Borj Barajneh: reinterpretation of a Palestine refugee camp in Beirut
Morphology, internal dynamics and articulations to its immediate environment

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Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.
Pity the nation that wears a cloth it does not weave, eats a bread it does not harvest, and drinks a wine that flows not from its own wine-press.
Pity the nation that despises a passion in its dream, yet submits in its awakening.
Pity the nation that raises not its voice save when it walks in a funeral, boasts not except among its ruins, and will rebel not to save when its neck is laid between the sword and the block.
Pity the nation whose statesman is a fox, whose philosopher is a juggler, and whose art is the art of patching and mimicking.
Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpeting, and farewells him with hootings, only to welcome another with trumpeting again.
Pity the nation whose sages are dumb with years and whose strong men are yet in the cradle.
Pity the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.


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Borj Barajneh: Reinterpretation of a Palestine Refugee Camp in Beirut

Morphology, Internal Dynamics, and Articulations to its Immediate Environment

by

Elisabeth Habib

Submitted to the Faculty of Architecture and Society on December 21, 2012 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Urban Planning and Policy Design

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the creation and evolution of one of Lebanon’s twelve Palestine refugee camps, Borj Barajneh, located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, through to the end of the 1975-1990 Civil War and to present days. This study seeks to understand to which extent Borj Barajneh is part of the city today. With this aim in view, this study presents a comprehensive analysis of the spatial practices and policies that have shaped and still affect the morphology and internal dynamics of the camp and its articulations with its immediate environment.

Firstly, this dissertation focuses on three main issues resulting from my analysis of several official reports, articles, conferences, the literature on the subject, a field trip to Borj Barajneh and interviews I conducted with the camp dwellers: (1) the lack of planning tools in Lebanon and the random urbanization in the suburbs of Beirut; (2) the location of Borj Barajneh in a stigmatized and marginalized suburb of Beirut, and (3) the non-interventionist strategy adopted by the Lebanese state towards the Palestinian issue and the planning of the refugee camps.

Secondly, having set the legal, spatial, social, economic, religious, and politic framework in which Borj Barajneh is implemented, this dissertation presents four main findings. First, the space of the camp represents a strong symbol of the refugees’ Palestinian identities in the host countries. Second, the space of the camp constitutes a physical representation of the legal restrictions imposed on the Palestinians. Third, as a refuge, the camp redefines its role on a local scale. Finally, as a humanitarian space, the camp creates ties with its surroundings.

Finally, this dissertation shows that despite the spatial and legal practices used by the Lebanese authorities to weaken and isolate the Palestine refugees, they however manage, through their own socio-spatial practices, to render Borj Barajneh’s borders porous, to open up the space of the camp, and to call for a reinterpretation of the role of the camp on a local scale.

Keywords: Lebanon, Palestine refugee camps, spatial practices, policies, Borj Barajneh
Borj Barajneh: Reinterpretazione di un Campo Profughi Palestinese a Beirut

Morfologia, Dinamiche Interne, e Articolazioni con l' Ambiente Circostante

da
Elisabeth Habib

Presentato alla Facoltà di Architettura e Società il 21 Dicembre 2012 in adempimento parziale dei requisiti per il grado di Laurea Magistrale in Pianificazione Urbana e Politiche Territoriali

RIASSUNTO

Questa tesi analizza la creazione e l' evoluzione di uno di dodici campi per rifugiati palestinesi presenti in Libano, Borj Barajneh, situato nella periferia sud di Beirut, dal suo insediamento a seguito del conflitto arabo-israeliana del 1948, fino alla fine della guerra civile del 1975-1990 e ai giorni nostri. L' obiettivo del lavoro è capire fino a che punto il campo Borj Barajneh sia effettivamente integrato nell' attuale tessuto sociale/urbanistico di Beirut. La tesi presenta un' analisi completa degli strumenti urbanistici e regolamenti di governo del territorio che hanno dato forma e ancora influenzano la morfologia e le dinamiche spaziali interne del campo e le sue articolazioni con l' ambiente circostante.

In primo luogo, questa tesi si incentra sulle tre principali problematiche riscontrate dall' analisi di diversi rapporti ufficiali governativi, articoli, atti di conferenze, dalla letteratura, nonché una visita a Borj Barajneh e le interviste agli abitanti del campo: (1) la mancanza di strumenti di pianificazione in Libano e l' urbanizzazione casuale della periferia di Beirut, (2) la posizione di Borj Barajneh in una periferia di Beirut stigmatizzata ed emarginata, e (3) la strategia non-interventista adottata dallo Stato libanese verso la questione palestinese e la pianificazione dei campi profughi.

In secondo luogo, dopo aver chiarito il quadro giuridico, spaziale, sociale, economico, religioso e politico in cui si è sviluppato il campo Borj Barajneh, sono presentati i quattro principali risultati conseguiti dall' analisi: lo spazio del campo rappresenta un simbolo forte d' identità dei profughi palestinesi nei paesi ospitanti, costituisce una rappresentazione fisica delle restrizioni legali imposte ai palestinesi, come rifugio, ridefinisce il suo ruolo sulla scala locale, ed infine, nella sua funzione di uno spazio umanitario, il campo crea legami con tutto l' ambiente circostante.

In conclusione, questo lavoro di tesi dimostra che, nonostante le politiche di governo del territorio imposte dalle autorità libanesi per indebolire e isolare i profughi palestinesi, questi siano riusciti, attraverso le proprie consuetudini socio-spatiali, a rendere porosi i confini di Borj Barajneh, ad aprire lo spazio del campo, e ad invitare ad una reinterpretazione del ruolo del campo sulla scala locale.

Parole chiavi: Libano, campi profughi palestinesi, pratiche spaziali, politiche territoriali, Borj Barajneh
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANERA</td>
<td>American Near East Refugee Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUB</td>
<td>American University of Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central Administration of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Committee for the Employment of Palestine refugees in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoM</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>DGUP</td>
<td>Directorate General for Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRA</td>
<td>Directorate General for Political and Refugee Affairs in Lebanon</td>
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<td>Elyssar</td>
<td>Public Agency for the Planning and Development of Beirut South-Western Suburbs</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fafo</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for Applied International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCUP</td>
<td>Higher Council for Urban Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAURIF</td>
<td>Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Île-de-France</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IFPO</td>
<td>Institut français du Proche Orient</td>
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<td>International Labor Office</td>
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<td>LRCS</td>
<td>League of the Red Cross Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRCS</td>
<td>Palestinian Red Crescent Society</td>
</tr>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidere</td>
<td>Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Beyrouth</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the near east</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJ</td>
<td>Université Saint-Joseph of Beirut</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“We wanted to change the world but the world changed us.”

1.1 Research content

From October 2010 to February 2011, I attended a course on Urban Ethnography within the framework of my curriculum at Politecnico di Milano. During this course, I was introduced to the works of Eyal Weizman, an Israeli architect Professor of Spatial and Visual Cultures at the University of London. This is how I came to read his 2007 book Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. Being Lebanese, and due to the presence of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, I have been introduced very soon to the notions of ‘refugees’ and ‘occupied territories’. However, my knowledge was rather broad and was limited to the fact that Lebanon hosted Palestine refugees because the conflict that has been going between Israel and the Palestinians since 1948 has not yet come to an end. I was not aware of the real dynamics of this conflict and its repercussions on the neighboring countries. Eyal Weizman book is written in the form of a story much more than in the form of an academic essay. A sinister story. With the clarity of vision of an artist, Weizman depicts Israel’s mechanisms of control and occupation of the Occupied Territories. By transforming the landscape and the built environment into tools of domination and control, Israel introduces a three-dimensional (in the air, on the ground, and underground) urban warfare and lays down the role of spatial practices in the politicization of space.

When I finished reading Eyal Weizman’s book, my first reaction was that I wanted to base my dissertation on the topics it tackles: how are surfaces and regulations used to control entire populations and contain them on a specific territory? How does this politicization of the space reflect on the territory? What kind of scissions/ties does this politicization of the space create with the surroundings of the territory? After a discussion with Professor Massimo Bricocoli, we came to the conclusion that it would be interesting to study this question in the framework of the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon rather than the Occupied Territories as I first intended to do. This suggestion was also justified by the fact that, by basing my study in Lebanon, I could conduct field trips and study the territory in which the camp is implemented. I could also interview the refugees and draw a map of their daily movements, thus understanding the camp’s dynamics and its articulations to its immediate environment.

The choice of one specific camp, Borj Barajneh, was not random. Before starting to work on this dissertation, I perceived the Palestine refugee camps as dangerous spaces where I was forbidden to go. Other than perceiving the refugees as undesirable outlaws, I didn’t knew much about them nor the spaces which they inhabited. I remember family trips to my father’s village in south Lebanon where we had to pass nearby the camps; my mother used to be anxious for a few minutes and wouldn’t stop asking why we really had to go through these ‘zones’. Moreover, throughout history, the camps have proven to be spaces of violence, out of the reach of the Lebanese authorities.
The last clash to date is the conflict of 2007 between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist militant organization. Of course, the news only relate the violence in the camps, to feed the Lebanese resentment against the Palestinians, and it is difficult for anyone who hasn’t visited a camp to imagine that people are living there, accomplishing everyday chores, working and studying, making friends, marrying and starting a family. Definitely, it is not only outlaws using the camp as a refuge from the authorities. But still, the choice of the camp was not easy or random. When embarking on a trip to a new place, we buy touristic guides, we ask our friends that have been there for tips, things to do and things to avoid. Somehow, approaching the idea of visiting a camp, this was an experience I had to go through, not having any previous reference or clear image. Even implemented in my country and inhabited by people speaking the same language as I do, the camps represent unknown closed off spaces, no-go areas. When passing by the camps by car, one cannot see what is happening inside the camp and its external morphology is similar to that of the poorest Lebanese neighborhoods. Hence, I had to enter in contact with a Palestine refugee willing to help me on my ‘research’. I met Ibrahim Eid, a surveyor working within the international multidisciplinary consultancy firm Dar al-Handasah (Shair and Partners) in Arbil (Iraq), through my father who works in that same firm. I used the term ‘research’ and not ‘dissertation’ or ‘academic project’ because I felt, when I first talked to mister Eid, that he, and the other refugees in general, was more willing to help me if the work I was doing led to a concrete project of rehabilitation within the camps. Mister Eid lives in Borj Barajneh, and this is how I ended up studying the case of the refugee camp of Borj Barajneh. Later in my research work, Borj Barajneh proved to be itself an extraordinary and interesting example of reinvention in which the space of the camp develops into a multicultural environment.

1.2 Aims and objectives

The subject of this dissertation tackles issues of war-displacement, political and sectarian affiliation, ethnic marginalization, and intra-religious conflicts. These are extremely sensitive issues in Lebanon and especially among the leading classes. Politicians avoid dealing with the Palestinian issue in Lebanon, many are afraid to revive a war whose scars are still visible, twenty-two years later, throughout the Lebanese cities and territory.

In this dissertation, my aim will be to establish how the Lebanese government but also local and “phantom” (this term, explained later in paragraph 2.3, refers to UNRWA’s perceived role and its actual function) actors have used spatial practices and policies to control and contain the Palestinians. My ultimate objective will be that of determining the internal dynamics of Borj Barajneh and its articulations to its immediate environment.

1.3 Methodology

Throughout the writing of this dissertation, it was very difficult to collect data. First of all, the last official census dates back to 1932 that is 80 years ago. Since then, Lebanon has experienced independence, a fifteen-year civil war, and several short-term conflicts, all of which deeply influenced the demographics of the country through emigration, internal and foreign immigrations, but also many deaths. Therefore, current available information about population, income, and education is only based on estimations. Moreover, although the Central Administration of Statistics has achieved considerable progress in gathering data, information about many services and living conditions are either incomplete or rarely updated. This concerns the following categories: water networks and resources, wastewater networks, electricity, profile of...
land owners, detailed land use maps, soil type, as well as other data categories related to anthropology and sociology. In addition, almost 50% percent of the country has not been surveyed yet and it was impossible for me to collect maps of Borj Barajneh and the surrounding neighborhoods. It is only thanks to mister Eid and his work with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the near east (UNRWA), during which his task was to survey the camp, that I was able to obtain a map of the camp with the various services and shops within it. I adapted and integrated this map, an AutoCAD file, using the findings of my field work.

This study is based on annual reports of the UNRWA and other sources on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: articles I retrieved from websites such as SAGE.com and Academia.edu and researches I found at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut or at the Institut français du Proche Orient located in the French Embassy of Beirut. Laws and regulations were retrieved from the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory report, kindly given by Dar al-Handasah (Shair and Partners) when I was doing my internship there, but also from reports I retrieved from the Ministry of Environment and Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) websites. Theoretical concepts of my dissertation are based on literature from the libraries of the Politecnico di Milano and the Université Saint-Joseph (Beirut). Finally, and even though I couldn’t meet him, I watched various videos of conferences given/moderated by French-Palestinian Professor of Sociology at the American University of Beirut, Sari Hanafi. These videos gave me a thorough understanding of the role of the Lebanese state, the local actors, and the UNRWA in the governance of the Palestinian refugee camps.

In the course of this research, I conducted two field trips. Even though I live very close to the camp (six kilometers by car), I wasn’t able to visit the camp more than one time. The visit to the refugee camp of Borj Barajneh, on August 23, 2012 was made possible thanks to the help of mister Eid, my guide during this visit, who welcomed me in his house and without whom it would have been impossible to find my way in the intricate alleys of the camp. Also, as mister Eid is a respected member of the Palestinian population within Borj Barajneh, he considerably eased my interviews and directly introduced me to refugees who could answer the many questions I had but also tell me about their daily lives within the camp. I also had the chance to meet Abu Muhamad, a refugee now living in Denmark who happened to be on holidays in Lebanon at the time of my visit. On several occasions, especially near the offices of political parties, I was asked not to take pictures. Sometimes also, mister Eid would point at a certain group of Palestinian men and ask me not to talk with them, without further explanations. I supposed it was because of a disagreement over politics. Overall, despite feeling ill at ease, the visit went smoothly and I was able to gather a lot of information.

A few days after my visit, I was having dinner with some acquaintances and, while telling them about my visit, their first reactions were:

-“Why would you go to a Palestinian camp?”
-“How did you do it?”
-“Was it safe?”
-“Did something bad happen to you while you were there?”

We usually hear stories of violence happening in the camps of northern and southern Lebanon, but rarely in the camps of Beirut’s suburbs. As I was expressing this thought, one of the persons present at this dinner recalled:

-“A few years ago, while I was doing an academic research, I wanted to visit Borj Barajneh and, for me, it ended up being a bad experience. I entered alone, with no guide or acquaintance from the camp, and, quickly, I was harassed by Palestinian men who wanted to know why I
was there, why I was taking pictures and trying to talk to people. Feeling unwanted and unsafe, I just left. I came back only a few days later, this time accompanied by a Lebanese social worker who used to visit the camp on a regular basis and to whom the refugees were accustomed.”

Knowing that a disagreeable experience happened to one of my acquaintances in this very camp, I felt even less comfortable to visit Borj Barajneh a second time. Later in this dissertation, I will explain how my field visit brought me to conclude that, through their socio-spatial practices, the Palestine refugees manage to open up the space of the camp and to render its borders porous. Despite this conclusion, and as I will also explain later, the Palestine refugee camps are still out of reach of the Lebanese authorities. Soldiers of the Lebanese Army are scattered throughout the dahiye but also throughout the entirety of the Lebanese territory, to a point that soldiers and tanks have became part of our daily urban landscape. However, I didn’t see a single Lebanese soldier/policeman inside the camp. Added to the testimony mentioned before but also to my original apprehension of visiting a Palestinian camp, something inherent to the Lebanese people, this reinforced my feeling of insecurity and I did not reiterate my visit to the camp. The second field trip, on October 8, 2012, consisted in visiting the surroundings of the camp, by car, in order to understand the differences/resemblances in morphology between the camp and its surroundings. Even outside the camp, on ‘Lebanese territory’, taking pictures was not something easy. Soldiers are scattered all over the dahiye, this suburb of Beirut in which Borj Barajneh is located, stronghold of the Hezbollah, and one is always concerned not to catch the attention of a militant by taking pictures. Some pictures were usable and others were blurry, my mother driving too fast, afraid to catch the attention of a suspicious eye.
CHAPTER 2: PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON

“Spaces of transit and waiting, [the camps] are organized like ‘cities’ yet without strategic planning as everything is designed not to last. They stabilize and last.”


2.1 Demography of the refugee camps in Lebanon

Lebanon (see Table 2-1 for general information about the country) counts twelve refugee camps which are mostly implemented around the four biggest cities of the country – Tripoli, Beirut, Saida, and Tyre – and have gradually become part of them. As shown in Map 2-1, the demographic situations are very different among the camps. We can distinguish three categories of camps: those of more than 25,000 registered inhabitants, Ein el Hilweh, Nahr el-Bared, and Rashidieh; those who accommodate between 10,000 and 25,000 registered refugees, Borj Barajneh, El Buss, and Borj Shemali; and finally the remaining six whose population doesn’t exceed 10,000 registered inhabitants, Wavel, Dbayeh, Mar Elias, Shatila, Mieh Mieh, and Beddawi. Though the size and the number of inhabitants may vary from camp to camp, the refugee camps are mostly characterized by a high population density. Within the framework of this dissertation, I will focus on the area known as the southern suburbs of Beirut (*al-dahiye al janubiya* - الضاحية الجنوبية in Arabic) which with an area of 16 square kilometers for 400,000 to 500,000 inhabitants is almost as big and inhabited as Beirut. At the core of this area, the refugee camp of Borj Barajneh with its 16,888 inhabitants gathered on 0.2 square kilometers – which represents a density of 84,440 in/km² – will be my area of study (see Map 2-2).

### Table 2-1: Lebanon at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (and largest city)</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoken languages</td>
<td>Arabic, French, English, and Armenian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Democratic Parliamentary Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>22 November 1943 from French Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,452 km² - about half the size of the Lombardy Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban area of Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,140,289 (CIA World factbook July 2012 estimations) about half the population of the Lombardy region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>361,366 (UNdata 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban area of Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,909,000 (CIA World factbook 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>404 in/km² (28th, including Palestine refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>87% of total population (CIA World factbook 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population growth rate</td>
<td>2.2% (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 2-1: Demography of the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon
Source: adapted from UNRWA (2012)

Map 2-2: Three different views to better understand the territory
Source: adapted from Google Earth satellite images and CIA maps of Lebanon and Beirut

* Before the 2007 conflict (data n/a for 2012)
2.2 Planning and development framework in Lebanon

2.2.1 Public stakeholders and the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory

In Lebanon, land use and urban planning involve several public stakeholders: the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Directorate General for Urban Planning (DGUP), the Higher Council for Urban Planning, local municipalities, and private land owners. Since 1999, the Ministry of Environment is often consulted by the DGUP to guide urban planning towards a “more holistic, integrated approach reconciling the imperatives of economic/social development and the urgency of protecting the environment and sustaining natural resources” (European Commission, 2006, p.119).

These public stakeholders (see Table 2-2 for a summary of their role and key responsibilities) rarely carry out planning projects (such as public housing or urban renewal). In its 2006 report on Lebanon, the Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Île-de-France (IAURIF) explains this as a result of the characteristic Lebanese relief. In fact, Lebanon is a small country (ranks 167 among 249 countries) predominantly mountainous (about 75% of its territory) of approximately 4,140,289 inhabitants. According to the IAURIF studies, 65% of the population lives on 19% of the territory situated at an altitude below 400 meters (IAURIF, 2006); this represents a limited land area with a high population density. Not only determining the habitable areas, the relief also plays an important role in the isolation of regions and requires heavier investments in transportation infrastructures than plains. Hence, in a country such as Lebanon, it is not surprising that public planning is reduced very often to the design and construction of transportation infrastructures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Player</th>
<th>Role and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)</td>
<td>The CDR is a public institution created as a replacement for the Ministry of Planning on January 31, 1997 by the Decree-Law 5. It is responsible for the planning and programming of reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in all sectors and across Lebanon. It is also mandated to develop the National Physical Master Plan. Almost 85% of all funds allocated for reconstruction transit through the CDR. Although directly linked to the CoM, it can bypass ministries to accelerate projects when needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate General for Urban Planning (DGUP)</td>
<td>The DGUP falls under the authority of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Its mandate is to develop regulations and orchestrate urban planning. It defines urban master plans and issues building permits for municipalities that do not have a municipal council or an engineering department (this includes most of the municipalities in Lebanon except Beirut, Tripoli, Federation of Municipalities of Jbail, Kesrouan, and Matn). Master plans need to be approved by the DGUP and decreed by the CoM within a maximum period of three years. If the approved master plan is not decreed by the CoM within three years, then the master plan is considered void and is replaced by the urban planning regulation in vigor before the master plan was approved by the DGUP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP)</td>
<td>The HCUP was established on September 24, 1962 by the Decree-Law 69. It is presided by the DGUP and consists of the Director Generals of select ministries (Interior and Municipalities, Housing, Public Works and Transport, Justice, and Environment), representatives from several institutions (CDR), and urban planning specialists. It reviews and approves urban master plans as well as large-scale development projects; it drafts decrees related to the establishment of real estate companies, land expropriation, and land parceling; it reviews decisions related to licenses for construction and parceling; and finally it reviews proposed amendments to urban planning and construction legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local municipalities</td>
<td>Lebanon has 994 municipalities. Municipalities and municipal federations have many responsibilities (all that concern physical development in their territorial limits). They implement urban projects; follow up on cleanliness and public health issues, water works, public transport, and tax collection. They may also request from the DGUP the definition of urban master plans and could implement such plans with the DGUP's accord, provided the municipalities have the necessary resources. Municipalities are also responsible for receiving applications for construction permits and issuing permits (although the construction permit needs the approval of the DGUP). Municipalities fall under the auspices of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, which controls the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF). This control has generally been seen as limiting the maneuverability and actions of municipalities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011)
It is mainly the private sector that carries out the housing and reconstruction projects. In fact, the most relevant planning process that Lebanon has undergone in its history, the reconstruction of downtown Beirut, was carried out by the private joint-stock company Solidere$^5$ (IAURIF, 2006). Moreover, even though the State decrees planning regulations particularly permissive and with high building densities, the excesses are frequent (additional floors and densities) and illegalities are often regularized (IAURIF, 2006). Added to the random urbanization that Lebanon has been experiencing since the civil war, this has led to the deterioration of the quality of the urban environment. Moreover, at the administrative level, there are significant deficiencies in the data collection. In its 2011 report *State and Trends of the Lebanese Environment* (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011), the Ministry of Environment cites in particular:

- The last official census dates back to 1932 that is 80 years ago. Since then, Lebanon has experienced independence, a fifteen-year civil war, and several short-term conflicts, all of which deeply influenced the demographics of the country through emigration, internal and foreign immigrations, but also many deaths;
- Almost 50% of the country has not been surveyed yet;
- An estimated 84% of the country has no master plans yet. Unplanned areas are managed by regulations that rely on the lot coverage and floor-area ratio. For instance, in residential areas these coefficients are respectively 25% and 50%. In other terms, a landowner can construct on 25% of his parcel and build two floors to achieve the floor-area ratio of 50%;
- Although the Central Administration of Statistics has achieved considerable progress in gathering data, information about many services and living conditions are either incomplete or rarely updated. This concerns the following categories: water networks and resources, wastewater networks, electricity, profile of land owners, detailed land use maps, soil type, as well as other data categories related to anthropology and sociology;
- The majority of technical employees working at the DGUP are architects and civil engineers with little to no expertise in urban planning.

These various deficiencies, added to the almost non-existent public participation in the urban planning process, have frequently led to the lack, or the development and implementation of inadequate master plans.

In 2001 and in line with the principles of Agenda 21$^6$, the Council of Ministers commissioned the CDR to prepare a *National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory* in order to promote sustainable land management (MoE, 2012). The Physical Master Plan underlines a turning point in the action of the public administrations in Lebanon. It established, for the first time since the country’s independence, the basic principles of land use and of spatial organization. The Physical Master Plan was developed from March 2002 to May 2004, on behalf of the CDR, and in collaboration with the DGUP, by a consortium bringing together IAURIF and Dar al-Handasah (Shair and Partners)$^7$, with assistance from local design and engineering offices (CNBureau, Consulting & Research Institute, AAA, URBI, Ecodit) and the Remote Sensing Centre of the Lebanese Scientific Research Council (IAURIF, 2006). The Physical Master Plan identifies the physical features affecting land use, future challenges, various guidelines for land use and development, and proposes sector-specific implementation phases (transportation, tourism, industry, agriculture, education, environment, urban planning, etc.) (CDR, 2005). The final report of the Physical Master Plan was published in 2004 (in its first edition) but the Council of Ministers only ratified it in 2009 by effect of the Decree-Law 2366 (MoE, 2012). The Physical Master Plan is the latest report addressing land use and urban planning in Lebanon.
2.2.2 The refugee camps in Beirut: camps on the edge of the city

In order to study and understand the articulations of the refugee camps to their environments, it is first relevant to analyze these surroundings. As seen in Map 2-1, three refugee camps are located in the urban area of Beirut: Mar Elias, inside the boundaries of Beirut-city, and Shatila and Borj Barajneh, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The southern suburbs originally developed around the capital and the agro-industrial flatlands of Hadath-Choueifat. The first urban planning projects regarding the development of the southern suburbs of Beirut date back to the period of the French mandate (1920-1943) and proposed the creation of a new town. For René Danger (1931-1932), the creation of a new town carried a spatial meaning where his master plan consisted in the creation of a garden city. In fact, the garden-city, a method of urban planning initiated in 1898 in the United Kingdom by Sir Ebenezer Howard, embodied a “hygienist ideology” (Mauriat, 1997) with a spatial order that contrasted with the disorder of the built-up areas of Beirut. Later, for the French urban planner Michel Ecochard (1941-1944), the creation of a new town carried in fact a social meaning where the southern suburbs were to be transformed into “dormitory suburbs” (Harb, 1996), a low density area mainly occupied by working-class housings. The links between urban planning and politics took several meanings depending on different times during the period that goes from the Independence to 1982. In the 1950s, and particularly during the tenure of President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958), planning was very much a tool aimed at and instrumental to an ideology promoting an independent and liberal country formed by a society of hierarchical classes (Verdeil, 2010). This is how, with the aim of creating “luxurious suburbs” (Harb, 2003), various large infrastructures either government-funded (the International Airport of Beirut, the Camille Chamoun City Stadium) either privately-funded (the Golf Club) were implemented in the southern suburbs. Master plans of high-standing residential developments (some were actually implemented in the neighborhoods adjacent to the Airport road) were also designed by private large developers.

This ideology of an elitist society in the southern suburbs contrasted with the reality of attempts of popular appropriation (Verdeil, 2010). In fact, the global development of the suburbs followed another path: from 1948, the suburbs witnessed the settlement of Palestine refugee camps and during the 1950s, illegal settlements housing the workers from the nearby infrastructures (the International Airport of Beirut, the Camille Chamoun City Stadium, and the Golf Club) and residential construction sites began to develop. This duality between the aim to modernity and the reality of poverty is a long-standing legacy that will influence the design of new urban development projects during the civil war and the period of reconstruction (Verdeil, 2010). In the context of a development policy initiated by President Fouad Chehab (1958-1964), many public schools, infrastructures and various networks serving the illegal areas were implemented in the beginning of the 1960s (Verdeil, 2010). Even with the existence of adequate zoning laws established in the 1950s and the 1960s, these were bypassed or ignored due to corruption in the system, and green spaces in the southern suburbs were rarely protected. This development policy was not pursued by President Charles Helou (1964-1970). His term was characterized by the creation of homogeneous socio-religious municipal units that would constitute, a few years later, one of the causes of the socio-political division of the territory. In 1973, during the term of President Sleiman Frangieh (1970-1976), the Directorate General for Urban Planning published a new proposal for a master plan advancing policies for decentralization: the White Book (Verdeil, 2010). The aim of this proposal was the integration of the suburbs with the city, through the modernization of the urban periphery. This modernization would start with a spatial reform
– based on road infrastructures, sewerage, and electricity networks – which would gradually lead to a social reform, supported by adequate health and education policies, which would then allow bringing together the inhabitants of the suburbs with the city dwellers of Beirut. During the civil war years (1975-1990), massive internal migrations from southern Lebanon and the Bekaa led to urban sprawl and extensive random urbanization (see Graph 2-1 and Figure 2-1), often without any urban planning or connection to the water and electricity networks (MoFA and MoE, 2002), thus transforming the old villages of Borj Barajneh, Haret Hraik, and Ghobeiry in an “urban continuum” (Harb, 2003).

With the migrant population predominantly Muslim Shia\(^9\), the previously balanced Christian Maronite–Muslim Shia population of the southern suburbs changed radically to Shia domination. A considerable part of the migrant population massively and illegally\(^10\) settled on the coastline in multi-storey buildings (Ouzai, Jnah), near the Palestinian camps (Shatila, Borj Barajneh), and on the outskirts of the eastern part of the southern suburbs (Hay el-Sellom, Aamroussieh). These illegal settlements, which are still partly characterizing the urban space of the southern suburbs, progressively formed what was to be called the “belt of misery” (Bougey et Pharès, 1973, quoted in Verdeil, 2010; Harb, 2003) of Beirut. A great part of this belt being constituted by Palestinian camps, the southern suburbs were seen more under the political angle as particularly dangerous surroundings, than under the planning angle as an urban problem (Verdeil, 2010). Paradoxically, the camps were never affected by urban policies and the Lebanese authorities considered them as extra-territorial entities\(^11\) (Verdeil, 2010). Hence, the plan of transforming the southern suburbs into a laboratory of urban modernity and bourgeoisie was quickly hindered by the development of a rebellious territory produced by poverty and forced migrations. Tempted to deny the illegal settlements but also obliged to recognize them, the proposals for the redevelopment of the suburbs during the civil war years showed a denial on the part of the State who wanted to exclude this area from the urban reality. Dysfunction problems, illegal constructions, barriers to growth and development were mentioned to justify projects of demolition and relocation. These proposals, and all that will follow, were part of a political antagonism inherently social but increasingly religious. Under Elias Sarkis mandate (1976-1982), no real attempt of urban development was implemented, with the exception of a few decrees relating to road projects. The mandate of Amine Gemayel (1982-1988) was marked by an attempt of “de-densification of the southern suburbs through the demolition of the illegal sectors with the aim of pushing back
the inhabitants to their villages of origin in the south and the Bekaa” (Harb, 1996). During this same period, the parliament voted a law aimed at legalizing building violations by the payment of fines; the southern suburbs were already largely concerned by these violations. This new law also covered the illegal settlements: according to the law, these buildings were to be destroyed without compensation, thereby denying the extent and severity of the housing problem in the Lebanese capital. The mandate of Amine Gemayel was also characterized by the creation of the Committee for the Development of the Southern Suburbs in the beginning of 1983. This probably was the main urban action undertaken by the State during this period. This committee, composed of officials from the municipalities of the southern suburbs as well as from representatives of welfare, public or private committees, was dissolved in 1990 because of budgetary difficulties which forbade it of carrying out its program. In 1983, the DGUP began a study on the development of the southern suburbs. The resulting strategic plan will never be implemented. Neither will be the strategic plan for the Beirut Metropolitan Area developed in 1986. Between 1985 and 1989, during the War of the Camps, the southern suburbs were the scene of Palestinian–Shia clashes between the Fatah (see Appendix B for a description of the different factions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation) and the Amal Movement and of inter-Shia clashes between the Hezbollah and the Amal Movement (see Appendix E for an explanation of these two Shia political parties). These conflicts weakened the Amal Movement in favor of the Hezbollah who then eradicated it from several neighborhoods. Thus, the Hezbollah was able to consolidate its control over the territory of the southern suburbs. In October 1989, fifteen years of conflict officially came to an end with the signing of the Taif Agreement (see Appendix D for the integral text of the Agreement).

At the end of the civil war, the southern suburbs were no longer just an area distinct from the city, but they also detached themselves from the other suburbs of Beirut. The southern suburbs progressively became the only suburbs with their own identity established on the change of social practices, on the politicization of a community group, and on the use of a specific vocabulary: by dropping the suffix ‘the south’ *al-dahiye al janubiya* became progressively *al-dahiye*, THE *dahiye*, the suburbs (Harb, 2003). To mention the other suburbs of Beirut, Lebanese began to use the plural *al-dawahi*. As Mona Harb recalls (Harb, 2003), in Lebanon, *dahiye* is not only the mere Arabic translation of ‘the suburbs’, the representation of the territory; in Lebanon the term *dahiye* also embodies the religious (one of the biggest strongholds of the Shia community in Lebanon), social (poor Lebanese population and Palestine refugees), spatial (distinct space delimited by major highways and characterized by important urban centers as well as illegal settlements), economic (important presence of shops, banks, and small industries that allow some self-sufficiency), and political (stronghold of the Hezbollah political party led by Hassan Nasrallah which controls it military and politically and has long by-passed the authority of the state) characteristics of the territory. Hence the term *dahiye* gives a pejorative dimension to the suburbs, a space seen as illegal in its urban development and perceived as a political threat. Mona Harb talks about an “urban stigmatization” (Harb, 2003) of the territory. In fact, signs, objects, and images vividly mark the territorial space of the *dahiye* and make it strongly distinct from the other suburbs of Beirut to the casual passer-by. On the main roads, pictures of martyrs, pictures of political leaders, and flags of various parties and countries are scattered along the landscape. For the Shia leaders, marking the territory by placing various signs related to Shia Islam (see Photo 2-1 a, b, and c) has at least two purposes: a spatial purpose (the control of a strategic territory, the *dahiye*), and a political one (the weight of the Shia parties, especially of the Hezbollah, on the national
and regional political system and the wide spreading of the Shia faith). For the Palestinian leaders, marking the territory by placing various signs related to the Palestinian cause, its martyrs and its landmarks (see Photo 2-1 d and e) does not have a spatial purpose, because their urban interventions are limited to the camps and strictly regulated by their refugee status, but rather a political one: to continuously remind the Palestinian martyrdom, to advocate for the Palestinian cause, and to increase new generations’ awareness of the issue. Mona Harb talks about a “territorialized identity” (Harb, 2004). Other local players are also responsible for the urban development of the dahiye: al-Mabarrat, a private association relatively close to the Hezbollah; the Shia Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri; the Shia Supreme Council, and also various real-estate developers (Harb, 1996). Another category playing a key-role on the urban development of the dahiye gathers together various public players previously mentioned in paragraph 2.2.1.

Since the end of the war, through various public policies, such as linking the dahiye to the capital and the other suburbs via a new road network or dealing with investors of different religious sects, the State has tried to abolish the status of enclave of the dahiye and by the same to counter the will of the Hezbollah to establish an independence from Beirut. For these reasons, the State has generally prevented the municipalities of the dahiye from taking part to the dynamics of reconstruction; these municipalities are not in charge of any project and the budgets allocated to them are reduced every year (Harb, 1996). In fact, for those who choose to walk in the neighborhoods of the dahiye, the southern suburbs of today are not visually very different from the other suburbs of Beirut. The suburbs try to break loose from the stigmatizing representations associated with it. Apart from the Palestinian camps of Shatila and Borj Barajneh and the illegal settlements which constitute nearly 30% of its territory (Harb, 2003), the urban landscape of the dahiye is also constituted by middle class residential buildings and luxurious districts providing services...
such as hotels (Beirut Golden Plaza), banks’ street (Michel Zakhour street), industrial areas, shopping centers (Home Depot of Lebanon, Karout Mall), entertainment venues (City Stadium, Ansar Football Field, Golf Club of Lebanon), governmental amenities (Ministry of Employment, Governmental Hospital of Bir Hassan, Hospital of the Great Prophet, the state-owned company Ogero), and the same street furniture as the capital (palm trees). However, in the minds of the Lebanese living outside of the dahiye, the dahiye still embodies to these days a Shia, poor, lawless, and illegal territory on the edge of their capital. It is in this urban reality that the Palestine refugee camp of Borj Barajneh is implemented.

2.2.3 The Palestine refugees in the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory and the Lebanese Law

The general attitude adopted by the Lebanese state towards the Palestinian issue and the planning of the refugee camps has continuously been a non-interventionist strategy. Alessandro Petti states in his book Arcipelaghi e enclave, Architettura dell’ordinamento spaziale contemporaneo that “this gap is a form of governance” (Petti, 2007, p.6).

This negation of the space of the camps can be found in the 1996 Elyssar project which aimed at redeveloping the southern suburbs of Beirut, between the Airport Road and the Mediterranean Sea. All the areas affected by the project are described in details in both the actual land use map and the projected master plan. However, at the center of this project, the refugee camp of Shatila is identified either by a white space labeled ‘Special status’ either by a space which color do not correspond to any area defined in the master plan (Map 2-3). This form of denial illustrates all the precautions taken by the Lebanese government vis-à-vis these spaces.

Among the future challenges tackled by the Physical Master Plan, we retain in particular those of social cohesion, demography, urban sprawl, and war and peace because they should be related to the refugees’ issue in Lebanon. However, throughout the “Challenges of the future” section, the Palestine refugees and the refugee camps are roughly mentioned seven times (see Table 2-3). To summarize, the Physical Master Plan acknowledges that the refugee camps constitute an issue for the Lebanese territory; it further includes or excludes the number of Palestinians living in camps depending on the nature of the statistic studied; and finally it states that the numbers proposed in this report should be revised down if the Palestinian cause was to be settled. Globally, the Physical Master Plan omits to define the challenges posed by the Palestine refugees and Palestinian camps on the Lebanese territory. Finally, in its guidelines for land use and urban development, the Physical Master Plan does not propose once any strategy related to the Palestine refugees or the Palestinian camps.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) recognizes, among others, the following inalienable human rights: right to free choice of employment (Article 23), right to an education (Article 26), right to own property (Article 17), right to an adequate standard of living (Article 25), and right to a nationality (Article 15). These rights are relevant to better understand the situation of the Palestine refugees in relation to the Lebanese Law. First of all, under the reciprocity clause of Ministerial Decree n° 17561 of July 10, 1962,
Palestine refugees are categorized as “stateless” (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010) foreigners; hence, and with no consideration of their particular refugee condition, they cannot exercise professions restricted to Lebanese citizens, they cannot be members of Lebanese professional associations, and finally they cannot exercise professions that require a work permit16 (AUB & UNRWA, 2010). Various Ministerial Decrees of December 18, 1982 and December 15, 1995 forbid Palestinians to exercise around 30 trades and professions (ANERA, 2010; ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010):

“professions in the law, journalists, technicians, owners of tourist companies, managers of publishing companies, hairdressers, professions in currency exchange, real estate agents, taxi drivers or driving instructors, publishers and printing presses, medical doctors, pharmacists, travel agents, news editors, hospital owners, insurance and re-insurance agents, topographers, engineers and architects, nurses, drug warehouse and medical laboratory workers, certified accountants, dentists, veterinarians, dental laboratory workers, physiotherapists and teachers at all school levels”.

Banned from exercising the aforementioned professions, the Palestine refugees have five main sources of income: employment with UNRWA; allowances from relatives working abroad; employment in Palestinian associations or organizations; employment in agriculture and Lebanese companies for which no work permit is needed; and employment in shops, enterprises or private offices within the refugee camps (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010). As shown in Graph 2-2, Palestinian refugee workers are divided according to various sectors of employment. Overall, as of January 2012, the Palestinian workforce in Lebanon still remains mainly unemployed17 (see Graph 2-3).

Secondly, the reciprocity clause implies that Palestine refugees cannot benefit from the Lebanese social security system. This situation forces the refugee to rely heavily on UNRWA’s medical centers (which offer the most affordable services (Fafo Foundation, 1999)), hospitals that have contracts with UNRWA, and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society which is funded by the PLO and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-3: The Palestine refugees in the framework of the NPMPLT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social cohesion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“[…] the households of foreigners where poverty is theoretically more acute, particularly in the Palestinian camps, are excluded from the sample.”, cit., p. II-9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The social situation in the Palestinian refugee camps, mostly in the South and in the North, poses serious concerns.”, cit., p. II-12.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
represents one of the main health providers for the refugees (Shafie, 2007). On a lesser extent and if their resources allow it, the refugees seek treatment in private clinics and hospitals (Fafo Foundation, 1999).

Thirdly, the Lebanese law restricts Palestinians’ access to the public school system. Palestinians can freely enroll in private schools but this rarely happens as most families do not have the financial resources for private education\(^1\). For these reasons, UNRWA in Lebanon offers primary and secondary\(^2\) education. The limitations imposed on refugees’ access to job opportunities have caused an increase of drop-outs among Palestinians students: even with high enrolment rates at the primary level (only 8% of Palestinians between 7 and 15 years are out of school), 50% of the Palestinians students drop out of school at age 16 (see Graph 2-4). In fact, studies conducted among Palestine refugees in Lebanon have showed that the employability of the refugee is not proportionate to his level of education. Graph 2-5 depicts how the percentage of employed and unemployed refugees is more or less the same among four different educational levels.

Overall, and despite the difficulties they face in the labor market, the Palestine refugees who completed a certain degree of education outnumber those who did not receive any education or those who did not complete elementary school (Graph 2-6).

Fourthly, Palestinian land ownership is regulated by the Decree-Law 296 dated April 3, 2001 (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011). This decree prohibits “any person who does not carry a citizenship issued by a recognized state” (Article 1 of Decree-Law 296) from owning property on the Lebanese soil. On one hand, this Decree prohibits Palestine refugees to purchase property but also to transfer property acquired before 2001 to their children. On the other hand, it allows non-Lebanese nationals of recognized states to acquire property in Lebanon but under certain conditions.

Fifthly, the camps implemented in areas where zoning regulations are available\(^3\) have been continuously omitted by these regulations. Thus, in the absence of specific zoning regulations, the camps have been deprived of some basic infrastructure and services such as proper connections to the water and electric network and sewer systems (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011).

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\(^1\) Shafie, 2007
\(^2\) Fafo Foundation, 1999
\(^3\) MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011
As Alessandro Petti underlines, “the lack of connection to the network, other than simply being a missing connection, is the result of a political choice of exclusion and containment of populations and territories” (Petti, 2007, p.77).

Graph 2-7 shows the various infrastructure problems faced by the Palestine refugee households in camps across Lebanon; overall, it is the northern camps that face more problems. Although the survey conducted by the Fafo (Fafo Foundation, 1999) dates from 1999, the conditions of the infrastructures have not changed much thirteen years later.

Finally, the Palestinian and Lebanese authorities oppose any permanent integration of the refugees through naturalization. From the Palestinian point of view, through naturalization, they will lose their refugee status; they will also implicitly be recognizing the legitimacy of the State of Israel and renouncing to the Palestinian cause and by the same to their “right of return” (MoFA and MoE, 2002); for most Palestinians in Lebanon this would be lived as ‘surrender’

From the Lebanese point of view, the naturalization of the Palestinians and their assimilation to the Lebanese society would firstly recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel and secondly shake up the demographic (see Table 2.4) and the economic balance of the country, both actions that the Lebanese state won’t be undertaking in the near future according to a 2012 report issued by the Ministry of Environment (MoE, 2012).
These various restrictions on Palestine refugee human rights are the result of one argument that supposes the future success of the peace process in the Middle East and the return of the Palestinians to Palestine. In fact, the Lebanese state, facing accusations of denying the Palestine refugees various civil rights such as the right to an education, the right to free choice of employment, the right to own property, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to a nationality, justifies itself by declaring “that withholding civil rights ensures that their [the Palestine refugees] presence in Lebanon is temporary” (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007) (also mentioned by Petti, 2007) and preserves their right of return (MoE, 2012).

However, in an article published in the Middle East Report n°244, Khalidi and Riskedahl (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007) underline that:

“While the vast majority of refugees themselves insist on their right of return to Palestine, most also say that this should not preclude their ability to enjoy basic human rights in Lebanon. Indeed, many argue that it is only if their civil rights are granted that they can be empowered as a community to demand redress in the context of a regional settlement”.

2.3 Main actor in the management of the camps: the role of United Nations Relief and Works Agency

Throughout these years, UNRWA has been the only constant authority to manage the camps. UNRWA was created on December 8, 1949 in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) established UNRWA as a temporary Agency carrying out, in collaboration with local governments, the direct relief and works programs for Palestine refugees. UNRWA began its operations on May 1, 1950. Considering the lack of solution to the Palestine refugees’ issue, the General Assembly has constantly renewed UNRWA’s mandate. It is currently valid until June 30, 2014.

According to UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are “people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict” (UNRWA). The UNRWA identifies three different categories of Palestine refugees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>First: Registered</th>
<th>Second: Non-registered</th>
<th>Third: Non-identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions required</td>
<td>• Fled Palestine in 1948 • Are registered with UNRWA and the DPRA in Lebanon</td>
<td>• Fled Palestine in 1948 • Fled the war of 1967 • Are not registered with UNRWA • Are registered with the DPRA</td>
<td>• Came to Lebanon with the PLO from Jordan, Gaza, the West Bank or Syria between 1967 and 1970 • Did not leave with the PLO in 1982 • Are not registered with UNRWA nor the DPRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding rights</td>
<td>• Permanent residence • Entitled to UNRWA's services</td>
<td>• Have a laissez-passer issued by the General Security • Entitled to UNRWA's services</td>
<td>• Are called non-IDs • Receive assistance on a case-by-case basis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Notes | The 1967 refugees do not meet UNRWA's definition. However, the UNGA adopts a yearly resolution allowing them to be included within UNRWA's mandate. According to several NGOs, their number ranges between 30,000 and 35,000. | Although not registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, they are registered in the areas of operation from which they came from between 1967 and 1970. According to several NGOs, their number is estimated close to 5,000. | Source: adapted from (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010)
As shown in Graph 2-8, the various categories of refugees are unevenly distributed throughout the Lebanese territory.

Graph 2-8: Distribution of refugees by registration status and geographical area

Source: (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010)

UNRWA provides services within five programs – education; health care; relief and social services; microfinance; camp infrastructure and improvement – to Palestine refugees in its five fields of operation: Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza Strip, Syria, and the West Bank (see Map 2-4). UNRWA provides its services directly to the refugees while cooperating closely with governmental authorities in the area of operations. When the Agency began its operation in 1950, it was answering the needs of about 726,000 Palestine refugees. Today, 5,115,755 Palestine refugees are entitled to receive UNRWA services. One-third of the registered Palestine refugees (around 1.7 million) live in 58 recognized refugee camps distributed among UNRWA’s five fields of operation. According to UNRWA’s working definition, a recognized camp is “a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and to set up facilities to cater to their needs” (UNRWA). By definition, refugees in camps do not own the land on which their residences were built but have the right to use it. The other two-thirds of the registered refugees live in and around the cities and towns of the host countries, often in the surroundings of recognized camps. Table 2-6 illustrates the distribution of the registered Palestine refugees between camp and urban dwellers in UNRWA’s five areas of operation. Although Lebanon hosts the lowest number of
refugees (465,798) among the various areas, the percentage of camp dwellers is relatively high (42.8%) compared to the other areas of operation (except for the Gaza Strip where the camp dwellers represent more than 50% of the total number of refugees). This high number is an indicator of “the vulnerability of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon” (Dorai, 2010).

Table 2-7: Camp governance actors in Lebanon through the years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Leading Local Authority</th>
<th>Second Leading Local Authority</th>
<th>Islamic Local Governmentalities</th>
<th>Phantom Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950's and 60s</td>
<td>Lebanese Military Intelligence</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970's</td>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980's</td>
<td>Popular Committees</td>
<td>Factions: PFLP-GC, Pro-Syrian faction Al-Sa’iqa</td>
<td>Hamas, Islamic Jihad</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990's</td>
<td>Popular Committees</td>
<td>Factions</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today</td>
<td>Committees (PLO and Coalition)</td>
<td>Factions; Fatah or Hamas</td>
<td>Hamas and conservative popular Lebanese Islam</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Agency is the only international organization established to face a specific refugee problem (Palestine refugees) in a specific geographical area (Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). All other cases of forced migration are handled by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, including Palestine refugees residing outside the UNRWA’s five areas of operation (Bocco, 2010).

In a working paper submitted to the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs of the AUB and titled Governing Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab East: Governmentalities in Search of Legitimacy, Sari Hanafi cites the various actors that are, apart from the Lebanese government, taking part in the governance of the camps since 1948 in Lebanon. These are summarized in Table 2-7.
To conclude this paragraph on UNRWA, it is interesting to investigate the role played by the Agency from the refugees’ point of view and not only from the point of view of the international community expressed in UNRWA’s mandate. In his 2010 paper titled *UNRWA and Governance Practices in Lebanon*, Sari Hanafi uses the term “phantom”\(^{27}\) (Hanafi, 2010b) to designate the role of the Agency in the governance of the camps. This designation comes from the refugees’ confusion between the perceived role of UNRWA and its actual function. Throughout the years, and with the aim of gaining the refugees’ trust and acceptance, UNRWA has appointed a camp dweller\(^{28}\) to become an UNRWA official staff member. Even though the function of this officer was only that of facilitating access to UNRWA’s services, the officer also administrated and coordinated many aspects of the refugees’ lives leading the camp residents to refer to him as “camp director” (Hanafi, 2010b). Hence, these officers, themselves refugees, by acting beyond UNRWA’s mandate, have implanted in the refugees’ mind that it was UNRWA’s function to govern the camps. Therefore, perceived as occupying a governing position without acting accordingly, UNRWA is considered a “phantom” (Hanafi, 2010b) authority by the refugees.
“They are refugees at one instance, a special category residents, on the other hand, and often, foreigners, and at best, Arab residents, in moments of rising national feelings, but always and forever, outlaws.”

3.1 1948-1952: exile and the years of adaptation

3.1.1 1948 Arab-Israeli War and creation of the State of Israel

The Balfour Declaration (dated November 2, 1917) was the first significant statement by a world power in favor of a Jewish “national home” in what was known as Palestine. In his declaration addressed to Lord Rothschild – a leader of the Jewish community in Britain – and on behalf of King George VI’s Government, the then British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour expressed his support to

“the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people [...] it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”. 29

At the end of the First World War and the Balkans War, and with the collapse of six hundred years of Ottoman rule (1301-1922), Palestine came under a British Mandate (1922-1948)30. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 18131 suggesting the implementation of the Partition Plan for Palestine. After the end of the British Mandate, this Plan would lead to the establishment of two independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem (see Map 3-1). It would also ensure the protection of religious and minority rights. The Plan, accepted by the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine, was rejected by the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee. The 1947-1948 Civil War (November 30, 1947-May 14, 1948) in Mandatory Palestine broke out immediately after adoption of the Resolution 181 by the UN General Assembly and the Partition Plan was never implemented32. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the Executive Head of the World Zionist Organization33 and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine34, declared the establishment of the State of Israel. The newly declared state included the ‘Jewish State’ of the Partition Plan as well as large portions of the ‘Arab State’. On May 15, 1948, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (May 15, 1948-March 10, 1949) broke out and led to the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine. The 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria officially ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and set the demarcation lines that were then adopted as the permanent boundaries of the newly declared State of Israel (see Map 3-2).
3.1.2 The first years of exile and the creation of Borj Barajneh

Following the declaration of the Jewish State on May 14, 1948, between 711,000 and 726,000 Palestinians originating from 533 Palestinian villages were expelled or fled from Israel and became refugees in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (see Map 3-3 and Map 3-4). Al-Nakbah (النكبة – the disaster) marks the mass expulsion and dispossession of the Palestinian people during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War:

“Al-Nakbah imposed a stunningly sharp chasm between past and present. A new world of violently crafted and maintained borders became a defining feature of daily life – borders that both locked Palestinians in and kept them out. Space was splintered as was time”. (Peteet, 2005, p.3)

On December 11, 1948, the UN General Assembly passed on Resolution 194 which has since been considered as the international legal framework for a solution to the Palestine refugees’ issue. More specifically, operative clause 11 has been interpreted as the basis for the “right of return” of Palestine refugees:

[The General Assembly] “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible”.

Since UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding no enforcement of Resolution 194 has ever occurred and operative clause 11 has never been satisfied. Since its admission to the UN on May 11, 1949, Israel has rejected any resolution recommending it to allow the Palestinians to return. As Julie Peteet writes, the heart of the Palestinian issue is not the circumstances under which the displaced left, but the “consistent denial of an internationally recognized right of return” (Peteet, 2005, p.3). For six decades, Palestinian politics have been shaped by the claim for the implementation of the right of return.

Photo 3-1: Palestinians fleeing from the newly established State of Israel in 1948

Source: www.al-nakba-history.com

Map 3-1: Palestine 1947 UN Partition Plan
Source: adapted from Resolution 181 (1947)

Map 3-2: Armistice demarcation lines of 1949
Source: adapted from UN Doc. S/1302/Rev.1 (1949)
In 1948 and only four years after it had declared its independence from the French Mandate (1920-1943), nearly 100,000 Palestine refugees, which predominantly originated from the Galilee region of northern Palestine, arrived in Lebanon. Facing this flow of refugees, emergency measures were taken to accommodate the Palestinian population, especially by the Lebanese government with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross (later cited as Red Cross) and several religious authorities (Gorokhoff, 1984). The first of these measures consisted in restoring the camps of Rashidieh and El Buss built by the French Mandate authorities near Tyre in 1936 and 1939 respectively to accommodate Armenian refugees from the Franco-Turkish War (or Cilicia War of May 1920-October 1921). However, these two camps became quickly full and, in October 1948, the Red Cross implemented a tent camp near Tyre who later took the name of Borj Shemali while in the same year the Lebanese government decided to convert the old French army barracks located in the Bekaa into refugee camps which took the names of Gouraud, Anjar, and Wavel (Gorokhoff, 1984). Between 1948 and 1956, eleven new camps were added to the aforementioned six. These were built on land leased by the Lebanese government or rented or purchased from private landowners (Gorokhoff, 1984). The Christian Palestine refugees were gathered by several Lebanese Christian missions and were able to find refuge on land owned by several Christian missions: near the Greek Orthodox monastery of Mar Elias in Beirut in 1952, near the Saint-Joseph monastery in Dbayeh in 1956, and in Jisr el-Basha (Mauriat, 1997). The remaining refugees were accommodated in Shatila (built in 1949 by the Red Cross) and Borj Barajneh (built in 1948 by the League of the Red Cross Societies) in the southern suburbs of Beirut; Tel el-Zaatar in Dekwaneh; Nahr el-Bared (built in 1949 by the League of the Red Cross Societies) and Beddawi (built in 1955 by UNRWA) near Tripoli; Ein el Hilweh (built in 1948 by the Red Cross) and Mieh Mieh (built in 1954 by UNRWA) near Saida; and finally the Nabatiyeh camp in south Lebanon. While many of the refugees were gradually accommodated in these seventeen camps, those with some capital or relatives were able to settle in outside the camps (Mauriat, 1997; Peteet, 2005). Today, the number of registered refugees in Lebanon has increased to 465,798 (UNRWA); of these, 199,812 reside in twelve camps.
Although UNRWA attributes the establishment of the camp of Borj Barajneh to the League of the Red Cross Societies in 1948, one of the most documented versions relating the creation of the camp of Borj Barajneh, goes to Philippe Gorokhoff (Gorokhoff, 1984). In his 1984 study, the author attributes the foundation of the camp of Borj Barajneh to the Aghas, a family of Palestinian notables from the village of Tarshiha in Galilee. In August 1948 long before the village was taken by the Israeli Defense Forces on October 31, 1948, the Aghas left Tarshiha and found refuge first in Aley in the Lebanese mountains then in the beginning of 1949 in the village of Borj Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut where the family had acquaintances. At that time, most of the inhabitants of Tarshiha were in the region of Tyre, either in the camps either in the surrounding villages. In May 1949, the Lebanese government decided to send the refugees originating from Tarshiha to Aleppo in Syria. While the majority accepted this decision and remained in Tyre waiting for their departure to Aleppo (where they will never be sent), the rest, 452 people exactly representing around 40 families, refused to leave Lebanon and went to rent apartments in Borj Barajneh having learned that the Aghas had established there earlier that year. Gorokhoff further underlines that due to the fact that in 1949, most of the Palestine refugees were confident that their situation was only temporary, they weren’t concerned about finding work and lived on the few savings they had the time to take with them before fleeing. For those who had searched and found work especially in the surrounding olive groves or on the construction site of the airport of Beirut two kilometers away from the camp, the wages they earned (one to two Lebanese pounds per day) were not enough to live and rent an apartment of two rooms (at twenty-five to thirty Lebanese pounds per month). The Palestine refugees in Lebanon being mainly rural with few resources (see Map 3-4), basic education, and little to no professional skills, the savings soon weren’t enough anymore to pay the rents and the tenants quickly found themselves in the mosque of Borj Barajneh where they were allowed to settle in. In February 1950, Hajj Mneymneh Rachid, a leading figure of Borj Barajneh, offered to the Palestine refugees a plot of 100,000 square meters, and committed himself to lend it to them for as long as they remain refugees. The first tents provided by the League of the Red Cross Societies were erected on a sandy area at the bottom of the hill rising in the middle of the new camp. This strategic location, decided by the League of the Red Cross Societies, would allow to install water tanks on the top of the hill and to use the slope as a natural flow without the use of pumps. The tents donated by the League of the Red Cross Societies were army tents of 9 square meters and could accommodate two families. However, in May 1950, UNRWA, which had just begun its operation, provided more (one per family) and wider (16 square meters) tents to the refugees. In the end of 1950, the remaining refugees from Tarshiha joined and settled in Borj Barajneh. At the same time, refugees who lived before 1948 in villages near Tarshiha and who were at the time being in other camps, decided to re-settle in Borj Barajneh. Hence, refugees from Kwikat, Kabreh, Sheikh-Daoud, and Ghabsiyeh were added to those of Tarshiha. “Perhaps a form of resistance to displacement” (Sayigh, 2005), in Borj Barajneh, the refugees “preserved inter-village demarcation lines” (Sayigh, 2005) and grouped together according to their villages of origin. Hence, Borj Barajneh became made up of five neighborhoods, each one named after the aforementioned Palestinian villages. In the end of 1951, and with the influx of new refugees from other camps, the population of the camp reached 2,811 inhabitants; this led the Lebanese government to issue in 1952 a law prohibiting internal migration from camp to camp without authorization from the proper Lebanese authorities.
3.2 1952-1969: evolution of the housing in Borj Barajneh

During the first two years of their displacement and with their presence interpreted as temporary, the Lebanese government and society put considerable resources in place to welcome the Palestine refugees even before the UNRWA took over. However, it soon became evident that the refugee issue would last longer than originally expected and Palestinians began to be considered as a security matter (Baraka, 2008).

Photo 3-3: Refugee camp in northern Lebanon, early 1950s - the temporality of the refugee condition was expressed through the tents, provisional and weak shelters

In fact, the massive influx of refugees overwhelmingly Muslim and their intensive demographic growth (from 114,000 in 1952 to 223,000 in 1968: an increment of 95.6% in 16 years), threatened to break the fragile sectarian balance existing in Lebanon (Mauriat, 1997). In the various reports he submitted to the General Assembly in the beginning of the fifties, John Blandford Jr. the then-Director of UNRWA drew attention to the resentment of the refugees who hold the international community responsible for the loss of their land (Gorokhoff, 1984). In 1967, the situation deteriorated when groups of fedayeen attacked Israel from Lebanon. Israeli violent reprisals against Lebanon further complicated the relations between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine refugees. In response to the fedayeen actions, the Lebanese authorities implemented strong measures to contain the refugees. These measures will then have a major impact on the life in the camps and more importantly on the evolution of the housing. In fact, this evolution, although very slow, was remarkable in the sense that the habitat went from “tents to hard huts” (Agier, 2001) and marked the transition from a temporary emergency situation to a permanent exile that has been going on for 64 years.

In his 1984 study, Philippe Gorokhoff thoroughly describes the evolution of the housing (Figure 3-1) in the Palestine refugee camps of Borj Barajneh (Gorokhoff, 1984). It was only six years after al-Nakbah that the Palestine refugees lost hope of an imminent return to their land. Living conditions under the weak shelters provided by the tents became extremely difficult. The tents, aimed at offering a provisional shelter were neither adapted to the winter, nor to the summer climates. During the winter, in addition to the cold, the rain soaked the sandy soil on which the camp was established; once the soil turned into mud, it was impossible for the tent’s pegs to maintain the tents in place which were then blown away by the winds coming from the Mediterranean Sea. During the summer, the combined actions of dew, sun and salt on the tents attacked the fabric that kept tearing. It is only in 1955 that the camp underwent its first transformations. Not trying anymore to survive while waiting an imminent return, the refugees wished now to settle in decent conditions, to build themselves a community, to empower their community and ultimately to fight for their right of return. During the
first stage of these transformations and following an agreement made with the Lebanese army, wooden poles and planks were installed along the walls of the tent and the tent itself became only used as a roof. The second stage of transformations occurred in 1957-1958. The wooden walls were then replaced either by cinder block, either by zinc plates provided to the refugees by UNRWA and with the consent of the Lebanese government. In the beginning of the 60s, the housing of the camp was divided into two categories: the first consisted in houses whose walls and roof was in zinc plates and the second in buildings whose walls were build with cinder blocks and the roof in zinc plates supported by wooden beams. Gorokhoff (Gorokhoff, 1984) and Mauriat (Mauriat, 1997) underline that in most cases Palestine refugees built their new house on the exact spot where their tent stood. The number of rooms and their size depended on the area previously occupied by the tent. Usually, the tent was replaced by two rooms of small dimensions (6 or 9 square meters) but when the family was large and lived in two tents, the area occupied by the new house could be larger. Between 1960 and 1970, the housing gradually converged into one single type constituted of walls in cinder blocks and roofs in zinc plates supported by wooden beams. Until 1970, it was strictly forbidden by the law to build concrete roofs and by the same to build a second storey. The habitat did not only evolve from the structural aspect but also and most importantly from the point of view of the comfort. Providing basic and effective conveniences in houses now aimed at permanently accommodate the refugees became salient. Until the end of the 50s and before the use of cinder blocks in the construction of the houses, very few conveniences existed in the camp. In fact, the water was distributed only five hours a day through a network of water tanks installed by the League of the Red Cross Societies in 1950 and later by UNRWA. It is only in 1964 that the Lebanese government allowed the camp dwellers to install running water and electricity in their houses, on the condition that they themselves would pay for this installation, as well as for the meters. However, due to the high costs of installation, few refugees took advantage of this decision and, in 1971, only 40% of the refugee dwellers had running water in their houses. The remaining 60% continued to collect water from the common faucets. Nevertheless, and as we will see later, the issue of the sewage disposal will never be resolved. The most life-changing improvement concerning the comfort of the housing has definitely been the introduction of electricity in 1964. To conclude,
Gorokhoff underlines that, apart from the zinc plates provided by UNRWA, the main transformations on the housing were paid by the refugees themselves (Gorokhoff, 1984). Hence, the improvement of the housing has been deeply related to the resources of the refugees and, by the same, to their profession (if they had one) and its nature. Therefore, in a country where Palestine refugees are highly discriminated by the labor market, transformations and improvement occurred very slowly.

It is also during this phase that, by putting the camps under tight control, the Lebanese government started to adopt a more aggressive attitude towards the Palestine refugees. Consequently, resentment arose towards the Lebanese and, in the 1960s, Palestinians started to organize in resistance groups. The more significant group was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) whose power would be legitimized by the 1969 Cairo Agreement50 (Frontiers Association, 2006) (see Appendix C for the integral text of this Agreement).

3.3 1969–1990: Borj Barajneh in time of war

3.3.1 1969–1982: Borj Barajneh under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organization

Between 1969 and 1982 and as a direct consequence of the Cairo Agreement, the refugee camps became under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO took care of the daily management of the camps, providing security as well as educational, health, and social services. The first achievement of the PLO was the creation of a “People’s Committee” (Gorokhoff, 1984). The first decisions taken by this Committee concerned the infrastructures of the camp itself. The main streets were paved, wells were drilled in order to provide running water for the entirety of the camp dwellers, and electricity became available throughout the camp. By 1971, 65% of the camps dwellers had electricity in their houses (Gorokhoff, 1984). However, the most important decisions taken by the Committee were to authorize the construction of roofs using resistant materials (such as cement) that could bear the weight of a second floor (Mauriat, 1997) and to authorize the enlargement of the houses as well as the construction of private bathrooms. The creation of employment opportunities by the PLO significantly increased the refugees’ incomes and Palestinian families were at last able to undertake such transformations (Latif, 2008). Hence, between 1970 and 1975, most of the families built a second floor and saw their houses double in surface (Mauriat, 1997). In the beginning of the 60s, the PLO supplemented UNRWA’s insufficient health services by the creation of a hospital, Haifa Hospital, run by Palestinian doctors and nurses under the supervision of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (Gorokhoff, 1984). I mentioned earlier in this dissertation how Borj Barajneh was divided into five neighborhoods, each one named after the name of five Palestinian villages. The construction of the Haifa Hospital and also the establishment of youth and women centers, of sports clubs, and of offices of the various resistance groups in the camps created new place names (Latif, 2008). Several areas were referred to by different names: the 1948 village name and the later PLO name. As Nadia Latif underlines, “these acts of naming served to commemorate, celebrate and assert the existence of the PLO and the Palestinian struggle for liberation” (Latif, 2008). Under the control of the PLO, the space of the camp acquired a new function. No more used as a space of discrimination, fear, and violence where to subdue the refugees, the camp was now a space where the promotion of education, health, and social projects were used to politically empower the camp dwellers and to mobilize them to join the Palestinian nationalist cause (Latif, 2008). During this period,
as represented in Graph 3-1, the population of Borj Barajneh of 2,611 in 1952 increased dramatically to 18,000 in 1975, and finally reached between 22,000 and 25,000 in 1982 (Gorokhoff, 1984). In 1982, a survey reports that the camp was made of approximately 2,500 houses (Gorokhoff, 1984). It further states that 26% of these houses had only one room, 45% two rooms, 21% three rooms, and 8% four rooms with the dimensions of the rooms ranging between 4 and 6 square meters. While most of the houses were equipped with running water, electricity, a kitchen, and a private toilet, only half of them had a private bathroom and were connected to the sewage disposal network.

Graph 3-1: Evolution of the population in Borj Barajneh between 1952 and 1982

Source: ©Elisabeth Habib (2012) representation of (Gorokhoff, 1984) study

3.3.2 1982–1990: War of the Camps and end of the civil war

Following the Israeli Invasion of June 1982 (June 6, 1982–May 17, 1983), Palestinians, no more under the protection of the PLO, became frequent targets of the Israeli military and the Lebanese militia groups. During the period from 1985 to 1989, known as the War of the Camps, the refugee camps were besieged by the Shia Amal militia and intense conflicts caused a heavy death toll and severe structural damages: 50% of the houses in Borj Barajneh were destroyed (Shafie, 2007). In fact, Borj Barajneh, considered as an important military base and training camp was frequently targeted by the assaults (Latif, 2008). The aim of these assaults was to take back the Palestinians to the 1948–1958 period: unarmed, politically unorganized, and under the administration and control of the Lebanese government. As underlined by Julie Peteet, “these sustained Lebanese assaults on the Palestinian community were intended to
reduce it to scale and confine refugees to their camps, to make place, social life, and identity isomorphic” (Peteet, 2005, p.9).

Following the War of the Camps, the Syrian army took control of Borj Barjaneh and established checkpoints on the main entrances. During that period, UNRWA barely assisted the refugees in rebuilding their houses and the Syrian army forbade building materials to enter the camp (Latif, 2008). Fifteen years of conflict officially came to an end with the signing of the Taif Agreement in Saudi Arabia on October 22, 1989 (see Appendix D for the integral text of this Agreement). This agreement promised the return to political stability in Lebanon, the restoration of the Lebanese governmental authority throughout the entire country, including the refugee camps, and restructured the political system by enhancing the power of the Muslim Sunni Prime Minister over those of the Christian Maronite President. Concretely, this agreement further complicated the interconnected political, economic and administrative systems and failed to end political and sectarian differences.

3.3.3 Consequences of the civil war on the marginalization of the refugees

In the post-1990 era, the public opinion considered the Palestinians as “troublemakers and the prime cause of Lebanon’s woes, and thus a presence to be managed, quarantined, and moved at will” (Peteet, 2005, p.14). After I visited Borj Barajneh in August 2012 and witnessed the misery in which Palestinians live nowadays, Mister X, a Lebanese who was 20 years old when the civil war started, confessed to me:

- “It is true that Palestinians live in inhuman conditions in Lebanon and suffered considerably throughout their history, but you shouldn’t forget that they hurt us a lot”.

Twenty-two years after the end of the war, the Lebanese still cannot forget the role played by the Palestinian resistance in the outbreak of the civil war. Thus, after the war, Palestine refugees became prone to various forms of marginalization: spatial, institutional, and economic.

Spatial marginalization

Before the Israeli invasion of 1982, the boundaries of camps such as Shatila and Borj Barajneh merged easily with the surrounding Lebanese slum neighborhoods; social interactions between Lebanese and Palestinians were common. With the restoration of the Lebanese governmental authority over the camps after the end of the civil war, the boundaries of the camps, now marked by Syrian and Lebanese checkpoints, became clearly distinct; very few camp inhabitants had Lebanese acquaintances and, when outside the camps, refugees were often subject to insults and physical violence.
Institutional marginalization

After the end of the civil war, the Palestinians, unlike the 1958 – 1969 period, were forbidden to organize politically and culturally: the Lebanese government wanted to preserve the recently recovered sovereignty of the state. They also experienced strict travel limitations and were forbidden to own property on Lebanese soil. Finally, rebuilding in the camps was strictly controlled and legally regulated.

Economic marginalization

After the Israeli invasion of 1982, with effect of various Ministerial Decrees of December 18, 1982 and December 15, 1995, Palestinians were forbidden to exercise around 30 trades and professions.
CHAPTER 4: BORJ BARAJNEH TODAY: REINTERPRETATION IN A LOCAL CONTEXT

“The refuge expressed the temporary while exile expresses the permanent.”

4.1 The refugee camps as laboratories

4.1.1 The refugee camps as spaces of exception

Refugee camps symbolize multiple functions and meanings. For humanitarian agencies, they bring together in one place the population to be managed and cared for; for host countries, they are meant to restrict any challenges to sovereignty; finally for the refugees themselves they are planned to provide shelter and food but they also constitute a constant reminder of al-Nakbah and the resulting unresolved conflict. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a refuge is a place that provides shelter or protection. Philipp Misselwitz and Can Altay (Rieniets, Sigler, & Christiaanse, 2009) give a threefold definition of a refuge:

1) An unresolved conflict is a triggering factor for the establishment of a space of refuge. Instead of dealing with the conflict and eventually solving it, the individual or group prefers or is forced into exile. This characteristic is equivalent to what we described as al-Nakbah earlier in this dissertation.

2) Spatial characteristics are the second feature common to all spaces of refuge. A refuge is essentially determined by clear territorial boundaries. These boundaries either maintain trespassers out either restrain and control those inside. In Lebanon, spatial characteristics such as elevation limitations, high density, empty spaces between Palestinian and Lebanese neighborhoods, political symbols, and Lebanese Army checkpoints at camps entrances clearly define the space of the camps.

3) The third characteristic defining a space of refuge is the systems of control governing it. In refugee camps, these systems are imposed by the host governments and can range from limiting freedom of movement to restraining choice of employment. In Lebanon, movements around the camps are controlled via Lebanese Army checkpoints at camps entrances and movements across countries are regulated by a Travel document for Palestine refugees (Photo 4-1) for registered refugees and a laissez-passer for non-registered refugees. Non-IDs refugees are not allowed to travel across countries. Moreover, the Lebanese labor law forbids Palestinians to exercise more than 30 syndicated professions as described earlier in this dissertation.
Whatever the meaning or function allocated to the camps, a general trend must be considered. In fact, “the urban impact of these spaces [the camps] is the production of an ever more fragmented and atomized urban tissue” (Rieniets, Sigler, Christiaanse, 2009, p.223). On one hand, this atomization of the urban tissue can lead to a tree-like city (Figure 4-1), “an archipelago of separate islands” (Rieniets, Sigler, Christiaanse, 2009, p.29), “a group of disconnected islands” (Petti, 2007, p.75) where all forms of communication between one island and the other are significantly blocked. A tree-like city, also closed city, suggests restriction of access for certain groups to some of its parts (Rieniets, Sigler, & Christiaanse, 2009). The closed city doesn’t allow interactions between its different “enclaves” (Petti, 2007, p.75). On the other hand, it can lead to an Open City (Figure 4-1), an archipelago of islands, “a group of connected islands” (Petti, 2007, p.75) where “the concentration and interaction of people from different background [...] stimulate[s] economic growth, innovation, and cultural emancipation” (Rieniets, Sigler, Christiaanse, 2009, p.33).

Hence, an Open City not only guarantees the coexistence of various inhabitants but also ensures their interactions. Therefore, closed and Open City are not defined by the existence or not of islands, but more by the scale and nature of these islands where their edge conditions – whether open or closed, porous or impermeable – are defined by physical and social factors.

Although designed to “care, cure, and control” (Hanafi, 2010a), camps are not only “spaces of passivity” (Peteet, 2005, p.29) where refugees expect aid agencies and host countries to take care of them but can also be sites of opposition as Lebanon experienced in the 1960s with the creation of the PLO. Rightly, throughout the literature, the spaces of the refugee camps within the Lebanese territory have been identified as “paradoxical spaces” (Agier, 2001), “zones of lawlessness” (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007), “security islands” (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007), and also “spaces of exception” (Hanafi, 2008; Hanafi 2010; Petti, 2007, p.22) for which the spatial configuration has been deliberately chosen for control and surveillance.

In Table 2-4, I exposed the fragile diversified ethnical and sectarian composition of Lebanon. This mixed fabric is described as fragile because of the mutual mistrust and fear that, twenty-two years after the end of the civil war, still remains between the various religious groups. Just like Lebanon, Beirut is a fragile composition of ethnic and religious groups where residents choose to live into ethnically and religiously segregated neighborhoods. Map 4-1 represents the distribution of the six main religious groups across the Lebanese territory. The map also shows how the district of Beirut is divided into four religious entities inside which the Palestinian camp of Borj Barajneh constitutes a Sunni enclave in a predominantly Shia environment.
To concur with Louis Wirth’s hypothesis on heterogeneity in his paper “Urbanism as a Way of Life” (Wirth, 2005), inhabitants in Lebanon are segregated more because of diversity in religion, income, social status, heritage, requirements, and modes of life than because they chose to be with people like themselves. This mixed fabric inevitably complicates if not forbids the possibility to share with the other everyday life activities, common interests, and face to face encounters in the city. Hence it appears that the fragmentation of the Lebanese territory plays an important role in the persistence of the spaces of exception. In fact, as explained by Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Diane Riskedahl, “it suits the interests of various groups [the Lebanese political parties] to maintain pockets of the country that can be blamed for outbreaks of instability” (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007). French-Palestinian sociologist Sari Hanafi underlines that in the specific case of the refugee camps in Lebanon, the state of exception is not established only by one authority (the various Lebanese political parties all representing the host authorities) but also by many other actors who, on different levels, are all involved in the “politics of space” (Hanafi, 2010a). These actors, or “sovereigns” as Hanafi calls them (Hanafi, 2010a), are the “real sovereign” (the host authorities), the “phantom sovereign” (the UNRWA), and the “local sovereigns” (the PLO and various Islamist groups). The Lebanese state deliberately let the camps become spaces deprived of laws and regulations and this especially to maintain their temporary aspect; for the PLO, the camps maintain the refugees’ Palestinian identities and represent the collective memory of al-Nakbah and the refugees’ struggle to return; for UNRWA, the camps, as humanitarian spaces, are especially designed to provide care, shelter, and education to refugees contained in one space and “transformed into bodies to be fed and sheltered without the political existence” (Hanafi, 2008); for the Islamist groups, the camps represent spaces deprived of laws and regulations which they can invest with no fear of reprisal from the host authorities and where they can recruit new militants.
To conclude, either established by the host authorities, the UNRWA, or the PLO and the Islamist groups, the space of exception largely shapes the living conditions of the refugees, the urbanization of the camp, but also its relation to its immediate environment.

4.1.2 The refugee camps, open or closed spaces?

Refugee camps can be categorized either as ‘open spaces’ either as ‘closed spaces’. From the urban point of view, open camps are managed by the host country, present the same urban features than any residential low income neighborhood, and are connected with the surrounding neighborhoods. From the societal point of view, refugees are fairly integrated socially (into the surrounding neighborhoods) and economically (into the labor market). On the contrary, closed camps “do not meet at least one of these conditions: they constitute urban enclaves or satellites located at the urban periphery, they lack green spaces, and they present poor access and poor housing” (Hanafi, 2008). Therefore, to recall the definition given earlier, a tree-like city (made up of closed camps) and a Open City (made up of open camps) are not defined by the existence or not of islands (the camps), but more by the scale and nature of these islands which edge conditions – whether open or closed, porous or impermeable – are defined by physical and social factors. The space of the camp, along with living in a poor urban area (as it is mainly the case with refugee camps in Lebanon) and being discriminated in the labor market (which is the case in Lebanon), is one of the three reasons explaining the social exclusion of some Palestine refugee communities (such as the refugees in Lebanon) (AUB & UNRWA, 2010). In fact, Sari Hanafi argues that, the space of the camp, may it be open or closed, shapes largely the refugees’ living conditions, their urban identity, and their relationship to Palestinian nationalism (Hanafi, 2008). He gives the example of the Palestine refugee camps in Jordan and Syria in contrast to those in Lebanon (Hanafi, 2008) and (Hanafi, 2010a). By asking himself why violence has erupted in the Lebanese camps and not in the Jordanian or Syrian camps, the sociologist comes to the conclusion that the space of the camp is responsible for its politicization. In fact, while the camps in Jordan and Syria are open spaces controlled by the host state, in Lebanon the camps constitute closed spaces which are being progressively invested by extremist Islamist organizations (Hanafi, 2008): these organizations are taking advantage of these spaces of void out of reach of the Lebanese law. Moreover, it seems that camp dwellers in Lebanon present a higher poverty rate than those in Jordan and Syria (AUB & UNRWA, 2010). Furthermore, in Jordan and Syria where, unlike Lebanon, there are no discriminations in the labor market, camp dwellers are better integrated socially and especially economically in the host society (AUB & UNRWA, 2010). Finally, French ethnologist and anthropologist Michel Agier gives this example of the Eritrean refugees self-settled on the periphery of Sudanese towns, rather than in camps, to illustrate his argument that open spaces create identity even if it is fictitious (Agier, 2002):

“Some Eritrean refugees have changed their names, their language, their dress and even their religion, with Christian men and women declaring themselves Muslims and taking up Islam, for the sole purpose of passing unnoticed. Some men, while remaining Christian ‘in their private world’, even made the pilgrimage to Mecca so as to become ‘fictitious El Haj’”.

In Sudan, Christian Eritrean refugees living in open spaces are adopting the customs of their Muslim Sudanese hosts in order to blend in the society; finding themselves without protection, they created a new identity for themselves. On the contrary, as observed in Lebanon, the refugee camp as a closed space reproduce, maintains, but more especially reinforces identity and ethnicity. To conclude, the camps as closed spaces influence the refugees’ living conditions (poverty, no planning regulations), their urban identity (social and economical
discriminations), and their relationship to Palestinian nationalism ( politicization of the camps, reinforcement of the Palestinian identity and ethnicity).

### 4.1.3 The refugee camps, porous or impermeable spaces?

From a large view, and by comparison to the refugee camps in Jordan and Syria, Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon have been established as spaces of exception and closed spaces. It is now relevant to study them from an intermediate view, and in relation to their immediate environment. Are the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon enclaves, totally isolated from their urban environment or did they develop ties of some kind with their surroundings? It is interesting to notice how most of the refugee camps in Lebanon are now part of the major cities in which they are implemented. On the one hand, the refugee camps still embody segregated and marginalized spaces due to the legal and security restrictions imposed by the Lebanese state. However, on the other hand, through various urban practices, the refugee camps are strongly connected to their urban environment (Doraï, 2010). In fact, economic activities and UNRWA services (shopping, banking, health care, education), daily mobility (to go to work/school/university, to visit friends/family) and the increasing presence of international migrants (Syrians, Bangladeshis, Sri-Lankans, and Sudanese settling in the camps for their cheap rents and accessibility to the main cities) constantly redefine the edges of the camps, making them more porous. These various urban practices “continually transgress the boundaries of the camps” (Doraï, 2008) and tend to create ties between the Palestine refugee camps, their immediate urban environment and its economic activities (Doraï, 2010).

To conclude, we can recall the words of Muna Budeiri, Jamal Al-Dali, and Nasser Abu Rahme (Rieniets, Sigler, Christiaanse, 2009, p.250):

> “Although bound by certain commonalities of Palestine refugee camps, each, by virtue of its sociopolitical and geographical location, develops a unique character both internally and externally with respect to relations with the wider society and host authority.”

Therefore, despite being closed in comparison to the refugee camps located in Jordan and Syria, the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon do not necessarily present the impermeable boundaries that are inherent to a closed space. In fact, each camp, when taken in its own sociopolitical and geographical location, shows specific ties with its immediate environment. It is also interesting to point out that the camps presenting the most porous edges are located in the multi-sectarian urban area of Beirut, while the camps that are subjected to security restrictions at their entrances are located in areas where one religious sect is predominant (see Map 4-1).

The following two parts are based on the previous chapters and on data I collected from the two field trips I conducted in Borj Barajneh in August 23 and October 8, 2012.

### 4.2 Borj Barajneh: morphology and internal dynamics

The camp of Borj Barajneh was established in 1948 to accommodate Palestine refugees originating from five villages (Tarshiha, Kabreh, Kwakat, Ghabssieh, Sheikh-Daoud) in the Galilee region of northern Palestine; these refugees were all rural and Muslim Sunni. When the camp was first established, refugees of each of the five Palestinian villages occupied a specific area in the camp in order to imitate the pattern and layout of their original villages in Palestine (Map 4-2). Today, Borj Barjaneh is still divided into these five distinct neighborhoods.
Established in the southern suburbs of Beirut, only two kilometers away from the International Airport of Beirut, Borj Barajneh hosts 16,888 refugees gathered on 0.2 square kilometers. If Borj Barajneh was situated in Milan, it would cover the area represented in Map 4-3.

In 1951, the camp accommodated 1,100 families. Today, around 3,800 families representing four generations⁵⁷ (Photo 4-2) of refugees still share the same area of land.

As of January 2012, only 10% of the camp dwellers were over 60 years (and for some of them, part of the first generation of refugees), while the 13-25 share represented almost 26% of the refugees of Borj Barajneh (Graph 4-1). As a comparison tool, we can calculate the dependency ratio of the camp. This ratio shows the number of people above the age of retirement (64 years in Lebanon) as a proportion of active population (the active population is the share between 15 and 64 years).
For the camp of Borj Barajneh, an approximate dependency ratio would be of 13.8%. Concretely, this ratio means that about eight people are contributing for one pensioner. Of course, with the high level of unemployment within the camp, this ratio has no real economic impact but it is rather an indicator that the population of the camp is relatively young. In fact, in 1995, the dependency ration of the 27 member states of the European Union was of 21.9%, representing less than five people contributing for one pensioner. In 2010, this ratio increased to 25.9%, hence less than four people contributing for one pensioner, and indicated an aging European population.

The camp was never extended to meet its population growth and, unable to expand horizontally, refugees were forced to extend vertically. Vertical extension became at last possible in the 1970s when the PLO took control of the camps and authorized the construction of additional floors (Photo 4-3). Today, while most houses have two to three floors, some illegally reach five. Hence, with a density of 84,440 in/km², Borj Barajneh is the most overpopulated camp in Lebanon.

Built upwards and closely packed together, the houses of Borj Barajneh prevent sunlight and fresh air from reaching the lower floors. During the day, some alleys are completely bathed in darkness and artificial lightning is needed (Photo 4-4).

The habitat and the road network are strongly shaped by the difference in altitude existing in the camp. In fact, in less than 500 meters from the west to the east of the camp, the altitude drops from 64 to 2 meters. This causes strong slopes and engenders the construction of staircases (Photo 4-5). This also forces refugees to build under the level of the road.
Houses are separated by alleys sometimes too narrow to allow two persons to walk side by side (Photo 4-6). Motorcycles and bicycles are the predominant means of transport as very few alleys are wide enough to allow car traffic (Photo 4-7). Many houses, especially those on the edges of the camp, are still pockmarked with shrapnel and bullet holes, persistent signs of a war not completely forgotten59.

In fact, this way of thinking is very common even among the Lebanese population. Knowing where (which villages and which families) our neighbors come from is an important criterion in the search of a house or apartment. Lebanon being a small country where “everyone knows everyone”, it is important to Lebanese to create ties with people they consider “respectable”.

The average house in the camp consists of three multipurpose rooms (the dining room/kitchen, the parents’ room, and the children’ room) and a bathroom. Considering that the average Palestinian family is made up of five children, physical space and privacy are severely limited. Mister Eid, whose family is made up of seven children, has a 2-stories house. The first floor consists of a living/dining room, a kitchen, and a toilet. A sink is placed in the living/dining room, just by the main door of the house. The second floor consists of three bedrooms and one bathroom. Due to the limited financial situation of the refugees, the houses are poorly built, with little to no ventilation. The lack of sunlight increases humidity inside the houses and the formation of mould on the walls especially near watering-place and windows or doors where rainwater leaks through the joints.

Five telephone exchanges for landlines are implemented within the camp. Electricity is available from five stations providing power to the five neighborhoods of the camp. Each station generates 1 Megawatt totaling 5 Megawatt for the whole camp, while the power needed is of 8 Megawatt. To compensate the electricity provided by the Lebanese state, twelve private power generators are implemented throughout the camp. Electric cables are suspended arbitrarily and dangerously from one side of the street to the other, with no maintenance provided to prevent accidents (Photo 4-8).

Mister Eid and his wife, Feriyal, are second generation Palestinian refugees. They were both born and raised in Borj Barajneh. When I asked Feriyal about the possibility of living outside the camp, she answered:

“We could. We could if we wanted. Because he works abroad, Ibrahim [mister Eid, her husband] has a comfortable salary. We could afford to rent and to live outside the camp. But we don’t want to. My family lives there, Ibrahim’s family also. We have a community there, our friends, our relatives. We couldn’t imagine a life outside the camp. Here, we know our neighbors and their families. Outside, we would just live next to strangers. This wouldn’t be acceptable.”
Eleven artesian wells provide salty and unclean water used for cleaning and showering; for cooking and drinking, refugees must purchase bottled water. The water is collected in two tower tanks of 250 cubic meters (Photo 4-9). All the refugees complained about the health problems resulting from the daily use of salty water. When asking Feriyal about the problems resulting from the use of salty water for daily use she said:

- “The salty water dries my skin. I have to apply moisturizer as often as I can to avoid having badly chapped hands. It also makes my body itchy, like my skin was threatening to crack. And salty water doesn’t work soap, shampoo and dish soap up into a lather. This is very inconvenient for washing. I feel like nothing can really be clean.”

The sewage system is not adequately adapted to the growing amounts of waste; this leads to the frequent flooding of streets but also of houses built under the level of the road. While mister Eid was explaining to me problems resulting from the actual sewage system, young Palestinian men gathered around us, very eager to know who I was and what was I doing in their camp. After mister Eid told them that,

- “She is doing a research for ‘Europe’. Who knows, maybe it will lead somewhere…”

the young men immediately started to share their problems with me. This is how I learned that

- “When the sewage system fails, which often occurs in winter when it rains heavily, the water floods the streets. Even the houses! You know, these houses that are built under the level of the road. Completely flooded.”

- “Yes, and there is no one to help us in case of flooding. Last winter, water reached this level, you see here? I tried to contact UNRWA but no one answered. It was during the night. I had to call the chabeb (literally ‘the young men’, chabeb is an expression commonly used in spoken Arabic and would be translated in English as ‘the guys’) to come and help me. The smell was horrible and we had water up to our knees. We tried to fix the external system. Some of us went to help the stricken people.”

- “And that horrible smell that remained after that flooding. Really fetid. I felt sick for days.”

In December 2009, a rehabilitation project funded by the EU took place (UNRWA, 2010). It aimed at installing a new water supply system (Photo 4-10), replacing the sewage networks, and collecting storm water. Until today, only the water supply system has been put in place.
right to return, the Lebanese state stresses on the contradiction between investment in the temporary place of living and maintaining the right of return to Palestine. In 2011, the attempt of the Palestinian National Authority to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed and the Authority received state status only in UNESCO (Photo 4-12). Unemployment, a direct consequence of the legal and political restrictions imposed on the refugees, is very high, particularly among men. It touches 50% of the camp’s population, from which 18% receive remittances from the Moqawama, the Palestinian Resistance. Many households also rely on remittances from family members working abroad. It is the case, for instance, of my guide mister Eid, who works as a surveyor in Arbil (Iraq) and whose family lives in Borj Barajneh. Eighty-eight per cent of working women work within NGOs providing social and educational services in the camp or in UNRWA’s schools and considerably contribute to the financial equilibrium of their households.

However, as underlined by Rosemary Sayigh, this contradiction “becomes less of one when we take into consideration both the practical and symbolic functions of the refugee’s house, containing as it does objects and practices that memorialize homes in Palestine” (Sayigh, 2005).

There are fifteen centers in Borj Barajneh that provide relief services such as nurseries, day care facilities, social activities for children and young women, active ageing houses, a job counseling center. Five mosques located inside the camp serve the camp dwellers. At the level of health services, the only...
medical services within the camp are the Haifa Hospital and UNRWA clinic (Photo 4-13). Moreover, several Palestinian doctors have their clinic inside the camp (Photo 4-14). Outside the camp, Hospital Rafik Hariri and Al-Sahel Hospital provide health care in return for a nominal fee. The refugees’ financial resources do not allow them to access expensive Lebanese hospitals and financial aid provided to Palestinians to cover relief and health services are decreasing every year.

Eight UNRWA schools provide elementary to intermediate educational service for the students of Borj Barajneh: six elementary schools working on double shifts, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, and two intermediate schools, one for boys and one for girls. All of UNRWA schools are located outside the camp. For their secondary education, students access generally Al-Jalil secondary school which serves all of Beirut. Reaching university, students enroll in the Lebanese University, the only public university in Lebanon, or go study abroad with scholarships funded by various NGOs and/or the Palestinian Resistance. Technical education is available within the camp with trainings in languages, computers, and accounting (Photo 4-15).

Inside the camp, refugees have access to several types of shops and services: engine workshops, five stationeries, libraries, clothing shops, forty grocery shops (around eight per neighborhood), butchers, thirty hairdressers for men and eleven for women, internet cafes, computer shops, pharmacies, bakeries, house furniture shops, a public market, snacks, hardware shops, and gift shops (Photo 4-16). No banks are implemented within the camp.

Table 4-1 summarizes the data, collected during my first field trip, related to Borj Barajneh’s major problems and main available services.
Photo 4-16: Considerably restricted in their employment opportunities in Lebanon, numerous Palestinians open their businesses inside the camps like here in Borj Barajneh.

Table 4-1: Borj Barajneh’s major problems and main available services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major problems in the camp</th>
<th>Major problems in the houses</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Water and sewage system</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overcrowding</td>
<td>Limited physical space</td>
<td>Five stations, each providing 1 megawatt</td>
<td>Only 2 tower tanks of 250 cubic meters</td>
<td>8 UNRWA schools from elementary to intermediate</td>
<td>Haifa Hospital and UNRWA clinic</td>
<td>50% of refugees are unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old sewage network</td>
<td>Poorly built</td>
<td>Lack of 3 megawatt for the basic functioning of the camp</td>
<td>Tanks provide salty water</td>
<td>Schools located outside the camp</td>
<td>Several pharmacies</td>
<td>18% of unemployed refugees receive remittances from the Palestinian Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow roads</td>
<td>Little to no ventilation, humidity and mould</td>
<td>12 private power generators</td>
<td>Old sewage network often flooding</td>
<td>Secondary and university education provided by Lebanese institutions</td>
<td>Several medical clinics</td>
<td>88% of working women work within NGOs or UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important slope</td>
<td>Salty water for daily usage</td>
<td>Electric cables suspended dangerously on the streets</td>
<td>New water supply system</td>
<td>Technical education available within the camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not all the houses are connected to the electricity, water or sewage system</td>
<td>EU Project to replace the sewage system and to install storm water collectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously mentioned, almost 50% percent of Lebanon has not been surveyed yet and it was impossible for me to find a map of Borj Barajneh and its surrounding neighborhoods. It is only thanks to my guide mister Eid and his work with the UNRWA, during which his task was to survey the camp, that I was able to obtain a map of the camp. The original AutoCAD file showed the delimitations of housing within the camp, the elevation at different points of the camp, and the location of various services within the camp (notably the Haifa Hospital, the UNRWA facilities, factories, cemetery, and free areas). I adapted and integrated this map using the findings of my field work: location of community centers, shops and market, mosques, pharmacies and medical clinics (identified as health facilities on Map 4-4), green areas, and landmarks (the landmarks are statues depicting Palestinian martyrs). The numbered items on Map 4-4 represent the most important points of reference inside the camp according to the camp dwellers.\textsuperscript{61}
The camp’s proximity to the city of Beirut and its low rents have created an unexpected rental housing market that constitutes an important and steady source of income for many families. The empty apartments rented were either built for the sole purpose of renting, either left empty by families that immigrated (most often to Europe) or went to settle in the city (in this case the apartments are managed by relatives still living in the camp). These apartments are rented to other refugees from the camp, from other camps, foreign migrant workers, researchers and volunteers and range between USD75 and USD200 (between 59€ and 157€) per month according to the surface of the apartment and the neighborhood in which it is situated. In Borj Barajneh, the foreign migrant workers include Syrians (between 2,000 and 3,000), Sri Lankans (between 200 and 300), and Bangladeshis (between 200 and 300).

While the Palestine refugees view the Syrians with suspicion – a reminiscence of the Syrian army’s tyranny after it took control of the camp following the War of the Camps – the Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans are treated with the same racist attitude they encounter among the Lebanese. Lebanese families rent or buy housing just outside the camp and never within it.

Since its creation, many Palestine refugees have left Borj Barajneh to settle in the dahiye or abroad. They have been able to do so either because their financial resources allowed it either because several countries, in particular Scandinavian countries, facilitated political asylum. Today, between 5,000 and 6,000 Palestine refugees from Borj Barjaneh live in the dahiye, while around 5,000 live in Scandinavian countries. It is the case of Abu Muhamad. While passing by one of the few squares of the camp (Photo 4-2), a coffee shop owner, friend of mister Eid, invited me to sit and have some dates and a cup of Turkish coffee. This is how I came to interview Abu Muhamad:

- “I left the camp 32 years ago, in 1980, during the civil war. It was easy at that time, Scandinavian countries facilitated political asylum for

Palestine refugees. My brother was already in Denmark, this is why I chose Denmark. There are a lot of Palestine refugees there. Also in Germany.”

Further on, I asked Abu Muhamad the reason behind the easiness of obtaining political asylum in the Scandinavian countries. He answered,

- “It surely isn’t by generosity. It rather is a strategic move. You see, we, the generation born in Palestinian camps, are of little interest to them. What they really want is our children and grand children born in Denmark. On the long term, they want them to forget the Palestinian cause and the right of return. For these countries, this can only be achieved by keeping the Palestine refugees away from the camps. But their strategy is not working. We are teaching the Palestinian cause to our children who in turn teach it to their children. The thing is, they want to make us forget that we are Palestinians and that we want our land. Like this, in 10, 20, 50 years, the Palestinians will be settled out of the Middle East and won’t ask anymore to return to their land. The conflict of the Middle East will be solved.”

I concluded my interview with Abu Muhamad, who was spending Eid al-Fitr (the celebrations ending the fasting month of Ramadan) in Lebanon, by asking him if he was happy in Denmark and if he often came back to Lebanon. He answered,

“We, my family and I, are not so happy. We speak Danish but we’re not really integrated in the Danish society. They’re very different from us, culture, customs, food, everything. I’m always home sick. I come to Lebanon as often as I can. Even my youngest child who doesn’t know Lebanon always talks about leaving Denmark and settling in Lebanon. There is no work for me and my children in Denmark. And even when we work, taxes are too high.”
4.3 Borj Barajneh: articulations to its environment

From a satellite image showing the refugee camp of Borj Barajneh and its surroundings, and following my second field trip, I was able to identify four characteristic patterns (Map 4-5):

(1) **Palestine refugee camp**: low-rise and low-quality cluster of buildings, narrow alleys not wide enough to allow car traffic, many covered alleys preventing sun light, very few green areas and empty spaces, very high density;

(2) **Lebanese poor illegal settlements of al-Raml**: low and middle-rise single buildings of low-quality, roads wide enough for one-way car traffic, very few green areas and some empty spaces, high density;

(3) **Lebanese middle class neighborhoods of Haret Hraik**: new and older middle-rise single buildings of good quality, roads wide enough for two-way car traffic, several green areas and many empty spaces, medium density;

(4) **Lebanese high middle class neighborhoods and services district of Raml al Aali**: planned middle-rise single buildings of good quality, roads wide enough for two-way and multi-lanes car traffic, many green areas and empty spaces, 4-star hotels and private hospital, low density.

Hence, the boundaries of Borj Barajneh are clearly demarcated on the north, west, and east by three roads: on the north, Al-Amliyah Road separates it from the new urban development implemented in Haret Hraik in 1991; on the east, Al-Anan Road separates the camp from a middle class neighborhood of Haret Hraik made up of older property; and on the west, Al-Imam El Khomayni Road also named Airport Road separates it from the planned, medium rise, and
good quality constructions of Raml al Aali. However, on the south, no clear infrastructural boundary separates the camp from the adjacent illegal and poor Shia neighborhood of al-Raml.

Borj Barajneh presents four main entrances: Al-Saayiya, Abu Faysal, Jawad Zeyn el-Dine, and Al-Amliyah. On the day on which I went to visit Borj Barajneh, I parked just outside of Al-Amliyah entrance (Photo 4-17 and Photo 4-18), near Al-Imam El Khomayni Road. Here, another type of boundary adds to the infrastructural one. Straight away, even before I entered the camp, flags and posters related to Shia Islam and Shia political parties, representative of the urban landscape of the dahiye, gave way to signs embodying the Palestinian resistance: posters of prominent Palestinian leaders (such as Yasser Arafat), Palestinian flags, and slogans: “You inspiration, us...a revolution”.

The analysis of the refugees’ socio-spatial practices is essential to fully comprehend the articulations between the camp and its surroundings. Firstly, the daily trips from the camp to the city must be studied. Two poles of activities influence the movements of entering and exiting the camp. On the one hand, along the southern and eastern boundaries of the camp, the various shops, owned either by Lebanese either by Palestinians, contribute to integrate the outer fringe of the camp into the urban landscape. Moreover, the resources generated by these shops allow the Palestinians to improve their houses, which increasingly tend to resemble those of the Lebanese slums and create a morphological urban continuity between Borj Barajneh and the locality of al-Raml. The shop owners, by implementing shops on the camp boundaries, and the Palestine refugees, who cross the camp boundaries on a daily basis, both create links of social and economic nature between camp refugees and their immediate environment. On the other hand, another indicator of everyday interactions between the camp dwellers and their surrounding environment is the location of UNRWA’s schools. These schools, located in the heart of the surroundings neighborhoods and not inside the camp, engender a daily movement of the children from the camp to the city and contribute in breaking the closedness of the space of the camp. Secondly, and as explained in the previous part, it is not uncommon in Borj Barajneh to find foreign migrants who have similar poor living standards as the camp dwellers. In fact, living in a refugee camp offers several advantages to the foreign migrant worker: low rent, protection from police inspections (a considerable proportion of the migrants are illegal and the Lebanese authorities almost never enter the camp (Photo 4-19), and a central location well connected and close to various workplaces. The space of the camp is no longer perceived by the surrounding populations as closed territory with a strong Palestinian identity but rather as a space of refuge for the poorest populations (Mauriat, 1997).
Even if today, the refugee camps in Lebanon still embody spaces of segregation and marginalization of a refugee population subjected to special laws and regulations, the articulations of Borj Barajneh with its immediate environment contribute to strengthen its integration within the dahiye. Even if, due to the failure to resolve the Palestinian issue, these camps remain spaces in suspense, dependent of their regional context, the various socio-spatial practices described earlier render Borj Barajneh’s borders porous, open up the space of the camp, and call for a reinterpretation of the role of the camp the local scale of the dahiye.

Map 4-6 summarizes the main findings of both my field trips in relation to Borj Barajneh’s articulations with its surroundings:

- Lebanese neighborhoods surrounding the camp
- Strong infrastructural boundaries on the west, north, and east (the thickness of the boundary is proportionate to the difficulty of a pedestrian to cross it)
- Four entrances to the camp
- Commercial axis on the east and south
- Movements of students towards UNRWA’s schools located in the neighborhoods on the east of the Airport Road
- Movements of migrants and refugees employed either in the surrounding neighborhoods, either in Beirut
CHAPTER 5: FINAL REMARKS

“There are still chores to be done, children to be raised, houses to be lived in.”

5.1 Main findings

The aim of this dissertation was to analyze the morphology and internal dynamics of the Palestine refugee camp of Borj Barajneh and its articulations to its immediate environment, the southern suburbs of Beirut. In order to reach this objective, it was essential to understand the role of spatial practices, tools and regulations used to control and contain the Palestinians. Hence, the study starts by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the factors that have shaped and still affect these dynamics by focusing on three main issues: (1) the lack of planning projects in Lebanon such as public housing and urban renewal, the excessive random urbanization in the suburbs of Beirut and the deficiencies in the data collection; (2) the location of Borj Barajneh, a Muslim Sunni refugee camp, in the dahiye, a stigmatized and marginalized Muslim Shia suburbs of Beirut, and (3) the legal framework of the Palestine refugees in Lebanon which restricts their access to education, employment, health services, and citizenship and the politics of negation adopted by the Lebanese authorities towards the refugees and the spaces they inhabit.

First, in Lebanon, the public stakeholders rarely carry out planning projects such as public housing or urban renewal. Mountainous on 75% of its territory, transportation infrastructures in Lebanon require heavier investments than in plain. Hence, it is not surprising that public planning resources are mainly used to the construction of transportation infrastructures. As a consequence, it is mainly the private sector that carries out the housing and reconstruction projects in Lebanon. Moreover, several factors influence the deterioration of the quality of the urban environment. On the one hand, the civil war triggered an excessive random urbanization in the suburbs of Beirut: internally displaced people escaping south Lebanon and finding refuge in the city, uncontrolled constructions, corruption of the planning stakeholders, etc. One the other hand, there has been significant deficiencies at the administrative level with regard to the data collection. In fact, the last official census dates back to 1932; 50% of the territory has not been surveyed yet; 84% of the country has no master plan; and finally the majority of technical employees working at the DGUP are architects and civil engineers with little to no expertise in urban planning. This lack of basic data raises a large range of questions on the possibility of effective planning and sound public policies in Lebanon.

Second, Borj Barajneh is situated in the southern suburbs of Beirut where, from the Independence to 1982, urban planning policies were part of a conflictual relationship between the ideology of an elitist society and the attempts of popular appropriation (Verdeil, 2010). Planned to become luxurious suburbs, their global development followed another path: from 1948, the suburbs witnessed the settlement of Palestine refugee camps and during the 1950s, illegal settlements housing the workers from the nearby
infrastructures and residential construction sites began to develop. Later on, during the civil war, massive internal migrations of poor and rural Muslim Shia from southern Lebanon and the Bekaa led to extensive random urbanization progressively forming the notorious “belt of misery” of Beirut. The proposals for the redevelopment of the suburbs during the civil war years showed a denial on the part of the State who wanted to exclude this area from the urban reality. Dysfunction problems, illegal constructions, barriers to growth and development were mentioned to justify projects of demolition and relocation. These proposals, and all that will follow, were part of a political antagonism inherently social but increasingly religious. Therefore, by the end of the civil war, the southern suburbs had become the only suburbs of Beirut with their own identity established on the change of social practices, on the politicization of a community group, and on the use of a specific vocabulary: the dahiye. In the everyday dialect, this term has outgrown its literal meaning of ‘the suburbs’ and now embodies the religious, social, spatial, economic and political characteristics of the territory; the dahiye gives a pejorative dimension to the suburbs, a space seen as illegal in its urban development and perceived as a political threat. The literature labels this phenomenon an “urban stigmatization” (Harb, 2003).

Last but not least, the general attitude adopted by the Lebanese state towards the Palestinian issue and the planning of the refugee camps has continuously been a non-interventionist strategy. Banned from exercising around 30 trades and professions, to form professional and cultural associations, from the Lebanese social security system, facing restrictions in accessing the public school system, from owning property on the Lebanese soil, from the Lebanese citizenship and deprived from an adequate standard of living, are among the various restrictions faced by the Palestine refugees. Moreover, the camps have never been affected by urban policies and the Lebanese authorities consider them as extra-territorial entities. These various restrictions on Palestine refugee human rights are the result of one argument that supposes the future success of the peace process in the Middle East and the return of the Palestinians to Palestine. In fact, the Lebanese state declares that restricting their civil rights guarantees that their presence in Lebanon is temporary and preserves their right of return. While UNRWA has played a crucial role in empowering Palestinian refugees by providing education, health but also work, the Agency, whose mandate does not cover protection and return, has sometimes worked in favor of the Lebanese state by contributing to the durability of the camps as temporary spaces. However, to cite Sari Hanafi, “the relationship between Palestinian national identity/belonging and the type of residential area is [...] very loose. There is no relationship between place of residence and being a supporter of the right of return” (Hanafi, 2008).

Having set the legal, spatial, social, economic, religious, and politic framework in which Borj Barajneh is implemented, this dissertation then analyzed the morphology and internal dynamics of the Palestine refugee camp and its articulations to its immediate environment. The analysis led to several observations and conclusions. First, the space of the camp represents a strong symbol of the refugees’ Palestinian identities in the host countries. Not only reproducing the structure of pre-1948 Palestinian society, the refugees also maintain their tragedy alive through signs and objects (posters, flags, slogans, graffiti) scattered all over their territory. Second, the space of the camp constitutes a physical representation of the legal restrictions imposed on the Palestinians: poverty, insalubrity, narrow alleys, lack of natural light are among the various problems encountered within the camp. Third, as a refuge, the camp has redefined its role on a local scale. By attracting foreign migrant workers in search of affordable housing and far from the reach of the Lebanese authorities, the space of the camp is no longer perceived by the surrounding...
populations as closed territory with a strong Palestinian identity but rather as a space of refuge for the poorest populations. Finally, as a humanitarian space, the camp created ties with its surroundings. By implementing their schools outside the boundaries of the camp, UNRWA engendered a daily movement of the children from the camp to the city and contributed in breaking the closeness of the space of the camp. To conclude, it seems that despite the spatial and legal practices used by the Lebanese authorities to weaken and isolate the Palestine refugees, they however manage, through their socio-spatial practices, to render Borj Barajneh’s borders porous, open up the space of the camp, and call for a reinterpretation of the role of the camp on a local scale.

5.2 Some orientations and recommendations

In the light of the recent Israel Defense Forces’ Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip from 14 to 21 November, the peace process in the Middle East and the return of the Palestinians to their pre-1948 territory seem now more impossible than ever. Hence, it is essential that the host countries, especially Lebanon, overlook the refugees’ status of individuals in need of shelter and food and start acknowledging their permanent existence and political identity. In fact, not trying anymore to survive one day at a time while waiting an imminent return, the refugees now wish to live in decent conditions and to build themselves a strong community. Sari Hanafi (Hanafi, 2010a) thoroughly explains the different steps towards the empowerment of the Palestinian community. On the one hand, he states that

“An urban master plan based on rehabilitation should take into account the physical, socio-economic, and cultural fabric of the concerned spaces. A bottom-up participatory approach should be used to outline the differentiated needs of the Palestinian refugee population: women, men, children, working class and middle class, etc. A solution grounded in the right of choice (between return, settling in the host land, Palestinian territory or in other countries), and close cooperation (not competition) between the PLO, the Palestinian National Authority, UNRWA and the host country, is the first step in alleviating the problems of the refugees. Alleviation would form the basis for empowering the refugees as transnational subjects”.

The French-Palestinian sociologist also declares that empowerment can only be achieved by

[...] “engaging in a serious process based on the following elements: allowing the Palestinian refugees to have full access to the labor market, including liberal professions; allowing the Palestinians the possibility to possess land and property; establishing an elected popular committee in each camp, a quasi-municipality, to be in charge of the camp administration; establishing joint Palestinian-Lebanese police centers in each camp; and, finally, the ending of the space of exception status of the camps by submitting the camps to the full Lebanese laws”.

In further studies, it would be relevant to analyze the future of the refugee camps in Lebanon, in case UNRWA was to terminate its mandate and leave the management of the camps to the PLO. How could the spaces of the camps and the camp dwellers survive without UNRWA’s services and the employment opportunities it has provided to the Palestinian community in Lebanon? Seeing that today life has set in the camps and that by the same, the refugees grew from “traumatized and voiceless victims” to “emancipated subjects” (Hanafi, 2010b), Sari Hanafi advises the Agency to prepare the Palestinians to an after UNRWA by making them reach a certain form of integration into the Lebanese society. To achieve this, the Agency will have to start promoting community initiatives, local institutions and social mobilization and to carefully assist and strengthen camp governance (Hanafi, 2010b).
Endnotes

1The figures are only those of the refugees registered with the UNRWA. In reality, these numbers may be higher (the refugees of 1967 and those who came with the PLO between 1967 and 1970 are not registered with the UNRWA) or lower (some refugees left Lebanon while still being registered with the UNRWA) (Frontiers Association, 2006 and (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010))

2The IAURIF is a French institution established on May 4, 1960 and carrying out urban planning projects both in France and abroad


4For more information on the CDR duties, consult the report provided by the Lebanese government to the seventh session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development in 1999: http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/lebanon/eco.htm

5Solidere was founded on May 5, 1994 by late then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and was incorporated as a privately owned company listed on the stock exchange


7Dar al-Handasah (Shair and Partners) is an international leading project design, management and supervision consultancy firm established in 1956 and with headquarters in Beirut

8Retrieved from a report provided by the Lebanese government to the fifth session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development in 1997: http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/lebanon/social.htm

9Shia is the second largest denomination of Islam. It is variously estimated that 10-20% of the world’s Muslims are Shia. The Shia majority countries are: Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain

10Here, illegality may relate to the land property and/or to the Construction Law

11In 1958, Greek architect Konstantinos Doxiadis wanted to integrate the Palestinian camps into his national housing plan but was told not to do so by the Lebanese administration (Sarkis, 2003 quoted in Verdeil, 2010)

12The dahiye stretches vertically from the south of the city to the airport. Horizontally, the dahiye is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the west and by the old road from Beirut-Saida on the east. Because of its strategic situation nearby the airport, the inhabitants of the capital often have the occasion to cross the dahiye. In 1998, a new highway directly linking the city center to the airport was built, allowing crossing it without having to “linger visually” (Harb, 2003). It is important to keep in mind that this definition of the territory is not perfect, some boundaries being difficult to draw

13For a more thorough study on “territorial markers” in Lebanon, consult Territorial Markers and Social Fragmentation in Beirut’s Visual Urban Landscape by Professor Liliane Buccianti-Barakat (Buccianti-Barakat, 2011)

14The report is available at the following link: http://www.cdr.gov.lb/study/sdatl/sdatle.htm

15This clause states that foreigners residing/working in Lebanon will be treated the same way as Lebanese citizens are treated in their countries

16As foreigners, Palestine refugees cannot work in Lebanon without a work permit. However, a work permit can be obtained with complicated administrative procedures (notably a Ministerial authorization) and at an expensive price that generally the refugees cannot afford (AUB & UNRWA, 2010)

17In 2002, 40% of the Palestine refugees’ workforce was unemployed according to Lebanon’s report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (MoFA and MoE, 2002). For detailed information on the employability of the Palestine
refugees in the Lebanese labor market and the laws/decrees regulating it, consult (ILO for Arab States & CEP, 2010)

For instance, one academic year in a private school is around 3,000 USD against 200 USD for the same curriculum in a public school

Lebanon is the only area of operation where UNRWA provides secondary education to compensate for the restricted access to public schools and the expensive scholar fees of private schools (Shafie, 2007)

In 2004 the total zoning extent in Lebanon covered only 16.2% (or 1,693 km2) of the territory (MoE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011)

From interviews conducted in Borj Barajneh refugee camp on August 23, 2012

It is estimated that two third of the Palestine refugees in Lebanon are of rural origin (Khalidi, 1992) in (Doraï, 2005). According to a survey published by the AUB (AUB & UNRWA, 2010), 66.4% of Palestine refugees are categorized as ‘poor’, living with less than $6 a day, while 35% of Lebanese live below this threshold designated by the UN. Moreover, 8.5% of Palestine refugees are categorized as ‘extremely poor’, living with less than $2.17 a day against 1.7% of Lebanese

Here, it is interesting to remind that in the 1950s and the 1960s around 50,000 Palestine refugees were granted Lebanese citizenship. They were mainly Christian Palestinians although some middle-class Muslim families were granted the citizenship if they could prove Lebanese ancestry (Shafie, 2007). In 1994, the Christian Palestinians who hadn’t been granted the citizenship in the 1950s or 1960s were granted nationality (Peteet, 2005). Hence, it appears that the Lebanese authorities deliberately chose which refugee to naturalize according to his religious affiliations, his social status, and the contribution he could make to the Lebanese society

Lebanon is among the thirty-two United Nations member states that do not recognize the State of Israel (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hres1249ih/pdf/BILLS-110hres1249ih.pdf). Therefore, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Arabs in general, refer to the State of Israel as Palestine

Resolution 302 (IV): http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/AF5F909791DE7FB0852560E500687282

As of January 2012

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘phantom’ as “something apparent to sense but with no substantial existence”

These camp dwellers were chosen among the elite and well-educated refugees: doctors, teachers, pharmacists, engineers, etc. (Hanafi, 2010b)

Excerpt from the 1917 Balfour Declaration (retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682961.stm)

Resolution 181: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253

On November 2011, a few days before the 64th anniversary of the UN Partition Plan, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas confessed that the Arabs’ refusal to accept the partition decision was a mistake that he is trying to rectify (retrieved from http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.asp?id=243669)

The World Zionist Organization (WZO) was founded in 1897 to implement the goals of Zionism. In its first years, the WZO worked at establishing Jewish settlements in Palestine (retrieved from http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/wzo_eng.htm)
The Jewish Agency for Palestine (later Jewish Agency for Israel) was created in 1929. It was in charge of facilitating Jewish immigration to Palestine, land purchase and planning the general policies of the Zionist leadership. On May 14, 1948, it became the Provisional government of Israel (retrieved from http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/About/History/)


From an interview conducted in Borj Barajneh on August 23, 2012

Resolution 194 A/RES/194 (III) – Operative clause 11: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1C000852568CF0077E51A

By effect of UN Resolution 273: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/83E8C29DB812A4E9852560E50067A5AC

A “new” section was later added by the UNRWA in 1963 to accommodate Palestinian refugees who were evacuated from the Gouraud camp by the Lebanese Army between 1955 and 1960

In 1955 and 1960, Gouraud and Anjar were taken by the Lebanese army to be reused as army facilities; during the Lebanese Civil War, Tel el-Zaatar and Jisr el-Basha were destroyed by a Christian militia; in 1978, Nabatieh was destroyed by Israeli bombardment (Gorokhoff, 1984)

Except when indicated, the source related to this section is (Gorokhoff, 1984)

In 1948, 93% of the refugees were Muslims and 7% were Christians (Gorokhoff, 1984)

Sunni is the largest branch of Islam. Sunni Islam is sometimes referred to as the orthodox version of the religion, from which the Muslim Shia are the dissident. Sunni are mostly present in north and sub-Saharan Africa, the Arabic Peninsula, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and several countries of the ex-USSR.

Palestinian fedayeen were guerillas operating especially against Israel. Retrieved from www.thefreedictionary.com/Fedayeen

On December 28th, 1968, Israeli commandos attacked the International Airport of Beirut and destroyed 90% of the Lebanese commercial air fleet. This raid was justified by the Israeli government as a “punishment” imposed on Lebanon guilty of hosting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine responsible two days earlier in Athens for the attack of an aircraft of the Israeli airline EL AL (Gorokhoff, 1984)

In refugee camps in Lebanon, it took 10 years for the tents to disappear, while it only took one year in refugee camps in Syria (Hanafi, 2008)

Except when indicated, the source related to this section is (Gorokhoff, 1984)

The Cairo Agreement was signed on November 3, 1969 between Yasser Arafat, then PLO chairman, and General Emile Bustani, then Lebanese Army Commander. Among other principles and measures, this agreement “[…] granted Palestinians the right to employment, to form municipal-like committees in the camps, and to engage in armed struggle from bases in Lebanon.” (Peteet, 2005, p.7). On May 21, 1987, the Cairo Agreement was annulled by effect of a law issued by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies (retrieved from http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen2_09.htm)

Official data not available
In fact, since the establishment of the Lebanese state in 1943, an extreme laissez-faire ruled the economic policy whose main features was low taxation, minimal spending on infrastructure and public services, and neglect of the productive sectors of the economy in favor of banking, trade, and services (Sayigh, 1988).

For example, the massacre of Sabra and Shatila camps (16 – 18 September 1982) where up to 3,000 Palestinians were slaughtered by a Lebanese Christian militia under the supervision of the Israel Defense Forces (for more information on the Sabra and Shatila massacre, consult (Fisk, 2001) and http://www.info-palestine.net/article.php3?id_article=11193 (in French)).

Sari Hanafi refers, among others, to the 2007 40-days armed conflict between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp and to various conflicts between armed men in Ein el-Helweh (Hanafi, 2008).

Islamist organizations such as Usbat al-Ansar, Jund al-Sham, and Fatah al-Islam.

Security restrictions vary from camp to camp and concern especially the camps implemented around Tyre, Saida, and Tripoli. The Lebanese checkpoints at the entrances of the camps, other than controlling the daily mobility of the camp dwellers and their visitors, are also aimed at preventing the maintenance and the renovation of the houses by forbidding the entrance of construction materials. Thus, the condition of the housing within these camps is considerably degrading (Dorai, 2010).

First generation refugee, parents and children born in Palestine, are today older than 64 years.


In fact, shrapnel and bullet holes are a frequent reminder of the civil war that one can see on the buildings in many areas of Beirut and its suburbs.

The camp is located only 1.7 kilometers away from the Mediterranean Sea. This results in a very high ground-water level which facilitates water pumping. The salty water is then directly distributed to the water tanks of the camp, without any desalination, a complex and expensive process that transforms salty water into freshwater.

Information retrieved from interviews with Borj Barajneh camp dwellers.
Appendixes

A. Chronology of Events

Until 2001, adapted from (Fisk, 2001, p.xvii)

1914-18 Ottoman rule in Syria and Lebanon collapses during First World War

1920 France, given mandate for Syria and Lebanon, creates State of Greater Lebanon. Britain holds mandate in Palestine

1943 Lebanon acquires independence from France on 22 November

1948 Creation of the State of Israel. Around 730,000 Palestinian are forced into exodus to Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank

1949 Establishment of UNRWA

1964 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded

1967 Defeat of the Arab Coalition in the Arab/Israeli Six Days War

1970 PLO guerrillas driven out of Jordan, set up headquarters in Beirut. Increase in PLO raids into Israel from southern Lebanon

1975 Outbreak of Lebanese Civil War after Phalangists attack PLO guerrillas in Beirut

1976 Civil war fighting intensifies. Syria invited by Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh to intervene in Lebanese fighting. Syrian troops enter Lebanon and occupy all but far south of the country

1978 Israeli army invades southern Lebanon. United Nations force (UNIFIL) sent to southern Lebanon

1982 Israeli army invades Beirut and forces PLO to leave Lebanon. Israeli forces send Christian Phalangist militias into Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila and order the massacre of hundreds of civilians in the camps. ‘War of the Camps’ between Palestinian armed groups and Amal Movement for two years

1987 Beginning of the First Intifada, Palestinian uprising against the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories

1990 Lebanese civil war officially ends

1993 Israel bombards southern Lebanon. Beirut is being rebuilt. End of the First Intifada which led to the Oslo Accords

1994 Establishment of the Palestinian National Authority as a result of the Oslo Accords

1996 More than 200 Lebanese civilians die in Israel’s ‘Grapes of Wrath’ attack on Lebanon, 106 in a UN compound at Qana

2000 Israel’s army finally retreats behind its frontier wire as Hezbollah proclaim victory. Beginning of the Second Intifada

2001 Ariel Sharon is elected Prime Minister of Israel

2005 End of the Second Intifada which resulted in the construction of the Israeli West Bank barrier, the Israeli settlers’ withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip

2006 Israeli ‘July war’ on Lebanon. Re-establishment of Palestinian diplomatic representation in Lebanon

2008 Israeli operation ‘Cast Lead’ between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinian militants of the Gaza Strip, notably the Hamas

2009 Reconstruction works started at Nahr el-Bared by UNRWA

2011 The Palestinian Authority attempt to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed, receiving state status only in UNESCO

2012 Israeli operation ‘Pillar of Defense’ between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinian militants of the Gaza Strip, notably the Hamas

B. Main Palestinian Political Factions in Lebanon

Retrieved from (International Crisis Group, 2009)

Main factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):
- Fatah (Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine), founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat, the dominant faction within the PLO since its creation. The PLO initially adopted armed struggle as its approach to Israel, but formally abandoned the principle in 1993 at the time of the signing of the Oslo accord. Unlike its rival the Hamas, the Fatah is not regarded as a terrorist organization by any government.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded in 1967 by Georges Habash, it combines Arab nationalism and Marxism in its ideology. In 1993, it stopped attending PLO Executive Committee meetings in protest against Oslo, before resuming attendance in the course of the second intifada in 2000.
- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a dissident PFLP faction, whose breakaway was led by Nayef Hawatmeh in 1969, has a Marxist-Leninist tendency. Like the PFLP, the DFLP boycotted Executive Committee meetings after the Oslo accord and only resumed attendance at the time of the second intifada in 2000.

Main factions of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (Tahaluf):
- Hamas, which entered Lebanon in 2000 by establishing an extensive social services network after its Jordan offices had been closed. During the 1990s, Jamaa Islamiyya prepared the ground for Hamas by developing social and educational networks in the camps. Hamas is the Palestinian Muslim Sunni political party that governs the Gaza Strip.
- Islamic Jihad, which has only a minor presence in Lebanon, is likewise engaged in social and charitable activities.
- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), whose leadership resides in Damascus, possesses three underground military bases in Lebanon outside the camps (in Nahmeh, south of Beirut, and in the Bekaa Valley). These house heavy and medium weapons and, in the Bekaa, train militants.
- Fatah al-Intifada, a group that splintered from Fatah in 1983. As with the PFLP-GC, its leadership resides in Damascus and it maintains military bases to store weapons and train militants.
- al-Saiqa (Lightning), founded in 1966 by the Syrian Baath party.

Jihadi-leaning Islamist forces:
- Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), founded in 1986, boasts a strong presence in the Ain al-Helweh camp. It was responsible in 1995 for the assassination of Nizar al-Halabi, the leader of Ahbash, an Islamist social organisation.
- Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Greater Syria), an Usbat al-Ansar splinter group. Its members were located in the Taamir neighbourhood adjoining Ain al-Helweh before evacuating to the Taware’ area in the camp.
- al-Harakha al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida (Fighting Islamic Movement) also centred in Ain al-Helweh.
- Ansar Allah (God’s Partisans), established in 1989 and with close ties to Hizbollah.
- Usbat al-Nour (The League of Light), an Usbat al-Ansar spin off, also present in Ain al-Helweh though not one of the principal organisations there.
- Fatah al-Islam (Conquest of Islam) was founded in 2006 in the Palestine refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared. From May 2007 to June 2007, it engaged in a conflict against the Lebanese Army and led to the destruction of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp.
C. Cairo Agreement

Retrieved from (International Crisis Group, 2009)

[The 1969 Cairo Accord was confidential and has never been officially published.

Decision no. 2550/D52 Date: 13 September 1969

Top Secret

On Monday the 3rd of November 1969, the Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander General Emile al-Bustani, and the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, headed by chairman Yasser Arafat, met in Cairo in the presence of the United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Riyad, and the War Minister, General Muhammad Fawzi.

In consonance with the bonds of brotherhood and common destiny, relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution must always be conducted on the bases of confidence, frankness, and positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution and within the framework of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security. The two delegations agreed on the following principles and measures:

A. The Palestinian Presence

It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following bases:
1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing in Lebanon;
2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to manage interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with the local Lebanese authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty;
3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle inside the camps to cooperate with the local committees and ensure good relations with the Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution;
4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are allowed to participate in the Palestinian revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security.

B. Commando Activities

It was agreed to facilitate commando activities by means of:
1. Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying passage points and reconnaissance in the border areas.
2. Safeguarding the road to the ‘Arqub region.
3. The Armed Struggle should control the conduct of all its organizations’ members and ensure that they don’t interfere in Lebanese affairs.
4. Establishing a joint command control between the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese army.
5. Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides.
6. The Armed Struggle command should conduct a census of its members in Lebanon.
7. Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese army headquarters to participate in the resolution of all emergency matters.
8. Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas which will be agreed with the Lebanese army command.
9. Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle members.
11. The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and supply centers for commando activity.
12. Releasing detainees and confiscated arms.
13. It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall continue to exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all circumstances.
14. The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of Lebanon as well the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs.
15. This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only.
D. Taif Agreement


First – General Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles

A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league’s charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception.
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.
D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions.
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state’s unity and of the system’s stability.
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.
H. Lebanon’s soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].
I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.
   1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber’s term.
   2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber may vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.
   3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.
   4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.
   5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:
      a. Equally between Christians and Muslims
      b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect
      c. Proportionately between the districts
   6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
   7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country’s unity. He shall contribute to enhancing
the constitution and to preserving Lebanon’s independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country’s interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies’ approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government’s general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to
ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.

D. Cabinet:
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.
The following are among the powers exercised by it:
1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent; if impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and its abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state’s general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister: The minister’s powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government’s general policy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from him individually.

F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:
   a. If its chairman resigns
   b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it
   c. If its chairman dies
   d. At the beginning of a president’s term
   e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies’ term
   f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism: Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected on the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council’s task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:
   a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public,
and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:
   a. The president of the republic
   b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker
   c. The prime minister
   d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:
1. Personal status affairs
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites
3. Freedom of religious education

[3]. To ensure the judiciary’s independence, a certain number of the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

C. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistence between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people’s factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

D. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state’s socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

E. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country’s
development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.

5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.

F. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second – Spreading the Sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese Territories:

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state’s own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias’ weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:
   1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.
   2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:
   1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.
   2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.
   3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.
   4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.
   5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq’a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammama-al-Mudayrij-’Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces’ relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.
Third – Liberating Lebanon from the Israeli Occupation:

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

Fourth – Lebanese-Syrian Relations:

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries’ coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries’ interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria’s security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon’s security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria’s security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon’s security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon’s security, independence, and sovereignty.

E. The Hezbollah and the Amal Movement

The Hezbollah and the Amal Movement are the only two Muslims Shia political parties in Lebanon.

A. The Amal Movement


The Amal (literally “Hope”, also the acronym of Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya, “Lebanese Resistance Detachments”) is a Muslim Shia militant group and political party based in Lebanon.

It was founded as Harakat al-Mahrumin (literally “The Movement of the Deprived”) in 1974 by Iranian-Lebanese Imam Musa al-Sadr and former Member of Parliament Hussein el-Husseini as an attempt to reform the Lebanese system. The Amal Movement’s ideology is Conservatism.

Amal’s main sphere of influence encompasses the southern suburbs of Beirut, the cities of Baalbek and Hermel in the Bekaa, and the southern Lebanon, notably around the cities of Tyre and Saida. The Movement has its own assistance networks gathered under the authority of the Council of the South. This Council is responsible for running schools, hospitals, and conducting public works in Muslim Shia areas. Amal also runs the joint television service Al-Mashriq. Since 1984, the Movement has been headed by Nabih Berri, also continuously elected Speaker of the Parliament since 1992.

B. The Hezbollah


The Hezbollah (literally “Party of God”) is a Muslim Shia militant group and political party based in Lebanon. It receives financial and political support from Iran and Syria and its paramilitary wing, regarded as a resistance movement.
Muslim Shia, traditionally the weakest religious group in Lebanon, first found their voice in the moderate and largely secular Amal Movement. Following the Islamic revolution of Muslim Shia Iran in 1979 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a group of Lebanese Muslim Shia clerics left the Amal Movement and formed the Hezbollah with the goal of driving Israel from Lebanon. Its leaders were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The Hezbollah follows Shia Islamist and Anti-Zionist ideologies.

The Hezbollah is based in the predominantly Muslim Shia areas of the Bekaa, southern Lebanon, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. It is a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals, and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Muslim Shia. The Hezbollah, which started with only a small militia, has grown to an organization with seats in the Lebanese government, a radio and a satellite television-station (Al-Manar), and programs for social development. It became part of the government for the first time on June 13, 2011. Since 1992, the organization has been headed by Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General.
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