to manage in a better way the incoming emergencies and the need for more funds from governments. This initiative helped achieve great progress, like the admission of additional numbers of refugees, including handicapped cases, to countries of resettlement and, as hoped, more funds. Other aims addressed by the refugee year such as the improvement of the legal status of refugees living on, or to be admitted to, their territory by acceding to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; the increase of the facilities for permanent refugee solutions through voluntary repatriation and assimilation within new national communities; and, for resettlement of refugees, providing further opportunities through the liberalization of immigration laws and regulations and through the inclusion of refugees in resettlement schemes. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees referred to the document of 1954 (Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees, A/RES/1388(XIV) 1959). The successive programmes for refugees were always more towards the concept of “permanency”. The Governments understood that the problem can’t be solved only with repatriation and that the idea of new settlements or integration in the existing settlements was necessary to overcome the never-ending emergencies (World Refugee Year, A/RES/1390(XIV) 1959).

In the meantime, while some refugees’ situation improved like in the case of refugees from Algeria and Morocco, other new emergencies arrived such as the “Problem raised by the situation of Angolan refugees in the Congo” (A/RES/1671 (XVI) 1961). Many efforts were made by the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), in co-operation with the United Nations in the Congo, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations, to provide those refugees with immediate assistance and to help them become self-supporting until their return to their own homes. The needs of the refugees cannot, in practice, be separated from those of the local population. Progress was achieved in the international protection of refugees and in the search for permanent solutions to refugee problems through voluntary repatriation, integration in countries of asylum or resettlement in other countries (Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, A/RES/1959 (XVIII) 1963).

Another initiative held in these years was the “Dedication of United Nations Day, 1966 to the cause of refugees”, A/RES/2038 (XX) 1965). A group of voluntary agencies decided to promote a fund-raising campaign from 24 to 31 October 1966, to benefit refugees mainly in Africa and Asia. Africa was one of the new emergencies of UNHCR in the 1960s when the resolution “Assistance to refugees in Africa” was adopted (A/RES/2040 (XX) 1965). Major refugee problems continued to arise in various parts of Africa. African States showed a continuing interest in the problems of refugees by generously receiving refugees in a truly humanitarian spirit and by acceding in increasing numbers to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Considering the new number of refugees in new parts of the world, a “Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” (A/RES/2198 (XXI) 1966) was needed. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, covered only persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951. New refugee situations that arose since the Convention was adopted implied that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention. The situation of the refugees in 1967 changed. It went from the emergencies of European refugees which were largely resolved, to the African, Chinese, Hungarian and Palestinian emergencies. The refugees are spread all over the world for various reasons. By 1967, an architectural plan for aid in the first phases of the camps was elaborated. The guidelines are the ones provided by the UN charter written after WWII. The other planning principles that were developed by UN are explained in the next paragraph.

\^ Due to the ongoing unsolved situations of refugees around the world, UNHCR mandate was prolonged. For further information, refer to “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, A/RES/1959 (XVIII) 1963.”

\^ The draft Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was submitted to the General Assembly after its consideration by the Economic and Social Council, so that the Secretary-General might be authorized to open the Protocol for accession by Governments within the shortest possible time.
The emergencies of refugees and migration from rural areas to cities happened in almost the same period and the United Nations did not have proper programs for the first phase of the emergencies. The main sources about housing and planning of the UN are contained in the “Housing and Town Planning” resolutions of the General Assembly, started in 1946. The other main principles used in order to phase the planning emergencies were the ones contained in the UN charter. In the post-war years, urban practice, the doctrine of CIAM and the Modernist architectural movement could have established housing and town planning principles. The reconstruction of post war cities and the consequent emergencies were seen as an opportunity to realize the principles of the Charter of Athens. CIAM architects and urban planners wanted to induce social and architectural transformation through modern architectural expression. The support of governments, public authorities and investments was essential to realize large scale plan developments and transformations. The theoretical approach led to the loss of any “natural means to create conditions in which cities might morph and adapt to the complexity of the built environment, and hence, often became the storage depots of urban disintegration” (Bittner, Hackenbroich and Vockler 2010). The discourse on human settlements which developed in the 1970s and was concretized in Habitat I in 1974 was based on the reconstruction of post war cities rather than addressing the emergency of refugee camps. The latter was not tackled in the discussions of urban planners, but was the main concern of specialized agencies dealing with the urgency of these situations in a program approach.

Considering the magnitude and gravity of housing problems in various parts of the world and the recommendations already made by the special meeting on emergency housing problems convened by the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, the GA decided to make a new Commission in charge of these problems. The tasks of this commission were the organization and unification of international exchanges of information relating to town planning principles, building techniques and climatic, economic, financial, legal and legislative aspects of housing and town planning questions. The commission had to consider the possibility of an international conference of experts to advise on the need for establishing an international mechanism to compare such information, lay down guidelines for new technical research on materials, methods of use and prefabrication, and to define standards capable of general application (Housing and Town Planning (CIAM). A/RES/53(1) 1946). Again in 1959 the discourse continued in the resolution “Low-cost Housing” (A/RES/1393 (XIV) 1959) where the GA established that the appropriate organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies considered the requests of Governments for technical assistance in this field. Member States should have, as part of their national plans, to develop or accelerate programs to promote the construction of low-cost housing and stimulate active participation by the people in these programs through self-help, mutual aid, cooperation and other similar measures. Collection and dissemination of information in the field of housing was fundamental, especially the information concerning technical and material needs of all countries with housing problems and concerning the relevant experience gained by other countries which might be able to assist others. The importance of adequate housing, community facilities and services began to be acknowledged as a human right. This would lead to a raise in the standards of living, especially for the lower income groups in the congested urban areas as reported in “Low-cost housing and related community facilities” (A/RES/1508 (XV) 1960). Until 1962, the situation about town planning inside the United Nations was not yet fully developed. It is only in 1973 that human settlements started to be analyzed, in preparation for the first international conference about them (United Nations Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements A/RES/3128(XXVIII) 1973). However, the discourse about settlements continued in parallel for many years with the one about refugee camps but without involving them directly.

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1 The Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne (CIAM), or International Congresses of Modern Architecture, was an organization founded in 1928 and dissolved in 1959, responsible for a series of events and congresses arranged across Europe by the most prominent architects of the time, with the objective of spreading the principles of the Modern Movement focusing in all the main domains of architecture (such as landscape, urbanism, industrial design, and many others).

20 The Charter of Athens was an urban planning document published by the Swiss architect, Le Corbusier in 1943. The work was based upon Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse (Radiant City) book of 1935 and urban studies undertaken by the Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in the early 1930s. The Charter got its name from the location of the fourth CIAM conference in 1933. The Charter had a huge impact on urban planning after World War II.
Palestine made its first appearance in the UN resolutions of 1947 in “Future government of Palestine” (A/RES/181(II)A-B 1947). Here, the General Assembly discussed the transitional period in between the British mandate and the Palestinian independence. Palestine by this time was already considered a threat to the peace. In order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council supplemented the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which were assigned to it by this resolution (UN Weekly Bulletin, The Problem of Palestine: review of attempts to settle conflicting claims 1946).

The question of Palestine in the beginning was a matter of how to regulate the immigration of Jewish displaced persons after 1945. Dr. Magnes [Jewish IHUD Association] suggested three principles upon which Jewish immigration could be encouraged: the first one was to permit Jewish immigration up to parity with Arabs; the second to regulate Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine; eventually, the third was to enlarge the economic absorptive capacity through a great development plan which would be of benefit to all inhabitants of Palestine. In the first stage of immigration, a program was developed as a response to the displacement of one hundred thousand persons. The second stage was immigration up to parity with the Arab countries (UN Weekly Bulletin, Committee Completes Evidence in Palestine: Arab States to be heard in Lebanon 1947).

Dr. Simon, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement said that immigration to Palestine should have continued on a larger scale. The General Assembly took on immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, addressed a special statement to the members of the Secretariat assigned to work with the Special Committee on Palestine. This committee is called upon to suggest proposals for the solutions of one of the most delicate and complicated political problems of our times.

“Jewish remnants of the victims of fascism must not be penalized and allowed to continue their sufferings because of political entanglement in Palestine. If bi-nationalism were set as the political aim, it would minimize to no small extent the opposition by Arabs to Jewish immigration.” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Committee Completes Evidence in Palestine: Arab States to be heard in Lebanon 1947)

Figure 11. First Official Map of Palestine Partition in Resolution 181, 1947

The Palestinian refugee profile 1946-1967

1947-1948: Question of Palestine partition

The United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises
According to the plan proposed by the majority, Palestine was to be divided into an Arab State, a Jewish State and the city of Jerusalem. The Arab and the Jewish states would become independent after a transitional period of two years beginning on September 1, 1947. Before their independence could be recognized, they each needed to adopt a constitution, make to the UN a declaration containing certain guarantees and sign a treaty by which a system of economic union of Palestine is created. The United Kingdom during the transitional period had to take such preparatory steps for the execution of the scheme recommended and carry out the following measures:

“Admit into the proposed Jewish State 150,000 Jewish immigrants at a uniform monthly rate, 30,000 of whom on are humanitarian grounds. Should it be a transitional period for 2 years, Jewish immigration shall be allowed at the rate of 60,000 per year.

The restriction introduced under the authority of the Palestine Order in Council will not apply to the transfer of land within the border of the proposed Jewish State.” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Majority Recommends Partition of Palestine: Three Committee Members propose Federal State 1947)

The Arab states without exception opposed the majority’s recommendations. Several representatives spoke with sympathy about the plight of the Jews but did not agree to the partition. The Jewish State should be such as to “ensure the development of Jewish life in Palestine in the interests of the present inhabitants and of future generations, including the refugees from Europe (Alberto Ulloa, Perú representative). The Arab states (Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq) strongly opposed the proposals for partition13 (UN Weekly Bulletin, First Reactions to Palestine Partition Proposals 1947).

13 General Noury As-Said stressed that there is no quarrel between Arabs and Jews, but rather between Arabs and “the political Zionists who want to dominate Palestine and other parts of the Arab world”. Camille Chamoun (Lebanon) called upon the UN to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Palestinian Arabs as vigorously as it had defended the rights of Korea and Greece. (UN Weekly Bulletin, First Reactions to Palestine Partition Proposals 1947).
In order to really understand the nature of the Palestine situation, an Ad Hoc Committee for Palestine went to Palestine. When the Committee came back, it offered its solutions. The majority, seven of the eleven members of the Committee favored partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem, linked by the economic union. The Arab States called for a free and independent Arab state, one which would be democratic, would respect fundamental human rights, and freedoms and the legitimate rights and interests of minorities. Two sub committees examined in detail the partition plan recommended by the majority of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)\(^{14}\) and the Arab proposals for an independent unitary state. Meanwhile a conciliation group, attempted without success to find a solution acceptable for both Arabs and Jews. Eventually, the Ad Hoc Committee rejected the Arab proposals, and submitted to the Assembly the recommendation for partition. The Arab representatives declared that the decision was illegal, immoral and contrary to the Charter. As a reaction, the representatives of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt rose and left the Assembly hall. The new plan should have come into force not later than October 1, 1948, but it was never realized (UN Weekly Bulletin, …To Consider further the Future Government of Palestine 1948).

There were many opinions about the partition and about the first years of this transitional period. During the meetings, all the countries of the United Nations had the possibility to express their ideas and make proposals to be discussed in the next assembly\(^{15}\) (UN Weekly Bulletin, Accord on Implementing Palestine Partition: US and USSR agree on compromise Proposals 1947).

\(^{14}\) The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created on 15 May 1947. United Kingdom government requested that the General Assembly “make recommendations under article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine”. The General Assembly adopted the recommendation to set up the UNSCOP to investigate the cause of the conflict in Palestine, and, if possible, find a solution. UNSCOP was composed of representatives of 11 nations.

\(^{15}\) The Soviet Union representative Semen K. Tsarapkin thought that a certain transitional period is necessary to prepare for the changes in the structure of Palestine. Furthermore, it was of the utmost importance to determine by whom, when, and how these changes would be carried out. The UK could not undertake the task as it had failed in its Mandate. Palestine should be administered during this transitional period by the Security Council through a Special Commission, composed of representatives of the Members of the Security Council. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Accord on Implementing Palestine Partition: US and USSR agree on compromise Proposals 1947).

Election regulations, for example, in each State should be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the UN Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election were persons over eighteen years of age who are: Palestinian citizens residing in that State and Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State\(^{16}\). The boundaries were perfectly described for both Palestinian and Jewish States in both text and maps. Despite the near end of the Mandatory Power of the UK, the situation in Palestine was getting worse with the complete opposition of the Arabs towards the partition proposed the year before. Violence and disorder were increasing and a truce was needed as soon as possible. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Immediate End to Palestine Violence Called for: Security Council Convokes Assembly and Arranges Truce Meeting 1948) The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the principles mentioned before was written on 1 October 1948. It would have remained in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, with the power of the Trusteeship Council to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at any date. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine were: customs union; joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate; operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce; joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation; access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power.

The situation between the two populations was tense. Jews and Arabs needed to reach an agreement\(^{17}\). What the General Assembly should try to do was to lead to conclude such an agreement and, therefore, make a satisfactory solution reachable. (UN Weekly Bulletin, General Assembly Reexamines Palestine Problem: Opening Session Reflects Gravity of Issues 1948) The citizenship was also a relevant issue. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, resided in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem would have become upon the recognition of independence, citizens of the State in which they were resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.

\(^{16}\) Dr. Arce (Argentina, President of the Assembly) observed that had they done so before, possibly this session would not have been necessary. However, they had preferred to fight and to destroy those elements indispensable to the progress and welfare of Palestine, but there was still time to reach an understanding.

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\(^{17}\) The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter II
United States and many other Members hoped that the general world opinion would influence the Arabs to give the Assembly’s recommendation of November 29 a chance to work. But the events didn’t turn out that way. The truce itself did not ensure the continuance of governmental authority in Palestine. The assembly considered the establishment of a temporary trusteeship for providing a government, and essential public services in Palestine pending further negotiations. The truce and the trusteeship together envisaged a military and political standstill to save human lives (UN Weekly Bulletin, Trusteeship or Partition? Political committee hears Conflicting Views 1948). It was an “inescapable conclusion”, the Commission reported, that unless forces adequate to restore and maintain law and order were provided, administrative chaos, starvation, strife, violence and bloodshed would follow the termination of the Mandate. The report pointed out that immediate attention must also be given to a number of urgent economic and financial problems. The statistics of the “casualties” in Palestine were growing in a serious way and reached a total of 6 187 deaths (UN Weekly Bulletin, Palestine Commission Stresses Urgent Problems: Submits Special Food Report to Security Council 1948). The end of the Mandate occurred at midnight in the morning of May 15, the 26 years old British Mandate administration came to an end. Immediately afterward, a proclamation by the Jewish authorities of a new state was announced. At the same time, Arab armed forces advanced into the Holy Land. In this period, two new UN positions in Palestine were added: A United Nations Mediator for Palestine and a Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, Folke Bernadotte and Harold Evans respectively (UN Weekly Bulletin, Assembly Authorizes Mediator for Palestine: “we have done what we could” - President Arce 1948).

The principles stated above were elaborated as a base for the creation of the new two States but after the end of the British mandate in 1948 the First Arab–Israeli War started in Palestine, putting in direct conflict the State of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states. One of the major consequences of this war was around 700 000 Palestinian refugees, a completely new refugee profile compared to those of WWII. The situation of these refugee in the first period was terrible as written in one of the UN weekly bulletins:

“On a barren, wind-swept hillside above the ancient town of Jericho thousands of refugees are huddled in tents, caves and other improvised shelters. Many of them, including women and children, are sick, undernourished and in urgent need of medical care. Their living conditions are of the most primitive; their only drinking water comes from a sluggish stream which also serves to wash clothes and bodies. Snow on the mountains and rain in the valleys combine to make the lives of the refugees even more miserable. This scene is multiplied many times in and around Palestine where an estimated 600000 refugees, most of them Palestinian Arabs, left homeless and destitute by the war in the Holy Land, are desperately in need of large scale aid.” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Plight of Palestine Refugees: UN aid plan in operation 1949)
The refugees’ conditions in 1948 were terrible, and official refugee camps were still not present. Even the boundaries between the two States were not clear, leaving people in a sort of no-man’s land and with an identity issue. The General Assembly adopted, in November 1948, its first resolution on aiding Palestine refugees. In response to a report by Ralph Bunche, Acting Mediator for Palestine, which stated “the situation of the refugees is now critical”, the GA established the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR). During its one year of existence, UNRPR provided emergency assistance to refugees from Palestine during the most critical phase. In the General Assembly Resolution “Palestine - Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator” (A/RES/194(III) 1948) the United Nations promoted a “peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine”. The freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air was accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine. The “wish to return” issue was mentioned as well. The Conciliation Commission wanted to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations. The Palestine situation in this first period after Israel’s creation was very critical. The reports of the UN Mediator (A/RES/194(III) 1948) wrote about some progress but the truth was that thousands of people were displaced in their own country, former Palestine, and thousands more spread in adjacent countries.

“Refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.” (A/RES/194(III) 1948)

The representatives of Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt called for a just and equitable solution but did not comment in detail on the Mediator’s suggestions. Egypt stressed the urgency of the refugee problem. The strongest attack on partition and the establishment of the Israeli State came from the representative of Pakistan.

“The immigration of hundreds of thousands of foreigners who intend to act as masters of the Holy Land… together with the fact that the inhabitants of that land have been forced to flee from a land which is theirs by right.”

At the end of 1948 more than a half million Arabs of Palestine were without homes and living in poor conditions. “Men, women, children had been forced to leave their native soil, to flee the terrorists who were acting in an outrageous fashion in Palestine. It was the inalienable right of those who had fled to be returned to their native soil” said the Egyptian representative. (UN Weekly Bulletin, The Problem of Palestine 1948) The exodus of the Palestinian population was ongoing and the first refugee camps started to appear in the neighboring Arab countries. The International Red Cross was the main organization together with other UN agencies to provide relief at the arrival of the refugees. The camps were still not present, they opened officially between the end of 1949 and 1950, together with the UNRWA establishment. The Conciliation Commission needed to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations. Until the end of the war between Israel and the Arab States, the Palestinian refugee’s situation worsened. The organization of this part of the emergency was very difficult. Together with the help of the International Red Cross, the United Nations tried to provide help for the displaced persons, building temporary refugee camps, while the displaced were moving and trying to reach other countries.

The first resolution about the tragic situation of Palestinian people was “Assistance to Palestine Refugees”, A/RES/212(III) 1948). The alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestinian refugees was one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land. Based on the Acting Mediator’s recommendation, a sum of approximately 29,500,000 USD was required to provide relief for 500 000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949. An additional amount of approximately 2,500,000 USD was also required for administrative and local operational expenses. These were the financial funds that they assumed were needed in the first period.
The Secretary-General took all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestinian refugees and to establish such administrative organization. He invited the assistance of the appropriate agencies of several Governments, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, the international Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies. The participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan was impartial as impartiality was one of the main principles of humanitarian assistance. A Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees was needed, to whom the Secretary General delegated the responsibility of the overall planning and implementation of the relief program. A Palestine Commission was established in 1948. Their discussions had all manner of repercussions on the tense situation in Palestine. For these reasons the discussions were held in closed meetings 18.

1949: First phase of humanitarian action and Political Armistices

On 19 November 1949, the General Assembly unanimously approved a voluntary relief plan for Palestine refugees proposed in the resolution “Assistance to Palestine Refugees” officially, A/RES/212(III) 1948). Under this plan the Secretary General was authorized to advance immediately the sum of 5,000,000 USD from the Working Capital Fund of the Organization towards a total of 29,500,000 USD over nine months. The distribution and field operations of the relief project were attributed to: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends Service Committee The Palestine Relief Organization was handling all purchases, and the collection and shipment of supplies. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Plight of Palestine Refugees: UN Aid Plan in Operation 1949). Many governments had generously responded to the appeal of resolution 212 (III) (A/RES/212(III) 1948), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to contribute in kind or in funds to “the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees”. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends Service Committee gave a fundamental contribution to this humanitarian cause by discharging the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief supplies and the general care of the refugees (“Assistance to Palestine refugees”, A/RES/302(IV) 1949). Despite the efforts of the UN and the other agencies, the situation of the Palestinian refugees was still in a phase of deep emergency. In 1949, a tragic event further shook the fragile equilibrium of the Middle East when one of the new UN’s personalities Folke Bernadotte, new Mediator for Palestine, was killed by a Zionist group in Jerusalem during the first phase of the Rodhe’s agreements. The latter had as an aim to put a stop to the war between Israel and the Arab countries unsuccessfully (UN Weekly Bulletin, Further Efforts for Palestine Settlements 1949). In the same period, the UN invited Dr. Bayard Dodge to give an opinion on the Palestinian refugee camps in the Arab countries. Dr. Bayard Dodge had a long and distinguished career in the Middle East. He gave a picture of the living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps. Dr. Dodge, who had retired recently from the Presidency of the American University of Beirut (1948), assisted in the initial organization of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. He continued to provide his services as a special adviser.

“As I walked through the camps and talked with the people, I learned that many of them had fled from seaport towns, packed like sardines in small vessels. …All these people were drying their tents and clothing after five days of rain. I found two and often three families crowded into a single tent, and 150 people were still living in caves. There were no proper hygienic arrangements, and the drainage was contaminating drinking water and collecting in pools. When I asked the men why they did not pitch their tents further apart and dig proper drains, they said that it was not worth, while as they expected to return home very soon. The women lacked change of clothing, and such things as soap, towels and fuel for cooking their scanty rations. Thousands of children were idle, learning bad habits and making life difficult for their mothers. In the Tyre region alone four hundred babies had already born and 350 more were expected soon. Many of the new born infants must be wrapped in newspapers for lack of cloth

The tasks of the Palestine Commission were mainly: Establish the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states and of the city of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the Assembly’s resolution; Assume responsibility progressively for the administration of Palestine as the Mandatory Power evacuates, pending establishment of the independent states; Establish Provisional Councils of Government in the new states and direct their activities during the transitional period; Appoint a Preparatory Economic Commission for paving the way for the Economic Union of the Jewish and Arab states and for the Joint Economic Board envisaged in the Assembly’s resolution (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Palestine Commission: Five Members’ Tackle Anxious Problems 1948). 18

18 The tasks of the Palestine Commission were mainly: Establish the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states and of the city of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the Assembly’s resolution; Assume responsibility progressively for the administration of Palestine as the Mandatory Power evacuates, pending establishment of the independent states; Establish Provisional Councils of Government in the new states and direct their activities during the transitional period; Appoint a Preparatory Economic Commission for paving the way for the Economic Union of the Jewish and Arab states and for the Joint Economic Board envisaged in the Assembly’s resolution (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Palestine Commission: Five Members’ Tackle Anxious Problems 1948).
or layettes. I found dysentery rampant in the camps, while smallpox had broken out in several places. Malaria will be another problem when the warm weather arrives." (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Middle East Aid 1949)

While the situation in the refugee camps was hardly improving, the war continued. The first armistice was signed on 24 February 1949, when Egypt and Israel signed a truce after 42 days of intensive discussions. Direct negotiations under the UN chairmanship had thus resulted in solving an obstinate military problem. It had also opened the prospect of a final settlement of the political problem in the near future. It was hoped that this first positive achievement would soon lead to a final settlement of the Palestine problem. "This is a good example of the kind of influence the UN is best fitted to exercise during the present severe tension in the world— that is to act as a mediating and conciliating influence for peace" said Secretary General Trygve Lie. Even before the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement

Figure 14. (Top left) Palestinian refugees at Khan Yunis camp south of Gaza, near the Egyptian border. (Top right) Refugees, with all the household goods they were able to save, moving into the camp. (Below left) 3000 tons of wheat flour which arrived at Beirut from the United States, being loaded for transportation to camps in Lebanon, Syria, Northern Palestine. (Below right) Mr. Stanton Griffis, Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, explains the project to a Mullah (village leader) at a Lebanese camp.

Figure 15. (Left) Headquarters of the United Nations Conciliation Commission at Jerusalem. (Right) Israeli and Arab soldiers mount guard outside Commission Headquarters.

Figure 16. Signatures and seal of seven religious leaders in the Middle East on a joint appeal for continued United Nations relief for the Palestinian refugees in a letter to the Secretary-General dated May 12.
was signed, Trans-Jordan and Lebanon, responding to the Acting Mediator’s invitation, had begun armistice negotiations with Israel. Saudi Arabia replied that it would accept the decisions which had or might be adopted by the Arab League, and Iraq expressed its intention to accept armistice terms agreed upon by Palestine’s Arab neighbors (UN Weekly Bulletin, Milestone to Peace in Palestine: the achievement of Egypt-Israel Armistice 1949). The second cease-fire agreement was signed by Trans-Jordan and Israel on March 11, ten day after negotiations began in Rhodes under the chairmanship of Acting Mediator Dr. Ralph J. Bunche. Meanwhile better progress was being made at Ras En-Naqura in Lebanon, where armistice negotiations had been going on between representatives of Israel and Lebanon during March (UN Weekly Bulletin, Further Progress in Palestine: new cease-fire and Armistice Agreements 1949).

In 1949 the main organization responsible for the refugees in these two years was the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), which was suffering all the time from lack of funds (UN Weekly Bulletin, Further Aid for Palestine Refugees 1949). By June 1949, UNRPR was feeding and taking care of 940 000 persons in the refugee camps of the Middle East, with foreseeable resources totaling less than 25,000,000 USD. In the beginning it was expected that the refugees would not be more than half a million. The Secretary General underlined that feeding and care levels extended to refugees were “dangerously low”, and that the situation was now rendered more critical by the necessity of extending UNRPR mandate beyond August 31 1949 (UN Weekly Bulletin, Continued Aid Urged for Palestine Refugees 1949). On April 27 1949, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine began a new phase of its work with a meeting in Lausanne. During the meeting, refugees and territorial issues were discussed to find an equilibrium that would maintain peace in Palestine. the Israeli and Arab delegations submitted proposals regarding the refugees question. Israel proposed that if the Gaza area was incorporated into Israel it would accept the entire Arab population of the area, inhabitants and refugees, as citizens of Israel. The Arab proposal was instead advocating for immediate return of the refugees who came from the territories under Israeli authority at that time, and which formed part of the Arab zone in the General Assembly’s partition resolution: Western Galilee, Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, Jaffa, Jerusalem and the coast line north of Gaza. This proposal was turned down by Israel. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Bringing Peace to Palestine: Lausanne Negotiations Reviewed 1949) In the same month the General Assembly, after a long debate, accepted Israel into the United Nations (UN Weekly Bulletin, Assembly’s Welcome to Israel 1949).

By the end of the first phase of the emergency, UNRPR was dissolved and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established and recognized officially by the General Assembly resolution on December 8 (A/RES/302) to deal with the Palestinian refugees. The agency, in collaboration with local Governments, was created to assist Palestinian refugees through direct relief and work programs, as the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East recommended in its first interim report. The present United Nations Relief for Palestine was to continue its work until April 1, 1950, when it would transfer its assets and liabilities to the new agency as agreed by the Secretary-General and the Director of UNRPR. The resolution figured a total expenditure over 18 months of 54,900,000 USD. Approximately 33,700,000 USD were required to finance the direct relief and works program through 1950, of which 20,200,000 USD was required for direct relief and 13,500,000 USD for the works program. Continued assistance to Palestinian refugees was necessary to prevent starvation and distress, and to ensure peace and stability; constructive measures should be taken at an early date toward terminating international assistance for relief. (UN Weekly Bulletin, A Works program for Palestine Refugees 1949)

In the next pages is showed through an UNRWA’s publication, the approach of the agency towards the Palestinian refugees during the first years of emergency. “From camps to Homes: Progress and Aims of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” is published in 1951 by UNRWA in Beirut and the United Nations Department of Public Information in New York.

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99 All the armistice agreements were very similar and incorporated the same principles: The Security Council’s injunction against resort to military force to settle the Palestine question shall be scrupulously respected; No aggressive action shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or armed forces of either party; Each party’s right to security and freedom from fear of attack shall be fully respected; The armistice is accepted as an “indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace”. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Further Progress in Palestine: new cease-fire and Armistice Agreements 1949)
Figure 17. UNRWA’s publication “From camps to Homes: Progress and Aims of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East”
THE REFUGEES

The Refugees are mostly peasants who used to form their own small plots of land. But there are also craftsmen and merchants among them, as well as a handful of professional men and women.

Mahmud’s present attitude is quite simpler. He wants to go back to his small home and plot of land. But, while insisting on this right and the right to compensation for his losses, he does not want the demoralizing idleness of his present life to continue. He wants to earn a living in his country of refuge and to provide for his children.

The location and size of the camps was chosen to facilitate relief. Often camps are placed in a region where work cannot be found. To earn a living, half the refugees will have to move to other countries.

THE CAMP LIFE

A camp usually consists of old army tents, each one housing an average family of five.

But when the Korean war made it increasingly difficult to get replacements for worn out tents, the Agency urged and assisted the Arabs to build themselves huts of mud or stone.

A camp may also consist of disused barracks divided by sacking into small cubicles, one to a family, with little or no privacy and just enough floor space for sleeping. In all cases, there is a proper water supply. Larger camps are provided with schools, clinics, food distribution and welfare centers.

Often, whole villages took flight together from Palestine and re-mixed grouped in camps, their former mayors becoming the natural link with the United Nations administration.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>THE REFUGEES LIVE</th>
<th>IN TENTS</th>
<th>IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises
When delay in reaching a political settlement of the Palestine problem made long term assistance necessary, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was created.

Rations ensuring a minimum of 2,600 calories a day per person are distributed monthly. Refugees utilize them in the traditional manner, baking their own pancakes like unleavened bread.

Works

Great efforts were made by UNRWA to provide work and pay for the refugees. But available funds were only sufficient to provide employment for a small minority, without producing lasting economic effects.

Nevertheless the refugees... made roads...

...planted trees...

A small beginning in the immense task of reforestation which could bring the barren hills back to life.

Over 100,000 people along the Israeli border have not lost their homes and cannot be considered as refugees, but they have lost their source of livelihood and also need help.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter II

United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises

Made materials and clothes for their own use...

And equipment for use in the work of the agency.

Yet, at best not more than 10% of the able-bodied men obtained temporary employment.

Education

The devotion of refugee teachers and the assistance of UNESCO made it possible to organize emergency education facilities.

At present, with the help of Near East Governments and existing institutions, 42% of school age children are being educated. Funds are not available to increase this percentage, but it compares favourably with the average school attendance in most countries of the region.

There are still over 130,000 refugee children who cannot be educated for lack of funds.
THE YOUNG AND THE WEAK

Children, pregnant women and old people receive milk, and supplementary meals on medical advice, with the help of UNICEF. Food for this programme often comes from the donations of voluntary organizations.

THE SICK

Medical treatment under the technical supervision of the World Health Organization is given free to refugees in 81 clinics and 1,780 hospital beds.

Most of the Doctors are Palestinian.
The agency provides supplies and services for a population equivalent to that of Washington DC or Brussels. This population is scattered over 100,000 square miles in five different countries. UNRWA distributes 11,000 tons of food each month.

But relief alone leads nowhere. It is demoralizing and wasteful at a time when the Arab states have their own social problems. A rising standard of living demands economic development of labour and technicians. The refugees can play a part far from being a burden; they can become an asset.
They are young

Nearly half the refugees are under fifteen.

They are adaptable

UNRWA teaches these and other trades to more than 4000, boys and girls. All cannot be taught for lack of funds. Yet the Near East needs them all.

They have initiative

Some 100 families settled down on the site of a Roman village, beside a ruined dam, in the Syrian plain. They built new homes with the old stones and rented nearby fields which they now till. Dilly, asleep for centuries, now revives.

Hundreds of refugees submitted plans and obtained loans from UNRWA to make a new start in their old trades, such as...

A machine work shop

The problem is not one of hundreds, but of tens of thousands.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter II

Within a few months, the beneficiaries of loans came off relief. But to be successful, such new ventures need an expanding economy.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT...

Carpentry

A TRACTOR HIRE SERVICE

Here the interest of the Near East countries and the refugees may coincide. Economic development affords opportunities for all.

DEMANDS TRAINING

ECONOMIC development implies more and better trained workers. A number of refugees — unfortunately too small — receive not only professional but technical training from the Agency and other institutions.

In this Benedictine school, in Tripoli, Lebanon, physics, mechanics and carpentry are taught to young Lebanese and refugees.

The Near East Governments are all increasing educational facilities and the Agency is always ready to co-operate. The top floor of this secondary school in Hebron, near Jerusalem, was built by Palestinian refugees.

A campaign against adult illiteracy is fast spreading throughout the Near East. Each one who learns is pledged to teach another.
**BETTER HEALTH**

Amongst the many forms of technical assistance put at the disposal of the countries of the Near East, one of the most useful is the training of nearly two hundred nurses, laboratory technicians, X-ray technicians, assistant pharmacists and midwives in the Agency's medical units and laboratories.

The Agency has also trained malaria technicians, malaria being one of the greatest obstacles to the development of many areas.

In Jordan an Agency laboratory is producing monthly fifty thousand doses of TAB, antirheumatic and smallpox vaccines, available to its own medical department and to Government Health services.

Trachoma and acute conjunctivitis, dysentery, malaria and, in some areas, bilharzia still sap the energy of the majority of the population.

**MORE WATER**

If the standard of living is to improve, the land must grow more food.

Although the main rivers have to some extent been harnessed for the purpose of irrigation, much remains to be done. Every possible source of water must be exploited.

The Jordanian Government is building small weirs in the upper reaches of the rivers to prevent the water from running off too swiftly.

Where there are no rivers, wells are being sunk. In the Jordan valley this operation was repeated sixteen times before non-brackish water could be found.

In regions with a rainfall below 8", which account for the greater part of the Near East, irrigation is essential if the farmer is to rise above the minimum subsistence level.
...MORE

FOR

THE

VILLAGE

MODEL houses have been devised which can be built of local material by unskilled workers and — if the dome type is used — require no timber.

In the Jordan Valley, near a well with enough water for both human consumption and irrigation, a site has been chosen where a village is being built for thirty-six families.

HOMES

FOR

THE

TOWN

HOUSES are also needed in urban districts. This experimental house, to hold four families, has been built in the suburbs of Damascus.

A joint Government-UNRWA project is in progress in Amman, the fast-expanding capital of Jordan.

These houses are enough in advance of local standards to provide an incentive without arousing jealousy.
Better Communications

This port, Aqaba on the Red Sea, and the port of Latakia, on the Mediterranean, are to be developed under plans prepared by the Jordanian and Syrian Governments respectively.

A number of great projects are in the making which can transform the economy of whole regions. Some are being undertaken or studied independently by the Near East Governments, while others are being realised with the assistance of the U.N. or member Nations, or by means of loans from the International Bank.

Technicians are already at work on the Litani development scheme, which will provide water for irrigation and power in Lebanon.

Other current projects (see map) are:

1. Aqaba dam extension project
2. Small development project
3. Jordan Valley development & power scheme
4. Litani River rice irrigation
5. Gharb marshes reclamation
6. Fezzan & Tassili land control, etc.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter II

United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises

1950: Definition of Palestinian Refugee and UNRWA establishment

At this point of the emergency of Palestinian refugees, there still no proper definition of a Palestinian refugee.

Who are the Palestinian refugees?

In 1950 one of UNRWA's first tasks was to define who is a Palestinian refugee. The interim report of the first director proposed that “for working purposes, the Agency has decided that a refugee is a needy person, who as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood”. Eventually this was made more specific, and the following definition is now used by the Agency:

“A Palestine refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition and the direct descendants of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are: registered with UNRWA; living in the area of UNRWA operations; and in need” (UNRWA, 1991, 6).

After the establishment of UNRWA, actions were implemented directly at a local level and the two main programs of relief and work started. Howard Kennedy was the first Director of UNRWA. The problem of the Palestinian refugees remains acute. Almost 750,000 Arabs fled from their homes on the Israeli side of the armistice and took refuge in neighboring Arab lands. Tens of thousands are now living in temporary camps. Others found shelter in caves, monasteries, schools and abandoned buildings. Also, some 17,000 Jewish refugees chose to flee from their homes around Jerusalem and in territories on the Arab side of the armistice lines. For the past 15 months, relief for the refugees has been provided by UNRPR with the assistance of UNICEF, various specialized agencies and voluntary organizations (UN Weekly Bulletin, New Director begins work for Refugee Palestinians 1950). The primary task of UNRWA was to transfer refugees from relief to work projects. Of the total 900,000 refugees, only 25 percent were in sufficiently good health to be employed on works projects. It was planned to start projects contributing to the development of national resources in the area, such as land terracing, road building, irrigation and the conservation of water. No government had yet contributed any significant sum. The Agency's activities were for a time financed by loans from the United Nations Working Fund, and a loan of one million pounds from the IRO. In 1949, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria contributed more than 6,000,000 USD for financing supplies and services. UNRWA headquarters were established in Beirut (UN Weekly Bulletin, Relief Works Project Aims to Solve Middle East Refugee Problem 1950). The program to provide temporary work for Palestinian refugees improved productivity in the regions where the refugees resided, thus marking the start of larger developments. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees inaugurated prosecution of the program of work relief for refugees. That was done to shift more responsibility on the shoulders of the individual governments and to ensure that these programs included projects which added value to the productivity of the host country. A fund was created, not exceeding 10,000,000 USD by the governments which were called upon to appoint their representatives, to form the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, available for allocation to the completion of approved pilot demonstration projects (UN Weekly Bulletin, Plans for New Era in Middle East 1950). The work of UNRWA started officially on May 1, 1950 as promised by the Director Howard Kennedy. In Lebanon, the Agency's representatives conferred with government departments, and the work started at the beginning of July. Road construction and forestry were the main tasks allocated to refugees.

“Mr. Kennedy reported that the able-bodied refugees generally want to work. The Agency distributes food, including milk provided by UNICEF. Clinics are operated for pregnant mothers, and about 30,000 children are being taught by 700 teachers, who are recruited from among the refugees themselves. There is no adult education, but there are vocational projects, such as carpentry and shoe repair shops, where the refugees are paid for the work they produce. Referring to various “strikes” which took place in

80 Before the war of 1948, many Jews were living in the Arab territories. They fled towards the new Israeli state.

81 IRO, the International Refugee Organization was replaced by UNHCR in 1950, as explained in the previous pages. In 1949 IRO was shutting down and deciding how to transfer its powers and funds.
May, Mr. Kennedy said that about 30,000 out of the total group of about 900,000 were affected. They refused to do work around the refugee camp, in such tasks as sanitary work, and refused milk and food, saying that they would rather die than take it. Many of the memoranda which he received contended that the work which he was undertaking was an ‘Anglo-American imperialist scheme’. Thus it was known that there were political influences working among the refugees. The difficulty has since subsided, however.  

It is very important to notice that resettlement was not a condition in the works program. Some refugees could have resettled as a result of finding a better livelihood where they were, but they were free to make their own choice. As mentioned earlier, after the planning of UNRWA’s programs, 54,900,000 USD were allocated to finance the Agency’s program including relief and work. But governments needed to participate (UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee Relief Works Starting in Near East 1950). The starting phase of these programs was very slow because of the insufficiency of funds. Although it was commonly thought that most of the refugees were in tented camps, two thirds were housed in improvised quarters, many unsuited for anything except temporary emergency use. Larger rooms were divided by sackcloth partitions. On the other side, tent occupants enjoyed better living conditions during the rainless period, but suffered more in the wet season. Due mostly to dwindling resources, many refugees who formerly rented rooms, had to leave the “improvised quarters”. Accordingly, a trend toward higher population in tented camps started; an increase of over 20,000 in the period from May to August (year?). In Israel, UNRWA provided relief to two types of refugees: Jews who fled to inside the borders of the new state and Arabs displaced from one area to another. The 17,000 Jewish refugees were integrated within one year into the economic life of Israel while the Arab refugees were still receiving relief. The programs of UNRWA were divided in two main parts Relief and Work. The two categories implied the tasks of the Agency. The funds were divided as well. The relief part of the program comprised supplies distribution, education and medical aid. The work program was about refugees’ jobs.

22 Refer to page n. X
23 The first governments to intervene in this emergency were: Canada 750,000 USD, Israel 30,000 USD, Luxembourg 2,000 USD, Switzerland 25,000 USD, and the UK with 9,000,000 USD. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee Relief Works Starting in Near East 1950)
Relief program
During its first month of activity, UNRWA attempted to cut the ration distribution to 800,000 but they decided to keep it at 860,000 in order have less problems. Contributions of supplies to the refugee program by UNICEF amounted to 3,000,000 USD. The WHO provided 42,857 USD for the medical program. UNESCO donated 50,000 USD for the educational program. The 74 UNESCO-UNRWA schools were providing education for 45 to 740 children and required 40,000 USD per year. The educational program needed to be extended specifically as not all of the children had access to education at that point.

Works program
The Agency has found itself unable to approach the high target of employment in work projects set by the Economic Survey Mission and, up to that moment, most of its work projects were regarded as short term projects. The reasons were: (a) the agency did not get started as early as hoped; (b) the time taken to interest refugees and governments in a works program took longer than anticipated; (c) there was no opportunity for any considerable works program in Gaza. The Lebanon program was necessarily limited and Jordan was not able to provide work for the number of refugees who were approaching its borders.

The projects were at first confined to the construction of roads and to forestry because such projects employ a high percentage of hand labor which means, more money for the refugee from UNRWA. Road construction projects for a total of 120 miles employing 7,357 workers were in operation in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Projects of forestation in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, extend to nearly 15,000 sites employing 1,336 people. About 3,100 refugees were employed in Gaza making materials and garments for refugees. Miscellaneous projects were active as well, such as archeological excavations and construction of irrigation canals (790 workers). Only 15,000 refugees were employed by 1950. If enough water was available, refugees were invited to cultivate the land under expert supervision, hoping that a large number will become self-supporting after the first harvest. In mid-September 1950, 4,079 refugees were employed in administration and maintenance services, transport, supply and distribution, sanitation, nursing, and teaching. 6,358 were employed in works projects and 4,065 in small handicraft trades.
United Nations basis of response to the refugee crises

Despite the efforts made for the refugee situation, the political and military situations were still very critical. All the governments involved in the armistices complained during this year of several violations by other governments. The first speaker, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, of Egypt, stressed the seriousness and extreme urgency of the question, which his Government brought to the attention of the Council in order to maintain peace in the Middle East.

"While we are pondering and debating here, many thousands of fellow human beings in Palestine are being subjected to most inhuman treatment, expelled from their homes, and forced to seek shelter elsewhere against the cold and the hardships of a speedily approaching winter" quoting Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi Bey. During the summer, 4071 Bedouins were expelled from Palestine and flew to Egypt. This expulsion was also going within the territory of the Mixed Armistice Commission that occupied an area that shouldn’t have been subjected to these kinds of events (UN Weekly Bulletin, Palestine Issues again to Fore - Armistice Violations Charged 1950).

The Palestine Commission believed that, having the interest of the refugees themselves in mind, attention needed also to be devoted in the future to resettlement in the Arab countries of non-returning refugees, their economic rehabilitation and the payment of compensation. Refugees not returning to their homes should receive just compensation for the loss of their properties (UN Weekly Bulletin, For Positive Peace in Palestine: Commission Urges Direct Talks 1950). In 1950 the Assembly’s Ad Hoc committee examined again relief, re-integration, and repatriation issues about Palestinian refugees, and counted around 750,000 people by the end of 1950. The Committee also received an Egyptian draft resolution, dealing with the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. This proposed the establishment of a special Repatriation Agency to handle all details of repatriation and compensation, and stipulated that refugees returning to their homes would be guaranteed full equality of rights with other inhabitants in Palestine and should not be discriminated against (UN Weekly Bulletin, New Proposals on Palestine Refugees 1950).

The continuation of the relief was not a solution. The remedy was to restore the refugees to their homes and their property or resettlement. Refugee camps couldn’t be the solution of this problem. Even after only two years the temporality of these settlements was a difficult theme to be dealt with as the refugee camps were turning into permanent settlements.

1951-1955: UNRWA relief and works programs in action

Works programs described above, were succeeded by a “reintegration” program aimed at helping refugees to find employment and become self-supporting. This integration program lasted until 1958 (UNRWA, 1991, 15). In 1951, UNRWA elected a new director; Holger Andersen, from Denmark, for the new Refugee Office created by the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission. Mr. Andersen, one of the world’s foremost experts on the movement of populations, was one of the neutral members of the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Population between Greece and Turkey. He was knowledgeable about property issues. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Director for Palestine Conciliation Commission Refugee Office 1951) It was very
Figure 21. Article in the United Nations Weekly Bulletin of January 1951 about the United Nations Project and Aid to Arab refugees.
important to have the right personalities in charge of such delicate situations. The years 1951 to 1955 were the “settlement” years. Palestinian people were adapting themselves to the new houses, or tents and trying to make the first improvements. Slowly, they understood that they were not going back to Palestine soon. The relief program continued. The work program always required more funds and new jobs for the refugees that were settling in the host countries. One new project of UNRWA was initiated in the valley of the Jordan River around the modern town of Jericho which contained many Arab refugees, a concern of the UN for several years. To furnish some of these useful employment, UNRWA arranged for them to work in a major archeological project: the excavation of the Biblical city of Jericho in collaboration with the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem. The refugees employed were each given about 2 weeks of work. Most of them were skilled workmen, rather than unskilled laborers. Arab refugees were so appreciative of this opportunity to earn a little money that they applied themselves industriously to the task (UN Weekly Bulletin, Arab Refugees in United Nations Project Aid in Major Archeological Finds 1951). The first relief and work program finished at the end of 1950. The new aid program was supposed to be spread over a period of 3 years, starting from July 1, 1951 and involved expenditures of 50 million USD on direct relief, and 200 million USD on projects designed to reintegrate the Palestinian refugees into the economies of the states in which they were sheltered, with the aim of making them self-sufficient (UN Weekly Bulletin, Assembly Approves Refugee Aid Plan and Continues Palestine Commission 1952).

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East financial accounts for the period January 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952 show that contributions and income for the eighteen months amounted to 57,298,113 USD. Direct relief expenses amounted to 35,266,970 USD and direct reintegration expenses to 2,482,000 USD; these totals, added to administrative and other indirect expenses (4,381,625 USD), produced a total expenditure of 42,130,595 USD. The excess of income over expenditure for the period was 15,167,518 USD. With the addition of the balance at December 31, 1950, of 6,904,991 USD, the Agency had 22,072,509 USD available for its activities after June 30, 1952 (UN Weekly Bulletin, Palestine Refugee Agency’s Report on Finances 1952). Even if UNRWA was struggling all the time with financial problems and funds management, their work was priceless. The Assembly recognized the period of uncertainty that UNRWA passed through but still didn’t see any other plausible solution for a better future. During 1951, UNRWA housed, fed and clothed more than 800,000 refugees scattered over more than 100,000 square miles. It had made progress on large-scale, long-range projects which provided work and wages for thousands now on relief. (UN Weekly Bulletin, Assembly Endorses Further Aid Program for Palestine Refugees 1952)

However, in 1953, the Arab States asked to change the resolution of 1947 regarding the partition of Palestine without obtaining results. One of the most unresolved issues by this date was the Arab refugee problem. A few refugees were permitted to return home, only to be expelled again by Israel after a short time. Also, the idea of compensation with money didn’t work. Great transformations had come upon the area since the original resolutions were adopted. A sovereign state in place of an international territory emerged. A vast movement of people from Europe and the Arab world increased the population of Israel by one million since the first refugee resolution was proposed (UN Weekly Bulletin, Assembly Rejects New Palestine Resolution 1953). Thus, in 1953, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of grave concern as indicated in the GA resolution “Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” (A/RES/720(VIII) 1953).
From Shifting Sands to Firm Foundations

Through Cooperative Aid

Arab Refugees Make New Homes and Become Self-Supporting

Fifty boys and girls in the little village of Beit Quz, near Nazareth, now have a new school, built by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Today, they are the children of independent farmers of the Beit Quz Cooperative, the first agricultural cooperative set up under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's self-help program to demonstrate its potential for further aid of international assistance.

The United Nations, in fact, continues to give the farmers advice in improved methods of agriculture and dry-farming for some time, but its main aid will soon come to an end when the school and community hall are handed over to the refugees, behind the story of success for its two years of hard work and great efforts.

Each family was given twenty-five acres of land, a small farm devoted, furniture, the first year's seed, and a two-room house with suitable chairs and tables for storing and harvesting the crops. The land, lying in terraces which the farmers built themselves, was ready for the corn in the field, leading to the farms from the nearby villages. Two years of unusually good rainfall did not disturb the fields and the farmers set about clearing the land, building terraces, and planting crops. Each family of four, having set aside enough vegetables for their own use.

Finally, there came a day when, after the harvest, a general meeting of the cooperatives was called to which a UNRWA Representative Officer was invited. Ahmad Tibi Ibrahim, a refugee from Nazareth, the famous village in Palestine, was among those present. The representative of UNRWA announced that the cooperative had a capital of fifty thousand dollars, fully paid, invested in the land. It should be noted that a large share had been raised, and the meeting ended with a general thanks for all that we have received.
The program agreements envisaging the commitment of approximately 120 million USD were signed by UNRWA and the governments of several Near Eastern countries. The mandate of the agency was extended until 30 June 1955. UNRWA was authorized by the General Assembly to adopt a budget for relief amounting to 24.8 million USD for the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1954, subject to adjustments due to refugee employment on projects, or the necessity to maintain adequate standards. A provisional budget for relief of 18 million USD for the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1955 was adopted. Life in the camps continued. With the help of UNRWA, refugees found shelter in organized camps, and received regular monthly rations and free health service and schooling. The agency set up a good number of welfare centers where, among other activities, women learned sewing, cutting and simple tailoring (UN Weekly Bulletin, Palestine’s Traditional Embroidery Revived in Arab Refugee Camps 1954).

Around 1954, the first stories about self-sufficiency started to spread, like the one reported in the article “From Shifting Sands to Firm Foundations; through cooperative aid Arab Refugees Make New Homes and become Self-Supporting”:

“Fifty boys and girls in the little village of Beit Qad, near Nazareth, now have a new school, solidly built of local stone, which is symbolic of the change that has to come to the life of their community”.

Until recently, the names of these children were still registered among the 800 000 Arab refugees who are living on monthly rations distributed by UNRWA. Beit Qad Cooperative is the first agricultural cooperative set up under UNRWA self-support program to declare itself in no further need of international assistance. Each family had twenty-five acres of land, a mule, farm implements, fertilizers, the first year’s seed, and a two-room house with stable and cisterns for conserving water. But long before these houses were finished, the refugees were living in tents which they brought with them from the nearby camps (UN Weekly Bulletin, From Shifting Sands to Firm Foundations; through cooperative aid Arab Refugees Make New Homes and become Self-Supporting 1954). In 1954, UNRWA’s mandate was extended for five years ending 30 June 1960. A relief budget of 25,000,000 USD and a rehabilitation budget of 36,200,000 for the fiscal year ending in 30 June 1955. The camps were in a particularly hard situation, especially the ones on the demarcation lines that were still subject to fights and changes. (Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East”, A/RES/818(IX) 1954)
1956-1960: Second phase of humanitarian action

The first phase of the emergency followed by UNRWA was finished. The life in the camps started to settle down and refugees were putting efforts to integrate and work. The sense of community was very strong as the refugees tried to recreate the same divisions that they had in their previous villages. The first improvements noted occurred in the Gaza area as reported by the “Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” (A/RES/1018(XI) 1957). The quality of the space changed during these years. The first UNRWA teacher training center opened in rented premises in the West Bank. Since 1956, UNRWA’s teacher-training programs have prepared over 13,600 Palestine refugees to be elementary teachers. (UNRWA, 1991, 9) UNRWA accepted the principle of free preparatory education for all refugee children capable of benefiting from it (UNRWA, 1991, 12-13). The tents were gradually succeeded by basic one or two-rooms shelters built and handed over to the refugees rent-free. Since the 1960s, refugees have been responsible for their housing, even if UNRWA still helped them to find accommodation and to repair shelters after emergencies. (UNRWA, 1991, 14) The last UNRWA schools in tents were closed in 1957. However, in many occasions after that year, particularly during emergencies, the Agency had to use tents as makeshift classrooms. These improvements did not reflect the difficult financial situation of UNRWA between 1958 and 1959. The mandate of the Agency was extended for a period of 3 years with a review at the end of the second one (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, A/RES/1456(XIV) 1959). Contributions to the budget were not sufficient and the agency kept on struggling to provide the same kind of relief to the refugees. The director of the Agency was asked by the GA to plan and carry out more projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and, in particular, programs related to education and vocational training (Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” A/RES/1315(XII) 1958).

1961-1967: Critical financial issues and camps development

In the 1960s the state of the refugee camps in the Middle East was quite settled. No progress was reported by the General Assembly on the main issue of repatriation (Report of the Director of the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” A/RES/1604(XV) 1961). On the contrary, the camps were improved by the people that were living there. UNRWA provided more services. In 1962, UNRWA opened Ramallah Women’s Training Center (vocational and teacher training), the first residential college for women in the Arabic-speaking region (UNRWA, 1991, 11). In this period, the General Assembly reduced the number of resolutions about UNRWA and Palestine issues, probably because of the temporary settlement of the emergency phase. One of the themes developed in these years was the “identification and evaluation” of Arab refugee immovable properties in Palestine. This issue was present since 1948 but the work was never completed. In the GA resolution “Report of the Director of the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” (A/RES/1725(XVI) 1961) the task was supposed to end by 1 September 1962. In 1965, UNRWA’s mandate was extended until 1969. The presence of the Agency was still required in the refugee camps (A/RES/2052(XX) 1965). In 1967, UNRWA took over the operation of the Gaza Center for the Blind, established in 1961 by the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, which continued to support it financially. (UNRWA, 1991, 16) In the same year, Palestine was again the theater of a terrible war, the Six-Day war24. New flows of refugees started and a new intervention of UN and UNRWA was needed as reported in the resolution, “Prisoners of War and Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestine Refugees” (A/RES/2052(XXI) 1967). The need to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war was urgent as a result of the recent war in the Middle East territory. New means of protection for civilians were made:

Urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings.

Essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war.

Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas

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24 Explained in page n.
since the outbreak of hostilities.

Scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

The main organizations and agencies that helped during this new emergency, together with UNRWA, were the International Committee of the Red Cross, the league of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations. UNICEF was in charge as well, especially for women and children.

From 1968 to today

1968-1974: Six-Day War consequences and growth of Human Settlement discourse

The Six-Day War\textsuperscript{25} was fought between June 5 and 10, 1967 by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The United Nations approach to Palestinian refugees changed following these events. From 1967 to 1975, due to the unstable political situation resulting from the deliberations of the Cairo Agreement\textsuperscript{26}, the UN didn’t address the topic directly through a set of resolution. However, UNRWA was still proceeding with its work as shown in its financial accounts. The impact of the Cairo Agreement was visible through the endorsement of new resolution about protection of 1967 refugees displaced due to the Six-Day war and right to self-determination.

Relations between Israel and its neighbors were never normalized after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The result of the 1967 war was extensive displacement of population in the captured territories\textsuperscript{27}. However, the majority of the population in both territories declined to take up the offer of citizenship. The consequences affecting the refugees of the Six-Day War were not reported immediately in the UN General Assembly resolutions, instead the growth of the human settlement discourse and a review of human rights principles especially in occupied territories were major issues discussed in the UN (Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories A/RES/2443(XXIII) 1968 and Respect for human rights in armed conflicts A/RES/3102(XXVIII) 1973). In 1974 the United Nations made a very big step towards Palestine. They invited, in the General Assembly resolution “Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization” (A/RES/3210(XXIX) 1974), the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate as an observer in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings (A/RES/3237(XXIX) 1974). Apart from these few interventions about the situation of Palestine, there was no mention about the refugees’ situation.

\textit{The Six-Day War}

The Six-Day War was also known as the June War, 1967 Arab–Israeli War, or Third Arab–Israeli War. The relations between Israel and its adjacent countries was never officially defined following the 1948 War. In reaction to the mobilization of Egyptian forces along the Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula, Israel sent a series of airstrikes against Egyptian airfields in a pre-emptive strike. At the same time, they launched a ground offensive into the Gaza Strip and Sinai, which caught the Egyptians by surprise. After some resistance, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser evacuated the Sinai. Israeli forces rushed westwards and occupied Sinai. Nasser induced Syria and Jordan to attack Israel by using the initially confused situation to claim that Egypt had defeated the Israeli air strike. Israeli counterattacks resulted in the seizure of East Jerusalem as well as the West Bank from the Jordanians, while Israel’s retaliation against Syria resulted in its occupation of the Golan Heights. A ceasefire was signed on June 11. Arab losses were tenfold those of Israel: less than a thousand Israelis were killed compared to over 20 000 Arabs. Israel got control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The displacement of civilian populations from the war had long-term consequences. 300 000 Palestinians fled from the West Bank and about 100 000 Syrians left the Golan to become refugees.

\textsuperscript{25} Refer to page n.
\textsuperscript{26} Refer to page n. X
\textsuperscript{27} Israel allowed only the inhabitants of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights to receive full Israeli citizenship, applying its law, administration, and authority to these territories in 1967 and 1981, respectively.
The human settlement theme continued until 1973 under the name “Housing, building and planning”, mentioned earlier, to change in 1974 to Habitat for the first time, during the preparation of the first international conference of UN-Habitat in 1976 called Habitat I (United Nations Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements”, A/RES/3128(XXVIII) 1973). In the “Housing, building and planning” sections, the principles to be used in order to obtain adequate housing and community facilities and economic development in rural and urban settlements all over the world were discussed. (A/RES/2598(XXV) 1969) On the threshold of the 1970s, the United Nations concern was to create conditions of social justice, stability and well-being for all, and to ensure a minimum standard of living consistent with human dignity through economic and social progress and development (United Nations Conference-Exposition on Human Settlements”, A/RES/3128(XXVIII) 1973). The creation of UN-Habitat was preceded by the establishment of another agency called United Nations Habitat and Human Settlement Foundation, an international foundation for human habitat management, environmental design and improvement of human settlements (Establishment of the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation, A/RES/3327(XXIX) 1974).

1975-1980: Palestine review and Habitat I

In 1975, following a long silence about the refugee issue, the resolution stating the UNRWA’s operational report reappeared with much more details than before. Refugees were again the main problem and the resolution named “Assistance to persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities” (A/RES/3419(XXX)A 1975) was the first one about the war of 1967. The refugees’ situation in the Middle East was still a matter of concern for all the Arab countries and others. From 1975 on, Palestinian refugees were never excluded from the central core of all the General Assemblies until today. The word “refugee” has always been associated with the Palestinian people since 1948. The Palestinian people were considered by the United Nations as “permanent refugees”. UNHCR, as well as UNRWA, was still very active on different fronts. UNHCR took charge of the humanitarian assistance to the Indo-Chinese displaced persons and of the elaboration of a draft convention on Territorial Asylum.

The same year when the updated Palestine resolutions were issued, a great importance was given to the UNHHSF (United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation) which was preparing its first international conference about Human Settlements in Vancouver in 1976. The Secretary General invited all states, agencies and non-governmental organizations to participate in the conference and to be active on the human settlements discourse. (“Dissemination of information and mobilization of public opinion regarding the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation”, A/RES/3434(XXX) 1975 and “Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements”, A/RES/3438(XXX) 1975). As mentioned28, 1976 was the year of “Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements”, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976. The main principles of the conference were summed up in the “Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements” resolution (A/RES/31/109 1976) and in the Vancouver Declaration:

To stimulate innovation, serve as a means for the exchange of experience and ensure the widest possible dissemination of new ideas and technologies in the field of human settlements

To formulate and make recommendations for an international program in this field which will assist Governments

To stimulate interest in developing appropriate financial systems and institutions for human settlements among those making financial resources available and those in a position to use such resources, considering that the most appropriate and effective action for dealing with human settlements problems is action at the national level, but that such action will require assistance and co-operation between and among all States

The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most important objective of every human settlement policy. These policies must facilitate the rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs of food, shelter, clean water, employment, health, education,

28 Refer to page n.
training, social security without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, ideology, national or social origin or other cause, in a frame of freedom, dignity and social justice.

In striving to achieve this objective, priority must be given to the needs of the most disadvantaged people.

Economic development should lead to the satisfaction of human needs and is a necessary means towards achieving a better quality of life, provided that it contributes to a more equitable distribution of its benefits among people and nations. In this context particular attention should be paid to the accelerated transition in developing countries from primary development to secondary development activities, and particularly to industrial development.

Human dignity and the exercise of free choice consistent with overall public welfare are basic rights which must be assured in every society. It is therefore the duty of all people and Government to join struggle against any form of colonialism, foreign aggression and occupation, domination, apartheid and all forms of racism and racial discriminations referred to in the resolutions as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The establishment of settlements in territories occupied by force is illegal. It is condemned by the international community. However, action still remains to be taken against the establishment of such settlements.

The right of free movement and the right of each individual to choose the place of settlement within the domain of his own country should be recognized and safeguarded.

Land is one of the fundamental elements in human settlements. Every State has the right to take the necessary steps to maintain under public control the use, possession, disposal and preservation of land. Every State has the right to plan and regulate use of land, which is one of its most important resources, in such a way that the growth of population centers both urban and rural are based on a comprehensive land use plan. Such measures must assure the attainment of basic goals of social and economic reform for every country, in conformity with its national and land tenure system and legislation.

Some guidelines for action were contained also in the Vancouver Declaration, among them there was an essential one: “A human settlement is more than a grouping of people, shelter and work places. Diversity in the characteristics of human settlements reflecting cultural and aesthetic values must be respected and encouraged and areas of historical, religious or archaeological importance and nature areas of special interest preserved for posterity. Places of worship, especially in areas of expanding human settlements, should be provided and recognized in order to satisfy the spiritual and religious needs of different groups in accordance with freedom of religious expression”, which was and still is applicable to the case of refugee camps. After the Vancouver Declaration, UNHHSF became the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) through resolution 32/162. It turned into UN-Habitat only in 1978 with resolution 56/206, by which the Assembly turned the Commission on Human Settlements and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), including the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation, into UN-Habitat. This year was a milestone for the United Nations. Habitat is one of the most powerful agencies and tools of the United Nations for urban planning and human settlements development, that was based only on the principles of the UN Charter of 1946 and was never fully planned before 1978. One of the first resolutions of the General Assembly involving the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements was called “Living conditions of Palestinian people” (A/RES/31/110 1976). The concern about the people living in occupied territories and the present inequalities was expressed here. It contained an invitation of cooperation with PLO, the representative of the Palestinian population. The resolution called “Living conditions of Palestinian People” became one of the continuously recurring resolutions of the General Assembly resolutions until today.

In the same years, during the ongoing civil war in Lebanon which ended in 1990, there was an urgent need for international action to assist the Government of Lebanon in its efforts for relief, reconstruction, and development. The United Nations active participation was clear through
the resolution named “Assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon” (A/RES/33/146 1978):

“Noting the appeals of the Secretary-General for relief and other forms of assistance to Lebanon and the creation of a special fund for this purpose. All Governments to contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, either through existing bilateral and multilateral channels or, in addition, through a special fund to be established by the Secretary-General for this purpose. Requests the Secretary-General to establish at Beirut a joint coordinating committee of the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to coordinate their assistance and advice to the Government of Lebanon in all matters relating to reconstruction and development. Committee on Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, headed by a coordinator appointed by the Secretary-General, shall also assist the Government of Lebanon in the assessment, formulation and phasing of aid and ensure its implementation within the framework of the needs of Lebanon.”

The last active theme is human rights, especially referring to rights during armed conflicts and occupied territories. The same topic is even more developed in the next years with the new flows of refugees and mass exoduses.

1981-1992: From self-determination to Sabra and Chatila and Habitat II

The discourse about human settlements after Habitat I remained unchanged for some years. From 1981 to 1992, Habitat invited all countries to respect the principles of the Vancouver Declaration and specifically to observe and try to improve Palestinian living conditions every year. The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements produced every year a report by the Commission on Human Settlements outlining the progress and financial situation of the period (Report of the Commission on Human Settlements, A/RES/36/72A 1981).

As reported in the resolution “Living Conditions of the Palestinian People” (A/RES/36/73 1981) curated by the Commission on Human Settlements, the Palestinian settlements situation was not improving at all. For the first time, Israel was pointed out as the cause of this problem of underdevelopment. The General Assembly denounced Israel for refusing to allow the Group of Experts on the Social and Economic Impact of the Israeli Occupation on the Living Conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Arab Territories to visit the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, condemned Israel for the deteriorating living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and asked for the elimination of the Israeli occupation as a prerequisite for the social and economic development of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories.

In the 1980s, the focus was directed to one of the main themes of the United Nations, the right to self-determination, with a series of resolutions such as “Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights” (A/RES/37/43 1982). The theme often referred to the Palestinian situation but also to other countries that in the same period were struggling for their rights like many states in Africa, Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Human rights were also very relevant to the new influxes of refugees (International co-operation to avert new flows of refugees, A/RES/37/84 1983) coming from the emergencies around the world. After this invitation of the General Assembly to cooperate towards the refugees’ situation and share the financial and territorial burden with the States into which the refugees were flowing, the UN started to consider the human rights related to mass exoduses. The mass exoduses were a phenomenon that was becoming frequent and in 1983 the resolution called “Human Rights and Mass Exoduses” (A/RES/40/149 1983) appeared. In the latter, the General Assembly declared to be “deeply disturbed by the continuing scale and magnitude of exoduses of refugees and displacements of population in many regions of the world and by the suffering of millions of refugees and displaced persons”. Thus, the UN invited all governments and international organizations to intensify their cooperation and assistance in world-wide efforts to address the problem. The beginning of the 1980s was a crucial period for Lebanon and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Israel during those years invaded some parts of the Lebanese territory, destroying many parts of refugee camps held by UNRWA and other parts of settlements. During those years, a lot of hard work completed during the many emergencies that Palestinian refugees passed through since 1948, was lost. Schools, sewage systems, houses, health centers and many other services were destroyed.
The Commissioner-General in the resolution “United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” (A/RES/37/120A-K 1982) ordered to provide housing, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to the Palestinian refugees whose houses were destroyed during the conflict, in order to protect them from the harsh weather. The most destroyed camps were the ones of Sabra and Chatila (Massacre of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, A/RES/37/123D 1982) in Beirut. The massacre in these camps was considered by the UN a “universal outrage” and defined it an “act of genocide” according to the UN’s definition. The Israeli invasions impacted the Middle East territory with many severe consequences. Palestinian refugees were again having the same troubles that were almost resolved during the 1970s. In many camps, refugees started all over again, without shelters and proper services. The invasion that started in 1987 in Jabaliya (UNRWA refugee camp), north of Gaza (The uprising Intifadah) of the Palestinian people, A/RES/43/21 1988) brought severe consequences. The uprising, as imagined, brought more violence and destruction, especially in Gaza, West Bank and Israel.

During the 1980s the discourse about human settlement was suspended. It appeared again in 1991 for the preparation of the new international conference on Human Settlements Habitat II in 1996. The aim was to adopt a general statement of principles and commitments and formulate a related global plan of action suitable for guiding national and international efforts through the first two decades of the next century (United Nations Conference on Human Settlements [Habitat II] A/RES/47/180 1992).

1993-X: Habitat II and III and Palestine situation

Habitat II, the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements was held in Istanbul from June 3 to 14, 1996, twenty years after Habitat I in 1976. It was called the “City Summit” and it brought together representatives of national and local governments, the private sector, comprising NGOs, research and training institutions and media. Habitat II, as opposed to Habitat I, mentioned the refugees’ situation in the Preamble of its final report among the emergency situations that Habitat should try to fix with its actions:

“the rapidly increasing number of displaced persons, including refugees, other displaced persons in need of international protection and internally displaced persons, as a result of natural and human-made disasters in many regions of the world, is aggravating the shelter crisis, highlighting the need for a speedy solution to the problem on a durable basis”

Also in the commitments, Habitat II emphasized that special attention should be given to the circumstances and needs of people living in poverty, people who are homeless, women, older people, indigenous people, refugees, displaced persons, persons with disabilities and those belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Special consideration should also be given to the needs of migrants. The same commitment is repeated in Habitat III in 2016 where the main theme of the conference was the “informal settlements”. The focus of Habitat II was to find an “adequate shelter for all” including refugees and displaced persons. UN-Habitat was never really connected with the situation of Palestinian refugees. UNRWA was always in charge of most of the tasks regarding them. In addition, Palestinian camps after the 1970s went more and more towards a self-reliant process. The humanitarian emergency phase was finished and after the Cairo Agreement, the camps in Lebanon...
had more freedom. However, governments at the 19th Session of the UN-Habitat Governing Council in 2003 adopted the resolution 19/18, which called on UN-Habitat to establish a Special Human Settlements Program for the Palestinian People (SHSPPP). The development objective of the program was to improve the human settlements conditions of Palestinians, contributing to reach peace, security and stability. In 2011, during the 23rd Governing Council, a new resolution 23/2 was adopted, requesting UN-Habitat “to further focus its operations on planning, land and housing issues in view of improving the housing and human settlement conditions of Palestinians, addressing the urbanization challenges, supporting the building of a Palestinian state, humanitarian action and peace-building, in the areas where there are acute humanitarian and development needs”. According to the words of UN-Habitat, “effective urbanization” was a choice, which was not achieved by chance but by design and political will. The positive outcomes of urbanization depended largely on the design. Hence, there was a potential for urbanization and sustainable development in Palestine. But at the same time, there were well known challenges. It was hard to imagine how urbanization can promote development in Palestine where over 60% of the West Bank, was under a restrictive planning process which was discriminatory and did not conform to international humanitarian law, or in Gaza, where recent and recurrent conflicts killed thousands of people, devastated the urban space, destroyed and damaged thousands of homes, and where reconstruction was proceeding too slowly, or Jerusalem, where one city was and is divided by multiple growing inequalities.

Urbanization, as a positive influence for development in Palestine, was a phenomenon significantly interrupted by the Israeli occupation. There is no development without urbanization. To be clear, the UN is trying to find a solution to Palestine-Israel issues, among them: the demarcation of borders, Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, water and natural resources, the Gaza blockade, and Palestinian refugees, together with actions to cease the destruction of Palestinian property not yet returned. UN-Habitat’s perspective on urbanization is centered on spatial and urban planning as means to attain human rights. UN-Habitat in the last 15 years played a more important role in Palestine than before. Its main tasks are leading debates on urbanization issues, supporting NGOs, government, and private sector firms on planning, and informing advocacy efforts by the international community on planning and building rights for Palestinian communities especially in West Bank and Jerusalem.

In 2016, Habitat III, the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, took place in the city of Quito in Ecuador, from 17 to 20 October 2016. In resolution 66/207 and according to the bi-decennial cycle established (1976, 1996 and 2016), the United Nations General Assembly decided to convene, the Habitat III Conference to reinforce the commitment to sustainable urbanization and to focus on the implementation of a “New Urban Agenda”, building on the Habitat Agenda of Istanbul in 1996. Again, one of the main themes of the conference were the “informal settlements”, defined as residential areas where:

Inhabitants have no security of tenure vis-à-vis the land or dwellings they inhabit, with modalities ranging from squatting to informal rental housing

The neighborhoods usually lack, or are cut off from, basic services and city infrastructure.

The housing may not comply with current planning and building regulations, and is often situated in geographically and environmentally hazardous areas and in addition, informal settlements can be a form of real estate speculation for all income levels of urban residents, affluent and poor.

The characteristics mentioned above can be compared with many of the refugee camps’ features that are analyzed in the next two chapters. In the first, from a wider perspective that encompasses the entire country of Lebanon and in the second from a detailed perspective of a case study, namely Nahr el Bared refugee camp. Simultaneously with the evolution of the refugee profile in the UN discourse, the refugee camps evolved turning in a new kind of settlement, which cannot be categorized as a city or a camp or an informal settlement.
Chapter III
Mapping refugee camps in Lebanon

The urban development of Palestinian settlements can be studied through the analysis of refugee camps in the Middle East. Lebanon is one of the host countries that was a refuge sought by around 110,000 Palestinians in 1948 after their expulsion from Palestine. The Lebanese territory hosted and hosts different internationally displaced communities such as Armenians, Palestinians and Syrians in light of the recent events. The coexistence of these refugees of diverse nationalities with the Lebanese society created complex dynamics in the urban fabric. The third chapter explains the various impacts of these populations on the Lebanese urban landscape, economy and politics. In order to assimilate the changes that occurred in one of the Palestinian refugee camps, the research focuses on a detailed analysis of Nahr el Bared.
Historical Background

Lebanon is located on the eastern sea board of the Mediterranean sea. It is border by Syria to the north and east, and Israel to the south. The total area is 10,452 km² and the population is estimated at 4 million. After the theoretical/decisional analysis of the Work of the UN put in relation with the refugee profile, the case of Lebanon is analyzed as the country hosts 600,000 Palestinians as well as other refugees of other nationalities: Armenian, Syriacs, Syrians.

- **2007**: Siege of the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared between May and September, following clashes between the radical Sunni Islamist group Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces. More than 300 people died and more than 30,000 residents fled before the army gained control of the camp (BBC 2016).
- **2008**: International Donor Conference in Vienna for the Reconstruction and the Recovery of Nahr El Bared Camp and Conflict-Affected Areas in Lebanon was held in June (BBC 2016).
- **2012**: The Syrian conflict that began in March 2011 spilled over into Lebanon in deadly clashes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites in Tripoli and Beirut. After a lull, in December, several days of deadly fighting between supporters and opponents of the Syrian president erupted in Tripoli. UN praised Lebanese families for having taken in more than third of the 160,000 Syrian refugees who have streamed into the country (BBC 2016).
- **2013**: Damascus warned Beirut to stop militants crossing the border to fight Syrian government forces. Clashes between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime continued in Tripoli. On May 25, 2013, Hezbollah announces his involvement in fighting in the Syrian Civil War with the Syrian regime. In September, the United Nations refugee agency said there are at least 700,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon (BBC 2016).
- **2014**: In February, Sunni Muslim politician Tammam Salam finally assembled a new power-sharing cabinet following 10 months of talks. UN announced in April that the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon has surpassed one million. In May, President Suleiman ended his term of office, leaving a power vacuum. Attempts made in parliament over subsequent years to choose a successor were unsuccessful. In August, Syrian rebels overran the border town of Arsal. They withdrew after being challenged by the Lebanese Armed Forces but 30 soldiers and police were taken captive. In September Prime Minister Salam appealed to world leaders at the UN to help Lebanon face a "terrorist onslaught" and the flood of refugees from Syria (BBC 2016).
- **2015**: New restrictions on Syrians entering Lebanon came into effect, slowing the flow of people trying to enter Lebanon (BBC 2016).
- **2016**: Michel Aoun elected President after 2 years and 4 months during which the office of President was vacant.
In May, armed clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian guerrillas in the Shatila refugee camp led to a humanitarian crisis and internecine strife. This war resulted in the deaths of at least 300 people and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which sought to establish a Palestinian state and resist Israeli occupation.

In June, the Israeli army launched an all-out invasion of Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 1,000 Israeli soldiers and 5,000 Palestinian guerrillas. The invasion also marked the beginning of a series of conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians that would last for several years.

In October, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on the PLO headquarters in Beirut, killing 180 people and destroying much of the city. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

In November, following the failure of the Israel-Syria nuclear talks, the Israeli army launched another invasion of Lebanon, this time in response to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Lebanese National Accord, which sought to establish a democratic government in Lebanon.

In December, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on Libyan forces in Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

In January, the Israeli army launched another invasion of Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Lebanese National Accord, which sought to establish a democratic government in Lebanon.

In February, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on Libyan forces in Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

In March, the Israeli army launched another invasion of Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Lebanese National Accord, which sought to establish a democratic government in Lebanon.

In April, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on Libyan forces in Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

In May, the Israeli army launched another invasion of Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Lebanese National Accord, which sought to establish a democratic government in Lebanon.

In June, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on Libyan forces in Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

In July, the Israeli army launched another invasion of Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The invasion resulted in the deaths of 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas and forced thousands of people to flee their homes. It also led to the formation of the Lebanese National Accord, which sought to establish a democratic government in Lebanon.

In August, the Israeli army launched a massive air attack on Libyan forces in Lebanon, following a series of attacks on Israeli positions. The attack led to international condemnation and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.
The situation worsened after the PLO was expelled from Jordan in 1970 after the conflict of Black September between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, and the Jordanian Armed Forces, under the leadership of King Hussein. Most of the refugees from Jordan, including more armed militiamen, regrouped in Lebanon. By this time, the Lebanese government was too weak and vulnerable to impose any significant controls on the Palestinians (LebanonWire 2016).

The Cairo Agreement was signed in November 1969 by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Lebanese army commander General Emile Bustani with the help of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The text of the agreement remained officially secret. In the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon's neighboring countries forced the government to let the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) use its territory to mount raids on northern Israel (RCPL 2004).

Israeli commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and destroyed thirteen Middle East Airlines and TMA aircraft. The Israeli strike was in retaliation for a series of Palestinian hijackings (RCPL 2004).

Lebanon played no active role in the Arab-Israeli war but it is to be affected by its aftermath when Palestinians use Lebanon as a base for attacks on Israel. After the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War which took place from June 5 and 10, 1967 between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (known at the time as the United Arab Republic), Jordan, and Syria. The latter started sending Palestinian guerrillas into Lebanon to attack Israel (RCPL 2004).

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded during the Arab League Summit in Cairo with the stated purpose of the “liberation of Palestine” through armed struggle.

Faced with increasing opposition which develops into a civil war, President Camille Chamoun, asked the US to send troops to preserve Lebanon's independence. The US sent marines (BBC 2016).

A set of Armistice Agreements were signed in 1949 between Israel and neighboring countries Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, to formally end the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and establish armistice lines under the supervision of the United Nations. The agreement with Lebanon was signed on 23 March 1949. The main points were: the provisions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations; the armistice line “Green Line” was drawn along the international boundary between Lebanon and Mandatory Palestine; Israel withdrew its forces from 13 villages in Lebanese territory, which were occupied during the war. (Library of Congress Country Studies 2003).
Main urban planning transformations

Ottoman empire

In the 19th century, Beirut was a city of little importance, as economically and politically other cities in the Levant of the Ottoman Empire were more significant for their harbors and trade activities. Beirut had all the typical elements present in Arab Ottoman cities. It had six gates, an administrative body which consisted of the Serail or garrison, the judicial court, two prisons and a market bazar at the center of the city known for its production and trade activities. At the end of the 19th century, Beirut was transformed into the major city of Greater Syria (Khayyat 1984) (M. Ghorayeb 1991). The first changes in the urban planning of the city occurred under the rule of the Ottoman Empire with the system of Tanzimat where fiscal and urban regulations distinguished between public and private spaces (M. Ghorayeb 1991). The urban expansion and demographic growth of Beirut were due mainly to the excessive flow of rural migrants in the second half of the 19th century. The decline of the local silk industry due to competition from the imported European industrial textiles destroyed large parts of the rural economy and local markets for craftsmanship and artisanal skills declined. Added to that, the conflicts between the Maronite and the Druze of Mount Lebanon in 1860 were one of the main causes of the 19th century rural migrations. External events contributed to the demographic growth of Beirut also, among them the Armenian massacres of 1914 which led to the displacement and relocation of Armenian refugees over the following decade in the country. Hence, the creation of dense slums east and northeast of the city of Beirut was initiated (Khayyat 1984).

French mandate

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the French mandate was imposed on Lebanon and Syria. The French decided to treat Lebanon as an independent entity because of the Maronite and hence Christian majority, opposing the Arab nationalism of the neighboring countries. The Ottoman intention of modernizing the city were manifested through the initiation of demolitions and expropriation of lands in the center of Beirut in 1915. The implementation of new infrastructural systems related to transport, harbor improvement and progressive urban expansion were carried by the French (M. Ghorayeb 1994). The French mandate in Lebanon was not as ambitious in terms of urban planning as in other French colonies such as Morocco. The politics of infrastructure and urbanism studied in order to modernize and rationalize Beirut were closely linked to the political control and economic exploitation of Lebanon. Therefore, national communications and connections to Syria improved in the mandate period. The port of Beirut, a strategic and economic asset for the French, was enlarged, new equipment was provided and a duty-free zone was established there in 1936. As the economic interest of trade and industries in Mount Lebanon was essential, financial auto-sufficiency was a goal to be achieved throughout the mandate period. Hence, the electrification of the city, tramways infrastructure and the sewage network were given to concessions while simultaneously, the urban lots of Beirut were divided. Due to the previous destruction of the center of Beirut by the Ottomans, the reconstruction of the center was intended to be a display of power by the French government. The Place de l’Étoile in the center of the city was the only place where the political power of the French was translated in urban form. In the first half of the 1920s, the cadaster was established to individualize land properties and distinguish between private and public domains. The ownership of private properties was guaranteed with the implementation of the cadaster and property taxes were collected.

The attempt to include in the cadaster, waqfs, lands owned by religious institutions which could have been a potential source of income of the government, failed. In terms of legal changes, in 1920, the control of urbanization happened through imposing the requirement for an authorization of construction prior to all construction works. The authorization was transformed into a permit of construction in 1934. Through these changes, the role of the state became more prominent. The French mandate centralized the administrative bodies in Beirut, making the municipality of Beirut, created in 1870, an important actor in the implementation of urban regulations and collection of taxes. The system was also westernized through the presence of French technicians. However, the main urban regulations were applied in the main cities, their extensions, the rural littoral as and the Bekaa valley. Mountains, inner cities and summer retreats which were also expanding in a rapid urbanization process were not included in the planning schemes. Many attempts at developing urban planning schemes were studied in the 1930s but none of them was executed (Verdeil 2005). In general, the French mandate didn’t make drastic urban reforms but rather built on the former situation of
the country. The expropriation of public spaces, the alignment and widening of streets were the main interventions done till the 1930s (Verdœil 2005). The 1930s were marked by a growing concern for the physical development of the city. The influence of French experts in the urban planning was remarkable. One of the main modifications implemented was the introduction of the Public Works department, based on the knowledge and colonialist experience of the French. The city was not anymore a spontaneous production of spaces but needed to be produced and organized by professionals and experts present in the mandate administration. The municipalities were given the power to take charge of small works such as changes in the existing roads while the department of Public Works was the one responsible to issue construction permits. In 1934, the commission of the Public Works issued a law enforcing the presence of an architect in the construction process to obtain a construction permit (M. Ghorayeb 1991) (M. Ghorayeb 1994).1

The first plan for the city of Beirut was drawn by René Danger2 in 1935. Geographic, climatic, geological and human factors were studied by the French consultant Danger. The latter’s descriptions of the city's morphology were impregnated with colonial romanticism. The study of the population’s density was more of an ethnographic interpretation of the social spread of the city inhabitants. The plan proposed intended to preserve the character of the area while adding institutional facilities and major infrastructure works. Hygiene urbanism was of great importance at that time as the implementation of sanitary sewers networks, a refuse collection and the removal of slums would help prevent illnesses. The Armenian neighborhood in the east was to be replaced by an industrial zone. Urban planning was therefore a social project which contributed to the wellbeing of the inhabitants. The analysis of the city was challenged by its commercial aspect and the topography of the country (Ghorayeb 1994). In order to prepare the city for future developments, trunk roads were determined: from Beirut to Tripoli in the North, to Saida in the South and to Damascus in the East. Zoning coefficients and densities of occupation for agricultural, commercial, industrial and touristic zones were defined as well by Danger. Residential developments and their respective service facilities were to be developed within the context of a larger vision of the city, where Beirut would be planned in coordination with its adjacent suburbs and villages. Environmental and esthetic features of the city would be preserved through the development of parks and public spaces (Khayyat 1984). Danger’s urban plan consisted mainly of: the development of the old neighborhood of the serail, the access to the port as an economic center, the Place de l’Étoile, the coastal road and a ring road. The Danger plan was not endorsed and therefore never executed (Khayyat 1984). In World War II, the relevance of improving connections and roads for military purposes was eminent. The military mobilization in 1941 was therefore a catalyst where the French General Catroux ordered an urgent study of the urban plan of Beirut to Michel Ecochard3 who was assigned to Beirut in 1941. Ecochard criticized the final plan presented by Danger stating that the plan lacked coherence and a vision as proposed by Danger. However, Ecochard couldn’t impose his ideas as companies and concessions, particularly the railway authority, contested his new scheme. The technical and expert approach of Ecochard was not aligned with the financial interests of the main entrepreneurs in Beirut, which created problems in the administration (Verdœil 2005).4

The building code was established as a legislative document in 1932 under the French mandate. It was successively altered in 1940, 1954, 1964, 1971, as well as several other revisions with the last one being in 2007. Inspired by the French building code, it tackled construction and occupation permits, facades, setbacks and light and ventilation regulations. As the code was not strictly applied, living spaces didn’t all respect the minimum requirements of livable conditions. Besides, the building code did not specify the land use of each zone, which led to the invasion of agricultural land by random constructions. Although municipalities had a responsibility in enforcing the implementation of the building code, they were not able to detect, or preferred ignoring, the lack of occupancy permits in which case, electricity and water should not be supplied to the new building. The same problem was noticeable in setback regulation or height restrictions where violations happened after the occupancy permit was issued. In this case, fines for these

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1 For further information, refer to Ghorayeb, Marlène. 1994. “L’urbanisme de la ville de Beyrouth sous le mandat français.” Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, no. 73-74, 327-339.
2 René Danger was the founder of the Cabinet Danger.
3 Michel Ecochard, 1905 – 1983, was a French architect and urban planner. He played a large part in the French redevelopment of Damascus during its occupation of Syria.
Figure 1. Danger masterplan of Beirut, 1932.
Figure 2. Ecochard masterplan of Beirut, 1942-1944
Figure 3. Egl masterplan of Beirut, 1950

types of violations were minimal and often bribing the municipality resolved the matter. Façade aesthetics were also mandatory in the building code which was obviously not taken into consideration in all cases. However, the houses inside were not necessarily reflecting the outside conditions. The private space was given more importance than public space by the individualistic Lebanese citizen generally. Additionally, the code makes a distinction only for zoned and un-zoned areas specifying the total and surface exploitation coefficients for each as well as the height of the building, the number of floors and the setbacks. The leeway given by the lack of specificity in the code allowed the population to circumvent the law easily. The suburbs of Beirut were even less controlled as the areas outside the perimeter of the city were not included in the planning scheme and their respective lots were exploited with no limit (Khayyat 1984).

At the end of the French mandate, in 1943, Ecochard developed a plan inspired by the modern movement with the intention of modernizing Beirut. The schematic plan consisted of three main sections: the principal means of circulation, a hierarchical road network and the construction of a new city. The new city revolved around the center of activities and particularly the port. In Ecochard's urban plan, Beirut was linked to Saida in the south through a hierarchical network of roads allowing people to reach all inner cities and villages from the littoral, while smaller interior roads were studied in their topographical context. The potential extension of the city and the large surfaces integrated in the urban planning of the city required the principles of construction to change: alleyways bordered by joined houses were replaced with houses which had setbacks on the roads. Several owners were incited to build compounds where common spaces were shared. The traditional inner courtyard houses were not anymore a model of construction for high-rise buildings. A height limit was also imposed on the buildings. The new city was divided in monofunctional areas as transportation was not anymore an issue with the availability of public transport. Residential units were given major importance and urban planning was supposed to modify the social relation among citizens, allowing people, specifically the labor force, to settle in housing units closer to the old city. The ideology of equality within the city and the mix of social classes was expressed by Ecochard. This type of urbanism would create a new man according to Ecochard. Urbanism was the responsibility of the state in the decision-making process and in the implementation of the masterplan. The purpose of Ecochard was to create a project which would defend the public interest; the French urban planner associated urbanism to the regulation of social imbalances brought about by capitalism and property speculation. The private sector stood against Ecochard as it didn't serve its economic purposes. Ecochard's plan, which reflected the modern movement, was empirical. Although he claimed knowing the oriental culture, his ideas of centralizing all public buildings in an administrative center near the Place de l'Étoile led him to reorganize all the neighborhoods and connect them through new streets to avoid traffic congestion (M. Ghorayeb, L’urbanisme de la ville de Beyrouth sous le mandat français 1994). The Ecochard Plan of 1944 intended the planning of Beirut outside its administrative limits, till Nahr el Mot in the North and Ouzai in the South. Based on a survey of open spaces and natural sites to be preserved, zoning of the city consisted of twelve functional areas of various densities: industrial, housing for workers, popular, middle income and luxury housing, commercial and civic centers. Like the Danger plan, Ecobard's master plan Ecochard's masterplan was not endorsed but many of its elements were integrated in later plans. The period at the end of the French mandate was marked by the change of mentality towards the urbanism of the city of Beirut. The necessity of creating a city with thoughtfully organized spaces studied by experts in the field of urbanism was acknowledged. Based on theories of urban space, the masterplan of the city needed to reflect esthetical and social values (Khayyat 1984).

Post-independence years

Following independence in 1943, there was no marked rupture with the period under the French mandate in the field of urbanism. Under the presidency of Bechara el Khoury, in office from 1943 to 1952, the state was barely involved in the economy of the country. The liberal regime empowering the bourgeois traders in Beirut marked its difference from Arab neighboring countries. Economic and spatial plans were deployed, continuing the Public Works related to soil and underground works, energy, rural and urban equipment and transport, tourism, industry, commerce and financial estimation of private and public investments. Funds were invested in the production of hydro electrical energy and irrigation, in the organization of the communication routes, the port and the airport, having as an aim the

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integration of the Republic of Lebanon in the regional economy and the improvement of its relations with Europe. The tertiary sector of the economy, services, commerce and tourism were therefore developed. Lebanon was seen as a bridge between western countries and the Arab region. In this context, the relevance of having a masterplan for Beirut was pointed out. The Ecochard plan was reviewed by a planner, Ernest Eghi, in 1950. Eghi recommended the highway system connecting the major cities of Saida in the South, Tripoli in the North and Zahle in the East which connected Lebanon to Syria, as well as the secondary road network from the cities to the summer retreats, the cornice, an avenue parallel to the coast, and the squares of the Museum, Martyrs’ square and the ring road around the commercial center. He also reduced the functional zones to five. The plans for the cities of Tripoli, Saida, Zahle and Baalbeck were not as developed as the one of Beirut. They consisted of boulevards, avenues and squares. The summer retreats were of particular interest to Eghi who perceived them as villages of different nature from the city like urban form. Still, the maps of Lebanon developed by Eghi were mainly representing secondary cities such as Tripoli with its port and some of its principal roads, Baalbeck with its archaeological remains. The plan suggested by Eghi highlighted the need to address the housing problem and limit the population of Beirut to 400 000 inhabitants. In the 1950s, the population of Beirut was already at 300,000 residents. The plan also took into consideration the possible expansion of the city, in the southern suburbs, the Dunes area. The main criticism to Ecochard’s plan was that it did not take into consideration the economic asset of Lebanon based on the service sector: commerce and tourism (Verdeil 2005) (M. Ghorayeb 1991).

Although the plan was not approved, it was a basis for the general masterplan developed and approved in 1952. The latter consisted of the principal roads of the Ecochard masterplan only, disregarding the zoning, the port, airport, natural and historical sites noted in the plan. However, the roads indicated in the plan were narrower than required considering the car traffic in this period and Beirut was not studied as a part of the regional context. This led to a mix of commercial shops and centers in residential areas, offices in residential buildings, congested streets, use of all open spaces in areas of high property value (Khayyat 1984). Through the development of the port and the commercial center of the city, the economy was supposed to improve.

As industries were located mainly in the suburbs of Beirut and Tripoli, the governorate of Mount Lebanon would also rely on economy and tourism. Urbanism was therefore used as a means for increasing the economic interests of favored businessmen by Bechara el Khoury. Hence, the corruption of the political and administrative systems was affecting the urban development of the country. In 1954, a decree was issued dividing the city’s residential areas, depending on their density. Zones were differentiated by exploitation coefficients only, allowing for a large leeway of interpretation for the private builders. The masterplan didn’t highlight open and green spaces and public buildings. Public intervention occurred only for the expropriation of lands for the construction of roads. The masterplan didn’t have any timeline of implementation (Verdeil 2005) (M. Ghorayeb 1991).7

On the other side, the institutional organization proposed by Ecochard was similar to the one he established in Damascus. The municipal technical office within the Ministry of Public Works created in 1940, was attached in 1942 to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and in 1943, a department charged with the execution of large-scale urban planning projects and road infrastructure was part of the ministry of Public Works. The urbanism departments in the municipalities were joined under regional divisions, the Governorates or Muhafazat in 1950, and each department was divided in five sections: urbanism, study of projects, execution, inspection and accounting. These structures, reflecting Ecochard’s ideas, complicated the administrative process of urbanism (Verdeil 2005). In the 1950s, Beirut went through a massive urbanization, vertically and horizontally. In 1943, the municipality of Beirut issued 390 construction permits for a total built-up area of 107,246 m². In 1955, 1261 construction permits were given for the construction of 640,593 m². Residential and office buildings in reinforced concrete and glass facades were introduced. In 1965, new built areas reached over one million square meters according to the Ministry of Planning (Khayyat 1984).

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6 Ernest Arnold Eghi, 1893 - 1974, was an Austrian - Swiss architect. He lived for a long time in Turkey, where he created the bulk of his built work.

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III

Mapping Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Figure 4. Beirut’s development in stages
In 1955, the flood of the river Abou Ali in Tripoli destroyed parts of the old town causing the death of 400 people and an earthquake in Jezezine in the south ended in the death of fifty people. International solidarity was therefore gathered and the National Reconstruction Office recruited a multidisciplinary team of engineers, architects and urbanists who had graduated from an English speaking university to study projects of reconstruction and urban planning. Their detachment from the local context in addressing social housing in Saida and Sour was criticized. Consequently, under the presidency of Camille Chamoun, Ecochard was involved again in the studies of regional urbanism in 1956. The French urban planner structured the south with axis and exchanges routes linking Beirut to its neighboring countries while providing zones for the development of the agricultural sector (Verdeil 2005).

From 1958 to 1964, the presidency of Fouad Chehab had many implications on the internal and external politics, the economy and society. Preceded by his military career, Chehab was surrounded by foreign experts, more specifically French, who attempted to define an economic and spatial plan. The civil war of 1958 caused because of tensions between Christians and Muslims was resolved through an intervention by the United States requested by then president Camille Chamoun. As the latter’s relation with Arab countries was not solid and favoritism within the government was very common, Fouad Chehab was elected as President because of his diplomatic relations with Arab countries. The institutionalization of the country was essential as this point in order to balance the political forces. The focus was split between the development of a masterplan for Beirut and one for its suburbs who had a large impact on the politics and the economy of the country. Administrative reforms executed in 1959 affected the Ministry of Public Works. Politics, urban planning and private interests were simultaneously taken into consideration. Urban planners would adjust their norms and regulations if conflicting with political or economic interests. The density of the population in Greater Beirut was thus very high. Ecochard dissociated himself from the approved plan. However, it is known as the Masterplan of Ecochard till today (Khayyat 1984). Since 1959, the urbanism department within the municipalities was replaced by the Directorate General of Town Planning (DGU) working under the ministry of Public Works. Politics, urban planning and private interests were simultaneously taken into consideration. Urban planners would adjust their norms and regulations if conflicting with political or economic interests. The construction of a casino were also highlights of the Chehab era. The war in 1975 inhibited the development of the plans (Verdeil 2005).

The town planning legislation of 1963 is an important milestone in the urban planning history of Lebanon. It is the first planning and legislation in the country. The legislation set a higher council for urban planning (HCUP), an independent body formed of representatives from concerned ministries to collaborate with the DGU, leaving the decision in the hands of the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic. The legislation helped moderate the chaotic situation created by the presence of the building code as one regulating process only. Nevertheless, the restraints were not always possible to put in place due to the alignment of the political body and the private investors, resulting in corruption, bribery… Speculation in real estate remained uncontrollable. In order to expropriate lands for large scale urban development, mixed real estate companies, public and private, were created, where 25% of the property goes to the state who is a shareholder with the private sector. Again, the difficulty of the administrative procedure
complicated the process of changing laws or inserting new clauses in the urban planning field. Conflicts of interest arose when a measure of control to the growth of Beirut was suggested, developers resisted the processes of implementation of the masterplan. The building code was nonetheless amended in 1983, which incited all entrepreneurs to obtain building permits the day before the implementation of the new laws integrated in the building code. Enhancements to the public and commercial spaces were added along with land use, division of lots and preservation of forested areas. The changes did not address real estate land speculation variations and land taxation. Developments in areas not part of the zoning or planning schemes were uncontrollable, resulting in an unstructured growth. The development of slums on the southern beaches surrounding the capital was an example where the combination of the displacement of large Shiite groups and the lack of clarification of the property status there resulted in the creation of slums. The municipalities, responsible for addressing the housing crisis were not able to do so (Khayyat 1984).

Informal settlements developed since the 1960s in violation of urban and building regulations and/or property rights. In the 1950s and the 1960s, because of the industrialization and urbanization processes, Lebanese people from South Lebanon and Bekaa Valley, enduring poverty and insecurities, moved to settle near the capital Beirut. The reasons of the creation and development of informal settlements in the suburbs of Beirut are:

First, housing and social policies regarding shelter need and social values of land were lacking. Modern standards of building and urban regulations were adopted in the 1960s, and processes of construction such as building permits were implemented. Both conflicted with the small scale affordable housing and the rural habits of construction. The protection of private property and the increase of land prices which are at the base of the real estate economy resulted in leaving a vast number of urban dwellers, with no labor protection and living wages insurance, unable to find affordable housing (Fawaz 2013). The inhabitants of the informal settlements near Beirut moved in order to seek employment opportunities in factories (eastern suburbs) and large institutions such as Beirut international Airport and Regie du Tabac (southern suburbs) as well as construction sites and quarries (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).

Second, conflicting property claims where public spaces were privatized or allocated to religious parties incited contestation through squatting. Before 1975, the informal settlements which developed in areas of contested property rights were Raml, Ouzai, Horch al Qatil, Horsh Tabet and Jnah. These areas were originally marked in the Ottoman registries as communal land Mushaa. The French mandate abolished this concept and transformed the areas into public land and later into private ones. They sold shares to Elite members who were involved in the development plans of the area (Fawaz and Peillen 2003) (Clerc 2012). These contested lands were squatted by rural migrants, the housing layouts as well as the appropriation and purchase procedures adopted were based on traditional family structures and rural patterns (Jähnigen 2012). From the 1950s to 1967 construction was ongoing but the settlements developed extensively during the war, as most of the owners of the lands were absent. “The residents recognized that they owned the structures but not the land” and therefore felt free to rent rooms within the houses (Fawaz and Peillen 2003). Their inner networks supplied them all the necessary materials and finances to build informal housing, creating a territory for people of one confession (Clerc 2012). Many urban planning interventions were planned in those conflicting property areas but were never carried on. The first ones under the presidency of Chamoun were the sports city and the golf club. Michel Ecochard’s master plan was aimed at forming an area with predominantly low density housing developments. Then

1 In the case of Ouzai, in 1948, the municipality of Bourj Al Barajneh leased shared parcels for 99 years to farm workers. They built their cabins on the land, the first building along the coastal road emerged then, large communal land parcels were converted into private land in 1953. As it was impossible to appeal against the decision, the mayor encouraged the inhabitants to squat several parcels in Ouzai and Raml, which increased in 1958. In 1961, an extension to the airport was planned by the state, destroying 30% to 40% of Ouzai. The project failed to be implemented due to the protest of the inhabitants. During the civil war, Ouzai expanded along the road toward Saida in the South. More Shiites from the South settled in Ouzai, being supported by Amal and Hezbollah. The coastal road became then “an important economic axis, a strategic position as a secure access to the south and a small harbor”. At the end of the civil war, the municipality refused to recognize them as citizens, whose vote and official matters are still to be dealt in their birth place and not their place of residence, denying them public services and other rights. Local self-administration is based on committees representing political and religious parties as Hezbollah. Schools and hospitals would be provided by local stakeholders and the party itself (Jähnigen 2012) (Clerc 2012). Housing conditions are poor: each household consists of 5.71 persons living in 29.3m². Many do not invest in their houses due to the insecurity of their tenure (Jähnigen 2012).
several public schools, hospitals and the Lebanese University which is located in Hadath today were commissioned from 1958 to 1964. In the case of Ouzai, from 1982 to 1988, the state tried to reduce its density and parts of it were destroyed. From 1988 to 1990, the conflict between the two political Shiites parties Hezbollah and Amal affected the area. It is only after 1990 that the government could begin to take control again (Jähnigen 2012).

Third, the existence of areas of exception such as the refugee camps (Syriac, Armenian and Palestinian). In temporary refugee camps, “the housing values were below the market values of surrounding areas”. Low income rural migrants would settle there first and then squat areas surrounding the camp itself such as in the case of Sabra, Shatila in Beirut. These informal settlements were developed either as a direct extension of existing refugee camps or in their close vicinity (Fawaz 2013). Since the 1930s, the Armenian and Syriac refugee camps were extended, especially in the areas of Qarantina, Bourj Hammoud and Karm el Zeitoun (Fawaz and Peillen 2003). Palestinian camps expanded also when rural migrants, whether Lebanese or Palestinian were placed by UNRWA inside the rural camps located in the eastern suburbs of Beirut. Tell el Zaatar in 1974 reached five times its original size in 1950, including the area of Ras el Dekwaneh. The inhabitants registered by UNRWA as Palestinian refugees were 6,347 but the actual number of inhabitants was 17,160. The surface area of the camp changed from 56,646m$^2$ to 300,000m$^2$. These areas became densely populated over time as rural migrants were attracted to the eastern industrial areas of Beirut. The southern suburbs had also a similar extension were Sabra was created at the limit of the refugee camp of Shatila. It was impossible to define the boundaries between Sabra and Shatila. In the 1960s, illegal temporary structures were built on land owned by families who fled from the South of Lebanon. The main development and densification of Sabra happened in the 1970s where confusion related to land property rights facilitated the squatting process. The inhabitants were three times the ones registered by UNRWA as Palestinian refugees (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).

Fourth, violations happened also because of the weakness, and sometimes absence of the Lebanese State. False permits were given through bribes, fostering illegal housing. Political instability and wars forced the displacement of large numbers of populations (Fawaz 2013, 3-5). Informal settlements developed on agricultural or green land, in the far suburbs of the capital city and in violation of urban regulations. Informal settlements were developed in the southern suburbs of the capital city where lands are of low monetary value. Being close to factories and other employment opportunities, the agricultural land area was informally urbanized in the 1950s. Hay el Selloum, Zaaytryeh, Roueissat and Hay al Ayn went through that process. The inhabitants who resided in these areas were rural migrants from the South of Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. They bought large agricultural lots from property owners and built houses on small lots of 100 to 200m$^2$ which didn’t comply with the zoning and construction codes. Some of these families were still organized by tribes and developers from their same villages helped them technically and financially. Politicians were exchanging building permits for votes.

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10 When Qarantina was vacated by the Armenian themselves, it was squatted by Lebanese migrants. The Armenians were renowned for their artisanal experience. They established small industrial areas around the city which attracted Lebanese and Arab migrants to their neighborhoods. Bourj Hammoud expanded towards the South hence the formation of Nabaa, Horsh Rahal and Sinn el Fil along the Beirut River. In 1976, militias surrounded Nabaa evicted the inhabitants leaving it to squatters. In the mid-1990s, the return policies of the Ministry of Displaced Peoplepeople helped the former owners of the houses to regain their properties. Some rented them out and some resettled. Renting their houses to Syrian, Ethiopian and Asian workers was very profitable as the migrants would pay per head or share a house among several people. This resulted in a mixed neighborhood where the illiteracy rate was 11%, much higher than the national illiteracy rate (Fawaz and Peillen 2003, 13).
The types of violations which could be combined in informal settlements in Lebanon are:

**Illegal land occupation**: private or public property squatted by dwellers without paying the price of the land to the official title holders recognized by the land registries.

**Illegal land subdivision**: lands were exchanged and built in violation of urban regulations that require particular procedures including lot sizes. The purchase of the dwellers occurred without following the law.

**Illegal building practices**: mostly combined with other violations. Buildings that were constructed with no building permits and/or didn’t abide by those permits, or buildings built in zones which are not residential such as agricultural zones for instance (Fawaz 2013).

**Civil war**

As mentioned earlier, the government was unable to implement the masterplan and zoning schemes in the country which resulted in the formation of chaotic urban morphologies surrounding the capital before and particularly during the civil war. Land squatting in the suburbs of the capital became common in the civil war years due to the many migration flows. In 1975 people were displaced from Tall al Zaatar and Quarantina and settled in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Ouzai). The invasion of Israel of South Lebanon in 1978 pushed Shiite families to squat unoccupied lands close to cities. The instability of the situation in the Bekaa valley and the Israeli Invasion in 1982 increased the migration flow towards Beirut. The war in the Chouf resulted in the displacement of Christians and Druze. Unstructured and spontaneous, the illegal occupation of the southern suburbs is therefore the immediate result of an urgent need for housing. Various communities and social groups claimed a right to the city. The unclear definition of private and public spaces and the non-rationality of the governing bodies played an important role in the development of the urban space (Khayyat 1984). Besides, the south west suburb of Beirut was always a terrain of experimental urban planning in Beirut where new tools of urban planning were implemented. However, along with the implementation of unclearly defined urban regulations, large numbers of people were displaced in the civil war from 1975 to 1990 and in their search of housing possibilities, squatted entire regions in the Southern suburbs of Beirut (Verdeil 2005). In the 1980s, informal settlements expanded vertically as their density was increasing while horizontally they couldn’t expand. Patterns of inner city informal settlements were introduced to accommodate the need for housing: a single house is divided into several units and rooms are shared. Rental housing options spread quickly, the subdivided units would be rented separately as well as additional floors constructed on top of the existing house (Fawaz 2013, 9). Houses, buildings and entire neighborhoods abandoned by their owners for security reasons were squatted by refugees and were transformed over time into larger squatter settlements. Most of these settlements were located close to Beirut. These squatted housing areas were organized according to the religious origin and later the nationalities of the foreign migrants creating heterogeneous settlements. Some were emptied or destroyed during the war depending on the militias supporting the community (Fawaz and Peillen 2003, 10). The destruction of the eastern suburbs informal settlements led to the displacement of their respective inhabitants to the southern suburbs (Jähnigen 2012, 322). The displaced resorted to self-housing in this laissez faire environment. Formal settlements were developed as a village: low rise housing, outdoor spaces attached to dwellings (courtyards and gardens), haphazard layout of building, rural attitudes, habits and social ties despite migration to city and attachment to the land itself (Clere 2012, 311). Occupying illegally lands, and building their houses gradually over time, the migrants were grouped based on confession, kinship or communities of origin, they were supported by political parties who defended their presence as squatters in the vicinity of the capital (Verdeil 2005).

Settlements where the construction was in good condition were emptied by militias and the abandoned houses were squatted by other refugees and
migrants\(^\text{14}\). New communities were formed. Other informal settlements such as Shatila and its extended area was completely destroyed in 1982 and remained uninhabited till 1992, the war was over then and the state decided to clear the sport stadium (Fawaz and Peillen 2003, 13). The city center and the green line particularly was evacuated in the first years of the civil war and then squatted by Lebanese migrants. After the war, the squatters were evicted and the houses were returned to their original owners, reducing the size of the informal settlements (Fawaz and Peillen 2003, 20).

On the other side, the urban landscape changed with the infiltration of 110 000 Palestinian refugees in 1948 in Lebanon. Kurds entered Lebanon gradually over time and settled in the Jewish neighborhood of Wadi Abou Jmîl in the center of the capital during the war in the 1970s. Due to political and economic reasons, workers from Syria and Egypt infiltrated themselves in Lebanon gradually. The various ethnic and foreign populations impacted the urbanization of Beirut as well as its social and demographic composition. In 1975, foreigners represented 45% of the total population of Greater Beirut which was higher than the percentage of rural migrants in the city. Both, rural migrants and foreigners, were assembled on the periphery of the capital as they supplied cheap manual labor for the industrialization growth. On the other hand, marginalized groups didn’t have any attachment to the urban society with which they coexisted. They therefore incited the creation of slums as a solution for the housing crisis they were facing and thus generated political instability. The war affected the migration and displacement process of the population from the South of Lebanon to the suburbs of the sprawling capital (Khayyat 1984).

In 1982, a new administrative organization was set up to deal with the consequences of the war through a reconstruction project in 1982 leading to the creation of a Masterplan for the Metropolitan Region: Schéma Directeur de la Région Métropolitaine. New organizations, having the capacity to technically address reconstruction issues based on the local and foreign market were formed. The land fill of the northern coast bordering the capital was a result of the post war reconstruction. Supported by politics, various stakeholders in the real estate market benefited financially by changing the economic and social landscape of the city (Verdeil 2005). Private initiatives were encouraged by a government whose economic and personal interests were at the base of all its decisions. The liberal approach was therefore inhibiting the implementation of urban planning requirements and favored private developments. The divided political structures were the major defining elements in the urban planning schemes, leaving the government itself a minor possibility of intervention (Khayyat 1984)\(^\text{15}\).

\textit{Post war years}

The post war years were marked by the reconstruction projects of the country led by prominent politicians, specifically Prime Minister Hariri. Apart from his personal interests, he aimed to reestablish the economy of the country to its prewar level. His political and financial position allowed him to coordinate the reconstruction projects in the center of Beirut and to influence the collection of external funds to support the process of expropriation of lands and urban developments. The social, financial and political aspects of the projects were criticized by intellectuals and experts in the field of urban planning and architecture, but without any consequence on the progress of reconstruction. The state’s involvement in the urban planning, as opposed to the previous period, was associated with its interest in reviving the public sector. The diversity of Lebanon in terms of its populations and their mentalities influenced by western and Arab countries was a challenge in addressing the politics of urbanism in the reconstruction period (Verdeil 2005)\(^\text{16}\).

However, in the post-war years, reconstruction projects and return policies attempted to send back the refugees to their original residence places by paying them a compensation fee. Large scale projects and infrastructures could then

\(^{14}\) The case of Jnah illustrates how the settlement was formed. Following the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the first wave of occupation occurred: 20 houses were built by Christians near the Notre Dame de Jnah church. After, the buildings were legalized by the municipality of Ghobeiry obtaining water supply, electricity and telephone lines in 1962. In 1975, at the beginning of the civil war, a second wave of occupation settled. Refugees from the Bekaa Valley and Southern Lebanon bought illegally subdivided parcels of lands from fake estate agents. The beach facilities and bungalows of Jnah: St Simon and St Michel were squatted with the support of the militias. The inhabitants of the eastern suburban informal settlements: Kurds, Palestinians and Syrians came to reside in Jnah (Jähnigen 2012, 325).

\(^{15}\) For further information, refer to Hibri, Hatim el. 2009. “Mapping Beirut Toward a History of the Translation of Space from the French Mandate through the Civil War (1920–91).” The Arab World Geographer 12, no. 34, 119-135.

be planned and executed in those areas. The construction of highways was coordinated with the Ministry of Displaced Persons and squatters were moved allowing the works to begin (the case of Nabaa, Bourj Hammoud, Karm el Zeitoun) (Fawaz and Peillen 2003). However, that was restricted to a small part of the informal settlement. In the southern suburb, a highway was constructed to connect Beirut city center to the international airport to hide the slums but apart from some roads, the resistance of the Shiite militias to removing the informal settlements inhibited the state to go on with the project. The Elyssar project was conceived to eradicate the informal settlements in the southern suburbs of Beirut. In 1995, 560 hectares were to be freed from the south-western sea front areas of the city’s suburbs. The area consisted of sand dunes and high end beaches which were squatted throughout the civil war. “The districts were a stronghold of the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah and neighboring districts as Burj Al Barajneh, Ghobeiry, Haret Hreik”. The Prime Minister Rafik Hariri wanted to “regain a foothold in those areas by the Elyssar project. In 1995, after three years of negotiations, the decision was formalized by a plan and ministerial decree to carry out a restructuring project for the area to improve the infrastructure, develop real estate and tourist resorts along the city’s biggest beach (Clerc 2012). The project was ideologically a “scheme of reconciliation among the Lebanese people and reunification of a city that was fragmented into numerous communities and districts by the civil war. It sought to open up and reinstate 560 hectares of the south-western suburbs in the city”. But residents wanted to maintain their sectarian territorial roots. The project was hardly implemented: only main roads and public facilities were built, causing the demolition of part of the illegal settlements (Clerc 2012). Relocation was a political, economic and social statement denying the city to Shiites. They were also used to the kind of urban life they have adopted and could not go back to their former rural life (Clerc 2012). Generally, very few policies were developed and none implemented to address the informal settlements. In addition, other public policies affected the development such as the displacement compensation policies, the regularization policies. The perception of dwellers in informal settlements to be criminals as the state tried to develop strategies to evacuate the dwellers. But these attempts failed as the neighborhoods were mobilized under the protection of political parties. The Ministry of Displaced Persons was responsible for addressing this issue instead of the Ministry of Housing. The jurisdiction of the informal settlements was under the municipalities within which they were located. The latter perceived informal settlements as “a temporary unbearable load where quarters of poverty and physical social and economic problems, dwellers were accumulated, while the dwellers were non-taxpayers or local voters who would not benefit the municipalities in any way (Fawaz 2013, 15).”

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Timeline 1: Historical creation of refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon

- 1915: Mass displacement of Armenian from Turkey and arrival in Lebanon.
- 1920: State of Greater Lebanon under the French Mandate.
- 1926: Declaration of the Lebanese Republic under the French mandate.
- 1930: Hayy El Siryan
- 1936: Bourj Hammoud
- 1939: Karm El Zeitoun
- 1940: Rashidieh
- 1941: Hayy El Buss
- 1942: Ein El Helweh
- 1943: Bourj Shemali
- 1945: Wavel
- 1948: Mar Elias
- 1949: Nahr El Bared
- 1950: Bourj El Barajneh
- 1954: Mieh Mieh
- 1955: Beddawi
- 1960: Shatila
- 1963: Dbayeh
- 1960: Rashidieh

- 1910: Lebanon part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918.
- 1918: Lebanon part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918.
- 1941: Naba
- 1945: Wata el Mousseitbeh
- 1950: Zaatriyeh
- 1955: Havy El Sellom
- 1958: Raml Ouzai
- 1960: Roucisset
- 1964: Foundation of PLO
- 1973: Civil war in Lebanon
- 1949: Armenia

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III Mapping Refugee Camps in Lebanon
Timeline 1: Historical creation of refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon

1967: Six-Day war in Jordan, Lebanon as a base for Palestinians
1970: Foundation of PLO
1970: Black September, expulsion of PLO from Jordan and regroupment in Lebanon
1970: First Israeli Invasion
1977: Second Israeli Invasion
1988: Annulment of the Cairo Agreement in Lebanon
1990: End of the civil war after the Taif Agreement in 1989
2000: Withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon
2005: End of Syrian occupation in Lebanon
2011: Start of the Syrian civil war
2012: First wave of Syrian refugees enter Lebanon
2013: Start of the Syrian civil war
2014: UN announces the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon surpasses one million
2015: UN announces the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon surpasses one million

Governorates:
- Nabatiyeh Governorate
- Bekaa Governorate
- Baalbek El-Hermel Governorate
- Mount Lebanon Governorate
- South Governorate
- North Governorate
- Beirut Governorate

Settlements:
- Sabra
- Akkar Governorate
- Wadi Khaled
- Horsh Tabet
- Laylaki
- Jnah Beaches
- Horsh El Qatif
- Amrussiyeh
- Hayy Zahra
- Horsh El Qatil
- Jnah Beaches
- Laylaki
- Sabra

Map of refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III
Mapping Refugee Camps in Lebanon
Map 1: Distribution of Refugee Camps (RC) and Informal Settlements (IS) in religious areas in Lebanon.

- Maronite
- Shiite
- Sunnite
- Druze
- Greek Orthodox
- Greek Catholic
- Armenian
- Alawi
- Lebanese IS
- Armenian RC
- Syrian RC
- Palestinian RC

Figure 5. Satellite view of Lebanon, 2017

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III
Map 2: Distribution of Refugee Camps (RC) and Informal Settlements (IS) in religious areas in Akkar Governorate

Map 3: Distribution of Refugee Camps (RC) and Informal Settlements (IS) in religious areas in North Governorate
Map 6: Distribution of Refugee Camps (RC) and Informal Settlements (IS) in religious areas in South Governorate

Map 7: Distribution of Refugee Camps (RC) and Informal Settlements (IS) in religious areas in Nabatieh Governorate
Armenian refugee camps

**Historical formation**

In a series of migrations that began in Late Antiquity29, Christians seeking security from persecution have found shelter in Lebanon. So, when in the wake of the First World War, thousands of Armenians arrived in Lebanon as refugees, they had followed a well-trodden path taken by other Christians before them. In the twenty years that followed the First World War, the Armenian refugees put roots in the localities that would in due course be Lebanon’s main Armenian enclaves (Abramson 2013). Arrangements for their accommodation were taken up by the Red Cross, the French Mandate Authorities, and the League of Nations, setting up thousands of tents on empty terrain, situated in the north-east part of Beirut, in the area of Medawar. These led to the creation of the first camp of Medawar in Qarantina in 1920 (Fawaz and Peillen 2003). Armenians proceeded as if they were in Lebanon to stay. In this first phase of emergency, the Armenian refugees benefitted from the assistance of the Armenian Catholic Church, the Lebanese authorities, and various Armenian relief organizations. But the refugees themselves were the principal agents of their own acclimatization and integration in Lebanon. The Armenians from Cilicia, who accounted for the greater bulk of the refugees, grouped themselves into small associations hayrenaksaks whose members shared a common origin in the same locality in Turkey. The hayrenaksaks aggregated their money and purchased land, often at reduced rates, from Christian landowners in Beirut. Each acquisition was then divided into plots that were parcelled out to individual proprietors. Hence the Armenian population settled near Beirut, the biggest settlement was Bourj Hammoud which emerged in the thirties. Complementing the labors of the hayrenaksaks was the Central Relief Committee (established in 1926), which aided in the construction of new neighborhoods for the refugees (Abramson 2013).

**Urbanization process**

As of 1926, on the initiative of various Armenian associations, and with the help of Mandate authorities, more permanent solutions were proposed and

29 Late antiquity is a periodization used by historians to describe the time of transition from classical antiquity to the Middle Ages in mainland Europe, the Mediterranean world, and the Near East.
the Armenian refugees were gradually relocated outside the Qarantina area, to the nearby areas of Bourj Hammoud and Karm el Zeitoun, and other “popular” low-income neighborhoods of the city. These were consolidated over time and their living conditions improved. In 1939, with the arrival of Armenians from Alexandretta as well as other areas of Syria, new extensions appeared to the north of the neighborhood (Ruppert 1999), of which the Sanjak Camp was the last trace until 2006. Today, only narrow sections of Bourj Hammoud can still be labelled as Armenian refugee camp (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).

Between 1948 and 1975, while the architectural process was already at a good stage, new populations came to join the few Armenian refugees who continued to live in Qarantina: Palestinian families as of 1948 and Lebanese migrants from the South, as well as Kurds and Syrians. The majority of these populations were fleeing unemployment and poverty and were attracted by the near industrial area (Nasr and Nasr 1974). The initial camp of Qarantina gradually extended to neighboring areas, especially on terrain owned privately, either by individuals or by the Maronites (Jazra 1969). Private owners have in fact often built precarious houses for rent. The Ministry of Housing conducted a study at the beginning of the 1960s which shows that processes of land occupation were very diverse, and included property ownership, rental, and others (Report of SMUH 1964). The camp was not only a residential area; it also housed many commercial activities, small industries, slaughterhouses, tanneries, and others. Another survey conducted in 1971 indicated that a total of 12,633 individuals and 2,560 households were located in the area. Only 29.4 percent of these were Lebanese, most of whom were from the south of the country. Most of the residents were Syrian and Kurdish, forming each a little over 30 per cent of the total population. The concentration of the Kurdish communities at the time was very notable, especially because Kurds in Qarantina represented a large percentage of the total Kurdish population in the city. On the other hand, the survey indicated that Syrian households, unlike others, were mostly composed of male migrant workers who gathered in rooms, rather than families. An important element of the Qarantina population was its mobility over time. Indeed, surveys conducted in 1963, 1971, and 1975 all indicated a stable number of residents, less than 15,000, but all identified different resident groups living in the area (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).

In 1975, Qarantina was among the slums and “popular neighborhoods” judged undesirable by militias in charge. It was placed under siege and attacked before being razed to the ground on January 18, 1977 (Massabni 1977). Its population fled to other areas of the city, such as the squatter settlements of the southern suburbs of Beirut and the fringes of downtown that were by then completely evacuated (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).
The origin of Sanjak camp can be traced back to 1939, following the annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskederun) to Turkey when Armenians, as refugees, migrated to Lebanon and settled in this “swampy deserted area”. (Karadjian 1986, XIII) The dispute over Alexandretta caused by the signature of the Franco-Syrian Peace Treaty in 1936, which guaranteed the independence of Syria. The perspective of a united and independent Syria alarmed Turkey that expressed concern to the League of Nation for the Turkish community in Alexandretta. The population of the Sanjak before its annexation was a mosaic, heterogeneous society with racial, religious and linguistic differences. There were five major communities: Turkish, Alawi, Sunni, Armenian and Greek Orthodox. Despite the differences, the mosaic coexisted and was equally represented in the local administration (Karadjian 1986, 13-14). The evacuation of the Armenian population started during 1938 when, after the general elections of May, the Parliament of the Hatay (Turkish province) attained a Turkish character. The wave of Armenian emigrants was about 15,000 people who left the Sanjak during August 1939 (Karadjian 1986, 18). The final exodus after the French evacuation was organized by the Armenian Prelacy of Alexandretta, an Armenian humanitarian organization working both in Syria and Lebanon. The organization tried to provide facilities for the resettlement of the refugees before the end of the winter season. The first three stops of the exodus were: Aleppo, where about 3,000 Armenians from the villages of the Amouk plain (Premilitaire, Abdel Huaye, Nor Marash, Hayashen, Kerek Khan, Beylan); Bassit near Latakia, for about 6,000 refugees from Gebel Mousa; and Tartus for about 3,750 Armenians from Alexandretta and villages around it. It was after this first phase of the displacement that the refugees were transported to Lebanon by boat and buses to be permanently settled there. Once in Lebanon, the refugees from Gebel Mountains were settled on a piece of land in Anjar while about 5,000 refugees preferred to stay in and around Beirut. Of those, around 280 families, the farmers, were encouraged to settle in Ras el Ain camp, on the Tyre-Haifa road. The rest remained in the coastal areas of Beirut struggling for survival (Karadjian 1986, 20-21).
to Lebanon and settled in this “swampy deserted area” (Semerdjian 2008). The refugees settled in Beirut in 1939, with the first gathering being near to the Armenian Church at Zokak el Blat. Armenian, local and foreign (mainly French) organizations provided them with simple accommodation like tents and blankets. In search for a permanent settlement, the refugees moved on to the Qarantina and the Tchachabouk areas (poor areas adjacent to the Beirut-Tripoli highway, which was emptied during the 1975-76 civil war), eventually to settle down in the permanent location of Eydebe according to the Bourj Hammoud municipality or “Sanjak camp” for the settlers, until 2006. During the 1940’s the area of Sanjak camp was a swampy deserted place, an unhealthy environment for the newly arrived Armenian refugees. Malaria was the most common disease, while the mud and the reeds did not allow for a proper development of the camp. In order to survive, the refugees organized a “close knit” community where some of them were entitled to dry the swamp, some others to agricultural tasks (Karadjian 1986, 20-21). All the other Armenian camps like Qarantina were evacuated for military and political reasons long after the Armenian inhabitants have left them. Sanjak was the only one to survive and a unique example of a refugee camp that turned into an informal settlement. Gradually, camp dwellers left the slums and camps to become active participants in the “pluralistic society” (Karadjian 1986, 4) of Lebanon. Sanjak slum remained an exception on carrying in it traces of its refugee past (Diab 2012).

“Sanjak” is a slum area situated in Bourj Hammoud in the Eastern suburb of Beirut. It is an example exhibiting many aspects of poverty and deprivation. Even if it is located a few kilometers from some of the focal points of the area like the market and its commercial center, it is physically and socially marginal. The new urbanization around the camp didn’t help to integrate it with the context, on the contrary it worked as a barrier separating it even more (Avakian 2015). During the 1940’s the area was completely detached from the other residential areas of Beirut and from market places. Food, running water, electricity, medical care was almost unattainable. (Karadjian 1986, 21-22)

The proprietors of Sanjak area were the families of Ghandour, Osseilli and a Greek called “Vasso”. Until 1975 the inhabitants would pay to the landowners a symbolic monthly fee. In the beginning, it was 25 piasters (cent of Lebanese lira), then over time it changed to one, two and five Lebanese pounds. They

were excluded from tax or rent and their settlement was interpreted as illegal by law. “Their only right to stay resided in their collective attitude, the years they spent there as well as, their common fate, poverty” (Karadjian 1986, 50). Considering their illegal status, very different from the one of Palestinian refugee camps, there were many attempts to force them to leave the camp. Fires (the most devastating of those premeditated fire incidents, happened in 1966, when the area adjacent to Sanjak, the Tiro camp, was burned demolishing most of the huts. Another big fire occurred in 1970 in the same area with less destructive effects), threats, bribes and many other ways. But every time, their desperation made them stronger in their determination to stay.
Urbanization process

The first phase, as in every refugee camp, was to put up the tents provided by the humanitarian organizations. Later, the Armenians started to construct their “box-like” huts made of reed and mud, the materials they found on their arrival. The proximity of the sea turned rapidly into a source of income, fishing became the most common occupation among the Armenians. Some people cut the reeds and sold them, others gathered the waste and the bones from the slaughter houses situated nearby the seashore, and sold them to farmers as natural fertilizers. (Karadjian 1986) Between 1945-49, when the government of Soviet Armenia decided to accept immigrants, many of the Armenian refugees settled in Lebanon sold their huts to other migrants and emigrated, hoping to find a better life, both economically and socially. The Soviet Union propaganda was very strong during these years, as attested by the UN weekly bulletin and several discussions about this topic. Finally, after some years, due to the industrialization and huge efforts of the camp’s population, the living conditions in the camp improved. The first step was to reconstruct the houses with wood and tin. Water and electricity were brought into the camp together with the construction of public toilets which improved hygienic conditions. Also the socio-cultural life was organized; a church and a school were built in the heart of the camp. Armenian political parties had their centers or clubs inside the camp as well. The main organization responsible for these new and better living conditions is the “Petites Soeurs” whose members lived among the population and shared the difficulties of life with them. The growth of Beirut also influenced positively the urbanization of the camp, creating new opportunities for work and new contacts in order to develop the social identity of the people (Karadjian 1986). In the 1970’s the big change happened and many houses started to improve their conditions using concrete. This was a sign of permanent settlement (Karadjian 1986). The development of refugee camps in Lebanon became faster during the 1970s, as the Palestinian refugee camps found their stability in the same period. Unfortunately, the destructive effects of the civil war arrived in 1978, when one third of the huts were destroyed. Later, on 1981, one of those violent days during the Lebanese civil war, Sanjak area was hit.

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“Because of the protracted civil disturbances, however, along with the absence of central authority, the houses were reconstructed, with the financial aid provided by a benevolent Swiss organization and the Armenian Catholic Church. The families were encouraged to rebuild their houses with more durable and resistant materials. The whole population participated in the realization of this project, women, children, old and young provided their services: Some carried sand, bricks, water... Others cemented and built.” (Karadjian 1986)

The whole Sanjak camp looked like a huge construction area. This collective work was again supervised as in the beginning by the “Petites Soeurs”. It was in this period that the living condition of the camp was improved again and the pavement of the streets and a better drainage system were added. The rain water could no longer stagnate in the houses, footpaths and alleyways. Canalization system and private toilets were introduced. The Lebanese war gave the Armenian refugees the possibility to establish a living in a more permanent and determined way than before, making them perceive even more the “right” to stay because of the effort they put in the realization of their new and improved houses. (Karadjian 1986)

Sanjak camp is constructed on a parcel of land of around 24,000 square meters, with a high population density of 52,083 per square km (Diab 2012). There are many characteristics that this camp shares with other refugee camps, like the congested and dense character. The urban fabric is characterized by a labyrinth of footpaths and alleyways. Some of the pathways which are cemented have a width of one and a half meter. Others are not paved and narrower and do not exceed half a meter each. The average space for each house varies from around 35 to 50 square meters. Almost all the houses are ground floor with no available outdoor space. The houses are almost stuck to one another; sitting in their house, the inhabitants can easily hear their neighbors’ conversations and activities causing a huge lack of privacy. Most of the houses have a poor aspect: they were built with concrete, unpainted outside walls, variegated aluminum and tin sheets for the roofs, some of them have an additional room, on their second floor made of tin or wood.

21 The name Petites Soeurs was invented by the inhabitants of the camp. The “Petites Soeurs” belonged to an international organization supervised by Rome and called the Little Sisters of Jesus Christ. Their mission is to assist the poor in living in the same milieu. They had a positive contribution in the welfare of the camp.
As well as the exterior appearance, the sanitary conditions are primitive. Most of the families have one small toilet with no space for a shower or bath. Only 6 percent have two bathrooms and 5 percent have heaters. The other 95 percent of the population use kerosene containers to boil water. Because of the limited space in the house, all the rooms are, at the same time, living rooms in the mornings, dining rooms at noon and bedrooms at night, the functions are completely mixed. Only 18 percent of the families living in the camps have four or more rooms in their houses. Overall the size of dwelling units is particularly small. The rooms vary in between nine to twelve square meters each and are often overcrowded by old furniture. The same situation is reflected in both the number and size of the rooms and the excessive number of people who are living in this limited space. As explained, the functions inside the house are completely mixed and all the rooms are serving as living room, dining room and bedrooms. 13 percent of the population don’t even have a room that can serve as a bedroom, while a 48 percent of the population has one. The same situation is repeated for the dining room, only 10 percent of the families have a separate dining room. The remaining 90 percent eat either in the living room or the bedroom. The kitchen is rather small to be used as dining room. Considering these conditions the houses are naturally overcrowded. (Karadjian 1986)

Soon after the beginning, the population of the camp had a majority of Armenians (around 85 percent). Other residents have included Shiites, Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians and other foreign workers. In the first phase of the history of the camp, the inhabitants were refugees from Alexandretta but gradually, due to different flows of migration, this homogeneity was lost (Avakian 2015). The common historical past and the ethnic composition of the population have created a homogeneous community, facilitating collective action, on the other hand, with time, the construction of popular houses, the rural urban migration, the high cost of living and the housing shortages have become important factors in changing the social character and homogeneity of this community. The main events that changed the composition are the mass migration to Soviet Armenia between 1945 and 1946 and recurrent fires in the nearby areas such as Qarantina. Gradually all the other camps near Sanjak were deserted and transformed into an industrial zone. Also a new influx of migrant families arrived from Aleppo, Kamishli and Damascus (Karadjian 1986).
The religious composition is another important element to understand the real identity of this place. Ninety percent are Armenians of different religious affiliations, where the dominant religious group is Armenian Orthodox, the remaining are evenly distributed among Maronites, Assyrians, Greek-Orthodox and Greek Catholics. The national identity of Sanjak is divided into two main communities: those who have a Lebanese identity and others who are Syrians. The Lebanese (Armenians and non-Armenians) are the oldest residents of the slum, while most of the families who have a Syrian nationality are relatively new migrants. 64 percent of household heads are Lebanese, while almost one-third have a Syrian nationality. The remaining have an unknown nationality. With the consent of the Lebanese authorities and the assistance of mandatory France, refugees were given identity cards, working facilities and were allowed to settle down in Lebanon. Most of the Syrian inhabitants arrived during the 1970’s when the young generation tried to escape the mandatory military service and at the same time, they were attracted by an increasingly successful economic life in Lebanon. The high proportion of the families who settled in the slum area at this period, had an illegal status, and therefore, are still confronting difficulties in finding jobs and circulating freely. The existing differences in lifestyle, social understanding and socio-economic status between the old and new settlers, the Lebanese and Syrian nationality holders, the inhabitants of the central and peripheral quarters of the slum, are obstacles to the formation of a social consciousness based on a common socio-economic situation (Karadjian 1986).

**Today’s situation**

In 2006, the decision to demolish the refugee camp of Sanjak was taken in order to build at the gates of city of Beirut a shopping mall which would benefit the municipality and its surroundings with economic gains. The following words are of an inhabitant of Sanjak in 2006, during the phase of demolition of the camp:

“Taking a gamble on the lotto provided better chances of finding a solution to the problem of Sanjak Camp than relying on the municipality of Bourj Hammoud, Armenian charities, and churches, all of which have yet to offer tangible solutions to the residents who have been expelled and others who face the same fate with the next stage of demolition.” (Semerdjian 2008)
Before 2006, Sanjak was an easy place to miss. It was hidden behind a bustling shopping center in Bourj Hammoud and next to the high-speed traffic along the Qarantina highway. It was one of the last standing Armenia refugee camps (Semerdjian 2008). The camp lies, ironically, behind the building of the Bourj Hammoud municipality. Before its demolition, it contained about 300 shops and homes that housed around 160 families. In 2008 the remains of the camp counts 45 homes still standing after two stages of demolition that lasted one year and a half (Semerdjian 2008). As mentioned before, over the years, as has happened in many international refugee camps, other communities entered the camps as Armenians moved out towards other areas. Some of them sold or rent their space to new residents like recent refugees from Syria, immigrants from south Asia and other Armenians. By the time of the demolition of Sanjak only 30% of the population of the camp was Armenian (Carpi 2010). After the purchase of the land, the municipality started the process of confiscation of the squatter properties by lifting the thin tin roofs off in order to prohibit new squatters from moving in (Semerdjian 2008). There are many social and economic factors that kept the Armenians inside the camps for such a long time. First of all, Sanjak camp houses were much cheaper than the houses in the rest of the city. Most families in the camp received 3,000 to 5,000 USD compensation from the municipality as annual compensation from the municipality. Unfortunately, this sum was not sufficient to cover the expenses to get a proper housing outside the camp (Semerdjian 2008). Sanjak refugee camp will become “St. Jacques Plaza” and according to the architect Vasken K. Chekijian, the project was conceived to meet the needs of the emerging middle class of Bourj Hammoud (Carpi 2010). The project comprehends a new mall and some residential buildings that will erase completely the camp of Sanjak, the name “St. Jacques” is the only memory of the place.

Figure 20. The destruction of Sanjak in 2008

Figure 21. Children playing in their former house courtyards

Figure 22. Demolished houses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Dominant population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Actors at establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karm el Zeitoun</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Armenian, Syriac, Lebanese, migrant workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Red Cross, French Mandate Authorities, League of Nations before WWII, Armenian Diaspora Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj Hammoud Tiro</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Armenian, Syriac, Lebanese, migrant workers</td>
<td>150 000</td>
<td>Red Cross, French Mandate Authorities, League of Nations before WWII, Armenian Diaspora Organisation, Armenian Relief Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaranina</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1920-1976</td>
<td>Armenian, Syriac, Lebanese, migrant workers</td>
<td>12 633</td>
<td>Red Cross, French Mandate Authorities, League of Nations before WWII, Armenian Diaspora Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanjak</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1939-2008</td>
<td>Armenian and migrant workers*</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>Red Cross, French Mandate Authorities, League of Nations before WWII, Armenian Diaspora Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayu el Siryan, Syriac</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1930-1996</td>
<td>Syriacs, Lebanese, Migrant workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Migrant workers: Syrians, Iraqis, Africans, Philippines, Sri Lankans

Table 1: Facts about Armenian refugee camps
Timeline 3: Historical creation of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon
Palestinian refugee camps

Historical formation

In 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel, about 700,000 Palestinians were dispersed, mostly to neighboring countries. Around 110,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and nowadays more than 400,000 are living there, most in refugee camps (Yamout, Rouham; Farran, Sarah; Rmeileh, Niveen Abu; Hogan, Dennis; Giacaman, Rita 2012). During the first years of their exile, Palestinian refugees in Beirut either rented places or lived in camps originally established for Armenian refugees, especially Qarantina. This happened until 1950, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), was delegated to organize the temporary settlement of Palestinians in neighboring countries and camps were instituted to house various Palestinian communities. The land was rented from private property owners, directly by UNRWA, and refugees were allowed to erect first tents and then houses on these plots. They remain today, within the same structures, with poor levels of services and living conditions (Fawaz and Peillen 2003).

The first camps established in Lebanon date from 1948-1949 such as the one of Dbayeh, Nahr el Bared, Wavel, Ein al Hilweh, Bourj Shemali, Mar Elias, Bourj el Barajneh and Shatila. Only two camps were established before 1949 and they were originally Armenian refugee camps: El Buss and Rashidieh. They were transformed during the 1950s and 1960s in order to host Palestinian refugees. Subsequently in 1954 and 1955 Mieh Mieh and Beddawi refugee camps were created. UNRWA originally established 16 camps, of which three were destroyed (Tel-El-Zaater, Nabatiyeh and Jisr El Basha) and one was evacuated (Gauroud) (UNRWA, 2002). Between 1948 and 1958, the Palestinian refugees lived in relative harmony with their Lebanese hosts, with some freedom of expression and political activity (Jaber 2006). The last camp, Sabra, was created in 1970 but as housing areas for rural-urban migrants and an expansion for Shatila. Two main principles dictated the camps’ location: proximity to cities and religion of the area, as all camps present one of these characteristics or both. The main actors responsible for the first phase of emergencies in the camps were the International Red Cross and subsequently UNRWA for all the camps. Only Mar Elias was established by Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Convent and Norwegian People Aid, together with UNRWA supervision. UNRWA also provides health and
educational services to refugees living in gatherings. Due to the legal aspect of land ownership, UNRWA, however, cannot always provide infrastructure such as shelter and water and sanitation assistance outside the camps (Chit 2009). The Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are typically divided into three groups:

Registered refugees: This group consists of refugees registered by both UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities. According to UNRWA statistics of March 2005 this group constitute 100,000 households with a total of 400,000 people. 53% (224,000) of these live in the 12 UNRWA camps while the remaining (176,000) live in gatherings or are scattered in the Lebanese community. One should however be aware that a large number of Palestinian refugees remain registered with UNRWA in spite of living permanently abroad - this often in order not to lose their legal rights as internationally recognized refugees. Some estimates therefore go as low as 250,000 Palestinian refugees actually present in Lebanon.

Non-registered refugees: Refugees who fall under this group are not registered by UNRWA because they left Palestine after 1948, took refuge outside UNRWA areas of operation or were not in need. Originally, UNRWA was only providing services to registered refugees, but has, since 2004 extended the service to non-registered refugees as well. This group is estimated at 35,000 persons.

Non-identified or non-ID refugees: This group of refugees is not registered by any authority in Lebanon and do not possess any valid documents acknowledging their legal existence. Thus, they are not entitled to any services provided by UNRWA or Lebanese authorities. Organizations like Palestinian Red Crescent Society provide some services. The non-ID refugees cannot leave the gatherings and camps due to potential legal persecution. The number of non-ID refugees is estimated at 3,000 (DRC, 2005).

The refugee camps close to the main cities of the country are: El Buss, Rashidieh and Bourj Shemali around Sour, Ein el Hilweh and Mich Mich around Saida; in the suburbs of Beirut Bourj el Barajneh, Sabra and Shatila and more towards the center of the city the small camp of Mar Elias. Al last Bedawi is close to Tripoli and Wavel near Baalbek. Dbayeh is the only Christian Palestinian refugee camp and it is located on the coast, in between Beirut and Jounieh in a Christian area. Nahr el Bared is the most isolated camp in the middle of an agricultural area in a Sunnite area. Most of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were Sunnites (Barakat 2013).

Most of the studies on refugees showed a clear difference between refugees in camps and urban refugees living in cities. The Palestinian case, due to its exceptional duration and the context of rapid urbanization of their host countries, invites us to re-examine this division. Most of the refugee camps in Lebanon are now part of the main Lebanese urban areas. On the one hand, they appear to be marginalized and segregated areas due to the special regulation and monitoring as well as the legal status of their Palestinian residents. On the other hand, refugee camps are strongly connected to their urban environment through the daily mobility of Palestinian refugees, the growing presence of other groups of refugees and migrants (such as Syrian or Asian workers and Iraqi or Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees), and the development of commercial activities that blur the boundaries of the refugee camps, making it a part of the city (Knudsen and Hanafi 2011). The distance from the city was and is an important factor for the development of a camp.

**Urbanization process**

After sixty years of exile, new forms of local integration have been generated especially in urban areas where refugee camps are now part of the cities that surrounded them. Since the late 1940s, refugee camps started to transform from tents to highly dense, built-up areas. In the 1950s the places where Palestinians settled in the suburbs of Beirut were not only Palestinian areas, but poor and segregated neighborhoods where marginalized migrants such as Syrians, Kurds or Armenians, also settled (Knudsen and Hanafi 2011). The houses started to become always less temporary and turn into proper settlements. In order to discourage permanent resettlement, the Lebanese government started placing harsh restriction on the refugees. For example, no housing development was permitted. In 1962, Palestinians were classified as foreigners and work permits became difficult to obtain. Martial law was imposed on the refugee camps, all which resulted in the 1969 ‘uprising’ in the
camps (Sharie 2007). With the signing of the 1969 Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) the situation of the refugees improved substantially. During more than ten years, from 1969 to 1982, the Palestinians have known in this country a liberty of action that no other host state gave them, which enabled them to mark their presence in certain spaces like camps and to transform deeply some urban neighborhoods. Due to the rapid urbanization of the Middle Eastern countries most of the refugee camps are part of the different main cities in their respective countries or host regions (Doraï 2007). As mentioned by Ishaq Al Qutub, president of Arab Student Aid International:

“In the case of the Palestinian Arab refugee camps – such as those existing in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria – they are prevailing features of the urban structures of these states. […] The camp cities, both small and large, can be considered as urban conglomerations in the demographic and ecological sense. […] These cities represent a unique urban pattern, which has special features, problems, structures, and consequently requires a special classification in the study of urban societies in the Middle East.”
(Qutub 1989)

During the 1970s many camps developed expansions near their borders and the refugees living in these new areas cannot be defined as camp dwellers. This is the case of Palestinians living in Sabra or in the Adjacent area of Nahr el Bared refugee camp. Also in Beddawi a city-like extension was built outside the camp perimeter. This densely built area consists of 6 to 7 floors-high buildings rented exclusively to Palestinian families (A. Loubani 2017).

Camps vary in their connection to the urban tissue of the city. Although marginalized and segregated, generally they are still connected to the urban environment through the different forms of spatial and economic mobility. In Hanafi’s description of the camps in Jordan and Syria, he points out that the refugee camp is an area economically connected but socially disconnected

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22 Refer to page n. X
23 Arab Student Aid International, as a non-profit, non-political, and tax-exempt educational organization, is part of the process of building the human resources and the development of highly specialized and qualified scholars being undertaken in the Arab States with the objective of enhancing social and economic and peace progress.
from the urban tissues in the neighboring areas. But this heterotopic place is not characterized merely by its isolation from its surroundings, but rather by different spatial sets of urban rules projected into the same spatial unit (for instance, being out of the municipality urban regulation but regulated by informal negotiations between the neighbors). These different formations coexist without either of them being derived from or reduced to the other. They constitute a space of tension revolving around deviation, marginality, and contradiction: a space of total control in which acts of resistance and transgression nevertheless take place. Having the significance of a grey zone of ambivalence, neither completely internal nor entirely external to the society at large (or both internal and external at the same time), these closed spaces are extraterritorial, not truly belonging to the place, subsisting “in,” but not being part “of” the space that they physically occupy (Hanafi 2010). For example, the refugee camp of Mar Elias in Beirut is situated at the crossroad between Beirut Southern suburbs of Bir Hassan and Ouzai, Ras Beirut and Cola intersection. This central location facilitates circulation both for camp dwellers who can easily reach other neighborhoods in Beirut and for people from outside the camp wishing to come in whether they are from Beirut or from other regions of Lebanon.

**Impact of the civil war**

For a brief period (1968–82), Palestinians in Lebanon enjoyed unrestricted mobility and a high level of internal autonomy (Peteet 2015). This period stopped in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon, occupied Beirut and forced the PLO out of Lebanon. The evacuation of the PLO led to a worsening situation for the Palestinian refugees. Refugees were left unprotected and were targeted by attacks from various different groups and factions, notably the Christian Phalange and Shiite Amal movements. This was accompanied by internal conflict among the Palestinians as well as external conflict with Israel. Israeli air strikes and artillery killed around 2,400 people in West Beirut, 1,100 in the refugee camps of Sidon and 1,200 in the camps of Tyre. In the camps of the South, the Israeli army destroyed houses that had survived the first attacks as well (USCR Report 1999). During the siege of West Beirut in the summer of 1982 after the PLO withdrawal, hundreds of Palestinians and Lebanese civilians residing in the camps were killed in the refugee camps of Sabra, Shatila and Bourj-El-Barajneh (Sharie 2007). Between 1985 and 1987, conflicts resulted in the destruction of 80% of homes in Shatila camp (Beirut), 50% of homes in Bourj El Barajneh camp and Sabra was almost totally destroyed. An estimated 2500 people were killed during this period (Jaber 2006). Because of these events, the camp cannot be considered only as a place of memory, continuity and stability in exile, but also as a vulnerable place (Dorai 2007).

“During the conflicts of the last thirty-five years, several camps have been completely razed, others severely damaged. Originally 15, the refugee camps today number 12. Some camps, for example Shatila, have been destroyed more than once. A survey carried out in 1988 found a total of 4,468 Palestinian families (around 25,334 individuals) scattered over eighty-seven locations. Of the surveyed families, 75.2% had been displaced more than once, 19.7% more than three times. A later study found that between 1972 and 1988, 90% of Palestinian refugees had been forced from their home at least once, two thirds had been forced twice, and 20% three or more times” (Sayigh 2004)

None of the camps have any formal infrastructure. Some of the destroyed camps were never rebuilt. There was a lot of poverty and the unemployment rate was higher than before the war. The area of land allocated to the camps has remained the same since 1948. Hence, in the densest camps, the refugees could only expand upwards. Construction continued to be uncontrolled and buildings didn’t conform to international safety standards. In the South of Lebanon, the Lebanese government had banned the entry of construction material to the camps since the late 1990s. Thus, the conditions of the camp houses, streets and shops deteriorated. Although this policy was revoked for a few months in 2004 it was readmitted in 2005 (Sharie 2007).

In conclusion, the civil war, as well as the different Israeli invasions, deeply scarred the population of refugee camps and worsened their already unstable conditions. Today in Lebanon, more than 50 percent of the refugees reside in the UNRWA camps. This high rate is one of the signs of the precariousness of the Palestinians in Lebanon. In addition, the legal constraints that affected

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24 Between 1985 and 1987, the Syrian backed Amal Movement, a major Shia militia attacked several Palestinian camps in Beirut and in the South in order to get rid of the remaining pro-Arafat PLO combatants. During periods of intense fighting many of the camps were besieged, cut off from the outside and suffered from lack of food, clean water and medical supplies.
Palestinian refugees deprived them of many essential rights like the access to large parts of the job market (Doraï 2007). Instability and immobility are two major aspects of Palestinian life in Lebanon. This leads to blur the distinction between camp and urban settlement (Doraï 2007). Ein el Hilweh is one of the most dangerous and unstable places in Lebanon and its situation worsened after the war and the invasions during which it was substantially destroyed. UNRWA constructed a multistory housing complex in 1993 to accommodate people from other camps that were destroyed and never rebuilt.

Assistance, protection and legal status

UNHCR makes a clear distinction between refugees in camps, and urban refugees. This categorization is linked to the implementation of its policies of protection and assistance.

“UNHCR protection and assistance programs are generally implemented at the field level. A key question in every project is the settlement pattern of the assisted population: are refugees living in camps, in urban areas or in rural areas among the local population? The exact numbers of refugee camps and people living in them are difficult to establish, for many reasons, including the lack of definition and the dynamic of camps. Should a camp have a minimum size or population density? Should camps have a clearly marked perimeter? Should detention centers, transit centers, collective centers and settlements be considered as camps? Moreover, reliable camp statistics may not always be available due to lack of UNHCR access or presence” (UNHCR 2005).

The legal status of the Palestinians has important implications on the socio-spatial organization of this community in the Lebanon. The legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon has never been addressed since their arrival in 1948. In 1950, the Lebanese government created the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs, which was responsible for the administration of Palestinian refugee issues. Then in 1959, the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs was created as an office in the Ministry of Interior. In 1962, the Lebanese Government classified the Palestinian refugees as foreigners and according to this law all foreigners had to obtain work permits (Al Natour 1997). In 1987, the Lebanese Government unilaterally abrogated the 1969 Cairo Agreement, thus cancelling all socio-economic rights previously granted to Palestinians. The issue of Palestinian rights was briefly considered in 1991, when a committee was specially created for this purpose. The Palestinian representatives presented a memorandum to the committee for the ‘Civil and Social Rights of the Palestinian People’ (Jaber 2006). However, nothing concrete resulted from this committee and since the early 1990’s, Lebanon has placed immense restrictions on the Palestinians in the form of legislation: Palestinian refugees have no political, social or civil rights (UNRWA 2002) (Sharie 2007). The refugees tend to be confined in the informal sector or in the least profitable labor activities which do not require a work permit. Furthermore, the departure of the PLO in 1982 deprived a large number of refugees of jobs developed by the strong presence of the Palestinian political institutions in Lebanon. In a Lebanese economic context, fragile since the end of the Civil war, the Palestinians are marginalized on the strongly competitive Lebanese labor market with the arrival of an important foreign manpower (Doraï 2007).

Palestinian groups and several Palestinian armed factions operate in the camps, although their freedom of movement is restricted. The Lebanese government has not tried to impose state control on the camps. There are about 15 Palestinian factions in Lebanon, the most important being: the coalition of Fatah (Fatah, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front); the contingents of the PLO; and Islamic forces: Ansar, Islamic Philanthropic Association, Al Jamaa al-Islamiyya, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP/DFLP), Palestinian National Alliance, Arab Liberation Front (affiliated with Iraq), Saiqa (Popular Liberation Forces, which is affiliated with Syria), Fatah Intifadah, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Jaber 2006).

Lebanon is the only location where UNRWA offers secondary education to counter balance the restricted access to public schools and the high costs of private schools. UNRWA runs 74 primary schools and 3 secondary schools in Lebanon, educating a total of 45,259 pupils. In central Lebanon, a total of 12 schools are functioning, 10 schools in Saida area plus 9 schools inside Ein el Hilweh refugee camp and one in Mich Mich. 14 schools are present in Tyre, among them 3 are in El Buss, 3 in Rashidieh and 3 in Bourj Shemal refugee camps. In north Lebanon, 17 UNRWA schools are present, 7 in Beddawi
and 7 in Nahr el Bared, the others are in the North but outside the refugee camps. As for the Bekaa, only 5 schools are provided and 2 of them are inside Wavel camp (MEDAIR, Statistical data 2014). Generally, the facilities in UNRWA’s school are in bad condition and the school buildings are in need of repair or replacement. Lebanon’s schools have among the highest class sizes in UNRWA’s five areas of operations. There is also an overall lack of recreational space for students. The poor socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon compel many students to leave school and seek work in order to support their families. Palestinian schools in Lebanon have the highest drop-out rates in all of UNRWA’s areas of operations (Sharie 2007). All Palestinian refugees are denied access to Lebanese public health care, relying on UNRWA medical centers as well as hospitals that have contracts with UNRWA. While UNRWA provides primary and secondary health care, it is only able to contribute a limited reimbursement towards tertiary hospital care. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) is also a principal health provider, although the lack of funding after the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982 has had a serious downward effect on the quality and scope of the services it provides. The 5 main sources of income of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are: employment with UNRWA; remittances from relatives working abroad; employment in Palestinian associations or organizations; employment in agriculture and Lebanese companies; employment in shops and enterprises within the refugee camps (Sharie 2007).

Today’s situation

Palestinian refugee population residing in Lebanon has historically faced social, economic and political exclusion. According to a 2010 Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, carried out by UNRWA/American University of Beirut, 63% of the working-age Palestinian population are unemployed, two-thirds exist below the money metric poverty line, while Palestinians as a whole are excluded from more than 30 professions (Barakat 2013). Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have the worst socio-economic situation in UNRWA’s five areas of operations with the highest percentage of Special Hardship Cases (SHCs). There are approximately 46,204 SHCs which is about 11.4% of the registered refugee population, in comparison with 8.7% in Gaza and 7.3% in Syria (UNRWA 2006). The SHCs receive direct support from UNRWA including direct food aid, cash assistance and shelter rehabilitation (Sharie 2007). The Lebanese Government forbids the reconstruction of totally destroyed camps, and in other camps any

reconstruction or building requires a special permit which is usually not issued. In some camps, Lebanese soldiers verify that the residents are not smuggling in building materials. Building without a permit is punishable by arrest and detention (Sharie 2007).

Demographics of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Graph 1: Population growth in Palestinian refugee camps

Graph 2: Population growth in Ein el Hilweh refugee camp
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Dominant population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Actors at establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar Elias</td>
<td>South West Beirut</td>
<td>1949 and 1952</td>
<td>Palestinian, Migrant workers</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Convent, UNRWA, Norwegian People Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj el Barajneh</td>
<td>Southern suburbs of Beirut</td>
<td>1949 and 1952</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>17 945</td>
<td>League of Red Cross Societies, UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shatila</td>
<td>Southern suburbs of Beirut</td>
<td>1949 and 1952</td>
<td>Palestinian, Syrians</td>
<td>9 842</td>
<td>International Committee of Red Cross, UNRWA, UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhayeh</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>1949 and 1956</td>
<td>Palestinian, Lebanese</td>
<td>4 351</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr el Bared</td>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>5 857 in 2006, 36 338</td>
<td>International Red Cross, UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beddawi</td>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>16 500</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavel</td>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>8 806</td>
<td>UNRWA in 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mieh Mieh</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>5 250</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein el Hilweh</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>54 116</td>
<td>International Red Cross, UNRWA in 1952, PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Buss</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1939 and 1950</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>11 254</td>
<td>Women's Humanitarian Organization, Vocational Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj Shernali</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Palestinian, Lebanese</td>
<td>22 789</td>
<td>UNRWA in 1953, PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidieh</td>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1936 and 1963</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>31 478</td>
<td>UNRWA in 1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Facts about Palestinian refugee camps

Graph 3: Population growth in Mar Elias refugee camp

Graph 4: Population growth in Bourj Barajneh refugee camp

Graph 5: Population growth in Beddawi refugee camp

Graph 6: Population growth in Wavel refugee camp

Graph 7: Population growth in Mieh Mieh refugee camp

Graph 8: Population growth in Ein el Hilweh refugee camp

Graph 9: Population growth in El Buss refugee camp

Graph 10: Population growth in Bourj Shernali refugee camp

Graph 11: Population growth in Rashidieh refugee camp
The Shatila refugee camp was established in 1949 by the International Committee of the Red Cross on a piece of land rented by UNRWA on a 99 year lease (UNRWA). Initially it covered one and a half square kilometers, for 15 families who had fled their villages around the area of Amka, Majd al-Krum and Yajur in northern Palestine, after the first Arab–Israeli war in 1948. The camp has grown considerably and fast. There has been no comprehensive census of camp residents, and estimates of total numbers vary considerably. According to UNRWA, only Palestinians live in the camp, all of them (12 130 by UNRWA’s count) covered by its services (Halabi 2004). In 1948, the commerce between Lebanon and Palestine was active all the time, there were no borders in the two countries (Interviewee Shatila 2016). The establishment phase of Shatila refugee camp continued until 1952. Palestinians lived for 20 years in tents. The International Red Cross and UNRWA distributed the families in tents depending on the number of members in the family. People from the same neighbourhood were spread in different camps in Lebanon. Then, the inhabitants began to name streets in the camp according to the neighborhood they came from, like Chari’ 2ariha, the street of Ariha, Chari’ Jinin, the street of Jinin, a camp in Palestine where a massacre occurred (Interviewee Shatila 2016). Shatila refugee camp was one of the last camps to be settled in Lebanon. Its location in the southern part of Beirut always helped the Palestinians to develop quicker compared to other refugee camps, especially economy wise.

In Shatila, the refugees lived in tents for 20 years, after this first phase, during the 1960s Palestinians stayed in zinc small rooms, the living conditions were still terrible. When Fatah was created, the PLO helped more Palestinians along with the UNRWA. Living conditions improved and the camp was built over time, buildings of 1 or 2 floors began to appear. Palestinians have a lot of immigrants that are living abroad who helped their parents in the camps rebuild their homes. One of the interviewed inhabitants of Shatila said that when the PLO rose between 1968 and 1969, everything changed. Before if a Palestinian would do anything wrong, he was arrested. He couldn’t throw water outside of the house without being noticed. During the civil war that

Refer to page n. X
started in 1975, the whole country was chaotic and everyone began building illegally their own houses. UNRWA constructed houses for the special hardship cases, the very poor people in the camp.

In the 1980s, the construction went on, most of the illegal housing was built then. The construction was chaotic. If they needed another room for a new born child, they would add a floor on top. Depending on your own skills and abilities, they would construct. If they were not skilled enough, the structure might not support the addition and the building will fall. There is no regulation or control or architecture, not even UNRWA. Savings were invested in building homes. The first room that was fixed was the bathroom. UNRWA had provided common bathrooms before in every neighborhood. Thus, they built their own private bathrooms, especially considering the needs of children in a house. Then the bedrooms were built and at the end the living rooms. Living rooms would be shared with neighbors. Windows were made of wood. At the beginning, there were spaces between one house and the other, so light would enter every house but now, everyone constructed rooms above each other in a way that ventilation and light are rarely entering the house. There is no organization, everyone is fighting for his own corner (Interviewee Shatila 2016). In 1985 after the massacre, when people left their own houses, other Palestinians came in and squatted the abandoned areas and since then, they couldn’t reclaim back their houses. No help was provided. There was a medical center but it didn’t have any medication to provide. The best medical centers and hospitals were accessible for Palestinian before 1985. The hospital of Ghazzeh in Sabra was one of the most important hospitals in Beirut till 1983. In the civil war, it was destroyed. Most of the people working there were killed. The abandoned hospital was squatted as well by the refugees left without a home after the events of the 1980s.

Probably due to limited services and lack of presence of UNRWA in the 1990s, the integration of other communities in the camp started. In 1995, the main urbanization happened. According to one of the people interviewed from one of the political factions inside the camp, what pushed most of the people to Shatila camp was Prime Minister Hariri26. Most of these people

26 Rafic Baha El Deen Al Hariri (1 November 1944 – 14 February 2005) was a Lebanese business tycoon and the Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 until his resignation on 20 October 2004. He headed five cabinets during his tenure. Hariri dominated the country’s post-war political and business life and is widely credited with reconstructing the

Figure 30. Unplanned addition of spaces and floors on top of original family house

Figure 31. Optimization of the use of space between buildings

Figure 32. Tarps added for waterproofing purposes on the roof

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III
had lived in Wadi Abou Jmil, the commercial center. A lot of refugees and Lebanese lived there but then, because of the restoration and rebuilding of the area, the inhabitants were paid 100 000 USD per family to leave their houses. Before, the camp hosted only Palestinians. The arrival of new communities in the beginning helped financially the Palestinians who constructed new houses and sold roofs to new comers. But the mix of people and nationalities had also a negative side. The area surrounding the camp was also constructed randomly, as the area of El Horsh, and the neighborhood of the sport city “Al Madina El Riyadiya” (Interviewee Shatila 2016).

“For the outsiders, the image of the camp is Palestinian and whenever something happens in the camp or an issue is raised, the Palestinians are blamed and it is mostly not the case. It is like the case of Ein el Hilweh, which affected the reputation of the camp. People would think of the camp as a chaotic unsafe area where you cannot go by your own. This is not the reality of our population. It is an unorganized chaos. In Berlin, the wall was removed. In China, they removed the wall since 100 years, in Israel, they stopped the construction of the wall. In Ain el Hilweh, the military forces are building a wall now. This will create an explosion, the people living there won't stand for it. They will kill the people next to them and outside the camp. The government should make things a bit easier for us.” (Interviewee Shatila 2016)

The result of the urbanization process, considering the internal divisions of ethnographic groups inside the camp, created four different neighborhoods: the market, mostly occupied by Syrian migrant traders, the Palestinian quarters, the Shiite quarters, and the illegal settlement neighborhood of Sabra (Halabi 2004). The initial infrastructure and the sewage system were made to accommodate 2 000 persons. With the passing of time, much more people settled in Shatila, in 2014 around 9 000 inhabitants were counted by UNRWA. All the infrastructures are not sufficient for the quantity of people present. Until nowadays, refugees are having flooding problems every winter. The electricity was barely there, and was not stable and the same for the water. Each neighborhood had private generators to provide...
The water provided for the houses is salt water from the sea. Although the inhabitants claim that they always paid all the legal fees for the electricity and the water, they never received any. That is the case of all Beirut though. The water problem is unsolvable, the water tank which was provided was and is not being used. Electricity and water pipes ran through the whole camp, next to each other. UNRWA was not responsible anymore for picking up the garbage in the streets so the PLO and other NGOs were trying to incite people to put their garbage at the same time in the morning outside of their homes in order to pick it up and keep the camp clean. That way, young people would be employed to work every day. Each local NGO is responsible for a time to do that job, and then they shift. Considering the lack of management over the camp, Palestinians established committees which were responsible for the management of the camp. There was a security committee and a popular committee. The factions are following countries and their political agendas. Two committees are present in the camp: the PLO and the Alliance, Tahaluf.[27] (Interviewee Shatila 2016).

UNRWA schools were very good before the overcrowding of the camp. After the 1990s instead of having 20 students in the class, the class were composed of 60, 70 students, especially with the arrival of the Syrians. According to the interview conducted in the camp it seems that UNRWA doesn’t have any role with the Palestinian refugees anymore, even concerning health and medication. The interest shifted completely to the Syrian refugees. “They are getting more help than anyone had in any war”. The school in Bir Hassan is the only one which continued till the Baccalaureate[28], for a total of three or four classes for all Beirut. After studying, the young people worked in construction or became merchants.

During the development process, Shatila refugee camp collected a mixed population with all kind of backgrounds, it was a melting pot. There were no industries in Shatila, manpower and labor are the major works that Palestinians were doing, both inside and outside the camp. The market of Sabra, commercial souk with vegetables and all kinds of goods was held by Palestinians and after the 1990s by other foreigners as well. They bring their products and vegetables from the Bekaa valley or from Syria. The exclusion

[27] The Palestinian political faction Tahaluf is composed of most Palestinian factions that were present in the camp who represent the majority was pro-Syrian.

[28] See page n. X
of Palestinians from the Lebanese political system and economic sector has led to unemployment and high density, the roots of social problems in all the camps (Halabi 2004).

**Impact of the civil war**

In the 1970s, after the events of September in Jordan known as Black September\(^\text{29}\), the return of Palestinians to the lands of 1967 was discussed, two countries would be living on one land. “When the revolution failed there and Palestinians were killed en masse, the dream of coming back home began to disappear. “At the end, this is my house. Do I want to hear the rain fall all the time on top of my head? The noise was so loud, I couldn’t even listen to my son. I had hoped to return to my own country one year later, but then I didn’t have any hope anymore to return before 20 years at least. All the Arab countries were dispersed. So, we decided to fix our homes. All people live in their own nations; our nation lives in us. Nothing is a permanent house for us, we will always have the faith of going back to our own country” (Interviewee Shatila 2016). Wars happened in Shatila, the camp was destroyed in 1982 and then it was reconstructed. Palestinians wanted to live there, thus they reconstructed and improved their homes gradually. In 1985, the Palestinian-Shiite clashes occurred and the camp was destroyed again and then reconstructed. Every time a Palestinian saved some money such as 100 USD, he used them for his home. 90% of the inhabitants had another property outside the camp. The ones who could not leave stayed in the camp. Whenever they had a house outside the camp, they rent the house inside Shatila to get an income, this is another way to implement the ethnographic differences. The massive settlement of displaced Shiites and Syrian workers within the camp after the civil war, attributable not only to cheap rents but also to the tacit approval of the Lebanese state, led to a sharp increase in the cost of rents. Palestinians have been pressured gradually into leaving Shatila and looking for alternative cheap housing, either in the slums around the camp or in other marginal camps. This has created discontent among Palestinian residents who risked the loss of their refugee status. Some

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\(^{29}\) Black September is the conflict fought between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, and the Jordanian Armed Forces, under the leadership of King Hussein primarily between 16 and 27 September 1970, and ended in July 1971. The armed conflict ended with the expulsion of the PLO leadership and thousands of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon.
reports estimate that the proportion of Palestinians in the camp dropped to 50 percent after the conflicts (Halabi 2004).

The fight over the identity of the camp is also manifested in the displays of political allegiance. Playing a certain radio station revealed the listener’s place of origin, religion and political allegiance, and there were many stories in Shatila of Palestinian residents threatening their Lebanese neighbors when they turned on their politically oriented radio stations. Living in “closed spaces” brought a need for explicit physical appropriation of the space such as the use of political flags, which signify religious and political allegiance. Camp residents are therefore divided into “insiders” and “outsiders”. These concepts reflected nationalist and ethnic loyalties more than physical location. Indeed, these concepts were related to the legitimacy of living in the camp, and are often connected to the camp’s history and to the first settlements.

Tension over the identity of the camp is an omnipresent theme in the respondents’ understanding of life there (Halabi 2004). The conflicts during the 1980s didn’t help the work situation. Palestinians from the 1990s started to be excluded also form the activities they’ve always practiced. Indeed, the market surrounding the camp was taken over mainly by Syrian traders and, slowly, Palestinian traders were denied access. The influx of non-Palestinian traders to the Sabra market in the postwar period led to an increase in the cost of rents for small shops typically occupied by Palestinians. This has kept many Palestinian sellers outside the market. Besides employment, competition over scarce resources included a struggle over housing. With the influx of additional refugees fleeing the 1967 war, the housing problem in Shatila became more acute and generated serious conflict between families. When non-Palestinians settled in Shatila after the war in Lebanon, housing became a source for inter-communal conflict and feuds (Halabi 2004). The natural population growth in the camp led to the building of illegal structures on land that was not rented by UNRWA, Sabra was the proof of this process. Due to the illegal nature of these apartments, no leases were issued to tenants, and the government was either unaware of the transactions or saw in these illegal settlements a solution to housing for those who were evacuated from the city center. Non-Palestinian contractors were not only building six-storey buildings on land that wasn’t theirs but they were also selling apartments to more than one Palestinian family. There has been major conflict over “ownership”, which is defined not in contracts and legal documents but, rather, is based merely on the contractor’s “promise”. The cultural, moral and economic conflict between the different communities living in the Shatila camp created a context within which incidents can quickly degenerate and kill people (Halabi 2004).

**Today’s situation**

Shatila, a place initially intended for Palestinian refugees, is now home to the some of the Palestinians’ previous war enemies (Halabi 2004). What all these groups have in common is their lack of legitimacy. Almost 60 years after they first settled, the Palestinian refugees still have the status of temporary and practically illegitimate residents. Meanwhile, the displaced Lebanese remain illegal settlers in the city and, as such, cannot vote in the municipality of their residence but in their place of origin. The Syrian migrant workers’ presence in Lebanon is exclusively tied to the construction sector, and they do not even appear in the Ministry of Labor’s registries. Since the war in Syria, even though Palestinians in Shatila were besieged by Syrians for 5 years, Syrians came to the camp to stay (especially Palestine-Syrians). They felt it was safer than outside in the capital because of political tension. The Syrians arrival “is creating some problems, because if I want to rent a place for my son, it will cost 500 USD which is expensive for me but then for the Syrians, 3 or 4 families divide the rent fee and live all together in one house.” (Interviewee Shatila 2016). Today, Shatila is an isolated peripheral city despite being close to Beirut’s center. Although the camp is still small in area, its inner streets are a labyrinth of unfinished structures, with expansion frequently taking the form of added storeys. These structures are technically illegal, but a network of connections based on bribery ensures continued construction. The ad-hoc and temporary character of the camp prevents the building of adequate infrastructure. The population continues to grow, and shortages of water and electricity are increasingly common. Residents are left to obtain power and water from private entrepreneurs.

In the streets of Shatila, where electric wires are suspended chaotically from one side of the street to the other, the sight of the sky is a luxury. The sewage system’s failure to contain growing amounts of waste leads to a frequent bursting of pipes. The streets of the camp are always busy. During the day, children play barefoot in the streets, waiting for their shift at the overcrowded schools. Near the major grocery shops, men gather around cups of tea or coffee. The number of unemployed young men around the headquarters of political groups is striking. Young women are usually confined indoors, and...
are not part of the outdoor scene in Shatila (Halabi 2004). The restrictions of the government are leading to create more thieves, criminals and violent people in the camps. “When the responsible of the family has an income of 500 to 600 USD what can he do? Even the PLO is not helping us at all. The UN was created for the Palestinian people, not for Afghanistan or Pakistan or any other country, as it says in the article 194. A hungry person who needs to feed his family will go to steal. But then the Lebanese person is not getting any help as well” (Interviewee Shatila 2016).

It is estimated that half of the 12,235 inhabitants of Shatila are non-Palestinians, mainly Syrian and Lebanese. Established in 1949 the camp is well known for the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 1982. Located in a poor neighborhood in Beirut, it is estimated that today half the population of Shatila is non-Palestinians. According to UNRWA, Shatila faces some of the worst environmental health conditions among Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, with only three square meter per capita, the camp is overcrowded, the sewage system is inadequate to serve the large number of inhabitants, and with open sewage drains and unreliable drinking water distributed by the municipality of Beirut the health hazard is very high. Additionally, some of the shelters around the camp are some of the worst among the official refugee camps in Lebanon. In a site visit to the camp, Roberts notes that the shelters appear to be made out of concrete slabs with pieces of cardboard, corrugated steel and plastic sheets for walls (Massad 2009) (Roberts 2000).

Many Palestinians also claim they are now in a minority in the camp, making up only about 30 per cent of the total population, with the remaining 70 per cent being “outsiders” and “invaders”. Other approximations in recent years for the total number of residents have ranged between 17,000 and 20,000. Shatila is surrounded by the Sabra market, built on the remains of the unofficial Sabra camp totally destroyed by the Israeli army in 1982 (Halabi 2004). The attribution of refugee status to the Palestinians also implied their right of return, as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. Palestinians who acquired citizenship of other countries, or who moved outside the camps, were stripped of their refugee entitlements (if this came to the notice of UNRWA) and lost their right of return to their Palestinian towns. This association of refugee status with physical presence within the camp led to a kind of spatial identification of the camp with the Palestinian homeland, and the possibility of returning there. Leaving Shatila, on the other hand, was equivalent to abandoning Palestinian identity and its entitlements (Halabi 2004).
Mapping Refugee Camps in Lebanon

The Syrian crisis began on March 15, 2011 with a wide spread protest against the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and developed into a violent civil war that still rages today. The flow of migration of Syrian refugees increased exponentially over time. The UNHCR has been actively helping the displaced in Syria and in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt. In May 2011, the first refugee camp was set up in Turkey, followed by the Zaatari Refugee camp in Jordan in July 2012. In December 2012, neighboring countries were hosting 500,000 refugees at least, in March 2013, the number of refugees reached one million and two million in September 2013. The UNHCR appointed a Regional refugee coordinator for Syrian refugees in May 2012 and issued appeals to the European Union to grant asylum to the displaced population which happened only later in 2013 when Germany accepted the first group of Syrian refugees for temporary relocation (UNHCR, Chronology of Syria’s Displacement Crisis, Fact Sheet: Timeline and Figures 2013). The UN established the first Regional Response Plan (RRP) for refugees in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt in March 2012 with a budget of 100 million USD. In 2013, the budget was of 1 billion USD and later 1.7 billion USD. The program launched in 2015 had a budget of 2.14 billion USD and 2.48 billion USD in 2016 (Dionigi February 2016). The governments of Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, along with the UNHCR ask for international help for the host countries in order to address the Syrian refugee crisis (UNHCR, Chronology of Syria’s Displacement Crisis, Fact Sheet: Timeline and Figures 2013).

Since the war in Syria, the flow of refugees to Lebanon and other neighboring countries has been increasing tremendously. At the end of 2012, 175,000 Syrian refugees were assessed to have entered Lebanon who shared its northern and eastern borders with Syria, while in mid-2013, the number exceeded 300,000 refugees (UNHCR December 2013). The number of registered refugees now is 1.2 million. Every month, 47,000 Syrian refugees arrive fleeing the war in their own country. As the movement of Syrians and Lebanese across borders was never restricted by any measures, the refugees could enter the country by presenting an ID only without any constraint. In 2013, the General Security Office (GSO) established checks at the border which didn’t affect much the...
increasing number of refugees entering the country. Loose border control, similarity of the local environment and geographic proximity led to the creation of settlements all over the territory (Dionigi February 2016). The number of Syrian refugees today represents more a quarter of the population of the host country. “According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), “Lebanon has become the country with the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide, struggling to keep pace with a crisis that shows no signs of slowing” (Grisgraber 2014). Added to that number, Syrian migrant workers who were living in Lebanon before the outbreak of the civil war and Syrians with financial means are also to be counted (UNHCR December 2013). While being distributed in the whole country, the highest concentration of refugees is in the Bekaa (35%) and North Lebanon (25%), both connected to the Syrian borders and in Beirut (25%). Most settlements are either in cities or in peri-urban areas at the borders of cities or villages (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). 18% of the registered refugee population is currently living in informal settlements consisting of tents and temporary structures (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon May 2016). In 2013, 78 percent of the refugees counted were women and children. 35 percent of them had disabilities of some sort (UNHCR December 2013).

The response of Lebanon to the Syrian crisis is led by the Government of Lebanon (GoL) and local actors and NGOs, having support from the international community (UNHCR December 2013). The GoL, is thriving to provide public services to refugees with nonetheless a limited capacity to do so. Water, waste management and power supply are the most challenging services to implement (UNHCR December 2013).

At the beginning of the war in Syria, in collaboration with the Lebanese government through the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the High Relief Council, the UNHCR established a presence on the northern borders, covering the presence of refugees internationally. The war was perceived as a short-term conflict at first. The general approach to the crisis didn’t change till 2014. Till July 2012, the number of refugees was increasing slowly as only 100 000 Syrian refugees were registered with UNHCR. As the conflict persisted and the political terrain of Lebanon became involved in the events of Syria, the humanitarian response of the government of Lebanon was linked to the political environment. The Baabda declaration signed in June 2012 dissociated Lebanon from regional and international conflicts, mentioning the importance of the right to humanitarian solidarity with no further specifications. Following that, the MoSA was the only accountable governmental body responsible for the refugee crisis, although it didn’t have the competences and the capacity to deal with the matter. The UNHCR became therefore the main actor in addressing the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Unstable transitional period of governance and series of attacks against civilians when Hezbollah was openly involved in the Syrian war affected the response to the crisis and led to a depoliticization of the refugees’ presence. Humanitarian actors were freely involved in managing the latter. In March 2014, the government decided to address directly the Syrian crisis that had reached an apex. In May 2014, the number of registered Syrians with UNHCR reached one million. A Crisis Cell was established by the government to collaborate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, the MoSA and later the General Security Office (GSO). Seeking help from international and local organization, exploring the possibility of relocation in safe zones in Syria and managing the living conditions of refugees internally based on international standards were on the government’s agenda. Refugees travelling back and forth to Syria were not allowed to seek refuge in Lebanon. The manifestation done by Syrians in 2014 gave rise to let Syrians stay. Conflicts between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Salafists groups30 based originally in Syria increased the perception of Syrians as a factor of insecurity. A policy paper approved by the government in October 2014 and enacted in December 2014 opposed the Berlin conference document where the responsibilities of the host state were given more importance than the international support required in situation of crisis. The approach was compared to the Cairo Agreement, seen as one of the indirect causes of the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon. The policy paper certified that Lebanon has already contributed more than its capacity allows in helping the Syrian refugees, that a legislation needed to be created to limit the entrance of new refugees, and that measures should be implemented to decrease the numbers of UNHCR registered Syrians in the country. The new measures did help reach the objective set by the policy, slowing down the migration flow, but it resulted as well in creating a segregation of Syrians in the Lebanese communities. Syrians were more vulnerable to being arrested or less likely to renew their papers in particular.

30 The Salafist movement or Salafist movement or Salafism is an ultra-conservative reform branch or movement within Sunni Islam that developed in Arabia in the first half of the 18th century against a background of European colonialism. It advocated a return to the traditions of the “devout ancestors”, the salaf.
circumstances. This also resulted in the non-registration of new born babies whenever the Syrians didn’t have legal documents, thus increasing the uncertainty of the exact number of Syrian refugees. The debate about citizenship discussed in the chapter of Nahr el Bared was also addressed. Lebanon has therefore changed its policy from an “open door policy” to a limitation of access of refugees in a difficult political and economic context where funds were not provided to sustain the GoL in its actions. Following the London pledging conference for the Syrian crisis in 2016, Lebanon stated its openness to soften measures in exchange of international funds (Dionigi February 2016). Besides, the unwillingness of the government to formalize the informal settlements of the Syrians is in response to the fear of having another type of permanent camp such as the Palestinian refugee camps. Informal settlements as defined by the UNHCR and the Government of Lebanon “covers a very wide range of realities, from a small encampment of tents and makeshift structures occupied by an extended family, to large settlements covering several plots of land and sheltering over 100 tents (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

International humanitarian assistance
The roles of the international humanitarian assistance were as follows: UNHCR was responsible for supporting the coordination of the humanitarian actions, having as partners the World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and UNRWA for Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) (UNHCR December 2013).

Local actors
As the Government of Lebanon did not have the capacity to develop a national strategy to the crisis, humanitarian organizations cooperated with municipal authorities (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). The difficulty of reaching any agreement within the government as all the ministers are to approve the receipt, disbursement, and use of any international funding for the refugee crisis, municipalities were given the power to collaborate with local and international NGOs and create social cohesion projects such as community building and conflict resolution (Grisgraber 2014). The role of municipalities changes depending on the situation. Their priorities are to respond to urgent needs, providing shelters, coordination of the services and conflict resolutions, while some other municipalities are more involved.
in negotiating with landlords the presence or absence of the settlement in particular areas, implementing local curfews when perceptions of insecurity of the host community are vocalized. The international organizations distribute goods and services to refugees bypassing the municipal authority. The management of the crisis, being handled separately by each municipality, was not unified (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014) (Dionigi February 2016).

The humanitarian assistance, based at the beginning of the crisis on lifesaving aid, changed its focus into a long-term development assistance. Emergency assistance and development aid are therefore combined in order to address the consequences of the crisis (Grisgraber 2014). The required humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in Lebanon needed double the amount of funds available to be achieved. The registration process improved over time, minimizing the amount of time it required. The complexity of the program was due to the numbers of refugees and their distribution in many governorates in Lebanon. International humanitarian organizations such as the WFP provided the food supply while UNHCR and NGOs distributed essential household items, clothes, blankets, stoves and fuel vouchers. The enrolment of children in the Lebanese public school system, although supported by the Ministry of Education, UNHCR and UNICEF, didn’t properly succeed. In 2013, the enrollment rate was 38 percent for primary school children and just 2 percent at the secondary level. As the Lebanese curriculum is largely different from the Syrian one, language wise firstly and program wise secondly, Syrian children couldn’t follow the new curriculum easily (UNHCR December 2013). NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) helped integrate children within the school programs (Norwegian Refugee Council September 2016). In 2014, a second shift every afternoon was set in public schools where Syrian students can attend an adapted program. However, the capacity of the schools, the transportation cost, and the professors’ training did not fit the requirements of the Syrian refugees (Grisgraber 2014). With the support of the Ministry of Public Health, health care was made accessible to refugees in limited amounts. In collaboration with UNICEF and UNRWA, vaccinations were made available to a large number of refugees. Improving shelter conditions, sanitation and hygiene through the construction of latrines and the distribution of hygiene kits was undertaken by UNICEF, UNHCR and WASH. Access to sanitary facilities and clean water are not always provided. This led to the increase in some illnesses such as hepatitis A and measles, the disease spread even more in summer (UNHCR December 2013). The objectives of the humanitarian response were to:

“Ensure protection of refugees, displaced persons and affected communities, by systematic registration and documentation of Syrian refugees, and recording of Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), supporting persons with specific needs, strengthened prevention and response to gender-based violence, improved protection of youth and children at risk

Deliver emergency relief and essential services to those most in need, by providing food security and agricultural livelihoods opportunities, supporting access to emergency shelter and assistance items, increasing access to adequate sanitation and clean water supply, supporting access to basic education, to national health services and PRS to UNRWA social services

Support the resilience of displaced and host communities by mobilizing local and displaced communities to enhance social cohesion and resilience to the shocks of displacement and increasing access to livelihoods and supporting local services” (UNHCR December 2013).

Community empowerment was essential to manage this large population spread all over the Lebanese territory. Mobilizing communities to better protect themselves and respond to the needs of their members was necessary (UNHCR December 2013). In terms of food protection, the illegal cross border trade resulted in the infiltration of animal and plant diseases, threatening the quality and safety of food and nutrition for refugees and host communities (UNHCR December 2013). Water, waste management and power supply which were already undersupplied affected also the situation of Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Palestinian Syrian refugees and Syrian refugees were seeking refuge in the camps as housing rents were lower than outside (UNHCR December 2013).
The urgency of finding shelter incited Syrians to live in extreme living conditions. The availability of housing was limited and refugees risked being evicted (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). Establishing large scale shelters was not a solution in the absence of political decisions concerning the refugee crisis and therefore the shelters provided were not enough to host all the refugees and not well enough to withstand various weather conditions (UNHCR December 2013).

In 2014, 41% of Syrians, according to UNHCR, lived in inadequate affordable shelters, resulting in dire living conditions. Shelters are overcrowded, have limited access to water and sanitation and urban services are generally not commonly provided in the whole country. The quality of shelters is also declining as the affordability of house rents is scarce. Consequently, shelter assistance, which is short term, was provided for a large number of refugees at the expense of long term rehabilitation. This led Syrian refugees to seek recourse in informal market channels which is responsive, flexible and more affordable in order to secure shelters. The quality of housing rented in the informal markets are however poor, and the tenure is insecure. Landlords and middlemen use their powerful position to control the refugees, regardless of the law emitted by the GoL concerning housing rights. In informal tented settlements, landlords are sometimes fixing an unrealistic rent price, leaving the refugees no choice but to leave the settlement overnight or to be evicted from it. The situation is better off in the South of Lebanon, as migrants are less and affordable housing is more available. Eviction, whether because of the increasing rent or the tension with the surrounding community, happens outside of the legal framework, in violation of Lebanese law and international standards. The refugees do not raise their issues to court as usually landlords and police forces or political parties coordinate together the eviction process. State private lands and waqf, religious endowment lands, are formal opportunities for refugees to normalize their settlements as their relations with the landowners is regulated. In the case of private lands, the legal framework in which the housing market needs to be addressed cannot be addressed without a system of market based incentives to be operative. The pattern of organization of an informal tented settlement is explained in the case study of Bebnine. Local and private systems of organization are used.
in an unsustainable manner. Services are therefore more difficult to provide. It affects negatively the surrounding environment as agricultural lands are affected by the establishment of informal settlements due to deforestation and soil and water contamination. In Beirut, the concentration of Syrian refugees is in poor residential neighborhood, where the majority of residents became Syrian, such as in Nabaa. This has some positive effects where the help provided by NGOs improves the social conditions of the area. On the other side, residents complain about losing the character of the neighborhoods and the increase of rental prices. In these dense urban areas, additional units are constructed on top of existing buildings, which results in a threat to the structural safety of the structure. The capacity of the infrastructure in these dense neighborhoods is not enough to adequately serve the increasing number of households. New requirements are therefore required, creating tensions between the Lebanese communities and the Syrian refugees (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

In a survey conducted by UNHCR in 2014, 57 percent of the Syrian refugees lived in a rented finished apartment or house of 1 to 3 rooms of 100 m² subdivided in units for several families, 25 percent in unfinished buildings or in garages, shops, warehouses, factories and other nonresidential units, and 16 percent live in “informal settlements” in rural areas. Informal settlements consist of tents or wooden structures mainly in Akkar in North Lebanon and in the Bekaa, mostly near agricultural lands. 20 to 100 families could be fit in an informal settlement as limited by the Lebanese government and every single settlement has to be approved by the Ministry of Social affairs. They could be considered as an essential part of the housing market. Two percent only live in collective shelters. Collective shelters are school or office buildings rehabilitated to house ten or more families. The adaptation of the structure to the needs of refugees is financed by NGOs, while the owner offers the building for free. The negotiations happen between the NGO and the owner of the building and end in the signed contract for one year, which ensures security and stability for the Syrians. Some of the latter are host by relatives for free, however they contribute in the house expenses such as electricity and water. In other cases, third-party hosting involves a cash-support to host families by an external organization. The hosting practices diminished as the duration of the conflict increased. The criteria deciding the choice of accommodation is related to the cost of the rent in 44 percent of the cases, to the proximity to services in 23 percent of cases. In 2014, less people lived in rented finished apartments than in 2013 and refugees living in informal tented settlements increased from 12.7 percent in 2013 to 16 percent in 2014 due to the shortage of affordable decent housing (UN-Habitat and UNHCR 2014). One quarter of the Syrian refugees have at least moved once because of the cost of the rent in 30 percent of the cases according to the UNHCR survey in 2014, 19 percent moved because of the inappropriate shelter conditions and 17 percent were evicted by landlords. In many cases, Syrian refugees try to settle first in Beirut and then move to informal tented settlements when they notice the lack of employment opportunities and the increase of the cost of the rent (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). In most informal settlements, tents are pitched in a self-help manner. NGOs provide materials such as poles, nylon sheets and sanitation kits. Carpets are put on the floor to serve as a floor surface. The area is therefore poorly insulated and privacy is not really taken into consideration. Open flame sources are used to heat their houses which is at the origin of fires sometimes. In 75 percent of the cases in Akkar, water is pumped from wells preexisting on the property, but the quality of the water is rarely good. Water-tank built by NGOs and basic sanitation systems such as shared toilet facilities and sealed septic tanks exist in some camps. Drainage improvements, weatherproofing and distribution of food supplies are also done by NGOs. In rural areas, the expansion of informal settlements is sometimes uncontrollable. Providing an adequate infrastructure in terms of electricity and water supply necessitates the cooperation of surrounding municipalities which is not always positive (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

Through preexisting migrant construction workers’ networks on social media in Lebanon prior to the war in Syria, refugees gather information about rented accommodation, prices and negotiate with landlords the payment processes. 18 percent of refugees live in informal settlements as defined by the UNHCR, mostly overcrowded, in extremely poor living conditions and with limited access to water. Most of these settlements are on rented private land that families occupied after reaching an agreement with the landowner through a middleman. Most of these temporary settlements are close to agricultural lands. The rent is either paid in cash or through a “work for rent” agreement with the landowners. At the end of 2015, the monthly rent per lot varied between 40USD to 200USD per family depending on the location, tent size and number of occupants. Water and electricity supply as well as refuse collection are not always provided (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon May 2016). Properties owned by Lebanese families who agreed to
Mapping Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Host for free the Syrian refugees for a period of 12 months are rehabilitated by the NGO Norwegian Refugee Council (Norwegian Refugee Council September 2016). Informal governance arrangements are set up, such as the shaweesh31, the community representative in informal settlements and refugee and host community committees. This increases the effectiveness of the humanitarian help and empowers the settlements to self-management. The shaweesh, always a male, having worked previously in Lebanon most of the time and hence more familiar with the Lebanese community, negotiates the access to a land, its price stability and ensures the monthly payment occurs in oral or written contracts. The land tenure could be a period of a month or a year (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

Integration in the community

The consequences of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon are many. The economy was the first to be affected as trade was reduced with countries in the Middle East reachable through the transit roads of Syria and with Syria itself. Inflation is one of the direct consequences of the unstable situation. The social balance among Lebanese is threatened also by the presence of Syrian political parties and the involvement of Lebanese political parties in the events in Syria. Incidents across borders were frequent, especially with the clashes in Arsal in the Bekaa and Tripoli (UNHCR December 2013) (Dionigi February 2016). Since then security concerns became more relevant than the humanitarian response for Lebanese communities (Grisgraber 2014).

At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, host communities welcomed refugees and offered their help in compassion with their difficult situation. However, supporting refugees became more and more challenging over time and transformed into a burden for the Lebanese community (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). The incapacity of the Government of Lebanon to improve the support given to Syrian refugees and disadvantaged Lebanese citizens led to an increase of tensions between the host community, which doesn’t benefit from any assistance, and the refugees (Grisgraber 2014). The competition over affordable housing and employment opportunities between the host community and refugees and the inadequacy of the existing infrastructure to accommodate such a large population played a role in fostering tension

31 Shaweesh is originally a military rank equivalent to a sergeant but have been mostly disused. The title is given to people to note their authority over others.
between the two (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). Nonetheless, the tensions between the host community and the Syrian refugees is relatively limited (Dionigi February 2016). As tensions were rising between the host community and the refugees, UNDP, UNHCR, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) set up a Task Force to support the host communities which included various stakeholders, including NGOs and donors. The livelihood program created for Syrians included also vulnerable members from the host community especially when refugees rented spaces in poor neighborhoods or informal settlements. Other programs were developed also to foster dialogue, mediation and conflict resolution (UNHCR December 2013). Part of the assistance provided by NRC was to integrate Syrian children within the host community through non-formal programmes and to empower the Syrian communities to manage themselves building community capacity (Norwegian Refugee Council September 2016).

Employment was difficult in Lebanon before the Syrian crisis. Work opportunities in agricultural fields and construction fields were very common as the wages of the Syrians were lower than the Lebanese. Even Syrians with professional degrees were not allowed to work as doctors or lawyers. Besides, illegal infiltration of refugees was an obstacle to their employment many times. In 2013, 13% of the registered refugees didn’t have any legal documents for their residence in Lebanon. The prices of permit renewal were also high which incited many refugees to stay illegally in the country (UNHCR December 2013). Work permits are also difficult to get as the government is trying to limit the competition in employment opportunities with Lebanese. The reliance on humanitarian assistance increased while the funds were not enough. Life skills training are provided by international and local groups. As many of these programs empowered women, the latter are more active than men who become idle. The employment rates differ from region to another. “When asked how refugees manage to pay the bills, service providers, NGO workers, and refugees themselves all gave similar answers: they work when and where they can, they sell personal property, they borrow money and go into debt, they beg, they send their children to work, and they hope that aid agencies will provide”. The impact of the presence of refugees on the daily life of Lebanese citizens is felt in the stagnant and rather declining economic situation of the country, the low wages, the rise in rent prices, the difficulty of finding jobs and the increase in crime all of which do not serve the improvement of the perception of the Syrians (Grisgraber 2014).
The Syrian refugee camp analyzed is on the site of Bebnine, in Akkar Governorate, in North Lebanon. Well connected to the Syrian borders, the inner city of Halba in Akkar is a major center for Syrian refugees and a safer area than the Syrian border and the insecure area of Wadi Khaled. The whole area of Akkar has been an economic center for exchange and connections with Syria before the crisis. Social ties and Syrians living on both sides of the borders were strong criteria that incited Syrian to settle in large numbers in Akkar. The possibilities of finding employment and the existing social networks of the area made of it a favorable area (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). According to the Medair statistical information, 19 informal settlements were counted in October 2016 in Akkar. 90 tents are pitched in those tented settlements to fit 701 individuals (MEDAIR October 2016). In Akkar, living conditions in rural informal settlements are considerably poor as the temporary structures are mostly unfinished, especially in tented settlements in the agricultural areas. An average of 9.6 individuals share a 20 m² tent. Overcrowded and with no privacy whatsoever, this leads to the creation of tensioned relations among the families. The temporariness of the structures and the lack of attempts to improve them are sometimes incited by the landlords who fear the emergence of more permanent structures that would allow the refugees to claim their land. Besides, pouring concrete may damage the agricultural efficiency of the land in the long term. Most of the refugees stay with their extended family relatives as soon as they arrive to Lebanon and set up their own tent later (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). Informal settlements have been named by the municipality responsible by their location and a number. The camp visited in the fieldwork and studied in this research is Bebnine 076. The latter is located near the older settlements of Bebnine 012 and 080 (MEDAIR October 2016).

The three camps are situated along an irrigation channel through agricultural lands, hence the narrow width of the settlement. The oldest among them, Bebnine 012, was created in July 2012. In 2014, the site contained 15 tents and 100 individuals while in October 2016 it counted 17 tents hosting 81 individuals, 5 latrines, and a water tank of 5000 Liters. In August 2016, three other sites, Bebnine 076, 077 and 078 were created. In similar manner to the closest camp Bebnine 012, Bebnine 076 was created and consisted of 20 tents housing 245 individuals. One month later, in September 2016, Bebnine 080
Private providers and illegal electricity and water connections were expensive to install and use as main sources compared to their efficiency. Municipal electricity used in Bebnine is as equally present as illegal electrical connections in Akkar. The garbage collection was a main preoccupation for the municipality. As many dumped their waste in water channels, burned it or left it on the street, the necessity of creating garbage collection facilities was pointed out but a solution was not achieved in many of the cases. This led also to the contamination of soils and underground water in the agricultural area (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). Health facilities were very limited. Due to the use of contaminated water used in settlements, diseases arose. Although medical clinics were free for Syrian refugees, the lack of awareness about diseases and the procedures to follow in case of occurrence was addressed by NGO and UNICEF continuously but that did not reach the vast number of refugees present in Akkar (Première Urgence 2012). Bebnine 076’s main source of water is through water trucking as well as the surrounding sites. The waste disposal was based on dumping waste outside the camp and the waste water disposal was a cesspit. In one the later settlements, although a borehole ensures the water required for the camp, the waste water stayed in an open pit for months. Most of these sites were flooded in winter due to heavy rains (MEDAIR October 2016). NGOs and UN agencies were very involved in the provision of materials, food supplies and health care in Bebnine.

**Process of development**

An interview with the Shaweesh of the camp of Bebnine 076 clarified the process of settlements of the Syrian refugees in the camp. The Shaweesh and his relatives which constituted the camp’s population were evicted from Menieh where they had settled in 2012. Forced evictions were frequent as they happened due to the municipality, the police force, the army or an insecure situation. The residents of Bebnine were evicted due to the relocation of informal settlements required by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Due to security reasons, the informal settlements had to be located in the beginning of the crisis at a distance of 300 m from the main road. As the conflict was ongoing, and political tensions were rising in Lebanon. In order to make sure weapons and illegal traffic does not happen, the LAF required refugees to move their
settlements 400 m from their original location and later it was required that settlements relocate to 1km from the main road (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). The search for another land to rent was the responsibility of the Shaweesh. Using the social networks and his own connections, the latter went through the streets of Akkar near Menieh, asking to negotiate with owners of agricultural lands the price of the rent of a land that would fit 245 individuals. The challenges were many as the owners were sometimes reluctant to rent their land due to the reaction of the neighboring communities. Before the agreement was signed, the landlord checked with his neighboring plots if they accept the presence of Syrian refugees in this area. Choosing a site closer to another older informal settlement was therefore easier as this condition would be overruled and the basic infrastructure was partially installed prior to the new settlement. The choice of the site of Bebnine 076 was hence due to its proximity to the older settlement of Bebnine 012 established in 2012. After agreeing on the price, 100 000 LBP per household, a verbal contract bound the Syrian population to pay a monthly fee collected by the Shaweesh (Interviewee Bebnine 2016). A commitment by the Syrians to ensure that agricultural lands surrounding the settlements won’t be invaded for food supplies was also required by the landlord (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014). Before moving in, the land needed to be leveled and prepared for the construction of temporary structures which the refugees did in collaboration with UNHCR. The size of the tents was decided according to the number of members in the family and their financial situation. The construction process was a self-help construction where materials were supplied by NGOs and UNHCR. Wooden posts and nylon covers for walls and roofs were the typical shelter kit distributed to refugees. In Bebnine, the new extensions of the original camp were organized by UNHCR (Interviewee Bebnine 2016) (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

The fieldwork provided insight on how exactly the camp of Bebnine was organized. The lot was divided in a grid like pattern where a space from each tent was marked, a concrete flooring was poured to delimit it and prevent flooding and water infiltration in the tent. Tents were divided in two spaces for two households fitting 15 to 20 members. The families consisted of 3 to 12 members generally. The kitchen was inside the tent and trenches were dug as a sanitary network. Hygienic conditions were poor, which allowed many diseases to spread among the inhabitants. As there is an irrigation channel along the site, the water was taken from there but its quality was
mediocre. Five water tanks were installed to ensure a water capacity of 6000 Liters (MEDAIR October 2016). Six latrines were erected as common toilets facilities. The limited number of latrines required the refugees to organize themselves in order to use the sanitary equipment provided. Another group of refugees was relocated to near Bebnine 076. They arrived at the site in the beginning of September 2016. Two weeks later, they were still waiting for materials to proceed with the construction of their tents. Living with their relatives in the already established camp, women and children were idle, waiting for their shelters to be ready to host them. On the other hand, men continued to improve their tent-like structures over time in Bebnine 076. Repairs, fixes, and money for weatherproofing were provided by NGOs and executed by the Syrian refugees themselves. The solidarity among them was clearly visible where, pressured by the coming of the winter season, they prepared themselves by fixing the temporary structures as much as possible to avoid their destruction and their flooding in winter (Interviewee Bebnine 2016). The new extension of the camp, was still unfinished in terms of infrastructure, the trenches along the earth paths were not dug everywhere. Rain would then render the site muddy and water would infiltrate all the tents even if concrete was poured under them with a slight parapet of 20cm. In the old settlement, the infrastructure was almost ready as trenches were all connected to the water course passing along the site and alleys were covered by gravel, preventing them from being transformed into muddy passages. The municipality and the landlord required the refugees to limit the perimeter of their settlement with a parapet of one meter delimiting their space. Streets of reasonable width connected all the settlements in this area together allowing vehicles from all types to reach the camp site if needed for security or aid reasons.

The employment opportunities being very limited as explained before, most of the men were grouped in the shaweesh tent, larger than all other tents, where discussions and complaints about their lifestyle were carried out almost all the time. The common area in front of the tent was covered but open. Around 20 men were sitting in that place “moving from shadow to shadow”. The site being surrounded by agricultural plains, did not have any tree or structures other the tents themselves providing a shadow point (Interviewee Bebnine 2016). The accessibility of the camp to the main street located at 1km from the site made life difficult for Syrians. As they needed to buy drinkable water, milk for the new-born and food, the refugees had to walk at least 1 km to reach a supermarket. The accessibility was also an issue for the transportation of children to school. Consequently, buses were provided to make sure all benefited from an education. As explained in the section above, the educational program of Lebanese schools was not appropriate for Syrian refugees due to differences in the main language used and the curriculum (Interviewee Bebnine 2016). Children were however eager to go to school in September as during summer, not much happens on site. Children were walking around playing, under the supervision of a young person who made sure they do not resort to violence or hit each other. The arrival of external people from NGOs or in this case, researchers, was a major event for the people in the camp, especially young people under 16 who were thriving to hear stories and play with them. Unfortunately, drugs, violence and begging have become common place because of the lack of employment opportunities and the difficulty to enroll in school at a later age, leaving young people hang feeling useless and thus hanging around in the camp (Interviewee Bebnine 2016).

The role of the Shaweesh was very important in Bebnine. Social networks were essential to the social structure of the camp. The community leader is the focal point of the refugees in Bebnine. Families who settled there were all related to each other, and whenever a newcomer arrived, the Shaweesh tried to provide shelter for him and ask humanitarian organizations for provisions. He collected the monthly rental of the land and paid the landowner, and was leading the negotiations when the refugees needed to relocate their settlements before arriving to Bebnine. In the case of Akkar, many times the eviction of refugees happened because of the illegal status of the owner of the land. No official contract was drafted. Only one out of five cases in Akkar is based on written contracts between the property owner and the Shaweesh. Nonetheless the written contracts were not registered but the municipalities or notaries, moukhtar, were informed of these operations. The contracts are of one year term with a fixed stipend every month. In Bebnine, the residents pay a fee for each structure set on the rented land (UNHabitat and UNHCR 2014).

Integration in the community

Tensions arose with the Lebanese community due to the necessity to share insufficient resources (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon 2015). The relation with the community depended on the behavior of the refugees
themselves and their mutual respect with the landlord on the conditions in which he rented them the land. The enclosure of the site by a small parapet of 1m height created a perception of security among the neighboring communities as it showed that the Syrians knew their limits. Walking around at night in large groups was not permitted by many municipalities as it gave a sense of insecurity for the Lebanese. The separation in Lebanese and Syrian programs at school was certainly inhibiting interaction among the children. The difficulty to find employment and the competition over the work opportunities among Lebanese and Syrians, especially in the under privileged region of Akkar led to a large amount of unemployed refugees, inactively sitting in their tent like structures all day long (Interviewee Bebnine 2016). Indeed, most of the Syrian refugees in Akkar are unskilled workers (65%), 15% are considered skilled workers, 10% traders and 10% as having had university studies prior to the crisis. However in 2012, 68% of the refugees were jobless and less than 30% worked either part time or on a daily basis. The increase in prices of rent and products in the area affected the refugees negatively (Première Urgence 2012).

![Unfinished infrastructure; alleys still not covered with gravel](image)

**Figure 56.** Unfinished infrastructure; alleys still not covered with gravel

**Graph 6: Distribution of Syrian Informal Tented Settlements in Lebanon**
### Table 3: Facts about Syrian Informal Tented Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of tents</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Beirut</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Beirut</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
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The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter III

Figure 57. Informal tented settlement view
Chapter IV
Biography of a Camp: Nahr el Bared

The choice of Nahr el Bared is dictated by some common characteristics with other Palestinian camps and unique features that help understand the involvement of the humanitarian governance in shaping the urban space both in its establishment phase in 1949 and 70 years later by the specialized agency United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Nahr el Bared was subject to a continuous dense urbanization which extended outside the borders of the official camp. The urban element of permeable boundaries translated the economic integration of the camp in the surrounding Lebanese communities. The self-reliant economy was the base for the creation of independent social hierarchies set in alignment with the political powers inside the Palestinian collective community. The self-reliance governance addressed above turned against Palestinian settlements due to the unstable and unsolved political situation of Palestinian refugees as explained in chapter four. This led to the reestablishment of a strong humanitarian and military governance which faded during the emergence of the self-helped urbanization.
Timeline 1: Historical timeline of Nahr el Bared refugee camp

1948
First Camp Construction by the League of Red Crescent

1950
Officialization of the camp by UNRWA

1969
LAF stops control NBC

1970
Sprawl “new camp”

1982
Israeli invasion NBC partially destroyed

2001
Law preventing ownership for Palestinians

2005
LPDC is established to control weapon issue

2007
War from May to September. 85% of Nahr el Bared is destroyed

2008
Vienna Donor Conference NGOs start works

2009
Reconstruction begins, Masterplan is approved

2011
First Families coming back to NBC
All the stories told in this section have a common origin: Palestine. 1948 was the year of the Palestinian Nakba, the catastrophe. 750,000 Palestinians were expelled into neighboring Arab countries, more than 500 villages were destroyed and depopulated, 13,000 people killed. As described in the UN section of this thesis, 77% of historic Palestine was controlled by the state of Israel\(^1\). Approximately, 110,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon, mostly coming from the Galilee area, the coastal cities of Jaffa, Haifa and Acre (Issa 2014). Sarah Loubani\(^2\) describes her life when she was 19 years old; she was living in Palestine in a house built in stone with a concrete roof as were most of the houses. Sarah is part of a group that moved from Palestine before the exodus, when she got married and together with her husband rented a house in Tripoli from Lebanese people for three years because of her husband’s job. He worked at IPC\(^3\), the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had oil refineries in Tripoli, Zahrani, and Homs. In 1948, Sarah’s husband was working in Tripoli, so they came here and then left to Syria as his work position moved to Syria. Her brothers, sisters, and parents stayed in Palestine (Interviewee S. Loubani 2017). Their lives were stable and the borders between the middle eastern countries were open prior to 1948 and depending on the job the head of household had, the family would settle in various locations.

\(^1\) Refer to page (see UN map)

\(^2\) The interviewee Sarah Loubani was born in 1929. She left Palestine in 1947 just before the beginning of the war. She married at 19 and moved together with her husband to Tripoli and then to Syria because of her husband’s job in IPC, the petroleum lines of Iraq. Sarah is in Lebanon to visit her daughter. Now they have left Syria because of the war and she is visiting her children. She has 5 girls and 5 boys. Two of the girls are living in Sweden, one in Lebanon and two in Syria.

\(^3\) The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), before 1929 the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), is an oil company which, between 1925 and 1961, had monopoly on all oil exploration and production in Iraq. Today, it is jointly owned by some of the world’s largest oil companies and is headquartered in London, England.
Unfortunately, not all the people had the same story. The refugees directed to
the camp of Nahr El Bared belonged to more than 50 Palestinian villages. Most of
them were from the area of Saffuriya (Newman 2010). The people came
to the camp with all their traditions and customs, accents and characteristics.
Sometimes their customs were contradictory. The difference of accents was
recognizable as well as the various backgrounds. Some of them were farmers
and villagers, coming from littoral cities and villages as Akka, Haifa, and
some came from internal cities such as Safad and Tabirat. Others came from
Lake Huleh and northern Palestine (Barakat 2013). As Hussein Ali Loubani
Palestinian movie”, one could tell the village of origin of a person or whether
he is coming from a rural or urban background, depending on how he
pronounced the letter “Qaf”; city dwellers replace it with an “Ah” while rural
residents stuck to “Qaf”. Their clothes also reflected their background. Kafir’
Inan, near the city of Safad, is one of the villages from which 418 inhabitants
were expelled and fled to Nahr el Bared. The land was mainly agricultural
and the village built up area represented 0.4 percent of the large total village
land. Farming and fabrication of pottery were the main occupations. A
school, a fountain and a mosque were located near Kfar’ Inan (DAAR 2009).
Hussein Ali Loubani and Mehyeddine Ahmad Loubani were forced to leave the village of Damoun in Palestine in 1948, that was the point in time where they became labeled as refugees. Hussein’s family came from the village, Ain Qatmoun located near the Lebanese frontiers.

“...A large group of us, Palestinians, stopped and looked towards the south: where Palestine is, the land of Palestine, the villages of Palestine: this was the last parcel of land of Palestine... said one of them before weeping. God knows if we will ever have the chance to see Palestine again, god help us for the coming days. A child was heard crying and said: « God, mom, aren’t we coming back to our home? Where are we going mum? »” (Loubani 2006)

Endless questions were asked by Palestinians and expressed by the children. This was the beginning of the “Nakba” or “The Catastrophe”, when the state of Israel in May 1948 was established. 80% of the Palestinians had been dislocated and exiled from their homes, villages, cities and lands in historic Palestine. Around 300 of its villages were erased and destroyed, cities, lands and homes confiscated and repopulated. It was the destruction and creation of a layer of urbanization that changed history and geography. The territory of Palestine was changed with a new one. It was a spatial and perceptual superimposition (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). In his autobiography, Hussein Loubani expresses the feelings tearing them apart when leaving Palestine: “I looked at my parents behind me and saw Palestine disappearing at the horizon and becoming a blurry dream!” (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

Figure 1. Migration of Palestinians in Lebanon

It was the 6th of November 1948, the first stop was Rmeich, a Lebanese village. The people conditions were terrible: bare feet, starving, thirsty and without any plan for the next days. No one in the village helped them to find water or food, the harsh attitude of the inhabitants of Rmeich shocked them as those were not expecting so many people to cross the border. None of the adjoining countries around Palestine knew the number of refugees arriving to claim relief. Their journey continued until the city of Bint Jbeil. The scene of the arrival is described by Hussein in his book:

“I went to search for water with my father, we couldn’t find any! Then I heard my father saying: «Come Hussein, we flew from the guns of the Jews and now we are going to die from thirst». A woman sitting at the door of her house heard our conversation and called me: «What is your name? » Hussein. She asked for the name of my father which was: Ali. She repeated the names and asked for a jar of water to be brought to us. We drank all the water and out of generosity, she gave us another jar filled with water to take back with us. While on our way, my father reflected: what if she knew my wife’s name is Khadije, my
daughter Fatima, and my second son: Mohammad.” (Loubani 2006).

In the night, Palestinian refugees were grouped in one of the public squares of Bint Jbeil, where several trucks were parked. They were transported to a wide sandy area where numerous tents were pitched. When they arrived, they had two options: whoever wanted to stay in Sour (South Lebanon) could take a tent for his family, and whoever wanted to go to Syria needed to wait near the train wagons. They learned that they were in a city called Sour. Hussein’s family decided to go to Syria and took the train where they were “packed as fish in a box of sardines”. (Loubani 2006) They were heading North, with the intention of reaching the city of Aleppo. Unfortunately, the Syrian government decided not to accept any more refugees, closing the borders, leaving the people who tried to reach Aleppo blocked in Tripoli and in northern Lebanon (Newman 2010).

The families tried to group themselves according to their place of origin trying in some way to mirror the “city society” or in this case the “village society” (Agier 2002)7. Hussein Loubani describes in his book “Biography of Faraj Mawaad, a struggle for life” how other groups of refugees were displaced to Anjar in the middle of the Bekaa valley, close to the Syrian/Lebanese frontier. There, Armenians had established a camp after World War I. Some others went to Baalbeck where two French barracks constructed under the French mandate were opened to them: Wavel and Gouraud barracks. These after some time became official refugee camps of UNRWA. the last group was distributed among the warehouses in Tripoli, the mosques of Tinal and Mahmoud Beik, the military Khan and beside the petroleum tanks (Loubani 2012).

The Red Cross distributed food to Palestinians in the barracks and warehouses that had previously belonged to the French army. No fuel or kaz, kerosene, was provided for heating purposes. In the complex, there was only one kitchen in the barracks building. The Red Cross Association along with other humanitarian organizations, started to distribute food rations monthly to the refugees: flour, lentils, sugar, oil, chick peas, soap and canned food. The shoes factory of Hajer in Mina was transformed in a place for food distribution for refugees. At the end of 1948, the school was opened to welcome refugee children from Mina, the fortress, Kazkhanam Ras Sakher. The school was set up with the help of the Lebanese humanitarian organization: the Permanent Palestinian Office. Following that, the International Red Cross took charge of the school (Loubani 2012).

As mentioned in chapter II, the first resolution on aiding Palestine refugees was adopted by the General Assembly on November 1948 (A/RES/212(III) 1948)8, when the International Red Cross started to prepare the refugee camps. Unfortunately, when Palestinians arrived in Lebanon the camps were not ready and groups of Palestinians stayed in parked wagons for a few days, getting food from humanitarian organizations based in Tripoli: bread, cheese, dates and some cans. When they left the wagons, humanitarian organizations distributed them in different spots in the city of Tripoli and Mina together with other refugees moved from the village of Qaroun in West Bekaa on the river Litani, close to the Qaroun lake. (Loubani 2012)

The timing of the first phase of the emergency was challenging. Winter was coming and very harsh weather conditions were forecasted. The hygiene was terrible as there were no showers. Collective haircuts were the solution
proposed to avoid hygienic problems. As stated also in the UN Weekly Bulletin in an article written by Dr. Bayard Dodge: “Many of the new born infants must be wrapped in newspapers for lack of cloth or layettes. I found dysentery rampant in the camps, while smallpox had broken out in several places. Malaria will be another problem when the warm weather arrives” (UN Weekly Bulletin, Progress of Middle East Aid 1949).

“We lived there in the French hangars, where the petrol tanks of IPC in the Kazkhana area were kept, before moving to Nahr El Bared. The hangars were replaced later on by slaughter houses. The only possible jobs for us at the time were: construction works, transportation, porters or carrying concrete unit blocks. Between Kazkhana and Tripoli, there were wide agricultural lands of lemon trees, orange and mandarin trees which people tried to grab, worsening the relations between the land owners and the Palestinians. I was working with friends in a bakery in Tripoli. At 10 years old, I was the one providing bread at home to my parents and my four siblings. That day, I finished work and went back to the hangars with 20 loafs of bread and ¼ of a Lebanese pound but no one was there. Some people told me that everyone was moved to Nahr el Bared in trucks. All my family was lost. The other workers and me came back to the bakery in Tripoli. We learned the day after from a professor who had transported the people to Menieh and to the new camp. We took a taxi who drove us to the camp of Nahr el Bared. It was night, there was no electricity and no light. All the area was full of similar tents, adjacent to each other, spread randomly” (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

As with Hussein’s family, Mehyeddine Loubani’s family went through the same journey to Nahr El Bared. Mehyeddine was one year old. His family was dropped in Tripoli, Mina in the area of Sekket el Hadid, the railway area. They stayed there in train wagons. Ghandour, a Lebanese man who owns a biscuit factory, was distributing biscuits, food and helping people. They lived in wagons until UNRWA finished preparing the camp (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).

The arrival to Nahr el Bared

Located 13 km North of Tripoli, Nahr el Bared, named after the river located south of the refugee camp, was not supposed to be a refugee camp. The site was transformed into a camp due to the closure of the Syrian borders to Palestinian refugees (Newman 2010). The Lebanese government, in collaboration with the International Red Cross chose an empty piece of land, a dry archaeological hill. The area was around 10 dunoms (10,000 m²) and was rented for 99 years from a Lebanese owner called: Rafic Al Mouriibi. He was a family doctor and had a clinic in Tripoli. The camp was located in a large agricultural area, far from the main city of Tripoli (Barakat 2013). Most of the camps were located close to urban and rural areas ensuring the provision of cheap agricultural and industrial labor forces (Issa 2014). The International Red Cross started the camp together with UNRWA’s predecessor, United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) and left the governance to UNRWA in 1950 when it was established (UNRWA 1983). Nahr El Bared refugee camp was and still is one of 12 Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, and of 58 camps in the region (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Barakat 2013). Most Palestinians who settled in refugee camps were of rural origin and poor and had no possibility of finding employment (Issa 2014). After extirpating wild plants and leveling the land, the International Red Cross and the refugees pitched rows of tents, leaving appropriate spaces between one tent and the other. “The view of this infinity of tents was exciting and touching” (Loubani 2012). Before the refugees came to Nahr El Bared, the Lebanese government and the International Red Cross prepared medical clinics, a school tent, and latrines for both men and women. The Red Cross did some interviews and a form of exam to recruit employees which were mainly volunteers. They would get a few loafs of thick bread as a sign of gratitude for their work. As soon as the refugees arrived, they constituted a committee of 28 members to deal with urgent situations before having a proper administrative body. This committee looked out for the necessary needs of the refugees and worked as a voluntary committee till the end of May 1950, the day UNRWA took charge according to the resolution “Assistance to Palestine” (A/RES/302 IV) (AVSI Khalife 2017). UNRWA had then a general director in Beirut, a regional director in Tripoli and a camp director in Nahr El Bared (Loubani 2012).
The refugees were assembled in the North-East area near the sea. They were divided by neighborhoods. Ahmad Loubani12 tells how each one started to construct his own “house” according to his own needs (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017). Hussein’s family arrived before Hussein to the camp of Nahr el Bared, where similar tents were pitched on a huge surface like mushrooms, everywhere. “How could we recognize our tent?” was the main question that passed through the mind of all the refugees. Upon his arrival, Hussein asked where his family tent was.

“I saw my uncle who led me to my tent and I called my mother. She answered back inviting me to enter. So, I walked around the circular tent in the dark. I couldn’t see from where I could enter the tent. Finally, my mother lifted the tent flap and I rushed in. I had some food with me and some money that I shared with my father.” (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

The refugee camp was not an easy space for orientation. At first sight the tents were all the same, it was almost impossible to make out the differences. The first characteristic that most of the people noticed were some open spaces with no tents. The creation of these spaces was because all the neighbors settled next to each other according to their places of origin. Hence, in between neighborhoods, open spaces remained unused. Each family had a small area and new comers were given adjacent areas. There was not a specific program for settling, the organization was very instinctive. The regroupment was a very common phenomenon in many camps. The former villagers of Palestine formed clusters of tents that developed into urban neighborhoods holding the names, the descendents, traditions, folklore and memories of the original villages. This was the beginning of a “new social reality”. The camp suddenly and instantly mixed and homogenized Palestinians from different social and economic backgrounds, villages and regions in a singular space, resembling its similarity to the city as a social mixer (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The nationality of the refugees is the sole ethnic group taken into consideration here. The refugee is the ultimate biopolitical subject with no cultural or political form, as the new place is deprived of all traditions,

12 Ahmad Loubani was born in 1977 in Nahr el Bared and he is Mehyeddine’s son and Sarah Loubani’s grandson. He works as administration officer in UNICEF and previously UNRWA. He’s married to Roula Najjar Loubani and has two children. Today he lives near Tripoli, just outside the Beddawi refugee camp.
rituals and meanings (Agamben 1995). The mass displacement problem was addressed first by erecting similar tents in all the camp, and second by dividing the place in ethnographic groups, attesting to the importance of ethnicity in planning principles of refugee camps (Agier 2002). The camp is hence a social spatial mechanism providing physical security and primary needs for the displaced as a response to an emergency situation (Boano and Floris 2005).

**First phase of the emergency**

In this first phase of the emergency, at first, the only tents that were immediately recognizable were the big school tents. These, were the first ones that Hussein noticed. As he was passionate about his studies, he wanted to join the school as soon as he arrived which his father opposed as he wanted him to work and help the family. After heated discussions, he convinced his father and went back to school in 1949 (Interviewee H.A. Louhani 2017). After some time in the camp, the refugees realized that there were three types and sizes of tents.

**Bell tent Khaymat Abou Jaras**: a circular tent for a family of 4 members. Hussein’s family of 6 members was given this tent. It looked like a bell. It had one post in its center. Abou Jaras was 3 by 2.5 meters.

**Indian tent Khaymat al Shader** intended for a family of 8 members. It had 3 short posts. It could be opened on two sides. It had a diameter of 10 meters’ diameter.

**Hospital tent Khaymat al Sivan** intended for more than 10 members. It was circular with a big post in its center, and a big amount of ropes radially holding the tent in the ground.

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14 Refer to Chapter I, page n. 4. b ethnic background For further information, refer to Agier, Michel. 2002. Between War and City: Towards an Anthropology of Refugee Camps. London: Sage.


**Drawing 1**: Neighborhood division in the official UNRWA camp of Nahr el Bared

**Drawing 2**: Tent types used depending on the number of members in a family.
Figure 2. Bell tent in 1950

Figure 3. Historical picture of the camp of Nahr el Bared in winter 1950

Figure 4. School tent in 1950

Figure 5. View from the sea towards the camp
The indoor space was divided with blankets, separating the children’s space, boys and girls and the parent’s space. There was no concrete on the floor, just blankets. Sand and earth were added on the ground to make it warmer. Indeed, in the first period, the water flooded the tents. The division was not instructed by anyone but spontaneous. “Till today, the camp is divided in the same way, the neighborhoods having names of Palestinian streets and areas such as Saffouri, Saasa, Damoun” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). In the same neighborhood, an open space called “ hakoura ” was created among the tents. Onions and garlic were being planted there. Stones and mud bricks were laid around the garden in order to delimit the space. The families ate from the products of this garden. Each one of them improved its production over time as Mehayedine’s father who planted figs and pomegranates. (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017)

As concerns hygiene, trenches were dug near the sea. Sackcloth was used to divide the toilets which didn’t have a roof. Cleaning and hygiene conditions were terrible. A few months later, the trenches were replaced with temporary latrines by UNRWA. A cabin made of sackcloth, “ kheich ”, with some wooden posts surrounding a pit. As Palestinian traditions were very different from the sheltering programs that were provided, refugees argued about whose turn it was to line up first for the toilets. A water-tank “ hawouz ” was installed on top of the hill by UNRWA as the main source of water. Ten taps were provided around it to distribute the water. Women went there with jars and tin cans. Conflicts, verbal and even physical, commonly occurred among them (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

Another type of hospital tent was used for the school. It was rectangular, had four big posts and was used as classrooms for the students and as a hospital for the voluntary doctors and nurses. Part of it was used to store the food and rations, and another part as a medical clinic, a classroom, or even a restaurant where they could distribute milk. UNRWA later built warehouses for food rations, and some rooms near the beach, all to service the refugees (Loubani 2012). However, Nahr el Bared was a very wild and isolated land, whenever the refugees needed bread, they had to go to Tripoli that was 15km away, and therefore impossible to reach easily on foot (Loubani 2012).

The emergency temporary school was managed by UNRWA. Children were grouped and distributed in three groups, the first, second and third elementary classes. Hussein was in the latter. “The school had three rooms, we were 15 in each class at the maximum. The third class had children from 9 to 12 years old. Each student received four notebooks, two pencils and an eraser. Small wooden benches were fitted to allow two students to sit at a desk. The blackboard was a small square set on a tripod."

Figure 6. Classes in the school tent
The director of the school was from Safouriat, a city which had a population of three times the number of refugees in Nahr el Bared (almost 8000 persons). The office of the director consisted of a big rectangular tent with a table and some chairs. He was a Palestinian patriotic man from Jerusalem, who loved Palestine and its inhabitants. He wore a hat differentiating him from the rest of the men. Faraj Mawaad, the director of the school, founded the school of Nahr el Bared which had a considerable number of classes, till the Brevet, or the intermediate level, grade 9.16 The director of the camp had a hospital tent or Siwan as an office. (Loubani 2006).

“As UNRWA did all this work for us, we needed to get acquainted and know who they were”. UNRWA was helped out by a group of young educated people who helped the refugees in their distribution in the tents in an organized manner and supported UNRWA in the food distribution process (Loubani 2012). The infrastructure and organization of UNRWA was part of the action programs which were decided in the General Assembly17 in response to the crisis of Palestine. The need to define who the refugee was, was one of the first tasks of UNRWA. In 1950, a Palestinian refugee was defined officially as:

“A Palestine refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition and the direct descendants of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are: registered with UNRWA; living in the area of UNRWA operations; and in need” (UNRWA 1991, 6).

The definition of the Palestinians themselves for refugee was slightly different: Palestinian refugees were the people who were obliged to leave their houses during the period November 1947 to194918. This definition includes all who had an Arab Palestinian father in Palestine or outside. As a refugee, he had the right to return to his father’s and grandfather’s land. In June 1949, a census was done by the UN in its 4th session and 940 000 Palestinians refugees were counted, in Nahr el Bared, the population was around 3000 refugees (Loubani 2012).

In this part of the emergency the camp was still considered temporary, a place of dependency on relief and misery due to the historical facts (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The role of the humanitarian organization, UNRWA is based on a state of exception housing refugees seen as bare lives in a non-political environment (Agamben 1995)19. But since the beginning the Palestinian refugee camp was also a space of community mobilization and political action to achieve the aspirations of return and liberation of Palestine (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012).

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16 In Lebanon, English or French with Arabic are taught from early years in schools. English or French are the mandatory medium of instruction for mathematics and science for all schools. Education is compulsory from age 6 to age 14. It is divided in 5 cycles split in 3 phases: Pre-school education (age 3 or 4), basic education comprising elementary and intermediate levels ending with the national exam called Brevet that corresponds to Grade 9, and secondary education completed at the age of 18 and ending with a Baccalauréat or a “professional certificate”, which both give access to tertiary education.

17 Refer to page

18 Refer to page

Refer to page n. 1 definition non-political

The principal transit road linking North Lebanon and Syria went through the middle of the camp. The road was six meters wide. Bordered on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south by the river El Bared, the site sloped towards the sea where the UNRWA compound, housing education and health services were located (Barakat 2013). Hussein Loubani describes the impact of the location of the camp on one of the busiest connections between Tripoli and Syria in the 1950s. All types of activities, shops, even houses invaded the road. It was a very active commercial hub which characterized Nahr el Bared from other Palestinian camps in Lebanon. “If one car stopped when it reached the camp, traffic would be completely stuck all the way to Tripoli” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The expansion of the shops onto the streets, and the informal appropriation of the public domain in all its forms is a normalized process among the inhabitants (AlSayyad and Roy 2006)20. Ahmad Farghawi21 certifies as well that the location of Nahr El Bared was the most important asset they had; it was the gate to Akkar as the highway was not yet constructed “Even the President passed by here!” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). On the other hand, the exposure of the camp to the sea on the West didn’t help: it actually had a negative impact on the image of the Palestinians because of the illegal products’ traffic that happened through the sea which was not done by the Palestinians (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

UNRWA was established by the General Assembly on the 8th of December 1949 (“Assistance to Palestine refugees” A/RES/302(IV))22 and started effectively working in May 1950. The documents of the refugees which were

20 Refer to page n. 4. C. normalized
21 The interviewee Ahmad Ali Farghawi was born in 1961 in Nahr el Bared. He is a very active person in the camp’s social life. He’s married to a Lebanese woman. He started his own activity in 2005 thanks to a project by French organizations. He’s selling gas bottles and his business is growing.
22 Refer to page n. UN
in the hands of the International Red Cross and the previous UN agency UNRPR were transferred to UNRWA\(^{23}\) (Loubani 2012). Procedures became more organized in mid May 1950 when employees were recruited by UNRWA for specific jobs and fixed salaries. Although UNRWA had a western attitude in the way it managed this process, recruiting employees for cleaning services, a woman assisted by two men for the management of the restaurant and the distribution of milk and a driver for its staff, it improved the organization of the camp (Loubani 2006). Unfortunately, this “Anglo-American imperialistic scheme\(^{23}\)” was not appreciated by the whole population and also by some of the Members of the United Nations. On the other hand, UNRWA constructed a water-tank or hawouz for each neighborhood. Women from each of the families went to collect water in the very early morning from the water-tank. An adequate water supply was granted from UNRWA at the desired quantity of 20 liters per person daily. The potability of the water was ensured by appropriate treatments and bacteriological analysis (UNRWA 1959)\(^{25}\). Common toilets and showers were installed and refugees waited for their turn in order to use the facilities installed and managed by UNRWA (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). In Lebanon, at the end of December 1958, the ratio of latrines was 3.4 to 100 persons. In addition, programs were initiated to promote private toilets (UNRWA 1959). As concerns the critical health conditions, UNRWA initiated a five-year program, which began in March 1954, to free most of their areas of activity from malaria. The sum of 404 207 USD was reserved for this program. The UN agency was indeed responsible for both relief and works which comprehended: education, health, employment and infrastructure, services which would have been planned and provided in collaboration with the host country (Loubani 2012). For all the host countries, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East financial accounts for the period January 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952 showed that contributions and income for the eighteen months amounted to 57 298 113 USD. Direct relief expenses amounted to 35 266 970 USD and direct reintegration expenses to 2 482 000 USD (UN Weekly Bulletin, Palestine Refugee Agency’s Report on Finances 1952)\(^{26}\).

\(^{23}\) Refer to page n. UN

\(^{24}\) As it was called in the article of the UN Weekly Bulletin, Refugee Relief Works Starting in Near East in 1990 (see page n. X)

\(^{25}\) Refer to page n. UN or book

\(^{26}\) Refer to page n. UN

The autobiography of Hussein Loubani describes the difficulties of the Palestinians in the first years of the establishment of Nahr El Bared. The 1950s were marked by harsh circumstances. Illnesses such as malaria and tuberculosis were widespread in the camp and could not be prevented or treated by UNRWA. This was due to the fact that no sewage system was installed, the grey water was collected in tanks. A medical clinic was set up to deal with urgent cases of illness. In 1951, the tents which constituted the hospital were replaced by rectangular rooms adjacent to each other and offered medical care for pregnant women and ill people. The distribution of rations took place west of the school, on the sea shore. The approved monthly ration per capita for many years consisted of: 10 kg of flour, 0,6 kg of sugar, 0,6 kg of pulses (lentils, red beans, chickpeas) 0,5 kg of rice or burghul, 0,375 kg of oil and fats (ghee), , and 150 gr of soap. This ration provided about 1500 calories per person per day, which was based on the donations received from UNRWA’s contributors. The ration was not intended to provide a complete diet (UNRWA 1983). The distribution of rations raised tensions among the inhabitants. UNRWA tried to make life easier for Palestinians by providing food rations, medical care and education (Loubani 2006).

On the other hand, schools didn’t have the capacity to ensure education for all the children in the camp. The school itself was a longitudinal tent with a front entrance and a rear one. The military green tarpaulin covering the space was supported by three wooden posts and was stabilized with pickets in the sandy ground. Each classroom faced either the western door or the eastern door of the tent. The furniture of each classroom consisted of a blackboard of one square meter and wooden seats laid in the sand. When it was windy and rainy, the structure was not stable enough and the roof flew off several times. Students went to recover the roof from the surrounding agricultural lands, carried it back to the school and fixed it again tethering it in the ground. Lazy students wouldn’t even bother to come to school, as the weather could be forecasted when looking at the dark clouds assembled above the sea, making studying impossible in rainy days (Loubani 2006). The conditions of studying in general were quite difficult, socially, morally and health wise. Studying and preparing for exams was only possible during the day. Lanterns were solely used to light up the tents at night whenever deemed necessary (Loubani 2006). The director of the school, Farah Mawaad, did many changes within the UNRWA school of Nahr el Bared. Mawaad had two assistants to help him with the management of the school. Teachers were appointed, either
Drawing 3: School evolution process from 1950 to the 1960s
because of their competence or due to personal connections. The services provided by UNRWA should have covered education for all age sections till university and the kindergarten as well but the secondary school was not given any importance unfortunately. This pushed Palestinians to send their children to public or private schools in the host country. But Faraj Mawaad incited UNRWA to pay the tuition fees for the secondary school which was 225,000 LBP. Palestinians had a discount reducing the tuition fee to 175,000 LBP; consequently, students could buy food, clothes or even rent a room with that sum (Loubani 2006). In 1951, two adjacent small rooms were built by the refugees, next to the big school tent, with concrete masonry blocks, covered with fiber cement roofs eternit. One of them was used for the school director and the larger one was for the professors. The rooms were next to the food distribution center on the sea shore. The complex was U shaped; the opening of the U was towards the only asphalted road in the whole camp. Students played football in the sandy playground, read, studied in the school compound and swam in the sea next to sea.

“We didn’t have any books in the first year except the Arabic language book. In the beginning of 1951, things began to change. Another book was given to us: a book of religious and civic studies, then a book of history and some other books for science studies. Arithmetic was taught orally, we would solve problems in our own notebooks. A ruler, a compass, an eraser and few notebooks with the brand of UNRWA marked on them were given to us” (Loubani 2006).

Faraj Mawaad encouraged all students to take the official Lebanese Brevet exam which none of the Palestinians had done before. Even in those difficult conditions, 15 students presented the Brevet in June 1951 and passed the exam. UNRWA realized then that the professors hired for the job should be qualified enough as the results of the school were unexpectedly excellent. UNRWA started to offer training at the beginning of year 1952 for teachers of different regions. Palestinian professors such as Faraj Mawaad delivered those training sessions organized in summer and other holiday seasons. The director made an agreement with the Institute of Islamic Education in Tripoli to continue the education of the Palestinians after the complementary school, till the Baccalauréat. Para-scholar activities were also held at the institute in Tripoli; Hussein Loubani was selected to learn to play on a small drum, hence he went every day to the Institute of Islamic Education in Tripoli. The library lent books to the students to read and return in a week, from Thursday to Thursday, except in exam periods. Reading nights were also organized in the
professors’ classroom that served as well for the Third Class. Students needed to present summaries for all the books they read to get extra points. Books about Palestine and its history were commonly rented. Some adaptations that explained the history of Palestine to children were also available. Donors gave money and books to the library, enhancing it over time. A registry and archives were added later while the library accumulated hundreds of books. Unfortunately, the library was burned once. Some of the students desperately tried to save some of the books. UNRWA, in collaboration with the director of the school aimed at erasing illiteracy. A night school was opened where refugees who didn’t have the chance to learn previously could take some courses and learn how to read and write. There were some beginners’ courses, and some more advanced courses for people who had a very basic education, who were in the majority. A weekly program was organized where men from different ages, backgrounds and clothing gathered and learned joyfully. Supervisors from UNRWA passed by at night to check if the curriculum was given properly. Rewards were distributed for successful students (Loubani 2006). Ahmad Farghawi and Walid Mawaad\textsuperscript{27} attest as well to the high rate of education in most Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Most of the inhabitants of Nahr el Bared sent their children to the UNRWA schools. They would even ask professors to give private lessons to their children if needed. The education of the children would only depend on the financial situation of the parents. “Palestinians that went outside Lebanon are professors and doctors today” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). These are the same years in which UNRWA accepted the principle of free preparatory education for all refugee children capable of benefiting from it (UNRWA 1991, 12-13)\textsuperscript{28}.

In addition, considering the types of jobs that Palestinians could do in the host country, UNRWA founded later a technical school where carpentry was taught and all the necessary equipment such as saws, vices, glue, timber boards of different sizes, nails, screws and specific tables was provided to practice those skills. Students learned how to fix closets, tables, seats and other types of furniture. Palestinian carpenters who studied in this school became successful in the Akkar area (Loubani 2006). UNRWA “works programs”, depending on the position of the refugee camps, usually were composed of road construction activities, afforestation, materials and garments production for refugees’ communities. Agricultural activities were also common, especially in Nahr el Bared. UNRWA encouraged agriculture hoping that a large number would become self-supporting after the first harvests (UN Weekly Bulletin, Lack of Contributions Restrict Palestine Refugee Work Program 1950)\textsuperscript{29}. UNRWA never had an active role in the shelters’ improvement but during the 1950s the Agency issued roofing material to the refugees to help them get proper accommodation (UNRWA 1983)\textsuperscript{30}. As explained by Jansen, the emergency forms of governance have as an aim the development of a self-reliant community. This shift from emergency to a governance of care and maintenance occurs over time (Jansen 2015)\textsuperscript{31}. Besides, having services proper to themselves provided by UNRWA in this case, makes the refugees dependent and isolated minimizing the contact with the outer world, living in a permanent state of exception (Diken 2004)\textsuperscript{32}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure10.png}
\caption{Sport activities and competitions}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{27} Walid Dib Mawaad was born in 1961 in Nahr El Bared. He’s a very good friend of Ahmad Ali Farghawi. He sells tiles on the highway to Syria very close to Nahr el Bared and he lives there. He’s married as is Ahmad Farghawi, to a Lebanese woman.

\textsuperscript{28} Refer to page n. UN

\textsuperscript{29} Refer to page n. UN

\textsuperscript{30} Refer to page n. 2. b. maintenance

\textsuperscript{31} Refer to page n. 2. a. minimize

For further information, refer to Jansen, Bram J. 2015. “‘Digging Aid’: The Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of Africa.” Journal of Refugee Studies, June.

\textsuperscript{32} Refer to page n. 2. a. minimize

Self-reliant Governance

The school was also the heart of the community life for young people. The end of year celebrations took place in the courtyard of the school. The microphone was used for the first time in 1955 marking that year for all students and parents. The exam results were astonishing as 94 out of 98 students passed the official examinations (Loubani 2006). Learning and competition were combined, many activities were created in order to occupy the students in their free time, and strengthening their Palestinian identity while making sure they didn’t drift into unhealthy paths. Competitions to draw maps were organized. A T-shirt was given as a prize to who knew best how to draw Palestine with its villages and cities or a topographical map of the mountains and plains of Palestine. Ironically, T-shirts were a modern piece of clothing that parents reprimanded their children to wear. Arab literature competitions were also organized where the winners’ articles were published in the school journal (Loubani 2006). An exposure to magazines such as the weekly Return Magazine, by Arab Nationalists, cultivated the Palestinian identity as well, explaining the conditions of the refugees socially, economically, educationally and politically, strengthening the position of Palestine against Israel. Another magazine which was popular was the Periodical of the Revolutionary “Nachrat el Thaer” that was published in Beirut from 20 November 1952 till mid-1958 and discussed the Palestinian cause (Loubani 2012). The struggle for the liberation of Palestine was at the center of the educational program. Nationalism was cultivated in each Palestinian soul in order to achieve the dream of their return. The strength and solidarity of Palestinians along with the Arab countries union were the only weapons that could eventually free Palestine. The benefit of the latter was and still is to claim Palestine back to the displaced Palestinian Arabs, as they were named in those articles (Loubani 2012). The scouts participated in national holidays celebrations in Beirut, Tripoli, Saida (Loubani 2012). Hussein Loubani recalls all the details of their trip to Palestine organized by the Arab Palestinian Scouts in 1956. "Our happiness was temporary" (Loubani 2006). Scouting allowed Palestinian refugees to learn, fight, explore areas in Lebanon and in Palestine; it specifically fostered the integration of the Palestinians of Nahr el Bared in the North, as did the musical troop.

The first musical troop, created in 1955, consisted of twenty members who played various instruments. The clarinet, piston and trumpet were distributed to the Palestinian children. The activity of the troop was at its peak from 1955 to 1960. Rehearsal took place in the school club, one of the big tents on the sea shore (Loubani 2012). As it was one of the most recognized musical troops in the North of Lebanon, it was selected to welcome Prince Saud Ben Abd al Aziz in front of Tripoli’s municipality in 1953. Hussein Loubani proudly describes their welcome to King Hussein of Jordan at the garden field. Boys from age 7 till 16 years old joined two units depending on their age. They continuously met with Lebanese scout troops in Tripoli and camped in the forests with them. The scouts were around a hundred and were divided in 3 teams: Team Palestine, Team Pipe and Team Sacred House. Between 1958 and 1960, the Palestinian scouts had military training and learned fighting skills that would help them win the Palestinian cause. But they also had a humanitarian role as well. They helped in the flood of the river Abou Ali in Tripoli in 1955, transporting mud, stones and tree trunks. The scouts participated in national holidays celebrations in Beirut, Tripoli, Saida (Loubani 2012). Hussein Loubani recalls all the details of their trip to Palestine organized by the Arab Palestinian Scouts in 1956. "Our happiness was temporary" (Loubani 2006). Scouting allowed Palestinian refugees to learn, fight, explore areas in Lebanon and in Palestine; it specifically fostered the integration of the Palestinians of Nahr el Bared in the North, as did the musical troop.

Other young students were proud to join the scout rover clan which had different type of activities. In 1952, a scout group was founded within the school of Nahr el Bared with a leader who was 20 years old. They reached out to scout leaders in Tripoli, to get some of their experience in the scout
The school club was at first a big tent, with many posts with weight lifting and other machinery used in the gym. The Young Men’s Christian Association\textsuperscript{13} (YMCA) in Tripoli helped provide the required equipment in 1952. It was a training place without a coach. Nahr el Bared became responsible for organizing sport activities in Palestinian camps situated in North Lebanon. In Summer 1952, the football team of Nahr el Bared school was assembled. Over the years, competitions were organized among classes in Nahr El Bared and with different Palestinian camps such as Beddawi. In the annual festivals, Palestinians participated in the games organized at the municipal playground of Tripoli or Beirut. (Loubani 2012). Basketball became popular in the 1960s. Hussein narrates the two weeks’ competition held in Broumana High School in 1968 where many Palestinian camps participated: Beddawi, Dbayeh, Jisr el Basha.

“We were very successful in ball games and swimming competitions. We also had training and conferences about theory and practice. In 1999, the popular committee and the coordination committee in Nahr el Bared tried to make sport trainings and competitions happen again, they elected a sport committee to set up an internal organization. But it was impossible to recreate the successful football team of the 50s nowadays” (Loubani 2006).

On the other hand, the practice of old people was to gather in a café, a “diwan”. In Nahr el Bared, there were 6 to 7 old people: Abou Rachid Saffouri, Abou Moufid Saasaa, etc… from the most prominent displaced families. Every neighborhood had its “diwan”. The diwans were part of the houses. The living room was as long as the house, with a wood stove for heating in its center and low seating around it, in the manner of the traditional Arabic seating. The “diwan” was called with the name of the oldest person in the house. When those old men passed away, the “diwans” were closed. No one had any more time to make the coffee and ask the neighbors to come over. (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).

13 The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) is a worldwide organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland, with more than 57 million beneficiaries from 125 national associations.

In 1954, the Arab Club was created, the weight lifting machines were set in the last room on the south-eastern part of the building. The gym had activities such as: weight lifting, physical training, swimming and diving, ping pong and other gymnastics and acrobatics. Games such as pool and baby foot were added later (Loubani 2012). The building was made of reinforced concrete. Four wide rooms were separated by foldable wooden partitions. The whole club could therefore be transformed into a big hall. Most of the nationalist young people would gather there, for entertainment, games such as chess and checkers, gym, ping pong, reading as a bookshelf was set there and a type writer for whoever wanted to learn. The club had a living room, a kitchen and a relaxation area at the entrance where almost 10 people could sit and relax. Benches at the entrance of the club were made of concrete, where young Palestinians would gather in the warm summer nights. Palestinians and Arab personalities were welcomed there, giving speeches, and celebrations were organized in that same communal space (Loubani 2006). The Arab Club, or Nadi Al Arabi, changed its name to The Young Palestinian Arabs Club (Nadi Al Chabab Al Arabi Al Falastini in 1963. In 1965, the club was moved from being in Jabal Tabour, near the school building to the Detectives Division Building (Lebanese) or Mabna Jamaat al Taharri which later became the Armed Struggle Building (Palestinian Police), Mabna Kifah al Moussilah. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)\textsuperscript{14}, which was founded in 1964 with the purpose of the “liberation of Palestine” was more and more involved in the club activities. The club was thus transformed into a political hub in the camp after the thawra, or revolution declared by Fatah\textsuperscript{15} in 1965 when it launched its first military operation inside occupied Palestine (Loubani 2006).

14 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an organization founded in 1964 during the Arab League Summit in Cairo with the stated purpose of the “liberation of Palestine” through armed struggle. It is recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” by over 100 states with which it holds diplomatic relations, and has enjoyed observer status at the United Nations since 1974. The PLO was considered by the United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991. In 1993, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected “violence and terrorism”; in response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

15 Fatah is a Palestinian nationalist political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Fatah was founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat, Khalil Wazir, Khaled al-Hassan and Salah Khalaf as a political movement and turned into a political party in 1965. It grew to prominence after the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 by engaging in guerrilla warfare against Israel, and constitutes the largest and dominant group within the PLO.
As education was provided formally and non-formally in the camps, a generation of teachers and professionals became leaders of the thawra when Israel defeated the Arab armies in 1967 (Issa 2014). The rise of influential leaders which might be “troublemakers” as described in the humanitarian glossary, created tension between the UNRWA and the refugees in the case of Nahr el Bared (Corbet 2015). The extra activities provided by the Palestinian themselves were also at the core of the camp’s politics which are based on the attachment of the refugees to their history. Malkki compares the detachment of refugees living in cities which are not immersed in their ideological historical roots to the refugees residing in the camps (L. Malkki 1995). As a result, the camp conserves its traditions and rituals, which is the case of Nahr el Bared described by its inhabitants as more conservative than other camps located closer to cities. Metaphorically, Turner describes the refugees lives as “a halt inside the camp while normal time continues outside the camp: a limbo with no promise of ending” (Turner 2015).

Hussein narrates his childhood in the first years of his arrival to Nahr el Bared. Starting from the basic house needs, wood was problematic to collect for cooking, heating and kerosene was not available for heating and other tools were unhealthy. “We would go to the agricultural lands to collect wood, through unsecured roads. The weather was challenging. The river of Abou Ali flooded many times, a girl drowned in the river when taken by its current to the delta and then the sea. Step by step, we understood the climate and nature of the area. As for our occupations, we would all work after school and in summer in the agricultural lands of Akkar: onions, watermelon, herbs... or help the fishermen collect fish joining them in their boats in the summer. They used the dynamite method. The sea area where most fishermen went was located just in front of the Damoun neighborhood of the camp. I would also collect gravel and sand from the beach, give it to my father to sell for construction works. When I was older, I worked in the stone quarries in Chekka. The days were long and tiring there and at night, when I came back, mosquitoes and hot weather wouldn’t let me sleep properly. I cannot describe that as a peaceful childhood, or whether I and the other children had any childhood” (Loubani 2006). Everyone in the camp was working. The abilities of the Palestinians, craftsmanship in particular, allowed them to find jobs outside the camp. Palestinians are known to be hard workers. They can’t obviously work in government bodies or in the army, which is the case of most Akkar. Palestinians got lower salaries than Lebanese workers. For example, building a roof would cost 3500 US dollars instead of 5000 if built by a Palestinian. The most important thing for Palestinians was to work. They were easier to recruit than foreigners as they didn’t need any papers to be issued in order to reside in Lebanon. All free-lance jobs were good for them, construction, plastering, painting, tiling, polishing, pouring concrete, mechanics, porters for cargo ships in the port, gathering fruits, oranges specifically... 70% of the people were working in Akkar, Tripoli and Zgharta (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). Palestinians didn’t have the possibility of obtaining permits to open pharmacies or clinics within the camp and outside. Their work opportunities were very limited.

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26 Refer to page n. 2.c.troublemakers

27 Refer to page n. 3.a.ideological

28 Refer to page n. 3.c promise of ending
The camp was based on the Roman distribution of “campus”. The tents distribution in a grid-like structure was similar to the military camps organization. In 1955 UNRWA counted 6,346 registered Palestinian refugees in Nahr el Bared. The sewage infrastructure consisted of trenches between the tents. People pouring water outside their tents were fined, as it was unhealthy to do so. All the dirty water was carried to the sea, which was very difficult in the harsh winter (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017). Till autumn 1951, most of the population of the camp was living on the northern hill overlooking the sea. UNRWA rented the southern hill as more space was needed. The family Al Safafirat moved from north to south. The Damoun people and the people who stayed before in Kazkhana moved from their tents near the school and took the place of the family that left, staying there till now. “We pitched our new tent in no time. The tent evolved over time, from having a concrete pad under it, a tent that cannot withstand the winds, with pickets in the ground, to a circular tent on top of stones of adobe bricks (Teen and Leben) of one meter high. The short internal parapet prevented floods and water filtration into the tent (Loubani 2006). At the beginning, the parapet was inside the tent, then it moved to the outside (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017). The house was built with straws put in the earth which were then plastered with white clay and straw, teen and leben. Some people wanted to cover the roof but they couldn’t because of the police checks all the time. Overnight, Hussein added a roof and installed a column made out of mud brick in the middle to support it. The latter was also made of mud and Hussein’s family flattened it often to compress it so it wouldn’t fall. However, the water infiltration continued inside the house. Oil lanterns were used, which made their noses black, until 1964, when electricity was provided to the camp (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

Zinc was used for the roofs instead of wood covers in 1955, but the interior space was very noisy in rainy days and sometimes the zinc roof detached from the structure under it because of the winds, which was very dangerous. At the end of 1958, refugees were allowed to build walls of two meters made of blocks of straw and mud. The houses looked like a Taboun or an open oven. The house was transformed later into a more permanent structure, changing from wood covers, to zinc roofs and then reinforced concrete roofs (Loubani 2006).
Drawing 5: Evolution of family shelters from tents to houses with zinc roofs in the 1960s.
The construction improved during the following years and concrete hollow blocks called khefen from 1962 to 1964 were used (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). However, “it was a shame to change from a tent like structure to a concrete house, it meant that they were not anymore hoping to go back to Palestine” (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017). However, building and enhancing houses required a permit which was almost impossible to obtain (Issa 2014). Hussein was the eldest of his brothers. In 1960, he started working, and with his earned salary, invested in his family home. He painted the walls with colors, green and yellow, he fixed the chairs, the bed and made other furniture improvements. He went into all the houses of his neighborhood where he drew birds, flowers, butterflies, rabbits and decorative elements in blue on white plaster, drawing a smile on people’s faces (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

Some of the inhabitants created an open oven called fourniye. As they needed wood to make it function, they collected wood in the lands around Nahr el Bared and stored them in front of every house. A small garden surrounded most of the houses where mint, onion and garlic were planted (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017). Coffee places became popular, people gathered there, to complain together about the difficulties in their lives. Qahwet Abed Darwiche was one of those frequented coffee shops. Bakeries were finally created where bread was produced inside the camp. Along with the schools, a proper hospital with a sufficient number of rooms, a health clinic and the water tank, all those shops were normalizing life within the camp. Financially people were getting better and better, it showed in their clothes, their food.

The house improved depending on the relations of the head of the family with the governing bodies (police, army, Arab organizations outside the country, etc..) and his connections.

“Everyone was beginning to develop his own life as the dream of going back to Palestine was starting to fade away” (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017).

Refugees deployed individual strategies of survival and collective forms of solidarity in order to improve their financial situations (Corbet 2015). The urbanization of Nahr el Bared was progressing continuously. Lebanese property owners sold their lands to Palestinians who expanded their properties till the Northern frontiers with Syria. The expansion of the camp was enormous as the new camp which consisted of the former Lebanese properties sold to Palestinians was four times the size of the old camp. It was and still is as big as the old camp from the east as it reaches the highway today. It is 1.5 times the size of the camp on the north side where it reaches Aabde and Mhammara till Hay el Jisr, the bridge. The new camp is considered an outskirt of the old camp. Mehyeddine Loubani is living till today in Hay 1 Jadid, which means the new area called also the corniche in the new camp (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The urbanization process was not accepted initially. In the 1950s, Palestinian refugees resisted UNRWA’s attempts to upgrade the camp. The action of improving their conditions and the infrastructure of the camp through humanitarian aids was understood as the result of an international decision inviting refugees to settle in their respective host countries, denying them the right to return to Palestine. When the expansion and modernization of the camps became “a tool for their advancement and liberation as a society”, their will to improve was accepted. This change happened in the light of the political discourse and following events in the Arab region. “Despite the camps geographic discontinuity such developments and transformations took place simultaneously across camps that were hundreds of kilometers apart – reemphasizing the potential of the camp as a political body and networked space.” (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012) The Palestinian camps were and still are a “quasi-political entity” recreating the structure of the pre-1948 Palestinian society, through the reproduction of the different neighborhoods of origin. The struggle to resist the changes and improvement was linked to denying the right of return. Besides, the Palestinian in the Arab region living in miserable camps would not settle in the host country and eventually return home. the relation between the place of residence and the right of return has never been clearly defined (Hanafi 2008).

The 1960s were a turning point where Palestinian refugees decided to settle in an endless encampment. The indeterminate temporariness of their situation confronted their thrive to build a future. The camp became a “place that evolves over time, constantly being reshaped” (Corbet 2015).
temporary was transformed into permanent, the camp, “apart from being a place of “no longer”, was also a place of “not yet”” (Turner 2005).

In the 1960s, most of young Palestinians joined political factions, especially the ones of liberation of Palestine, fighting for a right to return. The relations between the army, the police and the Palestinian refugees were becoming tense. The Deuxième Bureau of the Army Intelligence, Al Maktab al- Thani, and Police Detectives were the Lebanese government’s agency to suppress political activity and housing regulations in the Palestinian camps (Newman 2010). Some insiders were supporting those political bodies while others were enduring their rudeness.

“The police station of Al Abdeh accused us of wrongs sometimes without any proof, humiliating us. We couldn’t even listen to the channel The Arab’s Voice Sawt Al Aarab broadcast from Cairo, as we could be accused of conspiring against them. Whoever was distributing pamphlets or participating in manifestations was taken to be interrogated by the authorities in Tripoli and Beirut. We were constant suspects” (Loubani 2006).

Security measures were enforced, Palestinians needs mandatory permits for entry and exit in and out of the camps, curfews, Palestinian meetings were banned, listening to the radio and or reading newspapers were prohibited. State policies were shaped as a response to the security of the camps (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The 1960s were known for “oppressive and degrading measures against Palestinians as they were restricted in all aspects of life” (Issa 2014). This treatment of the refugee camp echoes the theory of Agamben, where the humanitarian governance tries to neutralize the refugees, seen as wounded victims. It is what Dicken explain as “politics of asylum” where the aim of the host community and the relief agency is to make sure “nothing disturbing really happens, and that politics do not take place” and categorizing the state of exception as a temporary anomaly (Diken 2004). While providing services to the “innocent victims of war and violence” having an international humanitarian compassion (Feldman and Ticktin 2010), the refugees are perceived as bare life, purely human beings with no political subjectivity, making them worthy of humanitarian assistance (Agier 2011).

Perspective on Encampment in Haiti.” Journal of Refugee Studies, June.

42 Refer to page n. 2.d anomaly

43 Refer to page n. 2.b innocent

44 Refer to page n. 2.b. worthy
The Cairo Agreement of 1969 which legalized and regulated the PLO presence in Lebanon changed the relation between the host country’s government and the Palestinian refugees (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The Government of Lebanon was no longer responsible for the security of the camps and was not allowed to interfere in their businesses. Construction went without restraint. No permit was needed to build. Following the creation of PLO in 1964, feeling supported and powerful again, Palestinian refugees started building houses in concrete imposing themselves on the host community. “The sounds of weapons could be heard in the nights and the Nationalist Expansion Al Madd al Qawmi began to spread” (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017). Politics influenced all social situations positively, improving the local conditions of Palestinians. The modernization of the camp started in 1969 when the Fatah Brigade entered the Lebanese territory and the Lebanese Armed Forces withdrew their forces from the camp. Since then, Nahr el Bared became a commercial and cultural hub for Akkar (Interviewee H.A. Loubani 2017) (Barakat 2013). Zinc roofs were removed, concrete roofs were poured and floors were tiled. Mud brick walls were replaced by concrete masonry ones. Whenever the police passed by, the refugees were fined 5 LBP and kept the concrete roof. The biggest house in the camp had two rooms. The garden for growing vegetables was transformed first into an enclosed room and then the rest of the house was built around it. En suite bathrooms were built later in the houses. Since the 1960s, electricity was provided by the government, charged according to an electricity meter in every house. Everything was constructed, there were no open spaces anymore. Mehyeddine’s family had one tree in the backyard. Houses with trees were recognizable. Mehyeddine also dug a well: “My father in law didn’t allow me to marry his daughter if I didn’t dig a well, my future wife cannot carry a jar on top of her head.” The well was a resource used by all the

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45 See page n. X

46 In 1970, the PLO leadership and its Fatah brigade were expelled from Jordan for fomenting a revolt, and entered Lebanon.
Drawing 6: Evolution of houses in the late 1960s and the civil war years
family who was responsible for its maintenance (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). Having for base the original tent division, built areas expanded within the boundaries of the original camp, taking over public spaces, narrowing down roads progressively (Barakat 2013). The urbanization process reflected a change of attitude of the refugees:

“We realized then that we were not coming back”, said Mehyeddine with tears in his eyes. “Who knows about politics can guess that we will never go back to Palestine, when you are forced to leave your country, you know it. Saying that you want to go back echoes empty words. We are the only people who won’t get our own independence in the whole world. The cause of Palestine is just a tool used by all the Arab countries to get funds.” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017)

Farghawi describes his first concrete home as well. “The first room that my family constructed, as well as other families, was the children bedroom, the parents’ bedroom followed later. The living room was the least important, many times a sitting area under a tent or under a vineyard structure was sufficient.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017) (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017).

All the works were done by the Palestinians themselves as many of them were skilled workers and foremen who worked in construction sites. Foundations were strong enough to carry more than one floor, allowing refugees to add more floors over time, depending on the space they needed. Balconies were even constructed on buildings of one or two floors. It was completely chaotic. If one of the sons was to marry, the father added one floor for him on top of his house, and then another floor for another son, etc... providing apartments for all his sons (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The extended family building type was therefore the most common one in the refugee camp (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012).

“In 1976, illegal construction spread; Palestinians and Lebanese who were forcefully displaced from the camps of Tell el Zaatar and Jisr el Basha as a result of conflicts and war came and settled in Nahr el Bared (Newman 2010). Additionally, as it was the times of the civil war, the Lebanese government was not interested anymore in controlling or checking the camps and the application of the construction law, so the Palestinians built as much as they wanted. The lack of control was everywhere, for Lebanese and Palestinians. The inhabitants of NBC strengthened the foundations of the initial houses and added floors above. In 1978, my [Ahmad’s] family built one floor and then in 1985 another one and in 1990 again. The foundation was conceived to support seven floors since the beginning. The civil war was a mess in terms of construction, no one was checking and a lot of illegal houses were constructed.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

In the 1980s, another wave of construction occurred. due to lack of housing and available space to build inside Nahr el Bared, many refugee families moved outside the official camp boundaries into the area immediately neighboring the camp, buying lands outside the camp and constructing their own houses there. They didn’t get any help by external stakeholders; it all depended on the landlord’s own income (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017). UNRWA refers to this area, which is part of the Lebanese municipalities of Mhammara and Bhamnine, as the Adjacent Area. Among the community, it is known as the “new camp”. It has a high concentration of Palestinian refugees (in an area of approximately 2 square km) and a smaller number of local Lebanese families. The Adjacent Area is not an official camp and has no fixed boundaries. Some Palestinians were able to buy land in this area before2001 from Lebanese landowners to build their own housing units; others rented buildings or apartments from Lebanese owners or from other Palestinians. The refugees living in this area tended to be better off economically than those inside the official camp, called “old camp” which was legally and spatially different (UNRWA 2008). Multi story apartment buildings were constructed for an entire extended family over 700 000 square meters, more than three times the old camp area. Lots in this area were either subdivided by the Lebanese owners who benefited from the increasing demand for lands by the Palestinians and sold parcels separately, or informally subdivided by the new owners themselves and sold to new Palestinian dwellers. The first lot was sold by a Lebanese owner from Mhammara village in 1969. It measured 1750 m2 and is located on the east side of the camp. It was not subdivided and the limits of the plot were unclear as it trespasses other lots and public domain. The third distinctive zone of Nahr el Bared is the Mohajareen or Displaced area, the latter is almost part of the old camp, it was developed in

57 Refer to page n. X
1982 when the PLO had the intention of building a hospital there. However, the plot was divided in small units of 55m² and 111 families who had been displaced from Tel el-Zaater camp since 1976 settled and lived in extremely poor conditions in the Mahajareen area (Hassan 2011). The land was owned by the Islamic Waqf in the 1980s (Saghieh and Saghieh October 2008) Fifty-four of these shelters were rehabilitated by the INGO Movimiento por la Paz (MPDL) in 2004-2005 (UNRWA 2008).

The informal building expansion was also financially supported by Palestinians living overseas, sending money to their families to improve their living conditions or building houses for themselves as a retirement plan (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). In a survey conducted in 2006, 72 percent of the households had income transferred from abroad (Tiltnes 2007). Exempted from taxes as refugees, the only fee they had to pay was the electricity fee. (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

The camp is, in this case, not only a refuge but an option with a strong political ideology behind it (Jansen 2015). The boundaries of the old camp, the original UNRWA land, were blurred with the new camp, an extension to the old camp. “This extension came as a response to the natural growth of the Palestinian community of Nahr el Bared. The old camp and the new camp are an extension to the same social fabric and structure” (Chit 2009). The new camp is not legally or politically classified as a camp and remains officially under municipal jurisdiction (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The official UNRWA camp was a high density urban fabric where more than 20,000 residents lived in 190,000 square meters while the urbanized rural area in the late 1970s, or new camp housed one third of the population of Nahr el Bared prior to the 2007 war (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The three main zones of Nahr el Bared: the old camp, the new camp, and the Mohajareen area are not perceived separately by the inhabitants themselves. Strong social and familial ties link the residents among each other or had houses in both the old camp and its extension. The neighborhoods referred to were still the same as the 1949 division (Hassan 2011). The reproduction and conservation of this urban division strengthen the identity of the Palestinians themselves and their belief in their cause.
The political events of 1968 and 1969 affected the perception of the camp and its political role as Palestinians felt they “regained their self-respect, pride and dignity. They felt back in control of their destiny and struggling as part of a mass movement to return home (Issa 2014). This manifested itself spatially in the 1970s urbanization which developed informally without any legal basis. The permanency of construction was not acceptable before. The strong political power that the Palestinians had as a support transformed the former tents into spatial permanent concrete structures. Political institutions, factories, training centers, markets and a variety of urban functions sprawl vertically and horizontally outside the official boundaries of the UNRWA camp. The latter was also the place where politics of “change, revolution and liberation” were developed. Palestinian refugee camps were political centers of action planning, and had a significant impact on the host states’ politics, becoming targets in the political and military discourse as they were centers for the Leftist Liberation movement in the Middle East (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The government of Lebanon was skeptical about the interference of the PLO and the possibility of dragging Lebanon into a conflict with Israel, especially before 1982 when the PLO was expelled from Beirut and southern Lebanon, due to the Israeli Invasion. PLO remained in the north till 1983 (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The refugee camp evolved from 1950
to 1969 from a depoliticized space to a hyper politicized one. In the 1950s, Palestinians, relying on the UNRWA services, were reluctant to upgrade their homes from tents to concrete houses, as it symbolized abandoning their right of return, acting as bare lives in the theoretical discourse of Agamben. The depoliticized environment, through the creation and consolidation of social hierarchies and political factions which represented the ideologies supporting the refugees’ beliefs, became a hyper politicized environment. Refugees “negotiate the suspended, temporary space of the camp, creating competing sovereignties” with the humanitarian governance (Turner 2015)48. New identities were created along with the reconstruction of their history as people in exile, reproducing their homeland. The camp became therefore a moral community where, based on a collective memory, their hope to return is cultivated. The multifaceted identity of the refugee altered throughout time and circumstances, as their labeling as refugees was also a political weapon (L. H. Malkki 1992)49, the continuous support of UNRWA confirmed the right of return while the camps themselves were home to cultivate the Palestinian nationalism and identity (Sanyal 2011)50. As the political parties were active in the camps, they played also a humanitarian role, improving the living conditions of the refugees and therefore increasing their dependency on these parties. Committees were assembled in the 1960s to deal with issues of health, economy, society and external relations. Different federations for women, teachers and students were created as well (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The popular committees played the equivalent role of municipalities, providing services related to electricity, water and garbage collection (Issa 2014). The camp was divided in five neighborhoods as described before51. The inhabitants of each neighborhood chose a representative to express their needs in each of the committees. The latter had also representatives from each of the three federations. After


49 Refer to page n. 3.b weapons

50 Refer to page n. 3.b Palestinian nationalism


51 Refer to page n. X

the creation of Fatah, these committees were in direct collaboration with UNRWA and the Government of Lebanon. The secretary general of the committee discussed major issues with the Government of Lebanon (GoL) and UNRWA. The committees were considered as persons of reference in the camps. GoL representatives coordinated with the committees in order to arrest a suspect. (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The Popular Committee Al Laïna el Chaibiat was established in 1974. Mehyeddine was the first to be part of it. The Popular committee was socially and economically responsible for managing construction problems and conflicts within the camp (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The ethnic chessboard described by Agier reflects the situation of Nahr el Bared where social hierarchies were put in place inside the camp in an innovative manner, having been detached from the former social structures (Agier, Un Monde de Camps 2014)52. Sociality was re-created and closely associated with politics, with the assistance of the humanitarian organizations (Petet 2005)53. Marginalized groups such as women for instance were given a chance to rise in contrast with the old social system. The role of influential leaders became therefore one of mediation between the humanitarian organizations and the refugees themselves as their knowledge and adaption of the rules allowed them to rise in power and influence the socio-political environment of the camp. “Localized spaces of sovereignty” were hence formed (Turner 2005)54. Akkar is an agricultural area where sugar cane and lemons were planted. There, Lebanese residents worked either in the agricultural field or joined the Lebanese Army or Police. Due to the lack of skilled workers, the Palestinians used this opportunity and trained themselves as apprentices in order to fill the job vacancies and earn money. At 19 years old, Mehyeddine built a house, did all the interior works required to make it livable such as plastering the walls and tiling the floors and sold it, becoming one of the contractors known in Nahr el Bared. “I was the first

52 Refer to page n. 2.e social strctures


53 Refer to page n. 2 e. sociality


54 Refer to page n. 2.d suspended

one in the camp to use a decorative plaster and sell this product. I established a contracting company called Taahoudet el Agha.” (Agha Contracting). The name Agha indicated a title of respect in society (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). The jobs undertook by Palestinians were mainly agricultural, as did most of the Lebanese in Akkar. The stone quarries, salt collectors, were good job opportunities the Palestinians seized. It was much easier to recruit Palestinians than other foreigners as they didn’t require any residence papers (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). Nahr el bared became a major economic hub in North Lebanon, being located between Tripoli, the second largest city in Lebanon, and the agricultural plains of Akkar, along the main transit road leading to the Lebanese Syrian borders. The camp contributed in providing a ready labor force for construction and agriculture. Along with being a major market in Akkar, many furniture manufacturing industries were located there, having no taxes to pay, the rent was cheaper and the labor force was present on site (Chit 2009). The dynamic of the relations between Lebanese and Palestinians in the North were of good nature, in terms of commerce, visits, invitations for weddings and funerals.

“The funeral is a crucial moment for our family’s relations. I would go with 30 or 40 Palestinians in Akkar to present my condolences to the family of the deceased, even in Christian villages. I used to call all the people in those villages such as Miniara for instance with their family names.” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017)

Ahmad Farghawi also stresses the positivity of these relations that extended even to Lebanese people living in Beirut, in Mount Lebanon, Hrajel particularly or Jezzine in the South (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). The integration of Palestinians within the Lebanese community was revealed in the common sport activities where Palestinian football players competed with Lebanese teams in Akkar. In the 1970s, the football field of Nahr el Bared was the only place where competitions could be held north of Tripoli (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). Also, cultural activities were shared, a theater play was held at the school in 1969-1970 and in 1980, then it was performed in Nahr el Bared Arab club, Beddawi, Tall Zaatar and even Baalbeck in the Bekaa (Loubani 2006).

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Figure 15. Sport competition between Palestinians and Lebanese football teams

Figure 16. School festival
Humanitarian Governance

In the 1970s, as the camp was becoming more and more dense, and political factions were formed, UNRWA undertook the responsibility of building a proper water network and a drainage system in coordination with another political party: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The committees representing the refugees raised the issues and complaints of the inhabitants of Nahr el Bared to UNRWA, collaborating with the UN agency for conflicts related to the built environment (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W. D. Mawaad 2017). Although UNRWA was not responsible for the new camp area, some infrastructure services were developed by the UN agency in the extension of the official camp. Health services and education were given to residents of both areas (Hassan 2011). The reliance on humanitarian organizations indeed extended often outside the camp boundaries according to Jansen (Jansen 2015)\(^\text{10}\). A health center was working efficiently within the camp. However, there was only one official hospital: the Hīlāl, in Beddawi. UNRWA provided constant help for special hardship cases\(^\text{11}\). All vaccines were given to every child born in the camp as well as milk and vitamins, till the age of one and a half years. In case of special hardship cases, help was provided to the child till 18 years old. Although UNRWA covered at some point 10 percent of the costs of the medical assistance, it covers nowadays 60% of the medical care, but the delay to get an approval for an operation takes a few weeks (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). Besides, the illiteracy rate was and is stands still to 11.52% in Nahr el Bared, which is lower than the illiteracy rate in Lebanon (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). Children continued their studies until university, as surveyed in 2006, with some exception where children leave school prematurely. In the age bracket of 6 to 19 years old, 20% of are not enrolled in any educational institution. 2720 children attended elementary school, while 1880 went to preparatory school. Nevertheless, compared to other Palestinian camps in the North such as Beddawi, more young people, especially men (27% men and 16% of women for secondary school) reach secondary and university levels in Nahr el Bared (Tīltīnes 2007). They reached the baccalaureate with UNRWA schools. Scholarships for universities were given by UNRWA and PLO for the best students at school. The first year at university was half paid by UNRWA. Palestinian refugees can also enroll in the Lebanese University, provided they pass the exam. History, sociology, geography and others were disciplines in which Palestinians can enroll but medical school, architecture, engineering, economics, law and journalism were not open for them. The reason why they can’t work in those fields are mainly two. First, they needed to master the French language which was not taught as a first language in the UNRWA schools: Arabic and English were the main language in those schools. Second, they cannot get any permission to work in those fields in the host country. In order to acquire diplomas in those professions, they had to go to private universities, which many did (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). Additionally, the security of the refugees depended on UNRWA, as the ones who did not have identity cards and hence were not registered with UNRWA risked being arrested if suspected (Newman 2010). The expansion and urbanization of the camp became out of control of humanitarian governance while the complexity of the space was developed (Agier 2002)\(^\text{12}\).

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\(^{10}\) Refer to page n. 2 reliance

For further information, refer to Jansen, Bram J. 2015. “‘Digging Aid’: The Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of Africa.” Journal of Refugee Studies, June.

\(^{11}\) The Special Hardship Case program is established to distribute relief to the neediest refugee families, concentrating on the poorest of the poor, for whom, as Commissioner-General Olof Rydbeck notes, “UNRWA is the only source for... relief.” This was later replaced by the Social Safety Net programme, which in 2013 supported nearly 30,000 Palestinian refugees, or 6 per cent of the total. (www.unrwa.org/content/special-hardship-case-programme)

\(^{12}\) Refer to page n. 2.b. out of the control

During the 1980s, the urbanization process that had already started after the Cairo Agreement continued. The houses in the old camp were almost complete, they had a living room, bathrooms and rooms. The infrastructure, the sewage system and all other improvements totally changed the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees. A new water tank was added in every neighborhood by UNRWA and the European Union, they were also responsible for its maintenance. Despite the huge improvement, Nahr el Bared still lacked dedicated systems for storm water drainage, and adequate water supply to houses and had limited electrical and communications connections (Barakat 2013). 92 percent of the households had piped water in their houses, while drinking water was bought in bottles, which is the case of a large number of regions in Lebanon (Tiltnes 2007).

“It was a great improvement compared to the common toilets installed in each neighborhood at their arrival to Nahr el Bared!” said Ahmad and Walid laughing (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

However, the 1980s were an unstable political period for Lebanese and Palestinian refugees: two wars were fought in Lebanon, the Lebanese civil war and the 1982 Lebanon War in which Israel invaded the Lebanese territory starting from the southern part. War shelters were constructed under the houses for protection. The refugees’ relatives living abroad who had a strong political connection, didn’t risk their lives to come back to Lebanon, instead they stopped in Cyprus or in other Mediterranean countries to meet their beloveds and went back to their new country. Nahr el Bared experienced fewer battles than other Palestinian camps. However, it was bombarded from the sea and the air by Israel during the 1970s and 1980s. Fighters from Fatah stayed in the North which was at the time controlled by Syria, even after the 1982 Israeli Invasion. Clashes erupted within Fatah between loyalists and supporters of the Syrian government who won the fight.
The winning faction, Fatah Al Intifada, Fatah Uprising, governed thereafter the camp of Nahr el Bared which had relatively calm times till the end of the civil war (Issa 2014). In the 1990s, the country was still not very stable. In 1983, construction was rare because of the Israeli invasion. A lot of merchants bought lands in the new camp. The ones who had enough savings married Lebanese women in order to register everything in their names and circumvent law problems. Hence, the humanitarian government was not very present anymore, other organizations and governments were sustaining the refugees in alternative ways. The French government, for example, was organizing some projects. In one of these, Ahmad managed to accomplish his gas project. They provided him with receptacles and materials in order to start a new activity. During a meeting in the common room they announced that an amount of money (2000/2500 USD) was to be spent for each project. Some of the inhabitants of Nahr el Bared presented their projects. Ahmad began with only 50 bottles of gas and has 200 small and big bottles today. The lifestyle of the refugees changed. “We had fridges, washing machines and even jacuzzi sometimes!” says Ahmad together with Walid (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

From 1992 to 2007 the density of construction increased even more, the camp expanded till Aabde and Bhanine. It was a period of urbanization for the whole country, inside and outside the camps. The area of the historic camp, the old camp, didn’t exceed 190 000 m² about 450 x 420m housing 22000 refugees in 1700 buildings, producing an incredible density of 1160 person per hectare (10000 m²). Nahr el Bared, along with some other Palestinian camps, started to be considered as “city camps”, spaces of exception and exclusion, different from every other kind of urbanization. The suspension of the law and of the regulated urbanization became normal, their way of being (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The indeterminate temporariness of their stay in the host country transformed the camps which by definition are temporary to quasi-permanent (Turner 2015). The boundaries of the new camp couldn’t be defined as the official UNRWA camp. The flexibility of

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59 Fatah al-Intifada is a splinter group from Fatah founded in 1983 by Abu Musa and Abu Saleh following disagreements with the Fatah leadership over military decisions and corruption during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. It receives financial, military and political support from Syria.

60 Refer to page n. 3.ö quasi permanent
its borders depended on real estate market developments and housing. As a consequence, land values increased reaching 100 USD per meter before the 2007 war. The zone adjacent to the camp changed from an agricultural area with lots between 5000 and 20 000 m² into a residential zone of small parcels which consisted of 100 to 400m². No zoning or legal regulations were followed as legal subdivision and registration were expensive and time consuming and 25 percent of lots exceeding 10 000m² had to be reserved for public spaces and streets. Accelerating the process and exploiting the totality of the lot area through an informal subdivision was beneficial for both land owners and buyers. 95 percent of the lots surrounding Nahr el Bared were acquired through this process. The process of land subdivision consisted of a surveyor hired by the land owner who divided the lots in smaller parcels of 100 to 400 m², leaving 10 to 20 percent of open spaces for streets. The surveyors were either Lebanese certified surveyors or Palestinians from Nahr el Bared who are trusted to solve any conflict of interest in times of need. Decisions concerning the ratios of public to private domain were decided by the land owners and the developers, mostly Palestinians. The developers who consisted of six big land developers in the camp and other small developers, were not involved in solving conflicts and issues after selling the land, their involvement in the whole process depended only on their personal profiles. The map was itself the official document supporting the sales contract. Names of buyers of all parcels with the date in which the transitions happened were indicated on the map, ensuring none of the parcels is sold twice. “Developers and surveyors, through this map, were playing the role of the urban planner, by allocating plots, and re-parcellating them, defining the private from the public domain and specifying the sizes of the parcels in each area” (Hassan 2011). Advertisement and technical and bureaucratic procedures were mostly taken care of by a middleman, Wakeel, from the camp. The contract was made up after the sum, paid in installments over a period of one or two years, was completed. On the other hand, the process of land acquisition impacted negatively the urban environment and the security of tenure of the refugees. The illegality of the transaction creates conflicts among the various buyers and developers, in terms of lots limits on the map and borders between private and public domain and prices of lands. Trust and reputation are hence important assets that developers built within the social ties of the camp. Respected figures in the camp, Sheikhs and elders played the role of mediators in cases of conflict. If unsolved, the Popular Committee intervenes. In 2007, after the war, all the dwellers were treated as squatters (Hassan 2011). Land development had positive and negative practices depending on the developer. Streets were sometimes designed randomly serving every lot separately or conceived in a good network of wide streets (above 6 meters). Sewage and water network were not always provided as an infrastructure. The subdivided map was sometimes communicated to the buyers, the area registered in the contract was not always the one the buyer got in reality. Lot limits were often not respected, trespassing on neighboring lots or public domain. Flexibility of payment and involvement in future conflict resolutions were not always ensured by the developer himself. However, legality was not perceived as a major issue because of the concept of temporariness of the refugees themselves (Hassan 2011). Before the 2001 Law in the 1990s Palestinian refugees had the possibility to acquire land although the process was complicated and time consuming. Refugees were considered foreigners and therefore had a restricted type of ownership allowing them to acquire a limited area only, registration taxes were higher than those a Lebanese citizen would pay. The procedures were also complicated and difficult to complete. Due to complications and expenses that didn’t secure the tenure of the refugees, many avoided registering lands in their own name to avoid paying taxes to the Lebanese government. Palestinians went to register their properties at the public notary or kateb al-adel in the form of an irrevocable Power of Attorney (Hassan 2011). Mehyeddine’s house is still not registered, although at the time it was constructed, he was allowed to register it in his own name, but that was too expensive, none of the Palestinians did it. In order to construct a house, some Palestinians went to the local municipality, conforming to the regulations and paying the same amount of taxes as Lebanese to secure a building permit (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).
Palestinian Property Rights

Palestinian’s ownership rights between 1969 and 2001: Palestinians are included in the stipulations of Legislative Decree No. 11614 issued in 1969, regarding non-Lebanese acquisition of property rights in Lebanon. Lebanese legislation requires non-Lebanese foreigners (including Palestinians) seeking to acquire property rights available to them to file an application for a license with the Minister of Finance, who in turn transfers it, along with his recommendation, to the Council of Ministers (Article 9). The Cabinet may then grant the license through a decree. The power of the Cabinet to grant or refuse the license is final and its decisions are not subject to any appeal. Source: Palestinian’s ownership right between 1969 and 2001 (Al Natour 1997).

Power of attorney: A power of attorney is a written authorization by which a person (called the “principal”) appoints another as his/her agent (called the “attorney-in-fact”) and confers upon him or her authority to do some act or acts in the principal’s name. It is referred to as letter of attorney in common law systems and mandate in civil law systems. Unless the power of attorney has been made irrevocable (please see below), the grantor may revoke the power of attorney by telling the attorney-in-fact it is revoked. Under the Lebanese law, a revocable power of attorney becomes ineffective if the principal dies or becomes incapacitated because of physical injury or mental illness.

An irrevocable power of attorney is a power of attorney that cannot be revoked by the principal because it is granted for the benefit of the attorney-in-fact or a third party. It does not become ineffective upon the death of the principal. (Saghieh and Saghieh October 2008).

The 2001 ownership Law: The Lebanese legislator issued Law No. 296 dated 03/04/2001, published in issue no. 15 (15/04/2001) of the Official Gazette, on the amendment in the law enforcing Decree No. 11614 dated 04/01/1969 (Law Concerning Obtainment by the Non-Lebanese of Corporeal Landed Property in Lebanon). Article One of this law provided that “no non-Lebanese person, natural or moral, and no Lebanese person considered by the law as a foreigner, may territory or any other corporeal rights intended by this law, except after obtainment of a permit granted by the Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, there being no exception to this rule except where expressly stipulated in this Law. No ownership of realty right of any kind is permitted to any person who does not hold citizenship from a recognized State, or to any person where such ownership contravenes the provisions of the Constitution concerning [Palestinian] settlement”. (Al Natour 1997) (Hassan 2011).

Graph 2: Types of property registration used by Palestinians in Nahr el Bared
Before 2001, 78% of the residents registered their property through power of Attorney at the public notary while 11% resorted to the popular committee. After 2001, 60% of the registrations went through the Popular Committee while 25% were registered at the local public notary and 10% only were officially registered through a Lebanese wife or daughter in Law. Legal registration consisted mostly of economic assets, investments in constructing apartment buildings, industrial or commercial units for sale or rent or institutions such as an NGO (Hassan 2011). In the 1990s, Palestinians were unofficially restrained from buying properties. They used to go to the public notary in order to put their properties in their names or registered their assets with the names of their Lebanese wives, when applicable. The inhabitants protested through a manifestation about the fact that their houses were inherited by religious institutions and tried unsuccessfully to claim their rights of property (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W. D. Mawaad 2017). All the Palestinians of Nahr el Bared were called to go to Halba and the municipality allowed them to keep their properties without paying any fine if they had built their homes before 1993. Whoever constructed his house after that date was fined. The 2001 law stated that Palestinians cannot own properties and/
or inherit their own lands and properties. The latter will go to the religious estates or “waqef” when inherited [Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017]. Renting and buying houses was therefore illegal. In Nahr el Bared, houses were mostly owned by the people pre-2001. Just a minority lived in rented houses (2 to 3%) (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). In 2001 Law No. 296 was amended to ban the entitlement of the stateless Palestinian refugees to property, pushing Palestinians to acquire lands without conforming to legal processes. Prior to the issued law which inhibited any person not carrying a citizenship issued by a recognized state to register properties in his name, refugees had the right to own 5,000 square meters without need of a permit. In the official camp, a space of exception, this law was not applicable. Therefore, the law affected mainly the Palestinians who could afford to live outside the camp boundaries, whether in the new camp or in other areas, making them more vulnerable and marginalized (Hassan 2011).

Another practice was to sell apartments within the camp constructed without a building permit through the Popular Committee contract. Apartments were not registered as they were not allocated to a specific lot. This resulted in making the popular committee a reliable institution to record transactions which could be updated in the central registry whenever needed. Although contracts didn’t have any value, they were perceived as legal when approved by the Popular Committee (Hassan 2011). These practices established within the camp produced private systems of governance, spreading norms and rules unaligned with the national law. The camp becomes a zone of no-law, an exclusive urban space, a state of exception (AlSayyad and Roy 2006).

The land divisions since the initial emergency phase in 1950 till the land divisions operated by developer and surveyors are specific to the inhabitants of the camp, regardless of the humanitarian governance and the host nation-state (Corbet 2015). The building processes are normalized within the camp defined as a grey area: a perimeter that excluded the people living within its limit from the host society spatially and legally and where refugees were able to adapt the regulations in place to their own benefit (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). For further information, refer to AlSayyad, Nezar, and Ananya Roy. 2006. “Medieval Modernity: On Citizenship and Urbanism in a Global Era.” Space and Polity, April: 1-20.

Refer to page n. 4.c. private systems

Refer to page n. 4.c. define land boundaries
2006) (Jansen 2015)\textsuperscript{63}. Other regulations affected the lives of the refugees in this period. Changes in regulations meant that Palestinians were not allowed to go to Syria anymore without a permission from the government. Before they were as free to circulate between Lebanon and Syria as all Lebanese citizens. This was a big change for the Palestinian community who had a lot of connections with Syrians, especially for commerce. Another recurrent legal discussion which affected Palestinians and was linked to their ownership of property rights is the issue of \textit{tawteen}, the naturalization of Palestinian refugees as Lebanese citizens. It was widely discussed and rejected by Lebanese political parties due to political reasons. Preventing this process was supporting the Palestinian right of return (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). Giving citizenship rights to refugees would also oppose the biopolitics of humanitarian organizations in addressing a “transient political mass waiting for return” (Hanafi 2008). This marginalization reinforced the concept of ghetto in many Palestinian camps. However, the region in which Nahr el Bared is located had never suffered conflicts and destruction that other Palestinian camps endured in the civil war (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). Today, politically, economically and socially marginalized, Palestinians are a minority without a recognized place in a sectarian system, reflected in the spatial enclaves which constitute the Palestinian camps (Hanafi 2008).

The naturalization of Palestinian refugees echoes the notion of citizenship and political rights of refugees in the scholar discourse. The camp being “a space in which the normal order is de facto suspended” (Agamben 1995)\textsuperscript{64}, “refugees were matter out of place who needed secluding in order not to pollute the national order of things” (L. H. Malkki 1992)\textsuperscript{65}. The camp and its refugees are isolated from the city and its citizens, Order could be forced on the camp, and therefore refugees become subject to the law, while simultaneously living in a space of no law (AlSayyad and Roy 2006)\textsuperscript{66}. The unstable circumstances of Lebanon in the past years led to the fragmentation of the Lebanese population. The unity of the latter needed to be strengthened through highlighting the importance and the benefits of the Lebanese citizenship, as opposed to the non-Lebanese people living in the country, and particularly the Palestinian refugees in the camps. In Jansen’s words, the Palestinian camps became the exception which explained the rule of the Lebanese citizenship in this case. The camp was consequently a legal exception where order was suspended within a set of boundaries crossed by insiders and outsiders constantly (Turner 2005)\textsuperscript{67}.

The Lebanese government prohibited the construction of buildings over two stories high in all the camps in Lebanon which forced the refugees to build “illegal” additions to the original shelters due to the increase of the demography (UNRWA 2008). In a survey conducted in 2006, a family in Nahr el Bared had an average of 5 members. However, this varies depending on the household. 31% have more than 7 members. One third of the population is younger than 15 years old, almost half of the inhabitants are below 20 years old. 14% of the houses in Nahr el Bared have only one room and 41% of the dwellings consist of two rooms (Tiltnes 2007). As described before, the extended family house was popular in Nahr el Bared, the head of household and his sons lived in the same residence, while most of the daughters moved to their husband’s parental residence when married (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). This resulted in haphazard and poor quality construction and some residential blocks being built up to six stories high. Nahr el Bared, like other Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, suffered from poor urban planning, poor access due to narrow roads and alleyways, lack of open community spaces and inadequate infrastructure. Lack of available land for normal urban expansion led to a high population density in a small area (the area of the official camp is approximately 2 square kilometers). The lack of natural light and ventilation in many housing units contributed

\textsuperscript{63} Refer to page n. 2.a. perimeter
For further information, refer to Jansen, Bram J. 2015. “‘Digging Aid’: The Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of Africa.” Journal of Refugee Studies, June.

\textsuperscript{64} Refer to page n. 2.e. de facto

\textsuperscript{65} Refer to page n. 2.e. national order

\textsuperscript{66} Refer to page n. 4. C no law

\textsuperscript{67} Refer to page n. 1 legal expetion
to a variety of health problems for the camp’s residents (UNRWA 2008). 43 percent of the residents reported poor ventilation in their own houses, 36 percent complained of having dark and gloomy dwellings and 74 percent of living in a humid and damp environment (Tiltnes 2007). Some examples of the houses of this period are explained and drawn by the inhabitants. Mehyyeddine house for example was surrounded by his cousin, his uncle, his mother and his brother’s houses.

“My cousin, my uncle, my mother and my brother’s houses surrounded my house. My home overlooked 3 streets. The entrance is from here, it opens on a covered space or balcony on 3 floors of 6 by 8 meters. That was the living room. The kitchen is in front, and it had two bedrooms. The area of the house was 132 m2. Eleven to twelve people were living in it. First, I covered the bedrooms with zinc roofs, the kitchen didn’t have any roof. When Fouad wanted to marry, I added a floor on top. We constructed the walls with concrete and then we expanded the house. The garden was at the back. We had a tree in there” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017)
Ahmad Farghawi’s family housing had 4 floors and he could access his house by passing through his parents’ home or separately. Every floor had two apartments and all the family lived in the same building. His parents had the largest apartment, combining two apartments together on the ground floor. They had a kind of common living room (open air), a sort of shaft, from which light entered the house. The manwar or the atrium, a shared living space on every floor between Ahmad’s and his brother’s apartment. It had an area of 40 m² where the children played and celebrations were held. This manwar existed on every floor. It fitted 70 people approximately. The ground floor was poorly lit and humid. They had more windows in the upper floors. The area of each apartment was 75m².

“Houses had more windows in the upper floors. Some houses were very humid. Everyone was building on his own and at his own expense so the construction quality was not always good. Even the first roof was built gradually, together with other rooms that were progressively added. The corridors were very small. Every time one of the family members married, a floor was added. Whenever the brothers had conflicts among each other, one of them would add an external stair avoiding passing through his brother’s apartment. From the entrance of my home, the corridor distributes the spaces. The living room is in front, next to it, the kitchen and the two bathrooms and on the other side of the corridor, two adjacent bedrooms” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

Walid describes his former house as well:

“A corridor distributed the circulation to the living room, closer to the door, the kitchen and the bedrooms were at the back of the house” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).
The spatial condition of the camp in the early 2000s was terrible as a result of an uncontrolled urbanization of almost 30 years. The numbers of this process of sprawl are provided by UNRWA. The total number of buildings in the old camp was 1697, divided into residential, commercial, institutional and UNRWA areas.

**Residential property**
- Total number of apartments: 4,591
- Average apartment area: 78 m²
- Average number of floors: 2.41 floors
- Total built area: 360,000 m²

**Commercial property**
- Total number of commercial units: 880
- Total built area: 18,800 m²

**Communal/Institutional property (included UNRWA compound)**
- Mosques: 4
- Kindergartens: 6
- Institutions: 10
- Clinics/dispensaries: 2
- Total area: 6,756 m²
- Total number of units: 5,493
- UNRWA compound area: 29,500 m²
  (5 schools, 2 health centers, 1 kindergarten, 2 community based buildings, 3 agency offices)  
  (UNRWA 2008)

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68 For further information, refer to report.
The total built area of both the new and the old camp was 400 000 m² and counted 2000 buildings. The same ratio of residential, commercial and institutional areas was repeated in the adjacent part of Nahr el Bared (Hassan 2011). From these numbers, it is understandable that the open spaces in the camp are almost not existing. They amount to only 12% of the total area of the camp. The only wide public space is composed primarily of a 1 to 1.8 m alley. Windows opened to 1m wide alleys facing buildings of 3 to 4 floors (or even 6). Most of the rooms in the camp had no windows at all, as the buildings were built back to back and wall to wall. The refugee community lived in extremely dark and humid spaces where natural lighting and ventilation did not reach the interior of their homes even in the middle of the day. The boundaries between outside and inside the houses are very thin and the semi-disappearance of the open public spaces made privacy disappear as well. Private spaces, activities, sounds and smells were combined in one space, a “space of exception” (Agamben 1995), a heterogeneous multifunctional place incomparable to monofunctional city space.

The state of exception became a rule in this case and transformed into a permanent spatial arrangement (AlSayyad and Roy 2006). Wide streets were rare in the camp. The main wide street in the center of the old camp gave opportunities for commerce, demonstration, communal interaction loud and exposed. The narrow alleys had a different rhythm and different social practices. In the latter, the sense of entering a private domain was the main feeling while walking through them. Private dimension is exposed and the walker is exposed as well. Children play, women gather in front of their houses and socialize and see the daylight which is not visible from inside the shelters (Barakat 2013). The houses inside were overcrowded and obviously lacked any kind of privacy. The roof was a very important space in which various activities took place. It was a space for large family gatherings and celebrations such as weddings, a garden, a studying place for students escaping the noise of the interior, a sleeping area during the hot and humid summer (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Roofs were often shared with other families. Nahr el Bared, compared to Beddawi for instance, has more commercial areas and ground space around their dwelling as well a common use of the roof (Tiltnes 2007). In some way, the roof became the public space that the community was missing outside and inside the houses.

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69 Refer to page n. 1. A. space of exception

70 Refer to page n. 4.c permanet spatial
Nahr el Bared is intersected by the principal road Tripoli-Syrian borders, the only thoroughfare within the camp that allowed car access. It is where the major retail commerce took place. Nahr el Bared was the only camp where a public national space entered through and within a camp. Because of this feature the camp developed an “informal credit-based economy” (Moujally 2012) and became an influential wholesale distribution center for the North governorate. The economic situation grew even more after the military support of Fatah Al Intifada’s faction in Nahr el Bared to Syria in 1983. In this period, the Syrian army succeeded to expel Fatah from the camps of the North. The camp benefited from some preferential treatment such as the absence of Lebanese military barricades on its outskirts and the freedom of movement as well as the free circulation of building materials, allowing the ulterior expansions (Moujally 2012).

Perpendicular to the main street laid the souks, where pedestrian, traditional commercial activity happened (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Prior to the conflict, Nahr el Bared was the leading Palestinian camp in Lebanon in terms of prosperity of its informal economy. It was a camp of traders and entrepreneurs and grew into a major commercial hub for the north due to its location in an agricultural area and its proximity to the Lebanese-Syrian border (UNRWA 2008). The camp was a trading point for agricultural products produced in the rural areas that were sent to Tripoli (Issa 2014). The camp continued to be a source of cheap labor for the surrounding Lebanese agricultural communities and provided neighboring Lebanese villages in the Akkar region with cheaper goods and services (UNRWA 2008). The fields of construction, hotels and restaurants were the most common work areas for men while women were more involved in education, health and social services. Craftsmanship was still present as half the employed men were craftsmen and a quarter in the service sector and sales market. The last two sectors are also common for women. 63% of the employed in Nahr el Bared work inside the camp for long hours, almost half of the employees work more than 56 hours per week. The average weekly income is 76 USD. (Tiltnes 2007). Al Najda and Samed associations built a factory to sue clothes in order to create jobs for women and young people. They exported products to Libya and learned skills in the vocational centers of UNRWA. A cooperative supermarket was created in the camp. Other associations like Ghassan Kanafani were also building nurseries and cleaning the roads. Many young people were involved and were paid daily (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).
During the 1990s the situation of Nahr el Bared improved a lot and the camp turned into a new kind of settlement. It was not temporary anymore. Everything in the camp had a permanent nature. The houses, commerce, integration, community were very developed and gave life to an unique “hub” for the Akkar governorate. The highway was constructed outside the camp in 1992. It took 5 years to build (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017) (CDR 2005).

“Nahr El Bared is the richest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, the camp developed enormously because of the road that was crossing it. The Palestinians produced ice cream and distributed it in the North and sold lupines terms. When people didn’t have money to pay them back, we were exchanging their goods for potatoes instead of money for example. People from Nahr El Bared are very skilled in commerce. We even collected some wild herbs and invented food recipes with them. We sold thyme, potatoes, tomatoes and many other products. We could choose if we wanted to work in agriculture or in commerce (food, clothes) after studying and worked in partnership with Lebanese people from Beirut and Zgharta. People came here for many reasons” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

Indeed, many households had more than one single income, combining a wage income (48%) with a self-employment income (35%) and some report property or other types of income (3%). Practices regarding savings consisted of gold and other precious metals rather than saving accounts at banks or other institutions contrary to the inhabitants of other Palestinian camps. (Tiltnes 2007). The position of the Nahr El Bared camp helped a in its development. The agricultural lands around gave the refugees the possibility of expansion and a strategic position towards the North. Thanks to its location, it became a commercial center where farmers came to sell their products and purchase goods taking advantage of the camp’s competitive prices. The presence of a cheap and dense assortment of businesses constituting markets proved to be a formidable asset that started to attract customers form Tripoli and other northern cities in an economic climate of Lebanon characterized by inflation and high prices (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012) (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). Nahr el Bared inhabitants developed an informal credit-based economy which improved their financial status. Compared to Beddawi, another Palestinian camp located closer to Tripoli, the community in Nahr el Bared appeared wealthier and more religiously conservative (Moujally 2012). Before the conflict, Palestinians were trusted people who offered good quality manual labor which was required everywhere. Ahmad continued telling that people asked:

“Why do you sell cheaper things than other places?”
“Because we have a ship that delivers everything for free!”

Actually, Nahr el Bared inhabitants sold products for cheaper prices because first, it was always based on family businesses and second, as a marketing strategy, lower prices were compensated by selling more products. Generally, refugees didn’t need to pay any rent, water, phone, sewage or municipality fees. That is why they sold their products for half their prices, contrary to people outside the camp. This made them much more competitive than the merchants of Tripoli. “The camp never slept: At 3 am butchers woke up to work in the butcheries while fishermen were at sea collecting the fish.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).For example, Walid sold tiles for 6,5 USD per square meter all over Lebanon. In any other place in Beirut they sold the same tiles for 18 dollars. The cost of manufacturing was 5,55 USD for him which probably was the same as in Beirut but the shop rent in the capital made the difference.

Graph 6: Location of main job

32% Outside a camp
65% In another camp
3% In Nahr el Bared

The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp Chapter IV

Biography of a Camp: Nahr el Bared
“We were never competing with Lebanese merchants, we are just working in different fields, a lot of Lebanese are buying from us. We didn’t have any industries apart from the ice-cream factory. Of course we were having black-smith, carpentry, aluminum workshops, but all in small sizes, just to cover our own needs.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

Even when the highway was constructed adjacent to the camp in the 1990s, the commercial center that Nahr el Bared had formed into kept its integral role in Akkar. The interdependence of the camp and the surrounding community was supported by the help and assistance of the humanitarian organizations. Relying partly on the humanitarian assistance and on their unclear rights which provided for them houses without taxes and land ownership, the refugees maintained the benefits of their status of refugees. They simultaneously integrated themselves in the context by being resourceful and creative in their economy, decreasing the isolation of the camp (Jansen 2015). However, Palestinians were facing difficulties because of the Lebanese laws restricting the nature of the jobs they could undertake.

Farghawi explains the situation:

“We can for example buy a truck but we can’t drive the truck. The Lebanese laws make our lives a bit difficult. We can’t have a truck driving license. Now we drive those trucks, but then when we are stopped by the police, we pay fines. Whenever we are working in a hospital, we do not have any official contracts, so we have to take the risk of being fired without warning. To register goods, we either register them in the name of our wives who are Lebanese, or in the name of Palestinians living abroad” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017),

According to Ahmad and Walid, the main difference between Lebanese and Palestinians was the concept of confessionalism, Taifiye which was not very strong among Palestinians; Christians, Muslims, Shiites or Sunnites lived together without any issue. Nevertheless, the relation between Lebanese and Palestinians was very good. Also, marriages between Palestinian men and

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71 Refer to page n. 2.c resourceful
72 In 1964, the Ministry of Labor adopted a policy under Ministerial Decree No. 17561 where professions in Lebanon are limited exclusively to Lebanese citizens, inhibiting Palestinians to work in several jobs categories (Schenker 2012).
73 Confessionalism (politics) is a system of government that refers to de jure mix of religion and politics. It typically entails distributing political and institutional power proportionally among confessional communities. Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic within the overall framework of confessionalism where the highest offices, parliament, cabinet and top tier government executives are proportionately reserved for representatives of religious communities.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp

Chapter IV

checkpoints and thus poses a greater risk of getting caught (International cars sold their product in Nahr al-Bared instead of Tripoli, which has many camp is located. For example, farmers who could not afford to register their from Syria. The camp's relative legal vacuum also attracted producers from it became an economic hub for Lebanese looking to buy smuggled goods from Tripoli to Syria and the lack of Lebanese policing inside the camp, a “tight state control began at the very perimeter of the camp” in south Lebanon. The camp is hence defined as a legally suspended space (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010).

As explained before, Nahr el Bared always had a very important role among the other camps in Lebanon especially in the North Governorate. The politics inside of the camp were very complex. Traditionally, Nahr El Bared has been governed by a popular committee, a unified body of sixteen representatives from Palestinian groups coming from the political spectrum. Its secretary general is selected from a different faction every month, giving each group the opportunity to exercise its influence. The popular committees often comprised unelected faction leaders who derived most of their legitimacy from their weapons. With state security forces essentially banned from interfering, residents often complain of chaos and inter-factional strife in large, armed, and unregulated pockets immune to Lebanese law and order (International Crisis Group 2012). In the late 1980s, the leftist movements in Palestine weakened and capitalism and neo-liberalism had supremacy. The Palestinian leadership returned to the occupied territories, abandoning the camps of exile which became suddenly at the periphery of Palestinian politics and faced the policies of their respective host states (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). In 1987, the Cairo Agreement was abrogated by President Amin Gemayel. The relations with Palestinian refugees depended on an unofficial arrangement; internal policies were taken charge of by the refugees themselves, while when conflicts occurred and an intervention from the Lebanese authorities was needed, the latter coordinated the interference with the camp authorities or relied on Palestinian factions to hand over suspects. Consequently, the end of the 1980s marked a new era where camps were internally governed by a web of complex power structures: the PLO, popular committees and organizations, other political parties representative bodies, factions, imams, notables and UNRWA directors (Issa 2014)... Refugees were denied the right to work and to own property, while the camps were limited to the same land area provided in 1948. These events brought the camps to severe consequences like an increase in their density: the open spaces disappeared and the Palestinian camps became the densest urban forms in the world. In this hyper-politicized context where the camp was originally an

Lebanese women from Akkar were very common. Strong economic, social and marriage ties integrated Nahr el Bared with the surrounding community (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). Mixed marriages between Palestinians and Lebanese were very common (Issa 2014).

“Me and Ahmad, for example, our wives are Lebanese. During the war in 2007, my cousin who is a soldier in the Lebanese army, was in the camp, my wife was besieged inside the camp and my aunt didn’t know who to cry for. We spent all our lives in the camp, so our attachment to the land is very strong of course. But we need to have rights to work more. We will never forget our cause, we will transfer it to our children and the next generations surely. It is like the Syrians; did they forget their country? Whenever we travel to Europe, Italy... and we see one Lebanese and hear their accent, we feel like home, like seeing someone from our own country. We were educated in Lebanon, we don’t know much about Palestine. I have two children: one says “Eh” to say yes in Arabic and speaks the Lebanese dialect and one says “Ah” and speaks the Palestinian dialect.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

Although 99.3% of the population of Nahr el Bared is Palestinian, (Tiltnes 2007) a lot of Lebanese would come to spend the night in the camp with friends without any problem, even important figures in the country passed by the camp to buy products. It was an open camp with a lot of movement inside and outside. People came to the camp to recruit workers or to find a nurse that could be trusted to stay in the house with an old person. The people of Akkar would come and ask some known people in the camp to recommend them a person who was fit for a job. The relation was based on trust. Some Lebanese are living also in the camp. Till 2007, Nahr al-Bared was integrated with the surrounding Lebanese municipalities through social and economic ties. In particular, due to its location on the highway from Tripoli to Syria and the lack of Lebanese policing inside the camp, it became an economic hub for Lebanese looking to buy smuggled goods from Syria. The camp’s relative legal vacuum also attracted producers from Akkar, an impoverished agricultural region north of Tripoli in which the camp is located. For example, farmers who could not afford to register their cars sold their product in Nahr al-Bared instead of Tripoli, which has many checkpoints and thus poses a greater risk of getting caught (International Crisis Group 2012). The integration of Nahr el Bared in the North was not mirrored in other Palestinian camps. Although the Lebanese security was not allowed to enter the camp and thus had to rely on Palestinian factions for arresting suspected persons hiding inside the camp, a “tight state control began at the very perimeter of the camp” in south Lebanon. The camp is hence defined as a legally suspended space (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010).
“apparent political vacuum”, refugees benefited from various opportunities coming from many social networks, activist and political movements (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Having no legitimate authority in the camps, religious institutions, the mosque imams and other influential political factions were seen as references by the Palestinian residents in Nahr el Bared. This vacuum led to the infiltration of Fatah el Islam inside the camp in 2006 (Hanafi 2008). Palestinians joined factions due to personal ties rather than following specific ideologies which are at the origin of the factions themselves.

“The nature of Palestinian society is tribal. To live in the camp you need to be supported by a faction. This is essential, you understand? You have to have protection, ilik dahir, if you get into a problem, if you need a university scholarship. By being in a faction you have a following, imtidad. Additionally, your parents before you may be affiliated. The nature of Palestinian society is factional. … It is rare to go into a home and not find it following a faction.” Rania, young generation, Nahr el-Bared camp, 28 July 2011 (Issa 2014).

At the same time, the Lebanese civil war continued all over the country after the departure of the PLO from Beirut and south Lebanon. The political involvement of Palestinians during the civil war cultivated a negative perception of the refugees by the Lebanese community. A very negative perception ran over the Palestinian refugee camps in these years. Palestinian camps were perceived as “security island, refuge for criminals, ghetto, a threat to Lebanon’s political stability (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). For example, Chatila refugee camp in Beirut suffered many years of displacement, persecution, war destruction, marginalization and discrimination. “The camp in this period became an image, a space, an address, a culture”, which summed up all these negative notions. “For younger generations, the camps started to symbolize a prison embodying their incapacity to work or change their reality forcing them to migrate and escape. The Palestinian camp has been in stagnation for the past 20 years in terms of political space. It was characterized by a void in governance, political splits, institutional failure and demise of Palestinian activism. This overlap and juxtaposes over the notions of empowerment, mobilization and liberation that existed in the camp in a past era enforcing the idea of the camp as an ironic, confusing and contradictory space” (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The negative perception of citizens of the host community leads to a lack of moral obligation towards

the refugee who becomes an outlaw excluded from ethical responsibility and legality (Diken 2004). Despite this overall negative perception, Nahr El Bared refugee camp was not as affected by the events of the Lebanese civil war. The reasons might be many, for example the fact that the camp is located in a Sunni area or because of the strong commercial power that refugees acquired in the region.

Humanitarian governance

Clearly, the humanitarian government lost power during these years. Refugees after the 1960s got less and less help from the humanitarian organizations and they became more independent and self-sufficient. Anyhow, UNRWA was always present inside the camp and refugees became employed in the UN agency. For example, Mehyeddine stayed 40 years in UNRWA, he worked there thanks to his connections and contact with the Director of UNRWA. He was the area maintenance and sanitation officer (1993). After some years in the 1990s the Agency closed this department. Because of his relations with the popular committee, he was sent to Beqaa for two years and a half to another camp. In 1995 UNRWA wanted to build a sewage network in Nahr El Bared and asked for him as a consultant. They offered him a position as director of the camp of Beddawi for 13 years, where he stayed till 2004. During that time, they selected another director in Nahr El Bared, but the people were not happy under his lead, so he took the position for both camps and continued as director of only Nahr El Bared for three and a half years after he left Beddawi. (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017). Many Palestinians with higher education were employed by UNRWA or other NGOs, benefiting from health insurance, maternity, pensions (Tiltnes 2007). However, the post war era was marked by more insecurities and marginalization than previously. UNRWA services were reduced as they had budget deficits since the mid-1970s. The Oslo Accords between the PLO, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority concerned only the Palestinian territories in Israel (Issa 2014). In the same Oslo Accords of 1993, Israel acknowledged the PLO negotiating team as “representing the Palestinian people”, in return for the PLO recognizing Israel’s right to exist in peace, acceptance of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and its rejection of “violence.

Refer to page n. 3. B ethical

Refer to page n. UN
and terrorism”. As a result, in 1994 the PLO established the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA) territorial administration, that exercises some governmental functions in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Murphy 2010). From 1993, PLO was recognized as the official government of Palestine and Palestinian camps as well. The state of exception where power is exercised over biological individuals by the humanitarian governance contradicts the evolution of the society and the self-reliant governance which emerged in the refugee camp (Corbet 2015).

The Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), established in October 2005 as an inter-ministerial coordinating body, was mandated to improve refugee conditions, eliminate Palestinian arms outside the camps and regulate possession of arms inside the camps. It has been an important regulator of relations between the two communities, yet it too has begun to lose influence as an intermediary logistical and political player in Nahr El Bared (International Crisis Group 2012). LPDC was based in the Prime Minister’s Office, at the time Fouad Siniora, and with the reopening of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Beirut, significant steps were made by the Government of Lebanon to support improvements in the conditions of the Palestinian refugee population. Nonetheless, the refugees did not have access to Lebanese public health, education and social services (UNRWA 2008).

Figure 35. 3D view of the official UNRWA camp before 2007

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Refer to page n. 2.b. evolution
“It’s where you live your life that you consider your home”
Reconstruction Process of Nahr el Bared
2007-2017

War and evacuation

Thousands of Palestinian refugees lost their houses, and poverty levels rose when Nahr el-Bared camp in North Lebanon was destroyed following three months of conflict in 2007. On May 20, intense clashes exploded in the city of Tripoli between a militant Islamist group, Fatah al Islam\(^\text{77}\), and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The conflict spread to Nahr El Bared where members of Fatah al-Islam and their families had settled during the new camp expansion. Fierce fighting and heavy bombardment over 105 days left the whole camp in ruins (UNRWA 2008). The death toll was high: 226 members of Fatah Al Islam, 179 Lebanese Soldiers and 50 civilians (Barakat 2013). 36 000 people were affected, 27 000 Palestinian refugees inside the camp and about 9 000 Lebanese citizens from the adjacent municipalities of Mouhammara and Bebnine (Chit 2009). The Palestinians who endured the Nakba felt their identity threatened again by seeing their homes built over 60 years in Nahr el Bared, destroyed in this conflict (The embassy of Palestine 2014). However, the memories of Ahmad Farghawi about the days of the evacuation are marked mainly by the collaboration of the army with the civilians to empty the camp, in order to defeat the terrorist group who had infiltrated the camp:

“If we were in any other Arab country, it wouldn’t have been the same. The way the army treated us when they wanted us to evacuate the camp was very humane and compassionate. I was trying to carry out an old woman from inside the camp. I arrived at the army checkpoint, they stopped me and called the Red Cross to come and help move the old woman. They provided transport and helped tremendously all of us evacuate the camp.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

\(^{77}\) Fatah al-Islam (meaning Conquest of Islam) is a radical Sunni Islamist group that formed in November 2006 in a Palestinian refugee camp, located in Lebanon. It has been described as a militant jihadist movement that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. Fatah al-Islam was led by a fugitive militant named Shaker al-Abssi, a Palestinian refugee.
In 2006, the Lebanese security weakened, especially compared to the Islamic armed resistance Hezbollah\(^7\). Hezbollah had “superior training, organization, firepower and intelligence” which made it the strongest non-sovereign military force in Middle East. The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War\(^8\), established a quasi-sovereign state in the Lebanese lands and became a reason to increase feelings of fear and insecurity within its population. During the war, a group of Islamic Salafist militants\(^9\) tried to enter Burj el Barajneh and Chatila refugee camps but were ousted by the popular committees. Later they moved towards the more religiously conservative region of the north around Tripoli. Some people from the group rented flats in the vicinity of Beddawi camp, close to Nahr el Bared (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). These militants, who became part of Fatah al-Islam sometime later, were not able to penetrate the urban fabric of Nahr al-Bared’s old camp, but managed to establish themselves in the adjacent new camp. The new camp expansion, as explained in the previous paragraphs, was lacking jurisdiction. There were no service provisions, no permit was required to build and no policy controlled the continuous sprawl. This brought about the creation of a “not camp nor city” zone (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Another large group of Salafist militants arrived in Nahr al Bared camp during that period. The newcomers initially stayed in the faction’s bases, but with an internal coup, the Salafists took over Fatah al-Intifada’s bases for themselves. On 26 November 2006, Shakir al Abssi was revealed to be the group’s leader and announced the creation of Fatah al-Islam (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The “casus belli” of the conflict was a bank robbery committed by a Fatah El Islam member. The latter was followed by the police’s raid into one of the group’s downtown Tripoli apartments for an attempted arrest. The group’s retaliation against the army was harsh: slaughtering 13 Lebanese soldiers. After these actions, the battles in the city started and quickly shifted towards Nahr el Bared, where the army started to shell both the camp and the adjacent area. The LAF initially sought to arrest the Fatah al-Islam members suspected of robbing a bank. They tried to find refuge in the camp to escape the Lebanese security police, the Internal Security Forces (ISF). What began as a chase of bank robbers, evolved into a battle to uproot an insurgent group (International Crisis Group 2012). The conflict in Nahr el Bared resulted in the arrest of Palestinians in many regions of Lebanon while all the roads were controlled by the Army with internal security checkpoints (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The camp was a war zone for four months and the Lebanese army prevented the entry of relief medicine or media. In the beginning the refugees wanted to stay in the camp in order to prevent its destruction when abandoned. After the first days of uninterrupted bombardments, the evacuation process was accepted and the refugees were taken out of the camp that was to be totally destroyed and reduced to rubble by the end of the war (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012).

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\(^7\) Hezbollah is a Shi'a Islamist militant group and political party based in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s paramilitary wing is the Jihad Council, and its political wing is Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc party in the Lebanese parliament. Since the assassination of Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, the group has been headed by Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General.

\(^8\) The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon, Northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon. Due to unprecedented Iranian military support to Hezbollah before and during the war, some consider it the first round of the Iran–Israel proxy conflict, rather than a continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

\(^9\) Refer to page n. X
At the end of the conflict, the government of then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora promised to rebuild the camp according to a new “model” designed to improve relations between its Palestinian inhabitants and the Lebanese population of nearby Tripoli and its surrounding villages. “The camp will not return to the previous environmental, social and political status quo that facilitated its takeover by terrorists” stated the Prime Minister at the conference to launch the Reconstruction Plan in February 2008. However, this model entailed an unprecedented degree of state interference in the camp, including the disarmament of its Palestinian political factions and the deployment of both the LAF and ISF inside its boundaries. The use of the word “model” also raised questions for it implied that the governance and security arrangements enforced in Nahr al Bared might also be applied to other Palestinian refugee camps. The government outlined its vision for Nahr al Bared in a document presented in the 2008 Vienna Donor Conference, made to raise funds for camp reconstruction. It centered on security, governance and reconstruction, but left unclear the division of powers and responsibilities between the government, UNRWA and camp residents (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The Vienna Document was a paper presented by the Lebanese government for the Reconstruction and the Recovery of Nahr El Bared Camp and Conflict-Affected Areas in Lebanon in the International Donor Conference hosted by the Austrian government in Vienna in June 2008. The proposal was criticized for not involving the community in the drafting of the Document and the Master Plan and the Lebanese government announced in the preface to the Vienna Document its intention to “turn the camp into a model for the rest of the camps in Lebanon” using “new types of Lebanese-led security arrangements” (Moujally 2012). At the time of the Vienna conference, the cost of the reconstruction was estimated at 277 million dollars; however, the current estimated cost stands at 328 million dollars for the old camp reconstruction only.

Map 7: Map of Nahr el Bared and its adjacent areas in 2007
After the conflict of 2007, 95 percent of the camp was destroyed (Barakat 2013), all the 26,000 inhabitants (5,000 families) of Nahr el Bared were displaced and around 20,000 people moved to Beddawi refugee camp and Tripoli. 20,452 displaced Palestinians resided within the official camp (the old camp), 5,500 Palestinians in the new camp and 1,000 Lebanese in the new camp as well (Barakat 2013). Josiane Khalife, from the NGO AVSI notices that till now, a large number of those families had not moved back to Nahr el Bared (A VSI Khalife 2017). The general balance of the consequences is drawn by the “Nahr El-Bared Crisis Appeal: Background Paper” of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on September 10th, 2007:

“Nearly 6,000 residential and commercial units were damaged or destroyed. Even for buildings which have not been fully demolished, their structural integrity is at risk. Also at least 433 small enterprises—especially single-family artisans, shopkeepers—were also totally or partially destroyed by the heavy bombing and rocket explosions. (…) 3 hospitals and 4 clinics requiring either reconstruction or extensive repair, and over 15 schools, mainly, kindergarten, destroyed or damaged.” (Chit 2009).

An important terminology issue was raised during the conflict. The army used the double terms Old and New Camp in order to differentiate the official UNRWA camp from its surrounding areas. At first, this differentiation was rejected by the community who perceived it as an attempt to separate the camp and its extensions. But one year after the end of the conflict, the Lebanese Army made a statement warning the media and the organizations from using the terminology “New Camp”. “Adjacent Area” was the only title to be used. This terminology’s importance marked the insistence of the army and public institutions to consider the New Camp as Lebanese territory, on which Lebanese governance could be established. Since then, the terminology used to refer to this part of the camp involved a political stand (Hassan 2011). Until 2007, the camp embodied the “notion of Palestine refugee identity” (Barakat 2013), a durable solution to their refugee plight, including the return to Palestine. Palestinian refugees perceived the destruction of Nahr el Bared as a threat to their right to remain a cohesive community, because many other camps which were destroyed during conflicts were never rebuilt (Barakat 2013). The Lebanese state has habitually practiced an exclusion/inclusion duality regarding Palestinian refugees until 2007. Palestinian refugee camps are mostly excluded from municipal services, but Palestinian refugees are included in issues of security and fees. Also, Palestinian refugees are excluded from the regime of rights and benefits but, as “political beings” under permanent control, are included under the security regime. The Nahr el Bared conflict, and the immediate community response in the form of participated reconstruction, clearly demonstrated the Palestinian refugee camp’s existing social dimension and their desire of preserving and developing their community identity (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). The decision to reconstruct Nahr el Bared was welcomed by the refugees. But at the same time, they knew that it was the symbol of a new phase for the camp. The refugees won’t have the same freedom as previously inside the camp of Nahr el Bared. The reconstruction phase documented in this section is strictly related to the humanitarian organization and governance. It was the beginning of a new phase of emergency, just like in the 1950s.

Josiane Khalife is the regional director of AVSI. AVSI Foundation, is an international non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in Italy in 1972. It has been present in Lebanon since 1996, and has implemented more than 50 projects divided between agriculture and water, educational, humanitarian and emergencies.

Figure 38. Drawing of a Palestinian child illustrating his perception of the camp
As mentioned above, most of the residents were displaced and lived in Beddawi camp or surrounding areas, with their extended families in other camps in Lebanon. Nahr el Bared conflict displaced 3,648 families in north Lebanon and 354 in central/south Lebanon (UNRWA 2008). 83% of the population took refuge in North Lebanon, divided among Beddawi refugee camp (44.9%), Jabal el Beddawi (17.42%), Tripoli (20.63%), Beirut, south of Lebanon and Bekaa (17.32%). The majority of the displaced population (89%) resided before 2007 in the old camp (Chit 2009). When the war was over, the LAF reopened most of the adjacent area in mid-October 2007, although the most damaged sections, called the “Prime” areas, remained closed and under army control. Between February and April 2008, 720 families returned to their homes in the new camp (Chit 2009). Damaged apartments and buildings were repaired with support from UNRWA and NGOs. In addition, by 25 April 2008, 416 displaced families moved into three temporary shelter sites located in the Adjacent Area and 920 families were scheduled to move into two new sites by August 2008 (UNRWA 2008). Unfortunately, the damage was not limited only to the residential areas of the camp but also 1,512 micro, small and medium enterprises were destroyed (SME working Group Livelihood Cluster May 2009).

During 2007 and 2008, in the first phase of the emergency, many terms were used to address the refugees and their “temporary” condition, the main ones were: Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), returnees and semi-returnees. According to United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the definitions were:

Internally displaced person: “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes of places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situation of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”

Returnees: “persons who have returned to their home or habitual place of residence especially after a prolonged absence”
Semi-returnees: “persons or families who have moved back to Nahr el Bared and Adjacent area but have not returned to their own homes yet, meaning they are hosted in temporary shelters in NBC adjacent area”.

The families who returned to Nahr el Bared adjacent area or new camp weren’t considered as returnees unless they have returned to their actual homes. The new camp was a “buffer zone”, a sort of a waiting station where the families would be provided temporary shelter units until their homes are reconstructed (Chit 2009). Several thousand refugees were initially provided with emergency shelter in UNRWA and government schools, mosques, kindergartens and community centers. The lack of any better alternatives meant that over 400 families stayed in collective temporary accommodation for six to ten months. During the early stages of the conflict, people thought that the fighting would be over in a few days, or in the worst-case scenario in a few weeks. That’s why most families fled with very few personal belongings. When it realized the amplitude of the destruction, the refugee community was traumatized by the conflict and destruction of the camp and the prospect of several years of displacement (UNRWA 2008). However, UNRWA received funding from donors through a Flash Appeal and Emergency Appeal in 2007, to support massive emergency operations to provide food, clothes, basic household items, emergency schooling, psychosocial activities and health services for the 5 449 displaced families. UNRWA schools, health center, other Agency installations and the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) clinic in the UNRWA compound on the sea shore in front of the old camp were also destroyed during the conflict. Hence the urgency of UNRWA’s Department of Health to make sure that all displaced refugees had access to basic health care. Health services were performed with funding from the Emergency Appeal. UNRWA established a temporary health clinic in the Adjacent Area. Around 100 patients visited it every day. The clinic was replaced by a semi-permanent clinic in a rented building in February 2008 (UNRWA 2008). In the first phase, the Agency subsequently built, three temporary prefabricated schools and two temporary health centers to ensure that basic schooling for the children continued and that the refugees had access to basic health services. UNRWA, in coordination with the UN Country Team and UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and national and international NGOs through

In 2008, three temporary shelter sites were constructed in the Adjacent Area as housing units for families living in unacceptable conditions in Beddawi camp. Simultaneously, buildings in the Adjacent Area were repaired and upgraded to provide additional accommodation for multiple families. UNRWA and partners carried out repairs of infrastructure and damaged buildings in the Adjacent Area and provided emergency water and electricity supplies until the Lebanese local authorities and utility providers were able to resume a normal work rhythm (UNRWA 2008). Since the beginning, UNRWA collaborated with Nahr el Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies (NBRC) on infrastructural repairs: water, wastewater and storm water drainage. UNRWA, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs carried out a lot of repairs and rehabilitation work on wells, pumps and the main water distribution network was adjusted by ICRC and UNRWA. Over 300 meters of storm water drainage channels were restored. They also provided for the phase of emergency new water tanks, prefabricated showers and additional toilets in collective centers. UNRWA was also involved in the solid waste management. Normally this function was not included in UNRWA programs, especially outside official camps, but after the conflict, the agency started a private initiative for the waste collection in the adjacent area along with active members of the community. 182 PVC garbage bins and 62 steel communal collection bins were distributed; waste was brought to the Tripoli municipality dump (UNRWA 2008). In the adjacent area, electricity was provided for 90 percent of the population by either the Electricité Du Liban (EDL) state electricity network, which covered 57.23% of the population for 12 hours a day or the UNRWA temporary electricity provision which covered 41.56% for 8 hours. Only 1.21% came from private sources. Half the population had an electricity meter installed. 55 percent of the population depended on UNRWA’s water network (Chit 2009). In February 2008, the rent subsidy program of UNRWA covered 52.04% of the families, 1 264, who rented...
Apartments outside of Nahr el Bared waiting for the handover of their units. The launching of the rent subsidy program had a quick effect in shaping shelter conditions for a substantial number of displaced families, in addition to the temporary units constructed by UNRWA in the adjacent area. Because of this new program, from June 2007 to February 2008, the number of families living in host houses dropped to 67.24% while 14.27% were still in schools and collective centers (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). The aim of this subsidy program was to improve the living conditions near Beddawi refugee camp. There, around 41% of the shelters contained 5 to 8 persons. The crowding index was at 10m$^2$/person or less for more than half of the surveyed population (58.09%). In other terms, more than half of the displaced were living in a space of 10m$^2$/person. Half of the population (50.36%) were living in a dwelling of one or two rooms, but the majority (39%) were living in a dwelling of 2 rooms (Chit 2009).

The temporary accommodations for Nahr el Bared post-conflict phase consisted of three types:

Rented accommodation: UNRWA provided rental subsidies to thousands of displaced families to enable them to rent temporary accommodation in the Adjacent Area, Beddawi camp and elsewhere in Lebanon. While UNRWA expected a decrease in the number of families receiving subsidies as more move into temporary shelters, the majority of displaced refugees remained in rented accommodation.

Temporary shelters: Hundreds of families remained in makeshift centers in schools, kindergartens and mosques in unacceptable conditions for up to nine months, until UNRWA constructed temporary shelters. By end April 2008, UNRWA had built 574 temporary shelter units in the Adjacent Area (on Plots 23, 674, 774) for 416 families. These units were small (18.6m$^2$), so families with more than five members were subsequently allocated additional units. Three hundred steel shelters (stacked as two storeys) were completed on a second temporary shelter site (Plot 674) by March 2008, to house 220 families. A third site, Plot 774, was completed in April 2008 to accommodate 92 families.

Collective centers: Due to lack of housing alternatives, 11 damaged or unfinished buildings in the Adjacent Area were rented and were refurbished as collective centers. These are now housing 167 families who have their own living space but in some of the centers, the kitchen and toilet facilities are shared. An additional five to seven buildings were supposed to be repaired to provide an additional 65 units if there are no other suitable housing alternatives. (UNRWA 2008)

Ahmad Loubani describes the shelters in his interview: “Prefabricated houses were constructed as a temporary solution for the inhabitants of the camp, while their houses were being reconstructed. They had solar panels in order to be self-sufficient” (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017) However, the majority of Nahr el Bared returnees and semi-returnees (39.31%) were living in apartments and a minority (0.15%) was found to be living in garages, while the “other” category (29.6%) indicated people living in UNRWA plots, Collective Centers or public buildings such as mosques. 12% of the accommodations were grouping more than one family: two or three families cohabited in one shelter. Almost 80% didn’t consider themselves living in crowded shelters. Rented houses seemed to have a larger number of people than the rest of the temporary shelters, where 6.25 persons were found to be sharing a house in average, while the general average in the camp before the crisis was 5.53 persons per shelter. Most of them (72.62%) were living in a shelter where they didn’t have any relationship with the other families sharing the same shelter and 26.79% were living with their relatives, while only 0.6% were at their neighbors or friends. The space of the shelter varied from 9m$^2$ to more than 200m$^2$, with the highest percentage of shelters’ space (26.27%) being less 20m$^2$. The absence of essential home furniture, was remarkable at a significant percentage of the population; the most common missing items were: sitting room or salon furniture (60%), beds (71%) and refrigerators (47%). Regarding the heating systems, one heater per house was available in the majority of cases (83%). (Chit 2009). During the phases of first resettlement, one of the main problems was the accessibility of Nahr el Bared adjacent areas. Many residents lost their notary documents during the conflict and couldn’t prove their ownership. A legal framework was required to rebuild the dwellings and activities of this part. (Hassan 2011).
The reconstruction of Nahr el Bared Camp and UNRWA Compound is the largest project that UNRWA has ever implemented. The requirements of the project included the rebuilding of 5,223 houses, 1,696 commercial units, the UNRWA Compound and all camp infrastructure, while simultaneously providing relief and recovery needs of the displaced residents (UNRWA 2010). Planning the reconstruction was a very complex process. To ensure that the input of the community was included, UNRWA enlisted the support of the Nahr el Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies (NBRC), a local organization composed of community activists and professionals from engineering, architecture and social sciences. Their task was to be a sort of mediator between UNRWA and the inhabitants. (UNRWA 2010). The involvement of the refugee community was fundamental and through a participatory approach, UNRWA and the Nahr el Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies (NBRC) were able to map the residential locations of all families before the conflict, prepared new urban plans, and proposed infrastructure plans and design drafts for residential units for the Preliminary Master Plan for the Reconstruction of Nahr el Bared. The principal community architect (Ismail Sheikh Hassan) was a volunteer and a founding member of the NBRC who, along with other volunteer architects from Beirut, dedicated his time to work with representatives of the NBC community to support them to realize their reconstruction vision (Barakat 2013).

A map drafted by a surveyor of an infrastructure contractor hired by UNRWA was used as a base but it was dated several years before 2007. However, it was sufficient to start the documentation process to draw an updated map of the camp. Each one of the clustered blocks was numbered...
and distributed to various volunteers residing within the block, to sketch
their own building and identify other owners. The first thing to do was to
locate all the buildings in the camp, then each block was numbered and
volunteers searched for the now dispersed residents of each building. Once
found, the families were interviewed, documenting the number of floors,
apartments, families living in the building, the names of all the residents,
ages, and a variety of socio-economic data such as car ownership, village of
origin and occupation. Also, the shops distribution and social landmarks were
mapped in the neighborhoods (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). After this first phase
of documentation, a more detailed one followed. The families were asked
the exact areas of their houses and all residents drew together the plan of
their old dwellings. The reconstruction of the camp layers, the overlapping
of the social spaces and the private residential spaces, was fundamental.

“We have an immense challenge in front of us. Reconstructing Nahr
el Bared camp will require a massive effort and it will be a long
undertaking. What we must do is build a whole town out of the ashes
of the old: houses, mosques and places of business, allowing thousands
of people to return to the place they have called home for decades.
This will not be easy and we should be aware of the difficulties that
may lie ahead.” UNRWA Commissioner-General, Karen Koning
Abu Zayd, 12 February 2008.

The “immense challenge” had definite objectives decided by the two main
stakeholders of the whole reconstruction, UNRWA and NBRC. The tasks
were the reconstruction of the NBC and UNRWA compound at its original
location, in accordance with principles and guidelines agreed upon with the
community and GoL; reconstruction of residential and non-residential units
in the same neighborhood pattern as before, with common area improvements
and infrastructural installations; the improvement of residential units from
their previous formulation, allowing proper ventilation and open public
space; the re-housing of all those Palestine refugee families who lived in the
camp prior to its destruction in 2007; the reconstruction of the UNRWA
compound with its various services and installations at its former location
adjacent to the sea (Barakat 2013).

Despite the thorough job undertaken by NBRC, the committee collapsed
in early 2010, because of internal problems and resistance from Palestinian
factions that felt excluded; indeed, its singular advantage had been its inclusion of community members acting independently of the political interests of factions and other interest groups. Thus, it was resuscitated in early 2011 and it encompassed the factions in its structure this time; as a result, UNRWA architects no longer benefited from a politically independent body that could communicate residents’ feedback. A former architect explained: “Our back-and-forth consultation with the community was much stronger when the [earlier version of the] NBRC still existed. It was seen as something that was purely for the people of Nahr al Bared, because it had camp residents working for them; people trusted the faces they recognized” (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008).

The reconstruction planning process started during the 2007 war. In the period of the conflict, the Government of Lebanon announced its intention to rebuild a new camp which would ensure better living conditions for the Palestinians. The fear of the Palestinians to be expelled from their homes was reassured by this initiative taken by the Government. The reconstruction project was a spatial manifestation of the political stand of the Government of Lebanon (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). UNRWA presented the master plan of the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared to the Government of Lebanon in February 2008. The Government of Lebanon represented by the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) was for the first time involved in the supervision of the urban development of a Palestinian camp (Barakat 2013). The presented design developed by a firm was based on international standards and efficiency, rational and cost effectiveness (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). It was discussed among UNRWA representatives and the LPDC regarding the reconstruction process, the street dimensions required to ensure accessibility of military forces within the camp, the percentages of total built area deducted from the plot areas in order to provide more open spaces in the camp and other design principles. On 13 May 2009, the coordination phase between UNRWA and GoL was over as the GoL approved its design, the master plan was put forward to the popular committees of Nahr el Bared and the PLO representative in Lebanon, Ambassador Abbas Zaki for endorsement. The construction permit for the camp of Nahr el Bared, excluding the UNRWA compound was presented by the GoL on 20 May 2009 and approved on 1 April 2010 (Barakat 2013). However, José Antonio Naya Villaverde, from the NGO ICU points out in his interview that the

José Antonio Naya Villaverde is the Middle East legal representative of ICU. ICU, Institute for University Co-operation Onlus, is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), recognized
The legal complexity of the situation impacted the pace of reconstruction. The full expropriation of lands by the Government of Lebanon occurred in 2014, legalizing the area of the old camp (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). UNRWA was given the task of design and build the area within the old camp: building, roads, alleyways. But, given the proximity of the new camp and the connections between the two camps, any decision about the infrastructure network in the old camp needed to be coordinated with the works in the new camp (International Crisis Group 2012). The director of UNRWA in North Lebanon pointed out that:

"Even more problematic than the lack of funding for the reconstruction of the adjacent area [new camp] is that we cannot build the old camp right up to the edge, as we would have to do if we are to fit all the people back inside. We would need to adapt the layout and some of the buildings located on the interface between the old camp and the adjacent area, but we do not have the authority to do this, and so far, the government has not found a mechanism to tackle the problem" (Barakat 2013).

Hence, the main actors for the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared were: The Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD), the Office of the Council of Ministers and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), UNRWA, LPDC, the PLO and Palestinian committees. The Central Fund for the Displaced was the governmental body responsible for the collection of funds and their allocation to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). International funds were assembled by the GoL as support for fighting terrorism in Lebanon (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Another important actor in the new camp rehabilitation was the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It supported UNRWA’s efforts in the recovery process of Nahr el Bared, both in the Old and the New Camps. Various interventions were undertaken, targeting both immediate and medium term needs. Initially

UNDP focused on electricity repairs and rubble removal, then it expanded the works under a UN joint intervention, including UNICEF, ILO, UN-Habitat and UNRWA. This new joint project, included activities in the New Camp such as road construction, sanitation, infrastructure and livelihoods. UNDP was requested to provide support for emergency repairs of the electricity system in the New Camp. In addition to these tasks UNDP was also in charge of enhancing the dialogue between Lebanese and Palestinian communities after the conflict. (UNDP 2008).

However, the responsibilities of each one of the stakeholders were not clearly defined and the expectations of the various actors were contradictory in several discussions. As the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared consists of handing over houses for refugees built on government expropriated land, with international funds, the main infrastructure of the site was to be undertaken by the government while the management of properties was supposed to be in the hands of UNRWA. The GoL intended to involve the UNRWA in the post reconstruction phase as much as the reconstruction phase, on a daily basis, ensuring the return of the refugees to their houses. On the other hand, the national authorities would take charge of security measures. This allocation of roles was not accepted by UNRWA as managing the camp on a day to day basis was not the scope of the UN agency. This statement from an

by the Italian Government and the European Union, which operates in the fields of university cooperation, education and vocational training, sanitation and healthcare, rural development, women’s promotion, social development and emergencies.

83 The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is a Lebanese governmental organization established in 1977, during the Lebanese civil war. Directly accountable to the prime minister, it was intended to assess infrastructural needs arising from Lebanon’s civil war and allocate international and Lebanese aid for rebuilding the country.
UNRWA official reflects the position of the agency regarding its own scope:

“The Lebanese government has always taken the erroneous view that we have responsibility for the camp. UNRWA provides services but we are not responsible for the camp. No doubt we are responsible for organizing the return of displaced refugees, but Lebanese law says very clearly that the responsibility for the camps lies with the Lebanese government. There is no provision of law that says UNRWA is responsible for managing the camps or for acting as a municipality for the camps. We are a service agency that provides health, relief, shelter and rehabilitation. We do this with the support of the state. We are willing to do in Nahr al Bared what we do in other camps. Regarding who is in charge, that discussion is between the Lebanese and Palestinians.” (International Crisis Group 2012)

Intentionally, as interpreted by UNRWA, the Lebanese government attempted to make UNRWA an exclusive representative of the Palestinian refugees, hence politicizing it, which conflicts with its role as a service agency of a technical nature. This resulted from the fact that the Vienna Donor Conference does not give the Palestinian community and its structures any decision-making authority, thus disempowering camp residents (International Crisis Group 2012). The background of the controversial division of roles between GoL and UNRWA is essentially political. In the case of Nahr el Bared, the camp was integrated socially and economically in the surrounding Lebanese community. Consequently, the permanency of the settlement, as well as other Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, is closely linked to the discourse on the naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon which if carried out, would impact enormously on the demographical balance of the country’s confessionalist structure (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). Besides, UNRWA was closely connected to the residents in the planning phase. Palestinians were able to express their concerns to the Agency and criticize them for the decisions taken on their behalf, while the LAF were less accessible to them, as their military presence in the camp was intimidating. Nevertheless, later on during the construction phase, UNRWA was blamed for inefficiencies and delays, resulting in tensions among residents and UN employees. In addition, services and financial support were expected from UNRWA by Nahr el Bared residents. (International Crisis Group 2012).

Criticism and sometimes unrealistic expectations were transformed into constructive suggestions and durable solutions. UNRWA and NBRC aimed to incorporate refugees’ views and ideas in projects before deciding on final project design and implementation. The dialogue was on going in this phase, especially with the camp popular committees, in the case of the temporary shelter areas, representatives were elected by the residents of each site (UNRWA 2008).

Throughout the planning and implementation of this project, with the help of NBRC, the Agency fostered new working relationships with the community, the Government of Lebanon, and various local and international organizations. These relationships were essential for the success of Nahr el Bared reconstruction (UNRWA 2010). In addition to the above mentioned efforts with LPDC, UNDP also supported dialogue through interventions such as the Summer School that took place in July 2008 for Lebanese and Palestinian Youth. Similarly, several Youth and Reconciliation activities followed in the second semester of 2008 (International Crisis Group 2012). The LPDC influence decreased over time44. Consequently, in 2008, the Nahr al-Bared Recovery and Reconstruction Cell (RRC) was created by the GoL to take charge of the reconstruction files instead of the LPDC (International Crisis Group 2012). Nonetheless, the LPDC was the only Lebanese non-military body actively present in the camp and therefore could have a central role in the dialogue between Lebanese and Palestinians governing bodies (International Crisis Group 2012). The role of the Palestinian committees was to follow the conditions of all the families and the difficulties they were facing. An arbitration committee consisting of a representative from each neighborhood informed the NBRC on the precise areas of the houses, making sure that no cheating and hence no tensions would happen among the residents. Another committee was in charge of raising delay issues and construction deficiencies to those responsible. Local associations such as Al Najdat supported this committee in the organization of peaceful manifestations to claim the inhabitants demands (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

44 The LPDC’s influence decreased over time when a young candidate Maya Majzoub, affiliated with the Future Movement, took the presidency of the committee, replacing the former diplomatic president of LPDC: Khalil Mekkawi. The approach adopted by Maya Majzoub was to engage less the residents, echoing a top down approach, which resulted in an unfriendly environment of collaboration between Palestinian and Lebanese within the LPDC.
The reconstruction of the adjacent area was a challenge since it occupied an ambiguous location that falls neither within UNRWA’s mandate nor fully within the jurisdiction of the local municipality. Consequently, Palestinian refugees living in the adjacent area received little assistance besides cash compensation from NGOs. The majority of the international actors were at the time preoccupied with the provision of relief to the displaced camp residents (Barakat 2013). The adjacent area was assessed by the partner NGO Global Shelter Cluster\(^8\): approximately 65 percent of it was to be rehabilitated by NGOs and through self-help initiatives. Once the most heavily damaged sections of the Adjacent Area “Prime Areas” were given access to by the LAF, NGOs took charge of repairing damaged buildings, allowing UNRWA to focus on relief assistance, livelihood support, and plans for the reconstruction of the old camp (UNRWA 2008). The NGOs that worked the most in the new camp area are Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria (ICU) and A VSI, two Italian non-governmental organizations\(^9\). 5 million Euros were given to the Lebanese Government from the Italian Government, the Foreign Minister Office Farnesina. The money was allocated to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) who was responsible for the execution of the project, as explained above. The Lebanese and Italian governments agreed upon engaging Italian NGOs as project leaders in 2007. For instance, A VSI, one of the Italian NGOs involved in the reconstruction projects initiated a partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council NGO who received funds from the European Union and were experts in reconstruction and refugee emergency projects. As the Lebanese government was responsible for the management of the funds, they assigned the analysis and assessment of the damages in the new camp or adjacent area to a certified national architecture and design company, Khatib and Alami, to estimate the amount of money required for the rehabilitation of each one of the houses, without the interference of the NGOs (A VSI and NRC 2012). Tender packages were issued by the GoL for the NGOs to assess the works to be executed (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017).

The reconstruction of the new camp was conducted differently than the old camp. ICU divided the project into two phases. The rehabilitation project was

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\(^8\) The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) coordination mechanism that supports people affected by natural disasters and internally displaced people affected by conflict with the means to live in safe, dignified and appropriate shelter.

\(^9\) See page n. X for further information.
paid in three installments, in order to control the reconstruction process and monitor the repairs. The administrative complexity of the project delayed the initiation of the works for two years after the end of the 2007 war. The first phase of ICU’s project started in 2010 and finished in 2012, and the second phase was from 2013 to 2014. The total cost of ICU’s rehabilitation project of 2014 was 1,992,838 euros. 426 shelter units were repaired and 15 units rehabilitated in the adjacent areas of Nahr el Bared (ICU 2015). ICU provided general project management, technical assistance and training, construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and equipment for infrastructure. They tried to support the community with all possible means. Interviews of former residents in Nahr el Bared were essential in ICU’s operations (ICU 2015). The support of the inhabitants of the new camp was mainly based on a process of self-housing assisting the Palestinian owners to rebuild their own properties, following some construction models (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). Through the NGOs, the Italian government made some restoration works, infrastructure repairs, and created a network to filter the water in the camp as well (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). On the other side, Palestinians living abroad sent money to their relatives, helping them in the reconstruction process (AVSI Khalife 2017).

The project of reconstruction of the new camp launched in 2011 was divided in three sections reflecting the level of destruction of the houses: houses that required small repairs, houses that were partially destroyed and houses that were totally destroyed. AVSI and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were involved in assisting the first two categories of small repairs and partial destruction (AVSI Khalife 2017). However, in 2010, Palestinian owners began rehabilitating their homes at their own expense. This resulted in adopting the approach of NRC and other NGOs to provide construction materials to the Palestinians without being involved in the construction works directly. Two to three French NGOs collaborated with AVSI also in the distribution of materials to inhabitants (AVSI Khalife 2017). The repair category counted 144 units, while the rehabilitation one only 10 units (AVSI and NRC 2012). The funds were divided in two phases, where 60% was given at the beginning of the project and 40% at the end of the process. The final total cost of AVSI project was 735 675 euros (AVSI and NRC 2012). In order to organize the repairs, a minimum requirement list was compiled by AVSI where elements essential for a livable house were listed. By the time, AVSI got involved on the site, 90% of the houses were already fully equipped, colored and decorated.

Large amounts of the money received from the NGOs was used to furnish the houses instead of doing repairs. The regional director of AVSI points out that, although the inhabitants of Nahr el Bared were eager to go back and live in their homes instead of living outside in rented apartments, “Palestinian women wouldn’t live in the house if it was not fully equipped and decorated”. The houses in the new camp contrasted with the apartments built by UNRWA in the new camp which were of a poorer quality, humid and with visible moisture problems (AVSI Khalife 2017). In general, NGOs were involved in the repair process of the partially destroyed houses. Windows and door repairs were their main tasks and assistance in fixing holes in walls and roofs, painting, power supply and sanitary infrastructure (Chit 2009).

“The war, a company helped repair roofs, water infiltration and other problems related to the houses. Other associations took care of water tanks. Individual water tanks are on the roofs, each inhabitant manages his own water. The association did follow ups on the projects as they wanted to make sure that the money was used for the same purposes it was given for” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

The reconstruction process slowed down though in the last years due to the lack of funds which were mostly redirected to the war in Syria. The inhabitants themselves were not able anymore to get cheaper materials from Syria for the reconstruction of their homes (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). Other NGOs, local and international contributed in the repairs and the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norwegian board of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, restored houses, constructed the migrants neighborhood in the new camp (created for the migrants who came from the South mainly), and distributed solar panels. Première Urgence (PU), a French organization, insured houses for Palestinians on its own expense. The Norwegian Popular Aids (NPA), based in the camp of Mar Elias in Beirut, provided equipment to people with disabilities and distributed home appliances, cleaning appliances, clothes and essentials for children needs. World Vision distributed bedrooms’ equipment like pillows and blankets, cleaning materials (shampoo, soap, wipes) for personal hygiene and house cleaning. Diakonia distributed clothes and shoes for all the residents collaborating with another association called Community Based Rehabilitation Association (CBRA) who was focused on assisting the
4% of the population affected by disabilities. The most common disabilities were motor impairments followed by hearing/speech disabilities (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). The Welfare Association, together with UNRWA, reconstructed schools in the camp of NBC and equipped them for disabled people, by installing appropriate architectural elements such as ramps and elevators in each school. They were supported by Handicap International, CBRA and the Lebanese Wheelchairs Users (LWU). Before the reconstruction, the disabled people could only reach the classrooms on the ground floor. The association Jamiiyet Al Irchad wa AlIslah, supported by the Qatar Red Crescent distributed electrical appliances like fridges, cookers, fans, electrical heaters. Also, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) distributed 1000 dollars for each family living in the camp. Financial help was given by Saudi Arabia (2 000 000 LBP per family), Oman, Emirates, Kuwait and the European Union, especially Italian organizations and German associations for restoration, heating and gas equipment (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

The UNRWA facilities, schools and health centers, were not finalized in a permanent manner; UNRWA was building instead prefabricated schools as the numbers of inhabitants that will return to NBC are still unknown (AVSI Khalife 2017). While the majority of the Palestinians of Nahr el Bared had houses outside the old camp, whenever their house was being reconstructed by UNRWA, it was rented to Syrian refugees. Syrian Palestinians refugees are now living in the prefabricated houses that were given to the Palestinian refugees while they were waiting for their houses to be reconstructed inside the old camp (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017) (AVSI Khalife 2017). The Livelihood Cluster was gathered after the conflict to provide support to micro and small enterprises and offer employment services to the population, both Lebanese and Palestinian, in Nahr el Bared, Beddawi Camp and surrounding municipalities. The Cluster was joined by international organizations, community based organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations to share information and have a more important role in the coordination of activities so as to improve the efficiency of livelihood interventions (Interviewee ICU J.A.N. Villaverde 2017). All the activities which provided economic recovery and employment services were considered livelihood interventions. They included support to micro and small enterprises and cash-for-work, job placement, career counseling, vocational, educational and training activities. The whole project of the Livelihood Cluster was very connected with the UN agencies. This was visible especially in the work modality. The Members of the Cluster were meeting twice a week to discuss the ongoing projects. UNRWA and ILO assisted the meetings of the Cluster with a “co-lead” role (SME working Group Livelihood Cluster May 2009). The main organizations providing micro and small enterprises support (SME) between 2008 and 2009 were Première Urgence (PU), OXFAM Great Britain with the Palestinian Arab Women League (PAWL), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA). The European Commission (EC) and the EC Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) were the leading donors. The first contributed with 44 percent of funds, while ECHO with 41 percent. A total of 1964 grant applications were received in April 2009, after the establishment of the eligibility criteria and the launch of the programs. PU was successfully able to accept and process 220 of these applications, with the average grant at $2,500. OXFAM GB and PAWL projects also covered 120 female and youth entrepreneurs, while PAWL supported other 108 beneficiaries through other three specific livelihoods projects in Nahr el Bared. The Livelihood Cluster helped 778 of the 803 SMEs targeted up to April 2009. 65 percent of which were in Nahr el Bared, both in the old and new camp. (SME working Group Livelihood Cluster May 2009).
Design and space principles

In order to ensure the stability of the area as soon as possible, the planning process was accompanied by actions such as: the continuation of emergency interventions (rent subsidy program, construction of temporary housing, food distribution); the start-up of recovery activities in the Adjacent Area (livelihood projects, re-establishing major services); and community solidarity. Two main categories of factors characterized the fragility of the situation:

Current factors, including the emergency interventions, which guaranteed surface stability, could at any moment encounter funding shortages and consequent termination; the fact that access to the NBC Adjacent Area was still limited; the prevalence of temporary or short-term jobs; the shortage in funding needed for reconstruction and economic rehabilitation which delayed the previous processes.

Pre-Existent factors, including the lack of basic human and civil rights for the Palestinian community in Lebanon; the concentration of poverty and deprivation in North Lebanon area in general; the lack of rights to ownership/property and employment, which were major determining factors to limited recovery performance; the recurrence of violence in North Lebanon (Chit 2009).

In order to avoid new hostilities and maintain a steady situation, the former self-design and space principles needed to change. The dense conformation of the former space was the central cause of the problems in the camp. The main request from the population was the preservation of the “Extended Family Building Type”, where the younger generation typically builds on top of their parents’ home. The Extended Family Building Type created social cohesion, minimized the potential for conflicts and increased the sense of ownership, encouraging the maintenance of buildings. This living arrangement allowed families to deal with a stressful existence in high density urban settings. It also maximized survival strategies like the sharing of resources among the relatives, fundamental in low income and marginalized communities (UNRWA 2008).

The importance of this typology is the ease and cost-effectiveness of future expansion and ownership by an extended family. The context of a marginalized community not allowed to legally own property in Lebanon was reflected by this demand. “Socially it reinforced the coherence of the village based neighborhood with the extended family building as its foundational element ” (Chit 2009). The refugees’ spatial formation was strictly related to their everyday life and their political organization and aspiration. The population was aware of the local context and their needs especially 60 years after their displacement.

“The State saw it as an expression of its intentions to build a secure and accessible camp which they could now control while the community saw it as an expression of their needs and aspirations as they rebuilt the camp as it was exactly, just better” (Chit 2009)

The analysis of the former architecture of the camp helped participants express their attachment to the land. It transformed the self-perception of the meaning and role of Nahr el Bared. The process of stimulating their right to produce their space and architecture, was more important as a principle, than an architectural product itself. Clearly, at this point the Palestinian refugees were not just a community but a potential society, they were not bare lives anymore, they had a political identity protected by their committees and political parties (Chit 2009). The final designed product, “the masterplan”, was not the aim of this reconstruction project. The camp after the destruction became an “urban canvas” on which next transformations, appropriations and additions were made by the refugees (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). For many of the people that witnessed the conflict, the camp was their home since birth. Nahr el Bared inhabitants missed their home, as this girl, displaced in Beddawi due to the conflict sang:

“Sadness is our fate
Trouble is our fate
Our dreams cannot be measured
And by God no one cares
I swear I miss our neighbourhood
I swear I miss our home
I miss the shouting of our neighbor
I wish I stayed in Nahr el Bared” (Issa 2014)
Their only memory of home is related to the camp and not to the Palestine territory. In the second generation of refugees, Palestine became the symbol of the injustice of 1948 but not a “home” anymore (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Regarding this concept Meyheddine during his interview says:

“This is my home, this is my land, I never knew Palestine apart from history and studies. I was born here. It’s where you live your life, your childhood and where your memories lie that you consider your home. You would only leave this country if you wanted to improve your living conditions. When they allowed us to come back in Nahr El Bared after the war, all the families came directly here. Everyone took his papers, his passport, diplomas and went back to Beddawi, but I stayed here, lying over the ruins of my house in the new camp, where nothing remained. I stayed in a corner, lit a fire, smoked a nargileh all night. This house is the work of 50 years of my life. It’s not only materialistic” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).

That’s why the role of the community in the redrawing and decision-making process was so essential. The reconstruction of every house was based on the previous built area especially in a post war compensation practice in Lebanon which conventionally compensated on the basis of house unit/apartment and not the individual built area of each home (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). From a spatial point of view, locations, neighborhoods, circulation routes and landmarks were preserved in the same exact way. However, the living conditions needed to be improved. In order to increase ventilation, natural light and access, the project imposed an increase of the open spaces of the camp from 11% to 35% (International Crisis Group 2012). This has been achieved through a range of measures, including re-allocating a percentage of “private property” as “public space”. Wider alleyways, 4.5 to 6 meters wide, were rebuilt in order to let the LAF access the camp. The creation of a hierarchy of alleys was a very important feature for the camp. The wider streets were the formal and public arteries to host male oriented practices and commerce, while the other were semi-public spaces enabling light to infiltrate each room of every apartment. The new blocks had a maximum ground area of 3,000 m² (International Crisis Group 2012).

“In the architecture, all the construction ways changed. The streets are larger, cars and even trucks can enter now. The army required a minimum size of roads in order to be able to reach all the camp if needed with their own vehicles. It is easier to control now; the size of the streets before inhibited people from reaching all the camp with cars. Light and ventilation are much better than before, but the apartments are smaller. 30% of the original area was removed” (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017).

The increase of public and open space reduced each of the private refugee plots by 33,85 m² and the area of ground floor buildings by 22%. This reduction in the camp’s urban footprint presented difficulties due to the fact that refugees’ private spaces were already extremely limited before 2007. The project’s architects have responded by developing a progressive formula for calculating the area by which each family’s plot has been reduced, premised on the notion of social justice: the larger the plot, the higher the percentage of deduction, ranging from 0 percent for small plots up to 37.2 m², to 35 percent for plots larger than 100 square meters (Barakat 2013).

Figure 45. Drawing of a Palestinian child about his perception of the camp.
Deductions of the area were compensated vertically by increasing the number of floors of the family extended buildings. This has resulted in an increase in the average number of floors from 2.47 pre-destruction to 3.30 post-reconstruction. This increase of floors (up to a maximum of four) was facilitated by the construction of stronger foundations and allowed the maximum deduction to which each plot is subject to be limited to 15% of the original plot area. In addition, the project incorporated minimum acceptable standards adopted by UNRWA based upon the living space required per person as follows (Barakat 2013):

1 person unit = 37.7 m²;
2-3 person unit = 50.2 m²;
4-5 person unit = 56.7 m²;
6 persons and above = 72.9 m²

Consequently, the former houses of families which did not respect these standards were upgraded during their rebuilding. Two layouts were planned for each apartment typology: one-room apartment, two-room apartment, three-room apartment, and so on. The reintroduction of roof terraces was welcomed by the refugees. In a place where public space is limited, roof terraces provided an important private outdoor space as explained previously. The landscaping of the open areas was up to the inhabitants themselves, there was no defined project for these places (Barakat 2013).
The participatory phase done by NBRC, UNRWA and all the community contributed to the Preliminary Master Plan that was endorsed by the Lebanese Prime Minister and presented to the International Donor Conference in Vienna on 23 June 2008. The Vienna donor conference, a collaborative effort between the GoL and UNRWA, with support from the Government of Austria, was held to gain funds for the reconstruction of the camp, the adjacent areas, and the surrounding Lebanese municipalities that had been affected by the conflict. (UNRWA 2010). Models, diagrams and plans were presented to the public in an open day workshop gathering comments, feedback and input. Concepts of different neighborhoods, strategic elements, public spaces and their use were the main topics addressed. The major activity was a large-scale map at a scale of 1:50 of the entire neighborhood, identifying the location of the houses, their relationships to neighbors and various streets, public spaces and semipublic spaces in the design. For Special Hardship Cases, it was very difficult to plan the open space as before. After each block’s ideal open space percentage deduction was determined around 7-26%, an area was subtracted from blocks with a larger external open space and allocated to blocks which needed an extra internal open space (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Each building had a customized design. The elevations of the new buildings were designed in a simple way, using a variety of standardized elements. On the other hand, public spaces were to be privately maintained and appropriated. The streets’ profiles were done in order to be become a memorial of the former shape of the camp (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012).
In order to facilitate the reconstruction UNRWA divided the principal blocks of the old camp into eight separate ‘Packages’ to proceed with a phased approach. The program was to design and execute all the eight packages together. One package design took from two to four months to be completed. Along with the design process, UNRWA passed through a “phased contracting process, involving the preparation of tender documents, tendering and the awarding of contracts” (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). During the initial stages of the project, under pressure to rebuild and return some of the refugees back as quickly as possible, UNRWA contracted one Lebanese firm to execute the reconstruction of Package 1 (P1). However, Package 1 phase underwent poor project management and delays in implementation due to the contractor, who ended up subcontracting to other smaller contractors, compromising both quality and timing. This led UNRWA to remove 40 buildings from P1 and transfer them to other smaller contractors (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Unfortunately, Package 2 had identical problems as P1, therefore, contracts were adjusted, reducing the contractor’s task. During the Package 3 phase, UNRWA addressed the issue differently by subcontracting a smaller block-sized to control carefully the contractor performance and quality of construction. This model was monitored and used as a reference for following packages (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). The phased approach allowed a quicker return of the displaced as soon as their properties were completed. This fast return system helped to reassure the refugees of UNRWA’s and the Lebanese Government’s, intention to rebuild the camp. Also, it reduced the relief costs that UNRWA paid for the displaced. As explained before, around 70% of the Palestinians lived on rental subsidies which cost 150 USD each month per family (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). UNRWA’s rental subsidy stopped few days after the return of the refugees to their homes (Barakat 2013).

The reconstruction of each package involved three main stages: pre-reconstruction, reconstruction, and handover (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Handover to residents occurred when the individual units were completed. A common frustration among the community was about the slow speed of reconstruction. Other complaints concerned quality issues as well as cultural design ones. Specific complaints about balconies being smaller than the former terraces they had, were common. The people criticized the construction as it “jeopardized people’s privacy and that bathrooms inappropriately opened directly into living areas (Barakat 2013”).

Map 9: Masterplan indicating the packages of the reconstruction
The phase of “pre-reconstruction” consisted of a large clean-up operation due to the scale of destruction. UNDP was actively involved in this stage. It estimated that a minimum of 500,000 m$^3$ of rubble mixed with other building materials and non-toxic and toxic waste needed to be removed. During transportation, the volume increased to approximately 700,000 m$^3$ (UNRWA 2008). The stages of the pre-reconstruction phase according to UNRWA were divided into three main categories: rubble removal, unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance, and archaeological preservation activities. Before the rubble removal, the demolition of the destroyed structures was necessary. Together with the rubble removal process, the UXO clearance started following the certification of site clearance (UNRWA 2010). In April 2008, the Government commissioned stakeholders to conduct an appraisal on structural damage and unexploded ordnance contamination. Following this assessment, between October 2009 and March 2010, the external stakeholders, together with the Handicap International NGO, removed half a million cubic meters of rubble and 12,506 pieces of UXO from the site. The discovery of archaeological remains during the rubble removal process led the Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) to order excavation and documentation of any revealed archaeological remains. Eventually, this led to delays in the reconstruction due to the necessity of pouring one meter of backfilling in the entire camp and changing radically the infrastructure and the foundation from isolated footings to thick reinforced concrete raft at significant cost to UNRWA (Barakat 2013). On 22 June 2009, backfilling started using crushed and compacted rock aggregates to protect any archaeological remains. Once backfilling began, the DGA team conducted geophysical and resistivity surveys. The whole construction site was suspended by the Council of Ministers for two months, until 13 August 2009 as Lebanese politicians had signed a petition against the Council of Ministers decision to preserve the antiquities by backfilling. On 16 November 2009, the DGA began the final geophysical survey of Package 1. This was completed on 24 November 2009, the same day the area was delivered to UNRWA (UNRWA 2010).

REIK drafted the contract documents and initiated the tendering process once the detailed designs for P2 were ready. The project was approved by the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP) in May 2010. On 11 July 2010, UNRWA signed a contract with ‘Danash Contracting and Trading Company’ for the construction of P2. The site was not ready for work, as the DGA still had to clear a number of archaeological sites revealed during the UXO clearance process. On 22 September 2010, the DGA finished its work.
in P2 and the contractor began backfilling these three blocks with the same procedure of Package 1. The process is the same as described for the previous part, after the backfilling, foundations were done and at last, columns and slabs were built. As of 31 October 2010, no building in P2 had yet reached the plastering and finishing stage (UNRWA 2010). UNRWA Compound was another important part in the first phase of reconstruction. RELK completed the detailed designs for School Complexes 1a, 4 and 5 between December 2009 and January 2010. Subsequently, on 1 April 2010, the Council of Ministers gave the approval to begin the UNRWA Compound restoration. An individual donor expressed interest in directly funding School Complex 1a and after a “foundation stone ceremony” organized by UNRWA to announce the initiation of construction, the project began on 27 May 2010. In August 2010, the foundations were finished and the frame of the School Complex was emerging. By the end of October 2010, the entire ground floor was cast, the first-floor slab was around 60 percent complete, and some columns for the second-floor slab were erected. The infrastructure design included networks for water, waste water, and electricity. A redesigned road network incorporated the water and telecommunications systems. The upgraded designs connected the infrastructure of the camp with the surrounding areas and with a major Government project of a waste-water trunk-line along the coast which will be connected to the new Tripoli Waste Water Treatment Plant (UNRWA 2010). The main road through the camp was enlarged to 12 meters to absorb heavy through-camp traffic and to increase the parking capacity for shoppers in the souk and commercial street. Secondary roads were also widened to six meters in strategic areas near the souk to facilitate more space for the buyers. The vehicles’ accessibility increased a lot during the reconstruction of the camp as security access was a key prerequisite of the LAF (Barakat 2013). In the first period of resettling, households were asked to rate a variety of public services: waste collection, sewage, drinking water, service water, electricity, irrigation infrastructure, roads, telecommunication, health services, educational services, relief services, social services, general hygiene, and environmental conditions both before and after the Nahr el Bared war of 2007. The ratings for all public services moved from a range of 3 to 4 before the crisis to a range of 2.5 to 3.5 after the crisis, attesting their degradation. Quality of waste collection, service water, irrigation infrastructure, health, and education services declined more than 20 percent compared to before (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). In early 2011, construction was nearly completed on the residential parts of Package 1, and the Agency planned to resettle around 100 families. The scale and nature of the project have presented significant obstacles for the Agency, which was facing for the first time such a huge enterprise (UNRWA 2010). However, the lack of funding made the construction process slower compared to the first plans.
As not only the camp was affected by the conflict of 2007, programs were drafted to support Lebanese villages in the vicinity of Nahr el Bared. Surrounding municipalities suffered harsh consequences and suffered from collateral damage resulting from the 2007 war. The municipalities directly hit were defined as second ring municipalities. They were: Beddawi, Wadi Nahle, Behneen, Rihanah, Mazraat Artousa, Minieh, Behneed El Abdeh, Deir Amar and Muhammara. These villages were part of a joint UNDP and UN-Habitat project: “building capacity of local elected leaders: enhancing recovery of Nahr el Bared surrounding communities October 2008 to May 2009”. Part of the project of early recovery of the surrounding municipalities was funded by the Italian cooperation and implemented by UNDP (UNDP 2011). Municipal elected members, municipal staff and NGOs representatives were to contribute in conflict resolution, undertake efficient decision-making, provide better municipal governance, engage their communities through participatory approaches and build networks among main governance actors in the villages. The main objective of this project was to enable local actors to have an essential role in promoting sustainable recovery and most of all developments in their respective municipalities. The partnership with UNDP and UN-Habitat was finalized and activities for this project started in July 2008. The second part of the project provided five joint Lebanese-Palestinian committees to be set-up in the Municipality of Mhammara for the provision of various social services. This was considered a pilot experience of a Palestinian-Lebanese effort to improve the management of public services (UNDP 2008). Another more detailed project of UNDP was in close coordination with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and funded by the Italian cooperation. It included the implementation of the Early Recovery of the Municipalities of Mhammara, Bebnine, Bhanine, Minieh, Beddawi and Deir Amar. The project started in February 2007, focused specifically on the recovery needs of the Lebanese residents in the area. The intervention was strategically in line with UNDP’s approach to reduce disparities in North Lebanon and promote peace reducing tensions between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities. The action planned for these purposes were:
Restoration and improvement of local infrastructure in the municipalities.

Rehabilitation of livelihoods activities in the municipalities.

Coordination of support to the government in responding to the Nahr el Bared crisis.

A workshop was organized by UNDP and LPDC in joint collaboration with donors such as the World Bank and European Commission, to decide the programs for the early recovery needs of the 6 municipalities. Each municipality got a precise program about specific themes:

- Mhammara: drainage of water channels, construction of retention walls and electricity repairs
- Bebnine: provision of equipment and goods to make the municipal center operational
- Beddawi: provision of equipment for garbage collection for Nahr el Bared displaced and municipal public works
- Minieh: construction of irrigation channels
- Bhanine: drainage of water channels and asphalting works for main roads leading to the village
- Deir Amar: providing health equipment to the municipality clinic and technical assistance in collaboration with WHO

There was also a 3rd ring of municipalities. They were 20 small municipalities, with populations ranging from 2000 to 400 people. NGOs and multilateral agencies UN, USAID, WB, EC, Italian Cooperation, GTZ and others provided them with aid. The main problem of these villages was their poor living condition. Nahr el Bared post crisis recovery and reconstruction phases have placed Akkar governorate on the priority agenda of several donor agencies. A Union of municipalities was considered a possible solution for these communities in order to ease the legal, policy, planning and financial factors. The expected results were: improved municipal performance, institutionalization, collaboration and clear functions and tasks (UNDP 2008).

Summary of reconstruction process progress

Today, the first two packages are completed while Package 3 is currently under construction. The first 700 families returned in April 2011, while by June 2013 the number of family returnees was 1400. In 2013, UNRWA still required to finance the reconstruction of 3000 families' homes. As it concerns the infrastructure progress, the networks were completed together with the reconstruction of the buildings in the first two packages. To improve efficiency, during Package 3, secondary infrastructure was included in the contractor's scope, while primary infrastructure connections stayed under the responsibility of UNRWA's main infrastructure contractor (Barakat 2013). The three schools contained in the UNRWA compound project were completed by April 2011, a secondary education facility was added as well. Two other schools are close to completion, while just one school remains unfunded as its construction depends upon UNRWA's funding for Packages 5 to 8. The camp's health center is also under construction in the UNRWA compound. The facility will have modern medical equipment, examination rooms and other medical needs. The most recent projections set the overall cost of the project at 336,154,001 USD. Currently, 171,154,001 USD were financed, leaving a deficit of 165,000,000 USD (Barakat 2013). The facilities of Nahr el Bared are not completed yet. According to the public opinion, the ones which they are still waiting for are: The Community Based Rehabilitation Association (CBRA), Markaz jamiat al ta'hil almoujtamaa”, Development Works Without Limits Association Nabea, Jamiyyat AA'mal tanmawi bila Houldoud Nabea, the Women's Activity Center Markaz al Anchitat Al Nisai, the camp director's office, services and social care offices, two UNRWA schools and a nursery. Concerning the percentage of people who returned, 35% of the inhabitants returned to the old camp. 60% returned to both the old and the new camp, as some of them are dispersed in many houses. Ahmad Farghwai expects the reconstruction process to be at 45% in July 2017 (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

89 United Nations, United States Agency for International Development, World Bank, European Commission, German Corporation for Technical Cooperation.
Biography of a Camp: Nahr el Bared

Figure 52. Satellite view of Nahr el Bared in 2011

Figure 53. Satellite view of Nahr el Bared in 2005

Figure 54. Satellite view of Nahr el Bared in 2012

Figure 55. Satellite view of Nahr el Bared in 2012
Many of the refugees complained about the loss of space in their houses but they sustained that even if the overall quality of construction was not the best one, it was better than the former self-construction process of Nahr el Bared. These are some examples of refugees’ houses before and after the reconstruction process, and their personal descriptions. Mehyeddine says:

“My apartment was 132 m², now it is only 92 m², but UNRWA gave me 4 floors instead of 3. So now I can marry 4 sons instead of 3! Also, the house overlooks one street only now while before it was giving on 3 streets. I rented my house in the old camp to Palestinians. Before, the neighbors were relatives. Now it’s not the same anymore, we are not all together like before” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).

While drawing his house, Ahmad Farghawi tells the story of his new house: “After the reconstruction, there are no balconies at all. Probably the foundations could support 10 floors instead of four or five like before. New houses are better in quality. The bedroom is a bit small, there is no space to put a double bed in there. The house was 75 m² and is now 60 m² only. The entrance gives to the corridor as well, the kitchen on its right. A corridor separates the two bathrooms and the living room from the two bedrooms.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

Walid Dib, a friend of Ahmad Farghawi draws his new house as well: “In the new house, the entrance gives to the corridor as well that reaches the living room and the kitchen on one side and the two bedrooms on the other” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

The reconstructed houses in the old camp were not always inhabited by their owners as they were rented most of the time to other Palestinians, jeopardizing the extended family building. Also, the Syrian Palestinians are living in the temporary shelters of UNRWA. Hence, the community life changed due to the alterations of the population living in the camp and its adjacent area.
Military Control

Nahr el Bared became the first official Palestine refugee camp in Lebanon to be directly owned by the GoL. As soon as the conflict ended, discussions began between GoL and the political representatives of the camp residents in order to define the rights and responsibilities of the refugees and the role of the UNRWA in maintaining the camp. Finally, though the government agreed in April 2009 to expropriate the land on which each of the packages lays awaiting for funds to be collected. The development of each package could not proceed until the GoL legally purchased the respective land plots (UNRWA 2010). After the 2007 war, the LAF controlled access to the camp and its adjacent area, and Palestinians and visitors were required to show identity papers upon entry and exit (Barakat 2013). Checkpoints and mobility limitations were limiting the recovery performance contributing to the dislocation of the economic activities outside the camp. This created an unbalanced economic competition between Lebanese and Palestinian, affecting negatively the efforts made to reduce tension among the two populations (Chit 2009). Josiane Khalife from the Italian NGO AVSI certifies that from 2007 to 2010, all the Palestinian inhabitants had to get a permit to enter the camp, no outsiders or foreigners were allowed to enter. This led Italian NGOs to hire Lebanese employees in order to facilitate the follow up of the project. In 2011, the situation was less rigid, Lebanese and Palestinians were granted access to the camp area more easily (AVSI Khalife 2017). The military control of Nahr el Bared was a strategic policy change concerning Palestinian camps in Lebanon that while improving the living conditions of Palestinians, was labeled as a security model for other Palestinian camps. Palestinian factions across the country were expected to look up to Nahr al Bared and learn new forms of coordination between them and the government inside the camps. Ain al Helweh, another Palestinian camp in the south of Lebanon, could benefit from an increased cooperation between armed factions within the camp and the Army on its perimeter in order to prevent violence and punish its protagonists (International Crisis Group 2012). Nahr el Bared was also considered a model in a wider security discussion about Palestinian camps in the host countries in the context of the “war against terror” (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2010). However, the development of the security issue was not paralleled with a process of civil rights or the normalization of security measures around the civilian population. In the period directly following the end of the conflict, the issues of security and control were at the center of Nahr el Bared debate. The army controlled the
camp and was directly involved in decision making capacity on fundamental actions such as emergency, relief, access to the camp and even planning. After one year from the end of the war, barbed wire and checkpoints surrounded the camp and adjacent areas, controlling the entry and exit of everyone (I. Sheikh Hassan 2012). Ahmad Farghawi talks about this period and remembers the difficulties of circulation inside and outside the boundaries of the camp:

“Most of the families lost their papers when they evacuated the camp in 2007. The situation was very difficult when inhabitants of the camp needed a permit, “tesrih”, to enter Nahr el Bared. If they have lost their wallets or papers it would be very difficult to enter the camp, the army wouldn’t allow it. The access to the camp was very tough during 3 years. Even if relatives came to visit someone for a funeral, they wouldn’t enter without having an official permission given by the army. However, the inhabitants did some manifestations in order to remove this procedure and loosen up the entry to the camp. Two persons died throwing stones in the manifestations, which led the army to intervene urgently. The inhabitants sent also articles to the United Kingdom and other countries hosting Palestinian communities, complaining about the accessibility of the camp. This led the Lebanese government and therefore the army to remove the process of having a “tesrih” to enter the camp of Nahr el Bared. Lebanese and Palestinian now need only to present their identity card at the army check point to enter the camp, but foreigners need an official permission to go there as it is considered a military land. The remaining issue is that a lot of people in Akkar don’t register their cars properly which makes the situation more complicated.” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017)

For years, relations between Palestinian camps and the government were regulated by the 1969 Cairo Agreement signed by the PLO and the Lebanese state represented by army commander General Emile Bustani, which allowed Palestinians self-rule inside the camps. Even if in 1987 the government unilaterally cancelled the agreement, the state effectively didn’t exercise its authority. Security forces did not enter the camps, leaving internal security and governance to Palestinians organizations. For decades, this arrangement was a weak point for Lebanese authorities and citizens, who considered it a violation on state sovereignty (International Crisis Group 2012). The current
situation in Nahr el Bared is unique among the twelve official Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The Siniora government believed that together with the LAF, an Internal Security Forces (ISF) presence was necessary. ISF gradually began to move into the camp. This created a huge debate about their presence in the Palestinian community. Achraf Rifi, the ISF chief, said: “We will deal with Nahr al Bared in the same way we deal with any other piece of Lebanese territory. In the future, the LAF will be on the outside of the camp and will enter only if necessary. Changing the LAF inside the camp with the ISF was a potential risk because the police, unlike the army, had the authority to interfere in refugees’ daily life (International Crisis Group 2012). The main concern of the camp residents was about some of the commercial activities. Palestinians in Lebanon cannot perform many professions as their work opportunities are limited by the host country and the presence of the ISF might put in danger some shops such as pharmacies illegally present in the camp. According to the government’s original vision outlined at the 2008 Vienna Donor Conference:

“Community policing in the Nahr al Bared Camp context entails the presence inside the camp of a culturally and politically sensitive ISF that will work to reduce the fears and tensions that existed prior to and after NBC conflict. Such type of policing will promote community engagement, partnership and proactive problem solving. The above security arrangements for Nahr al Bared were agreed upon with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Building trust between the ISF and the community would encourage camp residents to be more supportive and forthcoming in reporting community problems and security issues. Police officers would engage in various types of community activities (youth schemes, community programs, etc.) to foster a closer relationship with the residents of the camp” (International Crisis Group 2012).

However, the new model thought for Nahr el Bared crisis was not an answer to all problems. It failed the basic task of restoring refugees to a normal life. The relationship between camp residents and the state didn’t improve as much as expected. Refugees saw the authorities not protecting them, but rather protecting the country from them. Rigid permit requirements and rough treatment at camp checkpoints hurt relations with the Lebanese community, already significantly damaged by the conflict. Also, Palestinians did not have an effective representative in Nahr el Bared because of the political crisis that ran over the popular committees. The crisis in Nahr el Bared and most of all the army’s intervention was a “wake-up call” (International Crisis Group 2012) for all the Palestinian factions. The fear of a similar destiny brought Palestinian leaders across the political spectrum in all refugee camps to cooperate on security issues. The Fatah Intifada representative in Beddawi explained: “We have unified Palestinian factions and everyone has an interest in preserving the camp. After the Nahr al Bared crisis, we are willing to do anything in the other camps to avoid replication of the Nahr al Bared model”. The main object of concern in this regard is Ain al Helweh, the most lawless and uncontrollable camp, which continues to regularly experience assassinations, bombings and other security incidents. This camp has several of the features that made Nahr el Bared a perfect environment for Fatah al Islam: competing factions, armed groups of militants making up an uncoordinated security apparatus, and a large population of unemployed youth (International Crisis Group 2012). The conflict with Fatah al-Islam changed the perception of Lebanese towards the Palestinian camps where the latter were seen as security threats. This led to the popular and governmental support of the dominant presence of the LAF in Nahr el Bared (International Crisis Group 2012).
Self-Reliant Governance

The self-reliant governance disappeared for a period during the reconstruction process. Everything was in the hands of the humanitarian organizations, especially UNRWA. The economy degraded after 2007 and the unemployment percentage rose to 41 percent. The employment of Palestinian laborers was not enough for the socio-economic recovery of the camp even if 80 percent of the workers in the reconstruction project were Palestinians (Barakat 2013). Challenges came up due to the “shortage of Palestinian manpower in certain skilled construction jobs, in addition to security restrictions imposed by the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNRWA employment service center contractors found difficulties to fulfill quotas of Palestinian employees” (Barakat 2013). After the reconstruction of the first packages things changed in the commercial and social life.

“Commerce is not happening anymore. There are no jobs. Young people are driven by drugs. The Syrian refugees overcrowded all the other camps. The NGOs are focusing on the case of the Syrians now and forgot about the Palestinian situation. There is no work outside the camp. Although schools and health centers are provided by UNRWA, students cannot work in their field of studies after finishing university. Before the war, they used to open small shops to sell products, but after the war, that was impossible, hence many of them dealt with drugs. It is now impossible to feel safe letting the children run and play in the streets as before. Parents fear the influence of the youth on their children.” says Ahmad Loubani. New plagues were manifested in the camp. Poor commerce, drug addiction, poor education, violence and the camp’s connection with the outside worsened: “The relation between Lebanese and Palestinians was very positive before the war. After 2007, the prejudice increased between the two as the social media and other communication tools tried to divide the two populations” (Interviewee A. Loubani 2017).

Mehyeddine Loubani agrees as well about the Nahr el Bared post war situation but is more hopeful than the younger generation:

“Directly after the war in 2007, the relations between Lebanese and Palestinians deteriorated but then it went back again with the change of generation. The young people are very influenced by the media and sometimes they described the Palestinians as “monsters” so the Lebanese got scared. The wise old people still living in the camp interfered and changed the attitude of the younger people, as they had much better relations previously with the Lebanese. Services and favors from one to another are never forgotten, as well as trust relations where one could count on the other” (Interviewee M.A. Loubani 2017).

The limited accessibility inhibited both social and commercial relation as well: “No one can pass by the camp anymore while going to Akkar without stopping at an army check point first. Sales went down and products entering the camp needed to be checked at one specific army check point. The camp was like under a siege. Whoever had the financial means moved to Beddawi or other areas surrounding the camp” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017). Only small and medium businesses in Nahr el Bared adjacent area were still present. Businesses were run by Palestinian owners but very few businesses employed one to three workers. Workers were paid less than 350 000 LBP per month. This was because of the many obstacles which resulted from the conflict such as security checkpoints and lack of capital and supplies. The working population dropped from 32,44 percent before the war to 29.22 percent after the war, while the category of the “unemployed and looking for a job” increased from 2,18 to 5,99 percent (Chit 2009).
Before the crisis, the household income was 489,000 LBP for the new camp inhabitants. Instead, after the crisis the average income of the household was 296,000 LBP. It was interesting to see on the contrary that for Beddawi’s households, the income was lower before the conflict and then higher. Workload decreased and number of workers as well. When the breadwinners were interviewed about their future plans, 23 percent were planning to find a new job, 19 percent to establish or reestablish a commercial activity, and 58 percent had no plans. Usually, most of the refugees wanted to go back to their old jobs because of their experience (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008).

People who managed to open their activities again after the war, lost a lot of customers in Beddawi. They suffered from increased commodity prices. Business owners reported that before 52 percent of their customers were Lebanese. This share decreased by more than 50 percent to 18 percent for returnees and 24 percent for the displaced. This reflected the deterioration of Lebanese-Palestinian relations beyond the narrow circle of the active conflict. Also, low income was prevalent in Nahr el Bared refugee camp probably as one of the consequences of the humanitarian aid and lack of opportunities to establish a self-reliant economy.

The conflict disrupted the Lebanese-Palestinian relationship throughout the country and especially in the Akkar region. However, the relation with the Lebanese community was recoverable. A former LPDC consultant explained: “Everyone forgot who the enemy was. It started out as a war against extremists, but then the Lebanese forgot that they were fighting a faction that had taken over the camp and the Palestinians forgot that the army was fighting a faction, so the enemy lines got blurred” (International Crisis Group 2012). Some Palestinians in Nahr al Bared expressed resentment towards neighboring Lebanese. They thought they were unwelcoming in the crisis’s aftermath. A resident said: “After the Nahr al Bared war, even the sentiments of the Lebanese in the adjacent areas changed. Some openly protested our return to our homes. We always approached the Lebanese as if we are one people, but they don’t see us that way. I learned from this experience that we should never leave our homes, but be prepared to die in the camp” (International Crisis Group 2012). The answers about the Lebanese-Palestinian relations were very different and influenced by the personal memories of the conflict period. A survey was held by UNRWA where respondents were asked to rate this relation in the North and in the country. The ratings ranged between 3.7 and 4.8 before the crisis and between 1.8 and 2.8 after the crisis. A significant deterioration of these relations was reported in the country (43%) and
especially in the North (32%) (UNRWA, Consultation and Research Institute 2008). Other things changed in the post war recovery period. Nahr el Bared refugees’ attitude changed after the war. Before, the environment and the traditions of the camp were the same as in Palestine, this can be seen in the way people dress, if women cover their heads are not. As Nahr el Bared is 13 km from the city of Tripoli the difference between Nahr el Bared and Beddawi is noticeable in terms of rural and urban customs. “We preserved our traditions and the way we live in community here. A young person living in Bourj el Barajneh would be wearing for instance a jean there, but in Nahr el Bared that was not present.” Talking about the attachment to their origins, Farghawi criticizes “Palestinian living in Tripoli since a long time who do not speak the Palestinian dialect anymore which makes other Palestinians disappointed with them” (Interviewees A.A. Farghawi, W.D. Mawaad 2017).

“They saw the way of living in a city and adopted new lifestyles. This depended where the family lived during and after the war of 2007. The Palestinian political influence experienced a significant erosion after the 2007 crisis. The Palestinian political groups were blamed for three main factors: the lack of camp protection from destruction; the camp’s ultimate disarmament which deprived the factions of the principal means they used to exercise authority; and, third, the government’s vision for the camp, outlined in the Vienna Document. It did not mention the traditional governance structures: the popular committees. Palestinian political groups lost popular support and their power due to the loss of their weapons (International Crisis Group 2012). Camps in Lebanon were always treated as a “space of exception” and an experimental laboratory for control. Before and after the conflict different models of governance have contributed to the suspension of the space under laws and regulations. Actors involved in the politics of space are the host authorities mainly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO and UNRWA as well as Islamist groups and different local political committees (Hanafi 2008). A Hamas leader said regarding the Palestinian politics loss of power: “There are no longer any strong groups in Nahr el Bared now. The factions have become civilians, meaning we don’t have weapons anymore and we can only resort to peaceful protests”. An engineer in the camp made a similar point: “Because our leaders are weak, we are now waiting for the Lebanese to present an alternative approach. If our Palestinian leadership were strong and had a vision, we could do something for ourselves”. As an UNRWA official put it, “The factions in Nahr al Bared are disempowered because they don’t have guns and they are resented by the population who believes they didn’t do enough to stop Fatah al-Islam. This isn’t a good platform on which to negotiate a new way forward” (International Crisis Group 2012). Faction leaders opposed this perspective and proposed a similar governance to the civilian municipality one. Jamal Shehadi, the Hamas representative, said: “We accept that we will remain unarmed, and that LAF should be in charge of security while remaining outside the camp. But we want rights for duties. We want to have the right to continue our political activities and we insist on freedom of movement within the camp”. Fatah representative Abou Jihad suggested that Nahr al Bared should “become like Muhammara or any other neighborhood, with the popular committees in charge of local governance. Nahr al Bared doesn’t have weapons, so the factions won’t be involved in security” (International Crisis Group 2012). Popular committees’ members, in order to gain credibility again and exercise authority, wanted to be elected rather than appointed by the factions. Unfortunately, the democratic election of representatives was a fear of UNRWA because that will make them lose control over the representatives of the population in which they couldn’t interfere anymore. By contrast, the Vienna Document’s radical solution was to imply the proved loss of traditional Palestinian authorities and the lack of a defined Palestinian governing. This would have brought the affirmation that the camp no longer “belongs” to its Palestinian inhabitants. According to Hanafi’s opinion the possibilities for the post war political situation were mainly divided in two categories: let Palestinians access the full labor market and own property rights or impose the Lebanese authority completely inside the camps through a police center in the camp and total submission to the Lebanese laws (Hanafi 2008).

Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organization. It has a social service wing, Dawah, and a military wing, the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades, and, since 2007, has been the governing authority of the Gaza Strip. Hamas was founded in 1987, soon after the First Intifada broke out.
The humanitarian governance of refugee camps and the reaction of the refugees to its assistance had a strong impact on the spatiality and temporality of the camps. The military governance, the self-reliance governance and new humanitarian governance affected the urbanization process of Nahr el Bared throughout all its history.

Figure 64. Facades of reconstructed packages
Annexes
Interviews

Interviewee Mehyeddine Ahmad Loubani

I was born in 1946 in Damoun Qadaa Aakka. My mother was called Fatma. In 1948, we moved from Damoun to Qaroun in south Lebanon, stayed there for one month and a half; I was one year old. They dropped us in Mina, Tripoli. The area is called Sekket el Hadid, the railway line, we stayed in the wagons. A Lebanese guy called Ghandour was distributing biscuits and food and helping people. We stayed there till they prepared the camp of NB. In 1950, we went to Nahr el Bared. They distributed the tents to the families depending on the number of members, 5 people would have a big tent called “souwan” while for 2/3 people they were giving the “bell tent” called “abou jaras”. Abou Jaras was about 10 meters (diameter) and we divided it with blankets on the floor to differentiate children, boys and girls spaces. We didn’t have any concrete on the floor, just blankets. We used sand and earth on ground to make it warmer. Unrwa was helping us at that time. All the people coming from the same neighbourhood were sitting together. It’s still divided in the same way today: Saffouri, Saaasa, Damoun. No one told them to stay in the same neighbourhood, it was spontaneous division. We had a kind of piazza among the tents called “hakoura”. The people were planting onions, garlic and they were putting stones and mud bricks all around it to delimit the space. We were eating from this production; my father was growing figs and pomegranates. We stayed in tents till 62. In the early sixties, we were building walls of one meter height made of sand, mud, dried earth and straw to prevent the water coming in. This improved during the following years and we began constructing with concrete blocks called “khefen” (from ’62 to ’64).

In 1968, 1969, we began to put zinc roofs on top of the walls. After the revolution, we began building in concrete. People were removing zinc and putting concrete and when the police were checking they were paying a fine of 5 liras and you could keep it. When the government (LAF) left, construction spread. After that they added the floors, they started with the foundations and then they continued to add according to the space they needed. It was completely chaotic, if someone was marrying, his father was just adding a floor and the roof, all the brothers on top of each other. They had a lot of foremen and skilled workers, no one was asking permission to build. All the skilled workers of the area were Palestinian because the area is very agricultural and so it lacked skilled workers. The Lebanese of the area were all agricultural people or police or army. When I was 19 years old, I was building houses and selling them with all the interior works, I was a kind of contractor. I was doing the plastering and the decorative plaster, the first one in camp doing it and selling it. My “company” was called “Ta3ahoudet l Agha”, which means Agha (the lord, title of respect in society) Contracting. I was married at 17 years old. It was all agricultural around and it was “qasab mass” (sugar cane) and lemons. The Lebanese were selling their lands and Palestinians were buying those and in this way they got to the frontier and expanded a lot.

No one was registering the land in his name but at the notary “keteb aadel”, instead of paying to the government 30000 liras. My house is still not registered, it was permitted to register it but it was too expensive so no one was doing it. People were going to the municipality to get the permission to build their houses and they were paying the same as the Lebanese. This happened before the 90s. In the 90s they were giving fines to everyone who constructed but then the people went to Halba and they (municipality) permitted them to keep their properties without paying because they’ve built them before the law of Hariri (1993). Whoever constructed after 1993 got fined. The
law was saying that Palestinians couldn’t have properties and cannot inherit the lands and properties. The religious institutions “waqef” will inherit the lands. Till 2007 the camp was never destroyed. The main road to the north and Syria was passing through the camp and when they constructed the highway in 1990 it was outside the camp, they took 5 years to build it. If one car had a breakdown the traffic was completely stuck. The main road was 6 meters wide, all the activities, houses, shops were invading the road. The commercial area was on the main road and it was very active.

“Even the President would have passed by there!”

(In 1989) When the president René Mouawad was assassinated his convoy passed through the camp and they welcomed him dead. The biggest house in the camp had 2 rooms, people would do the house in place of the garden first and then they were building the other rooms. Everything was constructed, there was no empty space, no piazzas anymore. We had one tree, houses with trees were very recognizable because everyone lost it at the end. We had a well inside the house. My uncle told me when I married that I would not get his daughter as wife if I didn’t construct a well because she could not carry the jar on top of her head. Everyone in the family was taking water from the same well. The well needed a lot of maintenance, I had all the equipment for it. Unrwa prepared a “hawouz” (water tank) and the women were standing very early in the morning to get water. We had common toilets without sewage system, and tanks were used to collect sewage. Also there were communal showers and people were taking turns to use them, all this was unrwa responsibility. Then we got bathrooms in our own houses. We used kaz lanterns for lighting at first and then lux lights, after we got electricity from the government in the 60s we started paying based on the meter. Who knows politics knows that we will never go back to Palestine, when you leave your country you know it. It is empty words to say that you want to go back. We were the only people to not get their own independence in the whole world. The cause of Palestine is used by all the Arab countries to get money.

There was diwan kind of sitting area for old people where they were doing bitter coffee, 6/7 old people in the camp, one was Abou Rachid Saffouri, another one was Abou Moufid Saasa, every neighborhood had its diwan. When the old people died the diwans closed, people didn’t have time to make the coffee. The diwans were part of the houses. The living room was as long as the house, we had a wood stove in it to heat, then they were having Arabic seats (low ones). The diwan was called with the name of the old person of the house.

Marriage, divorce and their problems were brought to the old people to get advice. Those old people were like “majors”, they knew everyone and all the problems of the people in the camp. Damoun families: Loubani, Beqaii, Abou Chahine, El Hindi. They were choosing one of the old people from these families and he would be the major. Renting and buying houses was informal, they were marrying at the “cheikh” and they were registering it in Halba. Unrwa was doing all the other part of management. The popular committee (lejne el chaibiye) was established in 74, I was the first one to be in it, the committee was a reference to the camp. It was socially and economically responsible for the camp, managing construction problems and conflicts. There were a lot of committees, health committee, economy, social and external relations, after the revolution this committee was in collaboration with unrwa and government, the secretary general of the committee went to discuss with government and unrwa, also when the government needed to arrest someone it was going to them. There were 5 neighborhoods inside the camp. We had different federations: women, teachers, students. Both the neighborhoods and the 3 federations were represented in the committee and in the neighborhood, they were deciding who was going to represent them. In 74 they decided the people to represent them in the committee according to their configuration.

We had very good relations with Lebanese neighbors, in terms of commerce, visits, invitations for weddings and funerals. The funeral is very important for family relations, I would go with 30/40 Palestinians in Akkar to make condolences. Even in Christian villages. We used to know all the people from family names, especially with some villages like Miniara and others. At some point the relation was not very good but then it went back
again with the change of generation. The young people are very influenced by the media and sometimes they described the Palestinians as monsters so the Lebanese got scared. The wise people were helping to not have this attitude because they were having good relations before. If you did one service to a guy then the relation is good and you can count on him.
The new camp is 4 times the old camp, from the east is as big as the old camp till the highway, from the north one and a half till Aabde Mhammara and it goes till Hay el Jisr (bridge). The new camp is considered an outskirt of the old camp. The area where we are living is Hay el Jadid, the new area and the cornice.

We had a health center in the camp and there is only one hospital the Hilal in Beddawi. Unrwa was helping for special hardship cases, they were helping them constantly, all the vaccines were given for every child born in the camp and also milk and vitamins till one year and a half old. For the other special cases it was for more time. When the child was old enough (after 18) they were stopping the help. Unrwa pays 60% for the medical care. It’s approved after a few weeks from when you present for an operation and then they pay 60%. Sometimes they were covering 100%.

Everyone in the camp was working, the abilities of the Palestinians (craftsmanship) made them find jobs outside the camp. We were really hard workers, obviously not in government and army jobs. Palestinians were having cheaper salaries than Lebanese workers, for example building a roof would cost 3500 dollars instead of 5000. The important thing for Palestinians was to work. It was easier than having other foreigners because we didn’t need any papers to live there. All free-lance jobs were perfect, construction, plastering, painting, tiling, polishing, pouring concrete, mechanics. 70% of the people were working in Akkar, Tripoli, Zgharta.

Even after the war people went till university, baccalureat is reached with UNRWA schools. Scholarship for university by UNRWA and PLO for the best students at school. 1st year at university is half paid by UNRWA. Students go to the Lebanese university also if they pass the exam. They don’t enter the medical school, architecture, economics, law and journalism (in the Lebanese university, so they will go to private schools) because they can’t work in these fields and also because they need English and not French. History and Sociology and geography they can attend at the Lebanese university.

This is my home, this is my land, I never knew Palestine apart from history books and studies. I was born here. It’s where you live your life, childhood and memories that you consider home. You would leave this country because you want to improve your living conditions. When they allowed us to come back in Nahr El Bared after the war all the families came. Everyone took his papers, his passports, diplomas and they went back to Beddawi, but I stayed here where there was nothing. I stayed in a corner, lighted a fire all night, this house is my work for 50 years. It’s not only materialistic. I put my narghile and stayed in the fire corner. I had 4 floors in the old camp, now they are reconstructed and rented to Palestinians. Before the neighbors where relatives. Now it’s not the same anymore, we are not all together like before.

I stayed 40 years in Unrwa, I worked there thanks to my connections. I was the area maintenance and sanitation officer (1993). I even had contacts with the director of Unrwa. They closed this department later and because I was in the committee I went to BeKaa for 2 years and a half. They wanted to do a sewage network in Nahr El Bared in 1995 and I was the director of the camp of Beddawi for 13 years till 2004. They put another director in NBC but the people were not happy with him so I was responsible for both camps and then I continued in NBC for 3 years and a half.

In the reconstruction, we lost a lot of space but the quality is much better, I had 132 m2 and now I have 92, but they gave me 4 floors instead of 3. So now I can marry 4 sons instead of 3. The balcony is the “living room” of the house, even if it is open. We are eleven to twelve people in the same house.
I was born in 1939 in Damoun in Palestine. In 1948/49, we came in trucks from Sour (living in tents all similar to each other) to the north during the night, then we were living in French hangars, near the petrol tanks of IPC, kaz khana area, before moving to Nahr El Bared. Today where the hangars were there are slaughter houses. I was working with friends in a bakery in Tripoli and I was responsible because I was bringing bread home at 10 years old, we were 7 in the family. When I finished work and went back to the hangars, no one was there and they told me that everyone moved to NBC, that they took them in trucks to the camp. We were completely lost and went back to Tripoli and the owner of the bakery told us that he would drive us the day after to the camp. We arrived in the afternoon at the camp, there were tents that were all the same in a huge area like mushrooms, everywhere. How can we know our tent? we wondered. There were 150 villages inside Nahr El Bared, I asked where the people from Damoun were, and someone told me that they were on the hill, so I walked through the tents to reach the house. After a while I met my cousin and he told me where the tent was. The tent were completely closed and I didn’t know how to enter but I heard the voice of my mother and I called out, then she lifted the tent flap and I crawled to enter. I had a bag of “lahm baajine and maamoul” (meat pie and sweets) and I was the only kid with money. When the sun was up, I saw very big tents on the horizon and they told me that it was the school. I fought with my father because I wanted to go to school and my father wanted me to work. I was always the best at school and I won the fight with my father and went back to school. I loved science and chemistry but I succeeded in Arab literature and language. There were some open areas in the camp with no tents. All the neighbors were settling next to each other and in between neighborhoods there were these piazzas because no one was settling there. Each one had a small area and they were giving area when new people were coming. The water was going inside the tents, for toilets trenches were dug near the sea and they were using sackcloth to make divisions between toilets without roofs. Cleaning and hygiene was really terrible.

We realized after a while that there were 3 types of tents. The schools were very big and had 4 columns to hold them up, for the big families there was the “siwan”, round and big, for the medium families there was the “jama-loun” that was 3x2,5 meters and it had 3 poles, then there was “aboujaras” for the smaller families. For the toilets, they created emergency maralid maydaniyye(field toilets) they were made of sands and there were arguments about who was going first. Our traditions were very different from those of the sheltering programs. Unrwa created the “hawouz” which was the main source of water, there were ten taps around it to distribute water, women were going with jars and tin cans. We were building fires with stone and wood and we were blowing to make the fire work and cook traditional food. We tried to make bread by putting a steel sheet on top of the fire but it did not work well and if we wanted to buy bread we needed to go to Tripoli that was 15km away, and almost impossible. It was a very wild and isolated land. What was helping us was the river, clean and fresh water. In summer also the sea was helping, we knew how to swim. Some people became fishermen. The people coming from Damoun were the first ones eating fish.

They needed a director for the camp and they were making for him a big tent, did it with concrete blocks and zinc, they had a table and one person that was writing. They were giving us in this tent rations of food and in our ration we got flour, ghee, hummus, red beans, sugar and later sardines. Some people created something called “fourniye” (stove), they needed wood
for it so they were collecting wood from the lands, everyone was having wood in front of the house. They were also planting the land around the house with mint, onion, garlic. The coffee places started to appear where people gathered to complain together, Qahwet el Aabed Darwiche (cafe of the simple slave) was one of them. Then bakeries also began to appear to make bread. Everyone was beginning to develop their lives because the dream of going back to Palestine was starting to fade away. We were placing stones around the tents to prevent water from coming in and build a sort of parapet. Before the parapet was inside the tent, then it was moved outside. We used lanterns with oil and fûle (wick) that made our noses all black. It is with this light that I studied for all the time till ’64. In 1964 the electricity arrived at the camp.

The development was progressive and continuous. I am the eldest and in 1960 I began gaining a salary and to develop the house in a better way. I painted the walls with a lot of colors, part of it green, then yellow and then I fixed the chairs, beds and made other improvements. Before this, the walls were done with straws put in the earth and then it was plastered with white mud “tin and teben”. We wanted to cover the roof but couldn’t because of the police that was checking all the time, but because I was very active in the sport club they didn’t say anything for our roof. I installed the column in the middle made of mud brick. The roof was also made of mud and we were flattening it often so it wouldn’t fall, but water was still filtering inside. I went into all the houses of my area and drew birds, flowers and butterflies in blue on white plaster to make the people happy. After the revolution of Chamoun a lot of construction happened from May 1958 till the end of September 1958. The government was not present so we were building.

Cafés were starting to appear as well as bakeries, schools, hospital with a lot of room (properly established), health clinic, and water tank. Financially people were getting better and better, it showed in their clothes, food. The house was changing depending on the proximity of the governing bodies (police, army, arab organizations outside the country, etc..) and connections. There was no sewage and there were fines to people that threw water outside the tent. Before we were carrying all the dirty water to the sea, in winter it was very difficult. In 68 things changed with the Palestinian revolution. Palestinian after this imposed themselves and we began hearing the sounds of weapons in the nights and the nationalist expansion party al Madd al Qawmi began to spread. The politics influenced all the social situation and it gave something positive to the local conditions of the Palestinians. Then we began to build one room with concrete roof and tiled floor, some people even developed more with balconies and more floors. The things changed and then they began to be modern. Modernization began in 1968 and precisely in 1969. From then NBC became a commercial and cultural hub and was very important for Akkar till the day it got destroyed in 2007.
I will start by talking about the reconstruction process. I noted down for you the names of the organizations who helped in the reconstruction of NBC: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norwegian board of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. They did restoration of houses, constructed migrants neighborhood in the new camp (for people coming from the South mainly), distributed solar panels.

Premiere Urgence (PU), French organization who insured houses for Palestinians on their own expenses.

Association “jam3iyet elirchad wa alisla7” (Guidance and Rectification Association), supported by the Qatar Red Crescent. They distributed electrical appliances like fridges, cookers, fans, electrical heaters.

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), who distributed 1000 dollars for each family of the camp.

Norwegian Popular Aids (NPA), based in the camp of Mar Elias, they helped a lot the population especially people with disabilities (providing equipment). They were distributing home appliances, cleaning appliances, clothes and everything for children needs.

World Vision who distributed bedrooms’ equipment like pillows, blankets, cleaning materials (shampoo, soap, wipes) for personal hygiene and house cleaning.

Diakonia who distributed clothes and shoes for all the residents and they helped through another association called Community Based Rehabilitation Association (CBRA) who was helping especially disabled people.

Welfare Association together with Unrwa reconstructed the schools in the camp of NBC and they equipped the schools also for disabled people in terms of architectural elements also. They were supported by Handicap International, CBRA, LPHU (Lebanese wheelchairs users). In every school there was an electric lift and ramps. Before the reconstruction, the disabled people could only reach the ground floor of the schools.

The Palestinians created committees to follow up the conditions of all the families and to follow all the problems they needed to face. The Palestinians created an arbitration committee that was having a representative from each neighborhood in order to tell the reconstruction committee the precise areas of the houses, to avoid problems and cheating among the people. They had access to the drawings of the reconstruction. There was also another committee Mounasadat to raise the problems and make the construction of the camp faster. They were supported by local associations. The responsible for it was Nawal Hassan who was from the association Alnajda (Help). They were doing a lot of activism like peaceful manifestation to obtain what was needed.

The LPDC’s mission was to improve the dialogue between Palestinians and Lebanese. The financial help that we got was from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Emirates, Kuwait and European Union, especially Italian organization and German associations as it concerns the restoration part, they were bringing heating and gas equipment. The financial aid from Saudi Arabia was 2 000 000 liras for every family.

For the reconstruction, if the original area was 150, they were giving 100 adding one or more floors. The European Union did the sewage infrastructure in 2004. The European Union money was equivalent to 90 million liras but by the time they did the project, the value of the money decreased a lot. Italians made restoration, infrastructure and created a network to filter the water in the camp.
Till today, these facilities are not yet constructed are:
CBRA, Community Based Rehabilitation Association, Markaz jamʿiyat al ta2hil almoujtama3i, Development Works Without Limits Association, Nabea, Jamʿiyat 3amal tanmawi bila 7oudoud Nabe3, Women’s Activity Center, markaz el anchitat el nisa2i, Camp Director’s office, Services and Social Care office, Markaz el chou2oun el ijtimai3iya, 2 UNRWA schools, and the nursery.

A water tank was provided in every neighborhood by Unrwa and EU, they were responsible for the maintenance as well. In 1992 the PLO did a network for the water and pumps with the help of the French people. The French also gave ovens, cookers in order to create business inside the camp. People were presenting their projects to the French and then they decided whether to help them do their activity. In 1969 we started to build with concrete and eternit. The jobs were mainly agricultural together with the Lebanese people in Akkar. The stone quarries, salines were very good places to find jobs for Palestinians. It was much easier to employ Palestinians than other foreigners. The Palestinians who were working abroad were sending money to their families in Lebanon in order to construct room by room their houses in the camp. We didn’t pay anything for the houses or for the water but we were paying for electricity. When we were putting zinc roofs we put wheels and stones on top of it in order to keep it attached to the house. A lot of them by the way were flying away sometimes. In 76 a lot of illegal construction happened, the government during the civil war was not checking too much so we could build as much as we wanted. For the Lebanese and the Palestinians there was no control and we were just strengthening the foundations of the houses and then adding floors and floors. When we were doing the foundation in the beginning we were already providing for the possibility of having many floors. In 78 they constructed one floor and then in 85 another one and in 90 again. I built the foundation to support 7 floors from the beginning. The civil war was a mess in terms of construction, no one was checking and a lot of illegal building was constructed. When people construct, first they were doing the children bedroom and then another bedroom for parents and then the living room as it was less important, many times it was under a tent or under the vineyard structure. In the 80s we started to have a proper house with living room, bathrooms and bedrooms. Before we had common toilets, one in each neighborhood. Afterwards, infrastructure, sewage and everything arrived improving the conditions a lot. During the 80s people constructed war shelters under their houses in order to protect themselves. Palestinians living overseas were buying lands and if they were having strong political connection they were not going to Lebanon but stopping in Cyprus or other Mediterranean countries to meet their relatives and then go back. When the Syrians left from Lebanon there was again stability in the country and the construction began another time. In 83 there was not a lot of construction because of the Israeli invasion. The families that were in other Arab countries came back to visit relatives in Lebanon. There were a lot of traders who were buying lands in the camp. No one was helping in construction after the Syrian departure. The expenses are all on our side. The ones who had money were marrying Lebanese women in order to register everything in their name and bypass the law problems. From 1992 to 2007 the density of construction was very high, the camp expanded a lot till it reached Aabde and Bhanine. It was the same period of urbanization of Lebanon, the spread was everywhere in the country, camps or not. We had fridges, washing machines and even jacuzzi sometimes! Al Najda and Samed (PLO subsidiary) associations constructed a factory to sue clothes (couture) in order to create jobs for women and young people, they worked, exporting to Libya and learning skills in the center. They also set up a cooperative supermarket in the camp. Other associations like Ghassan Kanafani were also doing some projects such as nursery and cleaning of roads. Many young people were involved and were paid on a day by day basis.

In the 70s the water and sanitation networks were covered 90% by Unrwa and/or PLO. The popular committee was raising problems and issues of the people in the camp, collaborating with Unrwa, solving problems about houses, windows, new rooms, etc... Unrwa and PLO created also a playground area with a football pitch and other sports facilities. Other countries were helping as well, like people from Saudi Arabia especially with money. Physiotherapy for sick people and other services were also provided. The French in 2005 helped with my gas project with receptacles and ma-
terials. They held meetings in the common room with those who wanted to present their project, there was an amount of money that needed to be spent (2000/2500 dollar for project), some people were interested and some not. After the war, there was a company that helped with roofs, water infiltration and other problems related to the cover. Other associations took care of the water tanks. The water tanks are on the roofs and are individual because you need to manage your own water. They were doing the follow up of the projects, not just giving the money and leaving. I started with 50 bottles of gas and now I have 200, small and big ones.

Education is very good in the camp in the schools of Unrwa. Some people get private lessons from teachers. The Palestinians who went to work outside Lebanon are today professors and doctors. When they come back they open activities inside the camp to help their people even if it’s not allowed but usually they let them do it. Many are joining Unrwa or they leave Lebanon. Without all this help we would still be like Sudan with monkeys.

Some people were getting so much money that they hired some Lebanese as well. Depending on your financial condition you will continue your education. Even the embassy is allowing Palestinian to travel, it is not difficult. NBC is the richest camp of Palestinians, they developed a lot this camp especially because of the road that was crossing it. We created ice cream in the north and sold lupines. We were exchanging goods if they did not have money, they were giving us potatoes instead of money for example. We are very skilled people in commerce. Some herbs were growing wildly in nature and we collected them and invented food with them. We were also selling zaatar, potatoes, tomatoes and many other products. We could choose whether to work in agriculture or in commerce (food, clothes) after studying. We were working with people from Beirut and Zgharta (Lebanese people), people were going to the camp for many reasons, the location was the most important asset we had, it was the gate to Akkar, and everyone needed to pass by there. The sea didn’t help too much, the meat was coming from Zgharta and all the illegal traffic that was happening through the sea was not made by Palestinians. We were also trusted people and man labor was the most important thing. We were permitting instalments when people couldn’t afford to buy something. People were going to the camp to buy furniture, make up and every kind of goods. Not everyone in the camp was a merchant.

“why do you sell cheaper things than other places?”
“because we have a ship that delivers everything for free!”

We could do it because it was always a family business and because we were selling more. We were earning anyway. We didn’t need to pay rent, water, phone, sewage, municipality, we paid almost nothing. We sell for half price because we don’t need to pay all these things that other people outside the camp need to pay, we were much more competitive than the merchants of Tripoli. The tiles were sold for 6,5 dollars for square meter and they are selling all over Lebanon. In another place in Beirut they were selling the same tiles for 18 dollars. The cost of manufacturing for me is 5.55 dollars. So, I am earning a small amount of money but probably the same as in Beirut because they need to pay a rent and the shop. We are not competing with Lebanese merchants, we are just working in different fields, and a lot of Lebanese are buying from us. We didn’t have any industries a part from the ice-cream one. Of course we were having the black-smith, carpentry, aluminium lab, but all in small sizes, just to cover their needs.

The law of Hariri in 1993 stopped us from having properties and we couldn’t go into Syria anymore without a permission from the government. After the law, we were going to the notary to prove our properties or we were registering them in the names of our wives if they were Lebanese. We did a manifestation for the fact that our houses were inherited by religious institutions to protest for their rights.

My house was of 4 floors and I could enter both from my apartment or my parents’ one. We had two apartments for each floor and they were all for the family. My parents had the biggest one, combining two apartments together. We had a kind of a common living room (open air) which let in a lot of light, a sort of shaft. The ground floor was not very well lit. We had more windows in the upper floors. Other houses had a lot of humidity. Everyone was building on his own and the quality was not always super good. Even the first roof was built gradually together with other rooms that were gra-
dually growing. The corridors were very small. Every time someone married they were building one floor, if some of the brothers were fighting they were just adding external stairs in order to avoid to enter through the other apartments.

After the reconstruction, there are no balconies at all and probably the foundations are for 10 floors instead of 4/5 like before. For the reconstruction process, they asked for contractors to come and present their business plan and then Unrwa chose the best offer. Main contractors were Lebanese but there were also some Palestinians and Syrians. Unrwa is giving Lebanese contractors but then these were employing Palestinian and Syrians workers. It depends on the case, some time they were Lebanese and sometimes Palestinians and Syrians, that’s how they were providing jobs. It was a competition between Palestinians and Syrians basically because they have the same prices. The new houses are better in quality. The bedroom is a bit small, there is no space to put a double bed in there. The old house was 75 m2 and the new one is 60m2 only. That is without considering the “manwar” or the atrium, a shared living space on every floor between my and my brother’s apartment of 10m*4m where the children were playing, celebrations will happen. This “manwar” exists on every floor. It fits 70 people approximately. Some people lost their papers when they evacuated the camp.

Another difficult situation was when we needed a permit “tesrih” to enter the camp. If we lost our wallets or papers it would be very difficult to enter the camp, the army wouldn’t allow it. The access to the camp was very tough during 3 years. Even if relatives would come to visit someone for a funeral, they wouldn’t enter without having an official permission given by the army. But the inhabitants did some manifestations in order to remove this procedure and loosen up the entry to the camp. 2 persons died also when they were throwing stones in the manifestations and the army needed to intervene there. The inhabitants also sent articles to the UK and other countries hosting some Palestinian communities complaining about the accessibility of the camp which led the army to remove the process of having “tesrih” to enter the camp of Nahr el Bared. Lebanese and Palestinians just need to present their identity card now at the army check point to enter the camp but foreigners need an official permission to go there. There is also a problem in Akkar as a lot of people don’t register their cars properly which makes the situation more complicated. This limited accessibility inhibited all the commerce that previously went on in the camp. No one is coming into the camp anymore, so selling went down and the products entering the camp needed to be checked at one of the army check points. The camp was like under siege.

Whoever has the financial means, moved to Beddawi or other areas surrounding the camp. The number of unemployed, especially for young people increased tremendously and affected the young people very much in terms of violence and drugs… this happens in all Palestinian camps not only Nahr el Bared, it is also in all Lebanon. A major source of income is coming from Palestinian people living abroad who are sending a lot of money to their relatives living in the camps. But this is not enough, it is not self-sufficient.

UNRWA helped a lot in the infrastructure, water, electricity... these services are covered 80% by UNRWA. But now the services of UNRWA are decreasing. Then during the war period, the Hariri association was providing breakfast and lunch every day for more a year for the displaced. The sport activities stopped as well, football was one of the main activities, and the inhabitants were enrolled in football teams, competing with other Lebanese teams in Akkar. The playground was destroyed and just began being reconstructed. In the 1970s, it was the only football field other than Tripoli where everyone was coming to play. It was a very happy time when Lebanese and Palestinians were playing football together.

There is no Confessionalism “Ta2ifiye” among Palestinians, Christians, Muslims, Shiites or Sunnites can live together without any issue. And the relation between the Lebanese and Palestinians was very good. NBC is one of the few camps where foreigners could come without any problem, no kidnapping, no danger happened to them. Also, Palestinians of NBC were marrying Lebanese women from Akkar all the time. A lot of Lebanese would come to spend the night in the camp with friends without any pro-
blem, even important figures in the country were coming to buy products. It was an open camp with a lot of movement inside and out. At 3 am the butchers would wake up to work in the slaughterhouse. The fishermen were working also at night in the sea. So the camp didn’t sleep. We lost a lot in the camp, in 3 km you could get everything in the camp, vegetables, food, clothes… for affordable prices.

Me and Ahmad, for example, our wives are Lebanese. During the war, my cousin is a soldier in the army; he was in the camp, my wife was besieged inside the camp and my aunt didn’t know who to cry for. Some families were expanding, therefore they needed to add rooms to the apartments and they couldn’t; they would rent their house to other people and buy other land in the new camp for instance and build their own house there. People would come to the camp to recruit workers or to find a nurse that could be trusted to stay in the house with an old person. They were trusted people. The people of Akkar would come and ask some known people in the camp to recommend them a person who could do a particular job. The relation was based on trust. Some Lebanese were living also in the camp. 35% of the inhabitants returned to the old camp. 60% returned to both the old and the new camp, some of them are dispersed in many houses. The reconstruction process will be at 45% in July.

I constructed 3 houses because of the war. The construction and the structure is much better than before but the area is smaller. The camps in Beirut are a bit different as they are integrated in the city fabric. We as Palestinians, can adapt wherever we are. The environment and the traditions of NBC were as they were in Palestine, this can be seen in the way people dress, if women cover their heads or not. As NBC is far from the city, 13km from Tripoli, one can see the difference between Beddawi and NBC. We preserved our traditions and the way we live in our community here. A young person living in Burj el Barajneh would be wearing jeans there but in NBC that was not present. Some Palestinian had lived in Tripoli since a long time and don’t speak the Palestinian dialect anymore which makes other Palestinians disappointed with them.

After the war, this changed a bit. The young people who lived in Tripoli or in Beddawi came back changed. The clothes changed, the way women moved. Before a girl couldn’t go to the market alone, she would go to the vegetable market with her mother, brother or sister. Now she goes to Tripoli alone. They saw the way of living in a city and adopted new lifestyles. Her brother wouldn’t have allowed her to talk to anyone without being there. This depended where the family lived during and after the war of 2007. During the war, many Palestinians were living at their cousins. I was living at my Lebanese cousin’s place. I didn’t feel in any way uncomfortable there, and they were helping me as well. A lot of Lebanese helped out with low rents and providing food and materials for the displaced. The image that was portrayed was completely the opposite. It had the purpose of creating conflicts between Lebanese and Palestinians.

If we were in any other Arab country, it wouldn’t have been the same. The way the army treated us when they wanted us to evacuate the camp was very humane. I was trying to carry out an old woman from inside the camp to the outside. I arrived at the army checkpoint, they stopped me and called the Red Cross to come and help moving the old woman. They were providing transport and helped tremendously in this period. Even accessing the camp was facilitated in order to help people move outside the camp. The relationship between Lebanese and Palestinians was built on strong bonds, visits would happen between people from NBC and Lebanese living near Beirut or in Mount Lebanon (Hrajel) or even the South (Jezzine).

We spent all our lives in the camp, so our attachment to the land is very strong of course, but we just need to have rights to work more. We will never forget our cause, we will transfer it to our children and the next generations surely. It is like the Syrians; did they forget their country? Whenever we travel to Europe, Italy… and we see one Lebanese and hear their accent, we feel like we are at home, like seeing someone from your own country. We were educated in Lebanon, we don’t know much about Palestine. I have two children; one says “Eh” to say yes in Arabic and speaks the Lebanese dialect and one says “Ah” and speaks the Palestinian dialect.
We can for example buy a truck but we can’t drive the truck. Some Lebanese laws are making our lives a bit difficult. We can’t have a truck / commercial driving license “3oumoumi”. Now we do drive those trucks but then when we are stopped by the police, we pay fines. Whenever we work in a hospital, we do not have any official contracts, so we have the risk of being fired without warning.

To register goods, we either register them in the name of our wives who are Lebanese, or in the name of Palestinians living abroad. A lot of Christians were coming to NBC, although Christian inhabitants are very few.

I was born in Chatilla. I am from Safad in Palestine. The closest to Palestine in 1948 was Lebanon, commerce between the two countries was happening all the time, there were no borders between Lebanon and Palestine. Palestinians came to the Bekaa valley, to South Lebanon and Beirut. My parents came to Chatilla, on the outskirts of the capital. The Chatilla camp land was rented for 99 years by UNRWA in 1952. Before, the Palestinians were staying in tents in communities, dispersed all over Lebanon. First, my parents went North to Minieh and then to Beddawi and then they came to Chatilla. They stayed in zinc and small rooms, the living conditions were terrible and then the revolution happened and the PLO were helping more Palestinians along with the UNRWA. Living conditions improved and the camp was built over time, buildings of 1 or 2 floors were appearing. Palestinians have a lot of immigrants that are living abroad who help their parents in the camps rebuild their homes. Palestinians lived 20 years in the tents. The UNRWA divided the families in the tents depending on the number of member in the family. People from the same neighborhood didn’t stay together. They were divided in the different camps in Lebanon randomly. The inhabitants began to name streets in the camp according to the neigh-
borhood they came from, like Chari3 2ari7a, the street of Ariha, Chari3 Jinin, the street of Jinin, a camp in Palestine where a massacre occurred. When the PLO rose, everything changed. Before if a Palestinian would do anything wrong, he was arrested. He couldn’t throw water outside of the house without being noticed. During the civil war in 1975, the whole country was chaotic and everyone began building illegally their own houses. UNRWA constructed houses for the special hardship cases, the very poor people in the camp.

In the 1980s, construction went on, all the illegal housing was built then, the area of El Horsh, and the neighborhood of the sport city “Al Madina El Riyadiyat”. They are all supported by political parties, no one can remove them. And they compare themselves to the camp, but again the camp is different, we are refugees Some people think it is because of the camp that all this irregular housing was constructed. But the case of Chatilla is different as the camp site is rented by UNRWA, and it is therefore legal. The construction was chaotic. If they needed another room for a new born child, they would add a floor on top. Depending on your own skills and abilities, you would construct. If they are not skilled enough, the structure might not support the addition and the building will fall. There is no regulation or control or architecture, not even UNRWA. Savings were invested in building homes.

In 1995, the main urbanization happened. What pushed most of the people to Chatilla camp was Hariri. Most of these people were living in Wadi Abou Jmil, in the commercial center. A lot of refugees and Lebanese were living there. They were paid 100 000 USD per family to leave their houses and then new buildings were built there. Before, the camp was only hosting Palestinians. Financially, that helped the Palestinians as they were constructing houses and selling roofs to the new comers. But the mix of people and nationalities was also negative. The main aspect of the camp is Palestinian but then whenever something happens in the camp or an issue is raised, the Palestinians are blamed and it is mostly not the case. It is like the case of Ain el Hibweh, which affected the reputation of the camp. People on the outside would think of the camp as a chaotic unsafe area where you cannot go on your own. This is not the reality of our population. It is an unorganized chaos.

The infrastructure and the sewage system were made to accommodate 2000 persons. Now there is a lot more people. The electricity is barely coming, few minutes and it is not stable. It is the same for the water. They have private generators in each neighborhood to provide the electricity. The water is bought. The water served in the houses is salt water. Although we pay all the legal fees for the electricity and the water but we don’t receive any. That is the case of all Beirut though.

For showers, we use the salty water in the pipes first and then take a short shower with filtered water that we buy separately.

Wars happened in Chatilla, the camp was destroyed in 1982 and then it was reconstructed. The Palestinians want to live, so they reconstruct and improve their homes gradually, they have their cause and they want to continue their lives. Then in 1985, the civil war – the Palestinian-Shiite war occurred and then the camp was destroyed again and then reconstructed. Every time a Palestinian saves some money as 100 USD, he puts it on the side and invests it in his home. Then camp expanded and then the density of people increased. Some children were leaving and staying abroad and some stayed here.

Half of the camp was destroyed in 1982. In 1984 Chatilla was all destroyed. Then a truce happened and they reconstructed their own houses. It was destroyed again in 1986 and then in 1988. Later the Prime Minister Hariri implemented laws that made our lives difficult: we have no right to property, no work without residence permit. Financially and in terms of manpower, Lebanese benefited from the presence of Palestinians.

Since war in Syria, even though Palestinians in Chatilla were besieged by Syrians for 5 years, Syrians come to the camp to stay (especially Palestinian Syrians). They feel it is safer than outside in the capital because of the political tension. It is creating some problems, because if I want to rent a place for my son, it will cost 500 USD which is expensive for me but then for the Syrians, 3 or 4 families divide the rent fee and live all together in one house. One of the main issues is that the Lebanese government couldn’t satisfy the needs of its own people, because of the confessional aspect of the country. We are just asking to be treated like the Pakistani or the Indian worker, we just need a work permit, we don’t want to get the Lebanese nationality or
the property right. A lot of journalists and reporters come to take pictures of the camp and its misery. They basically take pictures of children playing in the sewage, Syrian children and not Palestinians. The rate of education in the Palestinian population is really high.

The UNRWA schools were very good before, now there is more pressure, instead of having 20 students in the class, they have 60, 70 students, especially with the arrival of the Syrians. UNRWA doesn’t have any role anymore with the Palestinian refugees, even concerning health and medication. Now the interest is the Syrian refugees. They are getting help more than anyone had in any war.

Every day, someone dies from the Palestinians fixing electricity problems, the water they get is salty water. The restrictions of the government are leading to create more thieves, criminals and violent people in the camps. When the responsible of the family has an income of 500 to 600 USD what can he do? Even the PLO is not helping us at all. The UN was created for the Palestinian people, not for Afghanistan or Pakistan or any other country, as it says in article 194. A hungry person who needs to feed his family will go to steal. But then the Lebanese person is not getting any help as well. In Berlin, the wall was removed. In china, they removed the wall since 100 years, in Israel, they stopped the wall construction. In Ain el Hilweh, they are building a wall now. This will create an explosion, the people living there won’t stand it. They will kill the people next to them and outside the camp. The government should make things a bit easier for us.

After studying, the young people work in construction, sell vegetables. They don’t have too many options after finishing university, 90% of the population is educated. They become architects or doctors. Some have the opportunity to travel outside. I went to Germany for some years. But then in Europe, it is not the same as before, you are labelled as an Arab person who came to a European country. In Lebanon, it is easier to build a life and improve our living conditions, it is closer to our culture here. I hope our voice will reach the authorities locally and internationally. The situation for young people is very stressful, with the unemployment rates increasing. The father can’t support all his children after they finish their education. None of the educated people is working in his field of studies. It has been 62 years that we are here, we are still foreigners. People immigrate to countries for 3 years and they give them the nationality. We are 90% locals. 60% of residences and properties in Lebanon are owned by Palestinians. Palestinians can’t register properties in their names. They register their goods in someone else’s name or they go to the Keteb 3adel. (Public Notary) where they make a Wikale bel beit (Power of Attorney for the house). The Palestinian properties go to the government after death. Chatilla has a mixed population, all backgrounds, it is a melting pot. There are no industries in Chatilla, manpower and labor are the major works that Palestinians take outside the camp and inside. The market of Sabra, commercial souk with vegetables and all kinds of goods was held by Palestinians and now by other foreigners as well. They bring their products and vegetables from the Bekaa valley or from Syria. We don’t have any issues with the Lebanese government. If there is anything wrong happening, we collaborate with the government to hand in the wrong people.

90% of the inhabitants have another property outside the camp. The ones who could not leave are staying here. Whenever they have a house outside the camp, they rent the house here to get an income. They prefer to live outside far from the sad reality they face every day in the camp. The Popular Committee (Al lejne el cha3biye) registers the house in the name of a Palestinian with witnesses around who could testify to who the house belongs. There is an oral agreement about who owns the house.

There is a committee made of Palestinians that is responsible for the management of the camp. The factions “Fasa2il” decide who will be part of this committee. There is a security committee and a popular committee (lejne 2amiye, cha3biye). The factions are following countries. Our revolution was the worst one in the world.

In 1970s, when the revolution happened in Jordan and Black September occurred, the return of Palestinians to the lands of 1967 was discussed, two.
countries would be living on one land. (King Hussein and Abdel el Nasser will be responsible for the Palestinian people: Al deflet ou l qita3 (West Bank and Gaza) and Israel went in Syria and Egypt – Jordan and Syria killed too many Palestinians.) When the revolution failed there and Palestinians were killed en masse, the dream of going back home began to disappear. At the end, it is my house. Do I want to hear the rain fall all the time on top of my head? The noise was so loud, I couldn’t even listen to my son. I had hoped to return to my own country one year later, but then I didn’t have any hope anymore to return before 20 years at least. All the Arab countries were dispersed. So, we decided to fix our homes.

The first room that was fixed was the bathroom. The UNRWA had provided common bathrooms before in every neighborhood. So we built our own private bathrooms, especially considering the needs of children in a house and then the bedrooms were built and at the end the living rooms. Living rooms would be shared with neighbors. Windows were made of wood. At the beginning, there were spaces between one house and the other, so light would enter every house but now, everyone constructed rooms above each other in a way that ventilation and light are rarely entering the house. There is no organization, everyone is fighting his own corners. In 1985, when people left their own houses, other Palestinians came in and squatted the abandoned and since then, they couldn’t claim back their houses.

No help is provided. There is a medical center, but they don’t have any medication to provide. Everyone needs to buy his own medication. The best medical centers and hospitals were accessible for Palestinian before 1985. Unrwa began limiting their services in 1992. The hospital of Ghazze in Sabra was one of the most important hospitals in Beirut till 1983. In the civil war, it was stolen and destroyed. Most of the people working there were killed. And refugees squatted the abandoned hospital.

The school in Bir Hassan is the only one which continues till the Baccalauréate, 3 or 4 classes for all Beirut. A big percentage of the young people goes there. There is also a medical center there. To get medical care, one goes to the medical center in the camp, they give a paper that needs to be taken to the main medical center in Bir Hassan, after approval, they send you to Hospital Haifa. It is easier to pay for a private doctor, which a lot of people do. We can adapt very easily to all places. The problem of Lebanon is its confessionalism. As Palestinians, we would welcome anyone without any distinction of religion. If a Christian comes, we would look up to him.

The rent for Syrian Palestinian goes from 100 to 300 USD. 2 committees are present in the camp: the PLO and the Alliance.

“kol l 3alam bit3ich bi watanha, ou nahna watanna bi3ich fina.” all the people live in their own nations, our nation lives within us”

“Nothing is a permanent house for us, we will always have the faith of going back to our own country.

The water problem is unsolvable, the water tank is not being used. There has been a conflict of interest around this matter. Electricity and water pipes run through the whole camp, next to each other. UNRWA is not responsible anymore for picking up the garbage in the streets so the PLO and other NGOs are trying to incite people to put their garbage at the same time in the morning outside of their homes in order to pick it up and keep the camp clean. That way, young people are employed to do the work every day. Each local NGO is responsible for a time to do that job, and then they change. The floods in winter are tremendous. The water enters the houses as the sewage system is not enough.
I was born in 1929 in Mjadel, Qadaa El Nassera and I was married at 14 years old. I lived in a house built in stone with a concrete roof. All houses were the same. I got married and moved to my uncle’s house. We rented a house in Tripoli from Lebanese people for 3 years when my husband worked in Lebanon and then moved with my children to Banyas in Syria for 30 years. The work of my husband was in IPC, the petrol lines of Iraq, refineries (mesfaye) in Tripoli, Zahran, Homs. In 1948, they were working in Tripoli, so we came here for work and left then to Syria to continue the work. My brothers, sisters, and parents stayed in Palestine. In 1982, the project in Banyas finished, my husband bought a land in the suburbs of Damascus with his brothers and built his own house there. I am here to visit. We left Syria now because of the war. I am visiting my children, staying with my daughter. I have 5 girls and 5 boys, one boy died. 2 girls are living in Sweden, 1 in Lebanon and 2 in Syria. I do not remember anything from Palestine. The neighbors were all Muslims. To do paperwork, one would go to El Nassera. Villages near Mjadel were: Maaloul, Safouri, Kaakour Each house was one floor maximum. When one would marry, he would live with his parents. After the emigration, they were building floors on top when marrying. 2 rooms, a kitchen a bathroom were the only rooms in the house. The rooms were big. 15 people will live there.

The people living in NBC came from Akka, Safad, Safouri, Nassiri and Yafa in Palestine. They were renowned for their commerce skills. The people living in Beddawi came from Yafa, Haifa, Safad. They were less of risk-takers in business than the ones in NBC. My family came from Damoun to the Qaroun in the Bekaa valley. They settled down in El Bass and then were moved to Nahr El Bared to live in tents. They were divided by neighborhoods. Each one constructed his own house according to his own needs. After the 1960s, they began putting zinc roofs on top of their houses. It was a shame to change from a tent like structure to a concrete house, it meant that they were not anymore hoping to go back to Palestine.

In the 1980s, there was another wave of construction. People began buying lands outside the camp and constructed their own house. They didn’t get any help. It all depended on the owner own income. A small garden for growing vegetables was near every house. Over time, the necessity of adding more rooms was growing and the garden was replaced by an enclosed room. The main road to Akkar and to Syria was passing through NBC, which enabled a lot the commerce in the area. It was the main hub in Akkar. And Palestinians are known for their skills in commerce. Some traffic happened, smoking...
There are no industries or work, inside the camp. They would sell the products inside the camp for cheaper prices than outside. After the war, all the activity stopped. The highway outside the camp isolated the camp from the neighboring areas.

There is an overload of people who want to return to the camp but the difficulty of accessing it and feeling besieged by the army is making it very difficult to live there. There is no work outside the camp. Schools and health centers are provided by UNRWA. But students after finishing university cannot work in their field of studies. They open small shops to sell products, but after the war, many of them dealt with drugs. It is now impossible to feel safe letting the children run and play in the streets as before. Parents fear the influence of the youth on their children. Beddawi is a more controlled environment now.

The relation between Lebanese and Palestinians was very positive before the war. After 2007, the prejudice increased between the two as the social media and other communication tools tried to divide the two populations. We feel we are watched and controlled by the army all the time now. The example of Nahr el Bared is a threat for other camps. We make sure the army sees us as collaborators against all threats coming from inside the camp.

At the time, Beddawi camp was surrounded by the army with many checkpoints and soldiers on all roofs, as some conflicts rose in the camp. It was in the interest of the Palestinians to stop any problem happening in the camp in order to regain their freedom of circulating in Beddawi. All the construction ways changed. The streets are larger, cars and even trucks can enter now. The army required a minimum size of roads in order to be able to reach all the camp if needed with their own vehicles. It is easier to control now as the size of the streets before inhibited people from reaching all the camp with cars.

Light and ventilation are much better than before, but the apartments are smaller. 30% of the original area was removed. Prefabricated houses were constructed as a temporary solution for the inhabitants of NBC, while their houses were being reconstructed. They had solar panels. Not everyone is getting what they wanted as a house. UNRWA asked the people to draw their houses and estimate its surface, then asked their respective neighbors to validate or correct the suggested original plan. Then they designed a house that would fulfil 70% of the original area and added an additional floor to compensate for it. When people realized this was the process, they increased the area of their original house but then the neighbors would correct the value given. The division are not particularly good now. A lot of people inside the camp are renting their houses as they are smaller. So inhabitants are not feeling as safe as before when they had their family surrounding their own house, where they could keep the doors open all day without the fear of having strangers all around them.

60% of the reconstruction has been built. 40% is still missing. There are no funds anymore to resume the construction. Before, children, when marrying would buy other houses in the new camp. Education is provided for everyone till the brevet. The access to the camp with the control of the army is very difficult. It changed tremendously from before the war and after, till today. Lebanese can enter easily. Commerce is not happening anymore. There are no jobs. Young people are driven to drugs. The Syrian refugees overcrowded the other camp. NGOs are focusing on the case of the Syrians now and forgot about the Palestinian situation. Palestinians have married a lot of Lebanese women from the outside. They are not requesting the Lebanese nationality. Nahr el Bared can be compared to Chatilla but not to Beddawi which has a street organization.
ICU – Institute for University Co-operation Onlus – is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), recognised by the Italian Government and the European Union, which operates in the fields of university cooperation, education and vocational training, sanitation and healthcare, rural development, women’s promotion, social development and emergencies. ICU was established in 1966 by some Italian university professors whose aim was to support the growth of the Culture and Science put at the service of mankind. In order to attain its aim, ICU purposes to promote measures and to carry out initiatives designed to: Support Human and Social growth in developing countries through development co-operation projects with special emphasis to the training of local human resources. Disseminate the idea of a development co-operation culture meant as promotion of the human dignity. The cause of Palestine is utopic and Nahr El Bared is a living proof of that. The Palestinian camps in Lebanon are a temporary solution for a permanent problem. The Palestinians are attached to the dream of coming back to their own country, while knowing that this might not be happening in the near future. The reconstruction of NBC demonstrated that the Palestinians were improving their living conditions constantly through the business they were having. While the majority had houses outside the old camp, whenever their house was being reconstructed by UNRWA, they were renting it to Syrian refugees. Who exactly is living in NBC? When the economic situation of a person living in a foreign country, the Palestinian in Lebanon, improves, it creates a feeling of permanency where one is socially and economically integrated in his surrounding community. There are 370 000 Palestinians in Lebanon which would impact enormously the demography if they were given the Lebanese nationality (confessionalism). Since the reconstruction, the activities inside the camp are much less and made the Palestinian settlement as formal. The situation of Nahr El Bared, being a military area, is a threat to all the other Palestinian camps especially Ain El Hilweh which is considered one of the most uncontrolled Palestinian camp in Lebanon. The support the inhabitants of the new camp of NBC was mainly based on helping the owner rebuild themselves their properties, following some models of construction. It is linked to the idea of self-housing. All the process of reconstruction slowed down in the last years because of the lack of funds. Most of the funds were redirected to the war in Syria. Even the people that were rebuilding their own houses were able to do so by getting cheaper materials from Syria, which is not possible anymore today. The main actors for the reconstruction of NBC:

- Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD)
- Office of council of ministers and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
- Lebanese army
- UNRWA
- Palestinian committees

When some funds are allocated to the reconstruction of NBC, they are held by the CFD that gives the responsibility of the planning of the reconstruction project to another governmental body, the CDR. The planning phase is based on a collaboration between the CDR, the Lebanese army, UNRWA and the Palestinian committees. A tender package would be dispatched to the NGOs that are executing the project. An Expatriate is usually responsible for the works. In ICU, the project was divided in 2 phases, 500 000 Euros each. Together ICU and AVSI were having 3 500 000 Euros. The project of rehabilitation of ICU was organized in 3 payments, in order to control the process of reconstruction and/or repair along with the owners. The main problems of the project were administrative, that is why 2 years were needed to start after the conflict. The 1st phase of ICU started in 2010 and finished in 2012 and the 2nd phase started in 2013 to 2014. In 2014, the government bought the remaining lands and the camp became legal. As far as it concerns the facilities, as schools and health centers, UNRWA is not finalizing their construction in a permanent manner (they are constructing prefabricated schools for instance) because they are still not sure how many of the inhabitants will return to NBC.
The Entangled History of a Refugee Camp

Interviewee: AVSI Josiane Khalife, MENA Regional Operations Manager

AVSI Foundation, is an international non-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in Italy in 1972. It is present in Lebanon since 1996, and has implemented more than 50 projects divided between agriculture and water, educational, humanitarian and emergencies. AVSI Foundation works towards development that is sustainable and capable of responding to the real needs of people. To this end, it works hard on projects focused on the challenge of education, in which the individual is accompanied and becomes the central character of their own development, and invests a lot of energy in promoting organizations within civil society.

After the war of 2007, all the inhabitants of Nahr el Bared were displaced and 20000 people moved to Beddawi and Tripoli. They lost their houses. Till now, a big number of those families didn’t move back to NBC. The way of life of a family would depend on the woman of the house who would not move if the house if not fully equipped and decorated.

5 Million Euros were given to the Lebanese Government from the Italian Government. It was a pilot project and the money was allocated to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), Majles al Inma2 wal I’mar. The government body that was entitled to manage the project and its execution is the Central Fund for the Displaced (CFD). An agreement to engage Italian NGOs as project leaders was reached in 2007. The Italian NGOs were responsible of the new camp area as UNRWA was assigned the reconstruction of the old camp.

AVSI had a partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council who were having funds from the European Union and were experienced in projects related to reconstruction and refugee emergencies. 2 to 3 French NGOs were collaborating with AVSI and NRC especially for the materials distribution. The Palestinians living outside of Lebanon were sending money to help the reconstruction process of their relatives. The inhabitants of NBC preferred to come back to their houses in the camp instead of living outside in rented homes.

The project started in 2011 and the area of Nahr el Bared was divided in 3 sections. 2 sections out of 3 were the responsibility of AVSI. The sections reflected the level of destruction of the houses: Small repairs, Partially destroyed, Totally destroyed.

AVSI was responsible for the small repairs and the partially destroyed sections. The project started in 2010 where a lot of houses were already rehabilitated by their respective owners to their own expense. This led NRC to give materials to the owners with being involved in the reconstruction. As the Lebanese government was responsible for the management of the funds, they assigned the analysis and assessment to Khatib and Alami, an architecture and design company, to estimate the amount of money required for the rehabilitation of each one of the house. The NGOs couldn’t interfere in this process.

In order to organize the repairs process, AVSI made a minimum requirement list that consisted of essential elements that made the house livable. The funds were distributed in 2 phases, 60% of the money was given at the beginning in order to start the works and 40% was given at the end of the process. Check in report.

90% of the houses were fully equipped, colored, decorated. A Palestinian woman wouldn’t settle in a house that is not fully equipped and decorated. A lot of the money received was used to furnish the house instead of doing main repairs in the construction. On the other side, the UNRWA construction was poor, of bad quality, humid, having moisture problems. The Syrian Palestinians refugees are staying now in the prefabricated houses that were given to the Palestinian refugees while their houses were being constructed inside the old camp.

Nahr el Bared was the richest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, because of the trade that was happening in this hub of Akkar. From 2007 to 2010, all the Palestinian inhabitants had to get a permit to enter the camp, no one could obtain that permit. In 2011, the situation was less rigid, Lebanese and Palestinians could enter more easily the camp area. Foreigners are not allowed
in there. This led Italian NGOs to hire Lebanese employees in order to fa-
cilitate the follow up of the project. The relation between the Lebanese and
the Palestinians has always been good, in terms of trade and connections,
even after the new property law of 2001. The camp extended to the hi-
gway and shops were open on the main road serving the area.
The only border that was always respected is the river. It is part of the govern-
ment public lands, and the houses constructed there before the war were
never reconstructed, for security reasons.
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