

# ARCHETYPES & ARCHITECTURE

Through the Eyes of  
Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz



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# Archetypes & Architecture

## Through the Eyes of Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz

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# ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the understanding of the concept of Archetype in the field of architectural theory. Even though the use of the term type by architectural theorists is a relatively recent phenomenon, which can be traced back to Plato, the idea of Archetype, as opposed to the explicit use of this term by theorists, has pervaded much of architectural theory ever since Vitruvius. In fact, many theorists have been concerned with issues that convey a notion of Archetype, like the origins of architectural form, the systematization of architectural knowledge, and the understanding of the process of creativity.

The fundamental premise of this work is that in order to comprehend the true significance of the concept of Archetype in architecture, it is necessary to get past some long-held misconceptions that link Archetype to the works of particular authors at a certain time. Fundamentally nebulous and challenging to precisely define, the archetype concept is. As Quatremère de Quincy notes, "Everything is precise and given in the model; everything is more or less vague in the type." Due to the vagueness of the concept, only a comparative study of the most relevant ideas formulated in the field of architectural theory can reveal the essential understanding, or understandings, of Archetype. This work attempts to provide such a comparative study.

In this regard, our starting point was a comparative study of the writings of several architectural theorists. By comparing and contrasting the ideas of these authors, a reference framework for "archetypes" was developed with the intention of identifying specific informational patterns. Aldo Rossi and Christian Norberg-Schulz were two of the authors whose works we chose to research for this project.

This research's other goal was to investigate the connection between the concept of Archetype and the historical development of architectural form. This work aims to demonstrate how the evolution of architectural form and the various understandings that Archetype has taken on throughout history are inextricably linked. Because of this, this work is both an investigation into the nature of architectural form while also serving as a study of the concept of Archetype.

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# INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of humankind, sheltering has taken an essential place in the context of survival and living. Architecture responds to this need for shelter in various shapes and forms in different frames of time. Among these numerous forms, certain forms and certain shapes reoccur at various times and in various places. This gives us a sense that there may be a fundamental “grammar” in the way we build. We can call the fragments of this grammar “archetypes”. Understanding this kind of grammar of architecture can be helpful in our journey in architecture. It can assist us as a reference point to solve problems of the present and even the future. Thus, understanding what an “archetype” is and how it comes into being are quite important questions.

The 18th century was a transformative period in the history of architecture, influenced by various historical events and cultural shifts. The Enlightenment, an intellectual and philosophical movement that reached its peak during the 18th century, encouraged a rational and scientific approach to knowledge. Meanwhile, advancements in technology and the rise of the Industrial Revolution, starting around the mid-18th century, brought about new materials and construction techniques, reshaping the built environment. The Industrial Revolution led to increased standardization and mass production, with the development of standardized components and prefabricated elements. This standardization not only facilitated efficient construction processes but also changed the way of thinking in architecture and led to the studies of the classification and categorization of architectural types. Architects and theorists sought to establish typological studies as a means to understand and systematize the standardized elements of architecture, aiming for both functional and aesthetic coherence. In 1753, the publication of “*Essai sur l’Architecture*” by Marc-Antoine Laugier proposed a simplified architectural language based on natural forms, contributing to the emergence of typological studies. His studies were developed and systematized by Quatremère de Quincy and Durand. These historical contexts, combined with the need for standardization, propelled the studies on “type” and “typology” in architecture, establishing a foundation for architectural theory and practice that would endure in the centuries to come.

Quatremère de Quincy says “Everything is precise and given in the model; everything is more or less vague in the type.”. This notion of

vagueness makes it quite hard to define what an “archetype” is. There are various studies to achieve such a definition. However, it almost always ends up with a subjective or arguable conclusion. Needless to say, although the conclusions are arguable, these studies help us to get closer to an answer. They pave the way for future research to better understand the concept of “archetypes” and their relation with architecture. Thus, a comparative approach to these studies can give us an idea about different understandings of this vague concept.

Undoubtedly, there are many aspects of archetypes we can examine to understand. The concept of “archetype” touches many fundamental notions of architecture. However, for a deeper understanding of the concept, examining the major relations that lead to the formation of an “archetype” can be one of the fundamental requirements.

In this respect, I believe there is an important nuance I would like to underline in order to give a clear framework for this study. This notion emerged in the process of my previous research “Archetypes and Timelessness in Architecture: A Reading over Aldo Rossi and Louis I. Kahn”. In the process of this study, my advisor came up with a question: “Are archetypes a priori?”. This question leads me to do a thought experiment. I started to think of an example of the possible process of formation of a common archetypal form: a gable roof. As we all know, the archetypal form of “house” always comes with a gable roof. If we consider an alternative timeline of the civilization in which the problem of the waterproofing cover of the buildings was solved or never occurred, would “gable roof” still be an archetypal form?

For now, we do not answer this question and investigate another case. We can take another example with different conditions and features into consideration. In this case, I believe a common example from nature can be bees and beehives. As we all know, the most common image of bees is related to the hexagonally shaped honeycombs. In a way, we can consider this hexagonal pattern as an archetypal form of bees. As an image, this hexagonal pattern goes beyond the existence of bees and turns into a symbolic marker with the values which we associate with bees, such as order, collectiveness, and integrity. In the context of the reasoning of occurrence behind such a structure, we can estimate possible reasons. The shape may be serving a functional purpose. “Efficient use of space” can be one of the first concepts that comes to mind. “Using less wax” can be another. However, these do not help us to understand the process of production of such complex structures with precise geometry. A common thought about this process is that it is a built-in knowledge that bees have biologically. However, recent studies show that this is not







Figure 1.1: Italian honeybee (*Apis mellifera Ligustica*) comb cell at (a) 'birth', and at (b) 2-days old, scale bar is 2 mm.

exactly the case. A study on "Honeybee Combs" in 2013 showed that actually bees form "circular" cells at first, but in a short time, they turn into "rounded hexagonal" shapes due to the flow of melting wax. The excess wax melts due to the body heat of honeybees and the rest of the wax naturally forms a structurally optimized form in the context of mechanical integrity.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the information we previously related to the "creative act" of the honeybee turned out to be a combination of "creative act" and "physical conditions".

Now, we can analyze the situation here for a better understanding. Firstly, there is the "creating subject" which is in this case, the bee. "Creating subject" takes a "creative act" in order to respond to a need or function. In this act, there is an operational and organizational optimization to a certain degree, due to the repetitive production of the "form" through time and space. We can consider this optimization as a biological heritage of evolutionary processes in the case of bees. However, such optimization can occur with the help of alternative ways, such as cultural heritage. "Creative act" creates the "form" that emerges as the application of an idea that is not tested by recent conditions. Thus, as a next step, the "form" faces the "physical conditions" and gets tested. In the case of failure, it needs an upgrade which can be part of the "act" for future generations. This way, the "form" goes through another process of optimization and turns into the final form. According to the dissertation of Leandro Madrazo, this notion have been mentioned by Quatremère as well:

"Quatremère was well aware that there were styles in architecture that did not evolve from the Greco-Roman model, like Egyptian or Chinese. He considered though that every style began with a first model whose form had been the result of necessity (besoin), meaning that the form of those models had been determined by the conditions of the place, like climate, productions of the country, and the lifestyle of the inhabitants."<sup>2</sup>

However, to be able to become an "archetype", it also should be perceived by another subject. In this case, it is humans. Humans as the "deriving subject" give the honeycomb a "meaning" through its "image". Now, the shape of the hexagon is the "symbol" of order, collectiveness, and integrity.

This analysis can assist us to better understand the previous example as well. In this case, the situation is the relations are different, but the elements are the same. Human as "creating subject" builds a shelter as a "creative act" for the need for an enclosure. This "act" can be instinctive to a degree. The house as the "form" faces the "physical

1. Karihaloo, B. L., Zhang, K., & Wang, J., "Honeybee combs: how the circular cells transform into rounded hexagons," *Journal of the Royal Society, Interface*, 10(86), 20130299, (2013).

2. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 181.



Figure 1.2: Alpine Vernacular Architecture.

condition” of precipitation of rain and snow and gets tested. In the case of failure, it needs an upgrade which can be part of the “act” for future generations. At a certain point in time, the gable roof becomes part of the house and solves the problem of precipitation. The “form” gets optimized through this process of upgrade. The information is transferred through the culture and the physical markers of the past. After a while, with the practice of numerous generations, the form of a gable roof turns into an archetypal form. As an “image”, this roof form goes beyond the existence of necessities and turns into a symbolic marker with the values which we associate with “house”, such as ease, comfort, safety, and belonging.

Obviously, the generational transfer of information plays a crucial role in the formation of archetypes. There are two important notions in this respect. One of which is the acceptance of the form. This notion can be related to the fulfillment of necessity. In the book “Necessity of Artifice”, Joseph Rykwert points out this notion with these words:

“An individual may clear or mark out a path in a wilderness: but unless he is followed by others, his path never becomes a road or street, because the road and the street are social institutions and it

3. Joseph Rykwert, *The Necessity of Artifice: Ideas in Architecture*, (London: Academy Editions, 1982), 105.




Figure 1.3: Diagram of Process of Formation of Archetype

is their acceptance by the community which gives them the name and the function with which I am here concerned.”<sup>3</sup>

Here, we can observe that Rykwert underlines the necessity of acceptance of the form. Without this kind of acceptance, the form never turns out to be an “archetype”.

The other important notion is the generational transformation of the form. As the information of “archetype” gets transferred from generation to generation, it gets reduced to its essential features. In the article “On the Typology of Architecture”, Giulio C. Argan mentions this notion with these words:

“The “type” therefore, is formed through a process of reducing a complex of formal variants to a common root form.”<sup>4</sup>

4. Giulio C. Argan, “On the Typology of Architecture,” translated by J. Rykwert, in *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory*, ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 246.

Here, we can observe Argan underlines the reduction of the form from a “complex of formal variants” to a “common root form”. This process of reduction is directly related to the cognitive abilities of the “perceiving subject”. Thus, the transformation of the information of “archetypes” is deeply connected to the cognitive processes of human beings.

These examples show that there are various aspects of the formation of archetypes. As we observed in these examples, the “creative act” and “physical conditions” are the major elements that shape the archetype. However, there is another element that should be taken into consideration. This is the “essential act” that leads the subject to a necessity to take a “creative act” in the first place. “Essential acts” are the rituals of living in a space that creates the necessity to build. It is the main element that needs enclosure from the negative “physical conditions”. On one hand, “essential acts” are related to “creative acts” in the context of the formation of the “form”. On the other hand, “deriving subject” mainly builds the “image” of the “form” based on “essential acts”. Rossi calls these acts “human events”. Norberg-Schulz calls these acts “human actions”. Kahn calls the space which is specified for these acts “served spaces”. Semper calls the element that gathers these acts the “hearth”. These are the acts that create the necessity to build. Thus, they play an essential role in the formation of “archetypes”. In this research, we will examine the relation between architecture, archetypes, and essential acts.

In order to achieve this, we started by determining a suitable methodology. As we mentioned before, the vagueness of the “archetypes” leads us to a comparative approach. In this respect, a comparative work among the writings of different architectural theorists was our starting point. The aim was to create a reference framework about “archetypes” through similarities and differences among the thoughts of these authors and deduce certain patterns of information from this framework. For this purpose, we decided to study the writings of three authors: Aldo Rossi, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and Joseph Rykwert. However, after a fair amount of reading, although Rossi’s and Norberg-Schulz’s writings were manifesting their ideas over similar issues, Rykwert’s writings did not coincide with the other two authors in the context of a comparative study. Thus, we decided to continue our study with Rossi and Norberg-Schulz. However, we will certainly benefit from these readings of Rykwert in various points of study.

After this introduction, we can try to understand the deeper levels of the concepts. This research especially aims to understand archetypes in the context of architecture. This is not a simple task to achieve due to the vagueness of the concept. Thus, to be able to dive into this subject we need to understand other aspects of this research. First of all, we need to understand the relation between architecture and archetypes. This way, we can acknowledge in what range the archetypes exist. Therefore, we can better understand the function, structure, and meaning of the archetypes inhere. After that, we need to gain knowledge about the importance of three main acts of its formation -creative act,

derivative act, and essential act- in architecture. It is an important part of this research to understand how the rituals shaped the architecture we know today. Also, another important part is to understand the role of "physical conditions" in the existence of archetypes.

Archetypes can be understood in various aspects which is not preferable in a certain manner from one to another. Since it is an abstract concept that is deeply related to the experiences of the individuals and collective subconscious, it is also hard to talk about this topic with tangible examples on a concrete plane.

In light of these conclusions, we need to determine a method that should be suitable for our purposes mentioned here. In this case, we decided to work with a parallel reading and comparison.

# ARCHETYPES

Archetypes take an important place in architecture. They are the main pathways of how we design and build in a timeless manner. Undoubtedly, having a better understanding of archetypes can serve as a way to understand how humanity creates space that responds to various aspects of its existence. Thus, although its vague nature, it is a necessary approach to study and have a better understanding of archetypes. However, archetypes have much deeper roots in the history of humankind beyond the boundaries of architecture. To be able to have a better understanding of archetypes, it is necessary to examine these roots.

Archetypes can be considered universal patterns or themes that are present in the collective unconscious of human beings. These patterns can manifest in literature, art, architecture, and mythology, and are believed to shape human behavior and understanding. They are often represented by characters, symbols, or motifs that are recognizable across cultures and time periods. Norwegian Architect Thomas Thiis-Evensen explains the concept with these words: "... behind the plurality of the many forms in history lies a simple set of archetypes which we can call the grammar of architecture."<sup>5</sup>

As we mentioned before, it is quite hard to precisely define the term "archetype". However, going through the etymological roots of the word can give us a starting point. According to the Britannica dictionary, the word "archetype" means "a primordial image, character, or pattern of circumstances that recurs throughout literature and thought consistently enough to be considered a universal concept or situation".<sup>6</sup> It is also mentioned that the word originates from the Ancient Greek word "archetypos". According to Online Etymology Dictionary, the Ancient Greek word "archetypos" means "first-moulded".<sup>7</sup> It is also mentioned in Oxford English Dictionary that the word "archetype" originates from the Ancient Greek word "archetypos" which is a combination of two words. One of which is "arkhē" which means "beginning, first".<sup>8</sup> The word "arkhē" can be related to the verbal noun "árkhō" which means "to begin, to lead, rule". The other word is the word "typos" which means "blow, pressing; sort, type". As you can presume, this is also the word which the English word "type" originate from. Thus, the word "archetype" is directly related to the word "type". It is also obvious that on all of the various roots, the word refers to the notion of primordality.

5. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, *Archetypes in Architecture*, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17.

6. "archetype," Britannica, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/archetype>.

7. "Etymology of archetype," Online Etymology Dictionary, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/archetype>.

8. "archetype, n.," OED Online, Oxford University Press, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/10344>.



Figure 2.1: A Photograph of Carl Gustav Jung.

The word “archetype” is adopted by Swiss psychologist and founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung, and for the first time, used in its Modern meaning in psychology. Jung’s concept of archetypes was influenced by the theories of Immanuel Kant, Plato, and Arthur Schopenhauer. The influence of Plato can be directly observed in Jung’s writings. In the book “Four Archetypes”, Jung directly mentions the relation between his concept of “archetype” and Plato’s concept of “Idea” with these words:

“‘Archetype,’ far from being a modern term, was already in use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with ‘Idea’ in the Platonic usage.”<sup>9</sup>

Here, we can observe that Jung considers the term “archetype” as synonymous with Plato’s “idea”. Therefore, we can take a deeper look into Plato’s “idea” for a better understanding of Jung’s “archetype”.

As Jung said, what Plato meant by the concept of “idea” is quite close to the modern term “archetype”. In his famous allegory of the cave, Plato pointed out that the physical world we perceive is a shadow or imitation of the true reality. He names these two different sides of exis-

9. Carl G. Jung, *Four Archetypes*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 7-8.





Figure 2.2: The Fresco of “The School of Athens” by Italian Renaissance artist Raphael, 1509-1511. Plato(left) and Aristotle(right) are in the center of the painting creating the symmetry to underline the duality in the intellectual world.

tence as the world of Forms which is the domain of imitations and the world of Ideas which is the domain of reality. In the article, British historian of philosophy David Sedley explains this notion in this passage:

“Consequently, Plato is often and I think correctly credited with a ‘two world’ thesis. There are two worlds: the intelligible world, populated by Forms, and the sensible world, populated by sensible particulars. Inquiry about Forms is pure intellectual inquiry, which must minimize or eliminate the use of the senses. And since knowledge is in its nature permanently true and not subject to revision, the unchanging world of Forms constitutes a suitable object for knowledge. By contrast, the familiar world of sensible particulars is suitable only for opinion: opinion, being in its very nature capable of fluctuating between true and false, is the appropriate mode of cognition for inherently unstable objects.”<sup>10</sup>

As we can observe here, for Plato, Forms are fundamentally various imperfect reflections of Ideas. In Plato’s understanding, Ideas are unchangeable, eternal, intelligible, divine causes of being.<sup>11</sup>

10. David Sedley, “An Introduction to Plato’s Theory of Forms,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements* 78 (2016): 3–22.




Figure 2.3: A diagram of Carl Jung's model of psyche.




Figure 2.4: Jung's diagram of the psyche for one of his private seminars given in English in 1925 for the Psychological Club Zurich.

Although Jung directly relates the term “archetype” to Plato’s “Idea”, his interpretation of the subject is quite different. First and foremost, Jung considers “archetypes” not as unchangeable and eternal beings, but as derived beings. He explains this point in this passage:

“Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and the Idea has evaporated into a mere *flatus vocis*. This change was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time the Idea is no longer something *a priori*, but is secondary and derived.”<sup>12</sup>

Here, we can see that Jung considers “archetype” as not *a priori*, but as secondary and derived. This fundamental difference opens the possibility of an extensive understanding of “archetype”. Therefore, Jung can consider the formation of an “archetype” as a result of progressive progress. Jung also states that “archetypes” are fundamentally related to the unconscious rather than the conscious in this passage:

“The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear.”<sup>13</sup>

Here, we can directly observe that Jung considers “archetype” as an element of unconsciousness rather than consciousness. Jung also states that “archetypes” are an element of the human psyche rather than physical facts with these words:

“The archetype does not proceed from physical facts, but describes how the psyche experiences the physical fact, and in so doing the psyche often behaves so autocratically that it denies tangible reality or makes statements that fly in the face of it.”<sup>14</sup>

As we can observe here, Jung considers “archetypes” as an experience of reality rather than reality itself. Thus, the existence of “archetype” deeply relates to our cognitive abilities.

Influenced by Jung’s work on the human psyche, American psychologist Noam Chomsky creates the concept of “deep structure” and “surface structure” to differentiate this new concept from grammar. He introduces these concepts with these words:

11. Plato, “78B–80C: Third Argument. The Kinship of Souls and Forms,” Chapter, In *Plato: Phaedo*, edited by R. Hackforth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 81–86.

12. Carl G. Jung, *Four Archetypes*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8.

13. *Ibid.*, 4.

14. Gerhard Adler, R. F. C. Hull, Barbara Forryan, and Janet M. Glover, eds. *Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 20: General Index*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 151.

“Consequently, the syntactic component of a grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure- that determines its phonetic interpretation.”<sup>15</sup>

To Chomsky, all languages share a deeper system of information that goes beyond their grammar rules. He calls this shared structure “universal grammar”. Chomsky explains this notion of “universal grammar” in detail in this passage:

“Within traditional linguistic theory, furthermore, it was clearly understood that one of the qualities that all languages have in common is their “creative” aspect. Thus an essential property of language is that it provides the means for expressing indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an indefinite range of new situations (for references, cf. Chomsky, 1964, forthcoming). The grammar of a particular language, then, is to be supplemented by a universal grammar that accommodates the creative aspect of language use and expresses the deep-seated regularities which, being universal, are omitted from the grammar itself. Therefore it is quite proper for a grammar to discuss only exceptions and irregularities in any detail. It is only when supplemented by a universal grammar that the grammar of a language provides a full account of the speaker-hearer’s competence.”<sup>16</sup>

Here, we can observe Chomsky pointing out the relation between “grammar” and “universal grammar”. To him, “grammar” discusses only “exceptions and irregularities”. On the other hand, “universal grammar” provides the fundamental reference system. In this manner, the bilateral relation between Chomsky’s “grammar” and “universal grammar” can be associated with the relation between “type” and “archetype”.

In conclusion, the term “archetype” has quite old roots in the history of humankind. Nonetheless, the popularity and use of the term have increased in the Modern era. It has been a part of various disciplines. In the meanwhile, the complexity of the discourse about the term has evolved as well as its popularity.




Figure 2.5: Classification of Grammars, Noam Chomsky.

15. Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 50th ed. (New York: The MIT Press, 1965), 16.

16. *Ibid*, 6.

## ARCHETYPES IN ARCHITECTURE

The concept of “archetype” had a considerably deeper connection with architecture, even though it was introduced later, due to the studies on “type” and “typology” since the 19th century. Although “type” is a different concept, since it is etymologically connected to “archetype”, it gives a deeper understanding of the concept. Thus, we can start by examining the history of the progress of “type” for a better understanding of “archetype”.

The word “type” appears in the stage of history when Johann Gutenberg invented the modern printing press in 1445. According to Britannica, this version of the word means “small metal blocks that are used for printing letters and numbers on paper”.<sup>17</sup> In the dissertation “The Reasoning of Architecture”, Sam Jacoby mentions this notion with these words: “‘Type’, as Johann Gutenberg’s invention of the modern printing press with movable types around 1445 demonstrates, is a medium of non-imitative reproduction.”<sup>18</sup> Thus, the main feature of the first meaning of the word consists of being “a medium of non-imitative reproduction”. Jacoby also mentions the background of the word “typology” in this passage:

“Similarly, “typology” first denoted in the study of scriptures reasoning by analogy in order to interpret the Old Testament as prefiguring the events and ideas of the New Testament: typology was the symbolic correlating of meanings. The authority and use of types by Jesus Christ implied ‘that we do not fully understand reality unless we perceive it typologically’. Until the eighteenth century, this religious meaning was upheld, as Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert’s entry of ‘Type’ in the Encyclopédie proves.”<sup>19</sup>

In this passage, we can understand that the word “typology” had roots in the New Testament. The word “typology” had a religious meaning until the 18th century.

The concept of “type” in architecture today, however, has a different meaning. According to Cambridge Dictionary, the word “type” means “the characteristics of a group of people or things that set them apart from other people or things, or people, things, or groups that share particular characteristics”.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, today “typology” has a different meaning as well. Jacoby explains this with a quotation from Paul-Alan Johnson:

“‘Typology’ in turn denotes the study of types and the analy-

17. “Type”, Britannica, Accessed June 11, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/type>.

18. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Architecture” (PhD diss., Technical University of Berlin, 2013), 8.

19. Ibid.

20. “type”, Cambridge Dictionary, Accessed June 11, 2023, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/type>.

sis of their characteristics.<sup>14</sup> Paul-Alan Johnson states, ‘strictly, “typology” is the knowledge (-logy, Greek logos) and study of types, their succession and their meaning or symbolism, the systemics of types, or the categorical overview of types. [...] To say, for example, that the temple is a “typology” if what is meant is that it is one type of shrine, or to use “typological” as the adjectival form instead of “typical” or “typal”, merely confuses.’. He distinguishes between type as the general (classifying) term and its specific meanings as archetype, the original (ideational) pattern for subsequent copies, prototype, the first (material) representation of the archetype, and stereotype, the conventional and continued reproduction of a (proto)type when it becomes a norm, the average and typical model in use.”<sup>21</sup>

Here, we can understand that the new meaning of “typology” is the “study of types”. In the meanwhile, through Johnson’s statement, Jacoby also underlines the variety of new terminology in the area of “typology”.

Before the words “type” and “typology” became a part of architectural terminology, there were several works and studies in this direction, mostly in the French Classical Canon. One of the first studies in this direction belonged to French theorist Roland Fréart de Chambray. Jacoby mentions his contribution with these words:

“Roland Fréart de Chambray in his survey of the orders in *Parallèle de l’architecture antique avec la moderne* of 1650 captures changing sentiments by denouncing Roman orders as corrupt and declaring a return to three ‘authentic’ Greek modes of building: Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian.”<sup>22</sup>

Here, Jacoby points out that the study of Fréart de Chambray intended a return to the “authentic” architecture of Greek. Later, Jacoby mentions two other theorist in this manner:

“With both F. Blondel and Perrault as much scientist as architect, they see the idealistic notions of the classical doctrine at odds with the rational empiricism prevalent in the sciences.”<sup>23</sup>

Jacoby underlines the fact that Blondel and Perrault, which were both scientists and architects, were criticizing the classical understanding of the architecture of the era as being unscientific. Jacoby mentions Blondel’s stance in this passage:

“Whereas Fréart de Chambray’s thesis largely depended on studies of buildings, François Blondel (1618–1686), the first



Figure 2.6: Frontispiece of Marc-Antoine Laugier: *Essai sur l’architecture* 2nd ed. 1755 by Charles Eisen (1720–1778). Allegorical engraving of the Vitruvian primitive hut.

21. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Architecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 8.

22. *Ibid.*, 34.

23. *Ibid.*, 34.




Figure 2.7: Archetypical modes of organization: centrality, axiality and network, Norberg-Schulz, *Existence; Space & Architecture*.

professor of architecture in the first state-sponsored school in France, the Académie Royale d'Architecture, but also a mathematician and member of the Académie des Sciences, is predominantly interested in theory. His arguments derive from the study of texts, especially the Ten Books on Architecture (*De architectura*, c. 25 BC) by Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, which he, despite acknowledging a deflection by a Roman taste, considers as truthful transmission of the Greek orders."<sup>24</sup>

For Jacoby, Blondel majorly shapes his stance around the texts of Vitruvius. On the other hand, Perrault takes another stance:

"In contrast to F. Blondel, Claude Perrault (1613–1688), having translated Vitruvius's Ten Books of Architecture into French in 1673, is impelled to question the authority of the ancients."<sup>25</sup>

As we can understand here, unlike Blondel, Perrault criticizes the classical understanding of architecture. Through the criticism of the authority of the ancients, Perrault creates a new path for architecture. Jacoby mentions this notion in this passage:

"Perrault's *Ordonnance* refutes the custom to alter proportions for optical reasons as unscientific and without precedent in antiquity. Encompassing a mathematical and conceptual but also experiential and perceptual understanding of proportion, his scientific distinction between conception and perception lastingly destabilises classical authority, arguing that an a priori and unconditional standard of beauty is untenable, as beauty is only verifiable as an aesthetic form of custom and convention."<sup>26</sup>

As we can understand, Perrault refuses the unconditional standards of antiquity and proposes a scientific and also perceptual approach to the issue. Later, Jacoby mentions another aspect of the era.

"The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reforms brought about by the French normative discourse, were motivated by the desire to institute a national canon and problematised the concept of history."<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, Jacoby also mentions that "rationalization" and "standardization" creates new problems yet to resolve in the architecture:

"Yet the deep ideological divides emerging with the eighteenth-century normative debate would remain unresolved

24. Ibid, 34.

25. Ibid, 35.

26. Ibid, 36.

27. Ibid, 42.

and caused a loss of disciplinary unity. By the early nineteenth century the quest for a cohesive French canon waned, partly due to the impossibility of the ambition itself but also increasingly displaced by the problems arising from technological rationalisation and stylistic standardization."<sup>28</sup>

After the studies of Perrault, French architect Julien-David Le Roy was one of the important figures in the discourse. Le Roy supported the stance of Perrault in the context of criticism of the authority of antiquity. Jacoby mentions Le Roy with these words:

"A decisive contributor to a historicist reassessment of Greek antiquity and the first to substantiate that Vitruvius's interpretations of the Greek orders were influenced by changing Roman tastes, was Julien-David Le Roy (1724–1803). Having visited Greece in winter 1754–55, Le Roy published *The Ruins of the Most Beautiful Monuments of Greece* (*Les Ruines des plus beaux monuments de la Grèce*) in 1758, the first in a series of significant archaeological, antiquarian, and aesthetic studies of antiquity, especially focussed on Greece."<sup>29</sup>

As we can see here, Le Roy takes a stance against the Vitruvian understanding of Greek antiquity. Therefore, he studies Greek antiquity himself. Similarly to Perrault, Le Roy also mentions the perceptual aspect of the architecture as well:

"Familiar with scientific studies confirming the human perception of spatial environments as conditioned by physiology but ultimately a learned understanding, Le Roy argues that the comprehension of architecture similarly depends on visual and haptic perception—which changes with the movement of an observer and is attributable to the reception of light in relation to form, proportion, and detail—and on an acquired knowledge of conventions through which perceived phenomena are comprehended. Experience as a physiological and cultural phenomenon, therefore, is a central argument of the *Histoire and Observations*, and indebted to empiricist writings of its time positing sensory stimulation as the primary means to understanding, knowledge, and aesthetic judgement."<sup>30</sup>

Here, we can understand that Le Roy values the perceptual and experiential aspects of architecture in the context of visual and haptic perception. Le Roy also studies the "temple" in a quite similar approach to a "typological study":

28. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University of Berlin, 2013), 42-43.

29. *Ibid.*, 43.

30. *Ibid.*, 46.






Figure 2.8: The Architecture Volume of “Encyclopédie méthodique” and “Dictionnaire historique d’architecture” by Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy.

“Examining the historical changes of the temple, Le Roy introduces once more an important diagrammatic plate. Organised by three columns, he compares the progressive transformation of the Egyptian and Phoenician, Greek and Roman, and Christian hut into temples with increasing scale, complexity, and detail, accompanied by a text explaining the relation of each example to its evolutionary and typological predecessor. The graphical comparison is presented as objective, ordered by typological and morphological differences or similarities as they occur relative to each other.”<sup>31</sup>

As we can understand here, the methodology of Le Roy coincides with Durand’s approach which we will examine further in the following parts of our chapter. However, the outcome of the study remains the domain of visuals rather than an abstract principle. Le Roy also mentions “primitive” ideas of architecture:

“The synchronised historical and theoretical-architectural enquiries represent to Le Roy the complementary psychological and physiological facets of ‘primitive original ideas’. Historical conditions and context affect the formal and evolving

31. Ibid, 49.




Figure 2.9: The drawing of "Ensembles D'Edifices" by Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand.

adaptation of architecture, with its transformation diagrammatically representable by drawings that abstract and clarify architecture's changing internal and external relations. With this, a common reasoning for a consistent aesthetic judgement of architecture is given, one based on principled and rational phenomena. At the same time, Le Roy insists on the importance of a subjective experience of architecture, affected by emotional and psychological sensations that architecture arouses within a particular situation."<sup>32</sup>

With these statements, Le Roy's approach can be related to the Laugier's idea of "cabane". In the dissertation "The Concept of Type in Architecture", Leandro Madrazo mentions this notion with this passage:

"In the culture of the eighteenth century, speculations on the origins of human creations were commonplace. In the field of architecture, the theories of Marc Antoine Laugier epitomize this concern with origins. Laugier attributed to the cabane, or primitive hut, the character of a fundamental principle of architecture. He endowed his cabane with a normative character: it was the model after which new architecture should be cre-

32. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 50-51.

ated. But, apart from the question of the origins, Laugier's theory of the primitive hut participates in the preoccupation with perception that dominated the thought of British empiricists in the preceding century. From this point of view, the cabane can be understood as the idea that the architect abstracts from the realm of sensible forms. Laugier's cabane is, in this regard, a conceptual construct rather than a sensible one."<sup>33</sup>

Madrazo also mentions Marc-Antoine Laugier's work was built as a reaction to Baroque and Rococo with these words:

"Laugier's theories were born as a reaction against the formal excesses in the architecture of his time, exemplified in the Baroque and Rococo. In order to correct those excesses, Laugier found necessary to return to the origins to find the fundamental principles of architecture, that is to say, the 'primitive hut.'"<sup>34</sup>

Madrazo also adds to the previous statement: "The primitive hut of Laugier is the direct antecedent of the concept of Type later formulated by Quatremère de Quincy."<sup>35</sup> As we can observe here, this change in the meaning starts with the dictionary entry of "Type" by Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy (1755-1849) in *Encyclopédie méthodique: Architecture* (1825). With this entry, Quatremère secularizes and formally introduces this term to architecture.<sup>36</sup> Thus, we can understand, even in the first moments of its emergence, the concept of "type" was deeply connected to the concept of "archetype" via an allegory of "primitive hut". According to Madrazo, Quatremère also mentions that "type" is formed around necessities and physical conditions of the environment:

"Unlike Laugier, Quatremère admits that there cannot be only one model from which all architecture is derived. Quatremère was well aware that there were styles in architecture that did not evolve from the Greco-Roman model, like Egyptian or Chinese. He considered though that every style began with a first model whose form had been the result of necessity (besoin), meaning that the form of those models had been determined by the conditions of the place, like climate, productions of the country, and the lifestyle of the inhabitants."<sup>37</sup>

As we can observe here, Madrazo points out the role of necessities and conditions of the place, like climate, production, and lifestyle. Jacoby mentions this notion of Quatremère in this passage:

"Although *De l'architecture égyptienne* develops arguments of

33. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 171.

34. *Ibid.*, 172.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy, 'Type', *Encyclopédie méthodique: Architecture*, III, 543–45.

37. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 181.

the *Mémoire*, it redefines the architecture by framing the conditions of invention not as a historical inevitability of progress but a social effort and achievement. This proclaims a social thesis very different from the predominantly formal argument of the *Mémoire*. *De l'architecture égyptienne* postulates that form is essentially metaphysical and unspecific but possesses cultural and social values, thus architecture is a social language.<sup>38</sup>

Here, we can observe Jacoby underlines Quatremère's concept of "invention", and he relates it to "cultural and social values". Quatremère also introduces the concept of "imitation" to the discourse of "type". Madrazo mentions this with these words:

"A fundamental premise of Quatremère theory is that architecture is an imitative art. In the course of his writings, he strove to demonstrate the validity of this theory by reformulating, paradoxically, Plato's doctrine of imitation."<sup>39</sup>

Later, using this notion of "imitation" and Plato's philosophical base, Quatremère introduces a similar binary conceptual system between "type" and "model":

"As an alternative to the dualism Idea-Image of the Platonic system, Quatremère proposes his own pair of terms, type-modèle. After establishing the existence of two objects of imitation, one abstract, the type, the other sensible, the modèle, Quatremère is in the condition to assert that architecture is an imitative art whose object of imitation is an abstract form, the type."<sup>40</sup>

Later, a contemporary of Quatremère, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand (1760–1834) worked on the concept of "type" and carried it a step further. Jacoby mentions Durand's work with these words:

"Contrary to Quatremère's emphasis of architecture and invention as expressions of socio-cultural form, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand (1760–1834) understood invention in terms of the formal arrangement of parts: as disposition."<sup>41</sup>

As we can see here, Jacoby points out that the fundamental difference between Quatremère and Durand is how they approach the notion of "invention". In another article, Jacoby explains this notion with these words:

"With history in the natural sciences defined as rational, as directly linked to verifiable structural development, Durand considered the effects of style and character on buildings

38. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 63.

39. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 201.

40. Ibid, 202.

41. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 63.




Figure 2.10: Caribbean Hut (The Great Exhibition), Gottfried Semper, *The Four Elements of Architecture*, 1851

as secondary and mere cultural phenomena. In their place, structural relations and, implicitly, formal complexity became a material verification of historical progress."<sup>42</sup>

Here, Jacoby points out that Durand prioritizes the "structural relations" and "material verification of historical progress" over "style" and "character". Madrazo mentions this notion in this passage:

"Durand assumed that a generic principle could be abstracted from the analytical study of past architectural works, and that based on that principle, new works could be created. This principle was the Type.

For Durand, type was a link between analysis and synthesis. In this regard, Durand -but not Quatremère- is the most direct precursor of architects like Aymonino or Rossi, for who Type was the link between scientific analysis and artistic synthesis."<sup>43</sup>

42. Sam Jacoby, "Typal and typological reasoning: a diagrammatic practice of architecture", *The Journal of Architecture*, 20:6, 2015, 949.

43. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 224.

After Quatremère and Durand, German architect Gottfried Semper was the one who took the theory of "type" a step further. Unlike Quatremère and Durand, Semper was a practitioner as well as an ed-




Figure 2.11: Drawings of "Primitive Hut".

icator of architecture. Jacoby introduces Semper with these words:

"Semper recognised a problematic nature of design research and was conscious that questions of history, theory, representation, and modalities of practice increasingly corresponded. In his intellectual effort to define an 'empirical theory' of building that is practical and material, as well as symbolic and cultural, he returned once again to the question of origins."<sup>44</sup>

As we can understand here, Semper's intention was to create an "empirical theory" of architecture with practical, material, symbolic, and cultural aspects. Semper is known for his book "The Four Elements of Architecture" published in 1851, which mentions that the buildings consist of four elements in his work. These are "the hearth, the roof, the enclosure, and the mound". Madrazo mentions this theory of Semper with these words:

"The hearth (Herd), therefore, was the "erste und wichtigste, das moralische Element der Baukunst"; and around it the other three elements were formed: the roof (Dach), the enclosure (Umfriedung) and the mound or terrace (Erdaufwurf); elements whose initial purpose was to protect the hearth."<sup>45</sup>

44. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 140.

Madrazo noted the translation of the German quotation: "It is the first and most important, the moral element of architecture.". Thus, for Semper, fundamentally the most important point of architecture is "the hearth" which gathers the living around itself. The "hearth" is simply the social aspect of architecture, its true connection to the human being. It is the center of living, while other elements are surrounding the living around the "hearth". In this manner, "hearth" can be considered as an essential element of architecture among others. Later, Madrazo sums up the important notions of Semper's work in this passage:

"The Separation of inner principle (e.g. abstract form or type) from visual appearance (e.g. sensible form) was consummated in Semper's theory. He contended that the fundamental principle did not have to resemble the architectural forms that derive from it. Thus, he dismissed the idea of a primitive form as a concrete model or image, suggested in Vitruvius' theory, and proposed instead four formless principles -the four elements- as the primitive causes of architectural form."<sup>46</sup>

Here, Madrazo underlines the important notion of how the search for origins has changed its focus from visual examples, like Laugier's primitive hut, to abstract and formless principles with the work of Semper. Undoubtedly, Quatremère and Durand have a massive role in this change, but it is Semper's work that we directly observe this change clearly. Jacoby sums up this journey of "type" in this passage:

"Quatremère, Durand, and Semper's theories are consistent with the principles of transformative composition in rhetoric. Quatremère's theory of type articulates the first and indispensable canon of 'invention' (inventio) by establishing a systematic architectural theory of invention that defines the disciplinary means and principles through which coherent arguments are generated in practice. Durand's method of design in turn is based on the second canon of 'arrangement' (dispositio or taxis), which follows once an argument or idea is strategised by invention. Arrangement manages the relative and iterative ordering of the part to the whole and organizes arguments into an effective discourse stating, outlining, and providing proof for a given case or problem. Finally, Semper's doctrine relates to the canon of 'style' (elocutio) by discussing the appropriate and effective modes to express ideas. Whereas invention determines what is articulated, style articulates how it is communicated."<sup>47</sup>

45. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 240.

46. *Ibid*, 266.

47. Sam Jacoby, "Typal and typological reasoning: a diagrammatic practice of architecture", *The Journal of Architecture*, 20:6, 2015, 956.

As we can understand here, the works of Quatremère, Durand, and

Semper create the basis of modern typology. In the nineteenth century, the paradigm of typology shifts from a visual reference to an abstract understanding of "type". Madrazo mentions this in this passage:

"The most prominent theorists of the nineteenth century, like Hübsch, Bötticher, Semper and Viollet-le-Duc, rejected the previous theories of the origins of architectural forms, particularly the theory of the primitive constructions of Vitruvius. For those writers, the visual similarity between the form of the hut and the form of the Greek temple was not enough reason to maintain that the last derived from the former. In that time, the notion of form as a pair made up of 'form' plus 'context', made popular by biology, became the prevalent 'form paradigm' in architectural theory as well."<sup>48</sup>

Here, Madrazo points out this shift of theories about the origins of architectural forms, from the visual similarity, like "primitive hut" and "Greek temple", to a contextual approach. In this respect, the works of Viollet-le-Duc are worth mentioning. Madrazo refers his works with these words:

"This attempt to 'rationalize' the processes by which architectural form comes to being is a distinctive mark of the theory of the nineteenth century, particularly, of the theories of Viollet-le-Duc."<sup>49</sup>

Here, we can understand that the studies of Viollet-le-Duc intend to "rationalize" the processes of architecture. Madrazo underlines the similarity of approaches between Semper and Viollet-le-Duc in this passage:

"The theories of Semper and Viollet-le-Duc can be seen as an attempt to provide an abstract model of the process by which architectural form comes to being. In the case of Semper, this abstract model or 'system' is based on the combinations of the four elements. For Viollet-le-Duc, the system is based on the relation form function, according to which a form would be the direct response to functional demands."<sup>50</sup>

Even though the words "type" and "typology" existed in architectural literature, the word "archetype" is used in a systematical manner within architectural theory for the first time by German architect Paul Zucker in the book "Town and Square" (1959). Thiis-Evensen, in his book "Archetypes in Architecture", mentions about him, "On the basis of a description of five square archetypes, he uses specific examples to show how history chooses that form which is appropriate and how these typologies, owing to dissimilar functional characteristics, vary from antiquity up to present day."<sup>51</sup>

48. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 227.

49. Ibid, 228.

50. Ibid, 265.







Figure 2.12: The square archetypes based on Zucker: a) the closed square, b) the nucleated square, c) the dominated square and d) the grouped square. In addition, there is the amorphous square (not shown), Paul Zucker, *Town and Square*.

Although Zucker was the first one to mention the “archetype” in architecture, the theory and the discourse expanded among Italian theorists in the 1960s. A typological debate has started and it expanded the hinterland of typology in architecture. Jacoby mentions this notion in this passage:

“The typological debate in the 1960s was provoked by a questioning of the Modernist functionalist doctrine and a return to a historical understanding of the city by Ernesto Nathan Rogers, Saverio Muratori, and Giulio Carlo Argan in Italy. Although arguably only shifting the balance between functionalism and typology, with an intrinsic relationship existing at least since the eighteenth century, their contentions created a new dialogue concerned with the nature of the historical object and architectural project.”<sup>52</sup>

51. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, *Archetypes in Architecture*, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17.

52. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Architecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 217.

As we can understand, the starting point of the debate was questioning the “Modernist functionalist doctrine” and searching for a historical approach. Ernesto Nathan Rogers, Saverio Muratori, and Giulio Carlo Argan participated in this debate with their writings. It is important to note that Rogers was the editor of the architectural magazine




Figure 2.13: Volumetric archetypes, project for a school, Leon Krier.




Figure 2.14: Volumetric archetypes volumes, Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture.

Casabella Continuità by the time Aldo Rossi started writing. Before we move further on, with Rossi's contributions to the discourse, examining Argan's perspective would be an appropriate approach since Rossi was fundamentally influenced by his ideas. ". In the article "That Obscure Object of Desire", Mary Lobsinger underlines the influence of Quatremère and Argan on Rossi with these words:

"Following Quatremère, Argan contended that type was not a preset image or a model to be copied and thus relevant to the practical making of objects. In contrast to a model, type was notional, a schema carrying the residue of all previously made forms. Type was an "interior structure" where all specific value, character, and quality had been sublimated. Type contained infinite formal possibilities and thus when put into practice by an architect would always produce different results or architectures with "no obvious resemblance to each other." The influence of Argan on Rossi is clear when Rossi writes in the *Autobiography*: "Nothing can yield more unforeseen results than a repetitive mechanism. And no mechanisms seem more repetitive in their typological aspects than the house, public buildings and the theater."<sup>53</sup>

Here, it is important to mention Italian art critic Giulio Carlo Argan as well. Argan departs from Quatremère's insistence on deriving principles from nature as an ideal. For Argan, "type" is derived from various building in a timeline. He mentions this with these words:

"The birth of a "type", therefore dependent on the existence of a series of buildings having between them an obvious formal and functional analogy."<sup>54</sup>

Argan also mentions the "vagueness" of type with a quotation from Quatremère. Then, he comments on this notion with these words:

"The notion of the vagueness or generality of the "type" -which cannot therefore directly affect the design of buildings or their formal quality, also explains its generation, the way in which a "type" is formed. It is never formulated a priori but always deduced from a series of instances."<sup>55</sup>

Here, we can understand that Argan considers "type" as a vague and derived concept which is developed from a "series of instances". He also mentions "type" as a "reduced" concept:

"The "type" therefore, is formed through a process of reduc-

53. Mary L. Lobsinger, "That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi," *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 46.

54. Giulio C. Argan, "On the Typology of Architecture," translated by J. Rykwert, in *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory*, ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 246.

55. *Ibid.*

ing a complex of formal variants to a common root form."<sup>56</sup>

For Argan, "type" reduces "complex" variants of history to a specific "form". Lobsinger also gives us details about Argan's understanding of "type" in this passage:

"Argan argued for a positive conception of type as an abstraction but not merely as such. Type was useful to architects because it had the capacity to bring together the sociohistorical moment and the absolute past. Since architectural types had been passed down through centuries by means of treatises, it was "legitimate to postulate the question of typology as a function of both the historical process of architecture and also of the thinking and working processes of the individual architect.". In other words, type displayed both the arc of total history and the specificity of the historical moment. Argan argued that type presented and synthesized social-historical and individual experience in the concrete present."<sup>57</sup>

Understanding Argan's perspective via his statements, we can now start examining Rossi's understanding of "archetype". We can easily state that Rossi is one of the most important figures in the context of "type" and "archetype" in the twentieth century. Madrazo sums up the situation in the century with these words:

"Whereas the notion of form-type had been condemned by the Modern Movement, an opposite reaction took place as soon as modern architecture entered in crisis in the 1960's. At that time, a renewed interest in the architectural tradition brought with it a revitalization of Quatremère's notion of Type. Architects like Aldo Rossi understood Type as an epistemological category with which it would be possible to build a scientific basis for the discipline of architecture. For the advocates of typology, Type was the link between tradition and modernity: it was an abstraction derived from existing architectural works which, in turn, would serve as generative principle for new ones."<sup>58</sup>

As we can understand here, Type was considered a "bridge" between tradition and modernity which also has generative features. Madrazo also mentions Rossi's attempt to use "type" to build a scientific base for architectural design. Jacoby explains Rossi's stance in comparison with the Modern Movement in this passage:

"The Architecture of the City is to begin with a critique of the

56. Giulio C. Argan, "On the Typology of Architecture," translated by J. Rykwert, in *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory*, ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 246.

57. Mary L. Lobsinger, "That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi," *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 46.

58. Leandro Madrazo, "The Concept of Type in Architecture" (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 303.




Figure 2.15: The Site plan of the Cemetery of San Cataldo, Modena, Italy, Aldo Rossi.

Modern Movement, especially its functionalist abstraction. However, it is also a revision of a rationalist doctrine that understands rationality as a relational structure, as this limits formal invention and forces a dependence on social content to explain and justify form.”<sup>59</sup>

As we can understand here, although Rossi opposes the functionalist position of the Modern Movement, he structures his book on the basis of a rationalist doctrine by revising the rationalist approach. Jacoby, later, underlines this notion with these words:

“Rossi finds this general framework in neo-Enlightenment humanism. He declares that a ‘rational’ analysis of the city is possible and formulates a different notion of modernity.”<sup>60</sup>

Examining Rossi’s approach to architecture, in general, gives us an idea of his understanding. In the context of “type”, Rossi makes several clear statements. Madrazo mentions these statements in this passage:

“Quatremère’s definition of Type was indeed one the pillars of the theoretical work that Aldo Rossi summed up in his *L’Architettura della città*. Rossi’s interpretation of Quatremère’s type, however, was both literal and idiosyncratic. His distinction between type and form is not fundamentally different from the previous distinction between type and *modele* formulated

59. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Architecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 226.

60. Ibid, 227.




Figure 2.16: Roosevelt Island Housing Competition, Oswald Mathias Ungers.

by Quatremère (e.g. “nessun tipo si identifica con una forma anche se tutte le forme architettoniche sono riconducibili a dei tipi”). For Rossi, type is something that precedes the form; it is the principle that remains unaltered in spite of the changes of the form. In this regard, type is seen as an objective, logical principle: “lo penso quindi al concetto di tipo come a qualcosa di permanente e di complesso, un enunciato logico che sta prima del/a forma e che la costituisce. And he goes as far as to identifying type with the idea of architecture itself: “Infine potremo dire che il tipo è l’idea stessa dell’architettura; ciò che sta più vicino al/a sua essenza.”<sup>61</sup>

Here, we can understand several points. One of which is the parallelism between Quatremère’s and Rossi’s understanding of “type” at the fundamental level. We also understand Rossi considers “type” as a “logical principle” rather than a particular form. Rossi also states that “type” is the idea of architecture itself. However, Madrazo also mentions a fundamental difference between Quatremère and Rossi:

“Still, there is one fundamental difference between Quatre-

61. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 1995), 325.

mère's type and the interpretation that architects like Rossi made of it. Quatremère's type needs to be understood within the context of his concern with the classic doctrine of art as imitation. In this regard, type was for Quatremère a principle underlying both natural and artistic forms. But for architects like Rossi, mimesis and nature are no longer a significant issue in the architectural debate. For them, the interest of the idea of Type lies in the possibility of building a scientific basis for the discipline of architecture."<sup>62</sup>

Madrazo points out the fact that although they share a similar approach to "type", the fundamental intention of Rossi is completely different from that of Quatremère.

In the 1970s, the concept of archetype was used in numerous works and studies, especially in the Postmodern discourse. Thiis-Evensen mentions this notion with these words:

"During the 1970's the theory of archetypes has increasingly utilized as a basis of architectural practice, through the work of, among others, Michael Graves, Rob and Leon Krier and Mario Botta."<sup>63</sup>

Later, Jacoby mentions another important debate starting outside Italy in the discourse of "type" in architecture in this passage:

"Rossi's thesis of type in *The Architecture of the City* as the irreducible 'apparatus' of architecture proposed historical continuity and rediscovery of forms in place of invention, a thesis shared by his contemporary Oswald Mathias Ungers. With the Italian debate on typology spreading in the late 1960s in continental Europe, similar dialogues emerged elsewhere, equally preoccupied with the nature of the architectural and historical object in the city. Unlike the Italian debate, however, which took recourse to Enlightenment theories, these discussions focused on a re-examination and critique of the Modern Movement's technical abstraction and break with history. The belated Anglo-Saxon discussion was largely due to an 'anti-intellectual bias,' which lacked a 'strong tradition in Modernism' and belief in 'the unity of theory and practice for architectural design', and when it finally occurred, was largely dominated by formal research."<sup>64</sup>

62. Ibid, 326.

63. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, *Archetypes in Architecture*, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17.

64. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 267.

Here, we can understand that another criticism of the Modern Movement's technical abstraction and break with history was starting in

the Anglo-Saxon geography. Jacoby mentions Ungers' stance in this respect with these words:

"An important contributor to the debate on architecture's relationship to the city after Modernism was Oswald Mathias Ungers (1926–2007), a prolific German architect and educator. His close exchange with such figures as the Smithson's, Rossi, and Rowe influenced his theories and pedagogy that shared the concerns of Team 10 and Neorationalism, and sought an anti-technocratic and autonomous language of architecture. Ungers saw architecture as a synthesis of art and techné, and therefore emerging from art and utility as a problem of composition in relation to the traditional concepts of rhythm, symmetry, proportion, axis, and contrast."<sup>65</sup>

What Jacoby underlines here is the fact that Ungers understand architecture as a concept emerging from art and utility rather than the traditional visual and compositional values. Later, Jacoby explains Ungers' stance further in this passage:

"He once again finds the autonomy of architecture in geometric order, which he believes rational and conceptual. And in a final shift in his thinking and allegiances, Ungers prescribes no longer to images or a morphological metamorphosis but elementary archetypes, the fiction of timelessness of form. Ungers seeks no longer diagrams of abstraction but formal diagrams themselves. As he admits: 'The designer does not invent, he discovers.'"<sup>66</sup>

Here, we can understand that Ungers considers "type" as not a "morphological metamorphosis" but as "elementary archetypes" or "the fiction of timelessness of form". Jacoby mentions Ungers' perspective toward "typology" as well:

"Typological thought connotes more to Ungers than just types as patterns or concepts, and is part of a necessary interim process of structuring and classification without reduction to a limited number of types and meanings as stereotypes. Typological reasoning signifies to him a creative process that relies on analogies, images, and metaphors, and is a means of recognising, in a Goethean sense of morphology, transformable types and archetypes and 'defines a way of thinking in basic all-encompassing contingencies, of having a universal view of the world of ideas, as well as that of reality.'"<sup>67</sup>

65. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 275.

66. Ibid, 293.

67. Ibid, 286.






Figure 2.17: , Worm's eye axonometric of Museum in Merida, Rafael Moneo, Hand drawn by Stan Allen,1984.

Jacoby points out the fact that Ungers considers "type" in a much more dynamic and rich sense rather than stable and reduced stereotypes.

In the contemporary context, the discourse is still developing. In this respect, one of the important writers is the Spanish architect Rafael Moneo. Jacoby mentions Moneo's stance with these words:

"Rafael Moneo in 'On Typology' (1978) posited that typology raises the contradictory questions of the architectural object in its singularity and repeatability. In the latter sense, the work of architecture is typified, relying on a type that classes objects with the 'same formal structure.'"<sup>68</sup>

Here, we can understand that Moneo mainly focuses on the "singularity" and "repeatability" of the architectural object in this context. Jacoby, later, explains further:

"For type to remain relevant, the architectural object must be considered beyond its singularity through what it has in common with others, and requires the renewal of its relation to a formal structure: 'the old definitions must be modified to accommodate an idea of type that can incorporate even the present state, where, in fact, subtle mechanisms of relationships

68. Ibid, 294.

are observable and suggest typological explanations'.<sup>69</sup>

Another important figure in the contemporary context of the discourse is Antoine Picon. He often mentions archetypes in his writings. One of which is the article "Dom-ino: Archetype and Fiction". In the article, Picon compares Laugier's "primitive hut" and Le Corbusier's "Dom-ino" with these words:

"Laugier's primitive hut and Le Corbusier's Dom-ino share this mix of matter-of-factness and fiction, which may underlie their common ambition to propose a new architectural archetype - namely, a configuration that appears both foundational and generic to the point that it may even be considered as situated on the threshold that separates mere construction from architecture and, more generally, the non-architectural from the architectural, whether the nonarchitectural be structural, urban, or even related to landscape."<sup>70</sup>

As we can understand here, Picon considers there are several similarities between the two examples. However, later, Picon also points out an important notion:

"An archetype is not a type. As a generic condition, as a limit, it can inspire very different types of buildings. In this respect, Dom-ino is even more archetypal than the 18th-century primitive hut, which was translated mainly to churches that share the same basic features: freestanding columns carrying barrel vaults, with the occasional presence of flying buttresses borrowed from the Gothic tradition."<sup>71</sup>

Here, Picon explains his understanding by considering Dom-ino as a more archetypal example. Thus, he states the fact that the crucial feature of "archetype" is not its relation with the "primitive" anymore.

69. Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning in Architecture" (PhD diss., Technical University Of Berlin, 2013), 294-295.

70. Antoine Picon, "Dom-ino: Archetype and Fiction," *Log*, no. 30 (2014), 171.

71. *Ibid*, 172.



TWO AUTHORS

There are several people who either directly write about archetypes or have works that are relatable to archetypes. However, in this case, since we will deeply examine the precise intellectual positions regarding archetypes, we will need two theorists who described their thoughts in a quite clear and detailed way. Also, since there will be a dialog, they should be people who lived in a similar timeframe. In light of these principles, we can say that a dialog between Aldo Rossi and Christian Norberg-Schulz would create a meaningful outcome on this topic.

Aldo Rossi is an architectural theorist and a practitioner of architecture, who is specifically interested in archetypes. He defines architecture as “a creation inseparable from civilized life and the society in which it is manifested” in the first chapter of his book, “Architecture of the City”.<sup>72</sup> He also says that “Architecture came into being along with the first traces of the city; it is deeply rooted in the formation of civilization and is a permanent, universal, and necessary artifact.”<sup>73</sup> As we understand from these statements, “city” is at the center of his understanding of architecture, which is deeply related to the living around it. We can also observe in his writings that he understands the city as a “man-made object” which is made of “urban artifacts”. He asks the question, “Where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin?” and later he answers it while he was talking about “locus” and “primary elements”, “it begins in the event and the sign that has marked the event.”<sup>74</sup> This concept can be understood as the “collective memory” of the city. Another point we can get from his writings, as we can also observe in the statement we mentioned, is that he defines architecture as a “permanent” and “universal” artifact. In fact, he periodically mentions “permanences/persistences” in his book, which we can directly relate directly to the archetypes.

Christian Norberg-Schulz is an architectural theorist and author. Comparing Rossi’s “urban artifact”, he names the architectural object as an “architectural thing” which can be related to Kant’s “Ding an Sich which means “the thing-in-itself” in German. In his writings, he underlines the problem of “meaning” in architecture. In this case, he gives a great role in monuments and monumentality. He quotes from S. Giedion and says “... meanings are expressed by means of symbols.”<sup>75</sup> And later, he explains the need for a “language of images”. Last but not least, Heidegger’s thoughts on architecture play an

72. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 21.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid, 106.

75. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 153.



Figure 3.1: "The Temple of Juno at Agrigento", Caspar David Friedrich, 1830. From the article "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture", Christian Norberg-Schulz.

important part in the roots of Norberg-Schulz's world of ideas. In his writings, he quotes him frequently. In terms of our research, two main concepts of Heidegger are quite important. One of which is "nearness". Nearness is one of the fundamental elements of his thought world. He explains, depending on the changes, how a subject experience a spatial relation in terms of practical and perceptual aspects. "Nearness" is what the subject experiences when these two aspects come together. Thus, it can be related to the role of rituals in our research. Another important concept of Heidegger is "dwelling" which can be defined in a very simplified manner as "living that constantly redefines the environment as a continuation of the design process". Thus, the concept of "dwelling" has immense importance and a deep connection with the subject of our research

#### BIOGRAPHY OF ALDO ROSSI

Aldo Rossi, an Italian architect, designer, and theorist, achieved international recognition and acclaim in three distinct fields: theory, drawing, and architecture. Born on May 3, 1931, in Milan, Italy, Rossi's contributions to the architectural discourse of the second half

of the 20th century earned him widespread fame and admiration. Graduating from Politecnico di Milano in 1959, Rossi embarked on a career that encompassed both practice and academia, leaving an indelible mark on the world of architecture. He was the first Italian to receive the Pritzker Prize for architecture. Tragically, his life was cut short on September 4, 1997, in Milan, Italy, but his legacy continues to inspire generations of architects and designers.<sup>76</sup>

Rossi's early engagement with architectural criticism unfolded within the pages of the renowned magazine "Casabella-Continuità." He not only wrote critical essays but also assumed the role of editor for the magazine from 1959 to 1964, further establishing his voice and influence within the architectural community. Throughout his career, Rossi authored two notable books that provided profound insights into his architectural philosophy. The first, published in 1966, is titled "L'Architettura della città" or "The Architecture of the City." In this seminal work, Rossi challenges the prevailing architectural conventions of the early 20th century, particularly the Modernist approach, and offers a critical examination of the concept of "function" as it relates to architectural artifacts. The book explores the relationship between architecture, the city, and human experience, solidifying Rossi's position as a visionary thinker and theorist. The second book, "Autobiografia scientifica" or "A Scientific Autobiography," published in 1981, provides personal and professional insights into Rossi's journey, shedding light on the formative experiences that shaped his architectural vision.<sup>77</sup>

Rossi's educational journey began within the Somascan Religious Order. He then pursued studies at Alessandro Volta College in Lecco, fostering a multidisciplinary approach that would later manifest in his architectural practice. In 1949, Rossi embarked on his architectural studies at Politecnico di Milano, immersing himself in the rich architectural heritage of Italy. In 1959, under the guidance of his thesis advisor Piero Portaluppi, Rossi graduated from the institution, armed with a strong theoretical foundation and a deep understanding of architectural principles. During this time, in 1955, he received an invitation from Ernesto Nathan Rogers to collaborate with the magazine "Casabella-Continuità," where he would contribute until 1964, further shaping his perspective on architecture.<sup>78</sup>

Rossi's professional career began to take shape even during his studies. From 1956 to 1957, he had the opportunity to work at the studios of influential architects and furniture designers Ignazio Gardella and Marco Zanuso, gaining practical experience and insights into design and craftsmanship. His early academic engagement came in 1963 when he assumed a position as an assistant professor under Ludovico

76. "Biography: Aldo Rossi," The Pritzker Architecture Prize, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://www.pritzkerprize.com/biography-aldo-rossi>.

77. "Aldo Rossi," Architectuul, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://architectuul.com/architect/aldo-rossi>.

78. "Aldo Rossi Biography, architecture & drawings," Casati Gallery, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://www.casatigallery.com/designers/aldo-rossi/>.

Quarani at the School of Urban Planning in Arezzo. This marked the beginning of Rossi's dual role as both a practitioner and an educator. In 1965, he became an assistant professor under Carlo Aymonino at the Institute of Architecture in Venice, further honing his teaching skills and sharing his architectural vision with a new generation of students.<sup>79</sup>

In 1966, Rossi's academic career reached a new milestone as he became a lecturer at Politecnico di Milano, a role he would fulfill while simultaneously making significant contributions to architectural theory and practice. It was during this period that he published his groundbreaking book "The Architecture of the City," which soon became one of the classic works in the field. Rossi's ability to articulate his ideas and theories through both his writings and his architectural projects solidified his position as a leading figure in the architectural community.<sup>80</sup>

Rossi's academic pursuits extended beyond Italy, with teaching engagements at prestigious institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Cooper Union, and Cornell, allowing him to share his knowledge and perspectives with a global audience. From 1971 to 1975, he chaired the Architectural Design department at ETH Zurich, where he continued to shape the minds of aspiring architects. Additionally, in 1973, he served as the director of the International Architectural Section of the "Triennale Milano," further showcasing his leadership and curatorial skills.<sup>81</sup>

Throughout his career, Rossi undertook various architectural projects that exemplified his design philosophy and theoretical approach. His first major project, the Monte Amiata Housing complex in Milan's Gallarate quarter, designed in collaboration with Carlo Aymonino in 1970, marked a turning point in Rossi's career from theory to practice. This ambitious project allowed Rossi and Aymonino to implement their urban ideologies and realize their utopian vision for an ideal micro-community within the city. The resulting complex consisted of five buildings, one of which Rossi designed himself, showcasing his ability to blend functionalism and poetic sensibilities.<sup>82</sup>

Another significant work in Rossi's portfolio is the San Cataldo Cemetery in Modena, Italy, constructed between 1971 and 1984. This cemetery is considered one of the pioneering and most important postmodernist works in the world, exemplifying Rossi's mastery of large-scale projects and his ability to imbue architecture with profound emotional and symbolic resonance. The cemetery's design reflects Rossi's exploration of the relationship between architecture and memory, creating a space that pays homage to the deceased while evoking a sense of timelessness.<sup>83</sup>

79. "Aldo Rossi Biography, architecture & drawings," Casati Gallery, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://www.casatigallery.com/designers/aldo-rossi/>.

80. "BIOGRAPHY," 20th Century Architecture, Accessed June 24, 2023, <http://architecture-history.org/architects/architects/ROSSI/biography.html>.

81. "Announcement: Aldo Rossi," The Pritzker Architecture Prize, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://www.pritzkerprize.com/biography-aldo-rossi>.

82. "Aldo Rossi," Architectuul, Accessed June 24, 2023, <https://architectuul.com/architect/aldo-rossi>.

83. Ibid.



In 1979, Rossi was commissioned to design the Teatro del Mondo for the Venice Biennale, further solidifying his reputation as a visionary architect. This floating theater, with its enigmatic geometric form, served as a testament to Rossi's ability to merge art, architecture, and theatricality into a single, captivating experience.<sup>84</sup>

Rossi's theoretical and urban works had a profound impact on the architectural approach of the "Internationale Bauausstellung 1984-1987" in West Berlin. His article titled "Aspetti della tipologia residenziale a Berlino, 1960" praised Berlin for its fragmented, multi-loci, and multi-fabric urban typology, presenting it as a counterpoint to the totalitarian master planning of the Modernists that preceded him. Rossi's ideas resonated with the concept of smaller urban zones, urban artifacts, and a more organic approach to urban renewal. Through his built projects for the International Building Exhibition (IBA) in Kochstrasse, Wilhelmstrasse, and Rauchstrasse, Rossi had the opportunity to put his theories into practice within the complex and layered urban fabric that forms the collective memory of Berlin. These projects became a testament to his ability to blend historical context with innovative design solutions.<sup>85</sup>

Aldo Rossi's lasting legacy lies in his significant contributions to architectural theory, his iconic built works, and his visionary approach to urban design. His ability to excel in theory, drawing, and architecture propelled him to global recognition and established him as a key figure in the architectural field. Rossi's critical insights continue to shape the discourse of architecture, inspiring new generations of architects to consider the relationship between the built environment, human experience, and the collective memory of cities. Though his life was tragically cut short, his visionary ideas and profound contributions ensure that his influence will be felt for generations to come.

## BIOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ

Christian Norberg-Schulz was a prominent Norwegian architect, author, educator, and architectural theorist, known for his profound contributions to the field of architecture. Born on May 23, 1926, in Oslo, Norway, Norberg-Schulz developed a passion for architecture at an early age and went on to leave a lasting impact on the profession through his extensive body of work and influential writings.<sup>86</sup>

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Large Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June 10, 2023, [https://snl.no/Christian\\_Norberg-Schulz/](https://snl.no/Christian_Norberg-Schulz/).

After completing his education under the renowned architectural historian Sigfried Giedion at ETH Zurich, Norberg-Schulz graduated in 1949 and returned to his hometown of Oslo. He began his professional career by working with esteemed architects Dagfinn Morseth

and Mads Wiel Gedde. It was during this time that he had the opportunity to collaborate with the celebrated architect Arne Korsmo on the Planetveien 10-12-14 housing project in Oslo, which showcased Norberg-Schulz's early talent and innovative design approach.<sup>87</sup>

In 1950, Norberg-Schulz, together with Korsmo and other notable architects such as Sverre Fehn and Jørn Utzon, founded PAGON, the Norwegian Delegation at CIAM (International Congresses of Modern Architecture). This platform allowed him to engage with other visionary architects and explore emerging ideas and philosophies in architecture. The following year, he became a member of CIAM in England, further expanding his network and knowledge within the architectural community.<sup>88</sup>

In 1952, Norberg-Schulz was awarded a prestigious Fulbright scholarship, which enabled him to pursue advanced studies at Harvard University in the United States. His time at Harvard broadened his horizons and exposed him to diverse architectural approaches and theories. Additionally, in the early 1960s, he embarked on an internship in Rome, immersing himself in the rich architectural heritage of the city and deepening his understanding of classical Italian architecture.<sup>89</sup>

Norberg-Schulz's career took a significant turn in 1963 when he commenced his teaching journey at the School of Architecture in Oslo. Simultaneously, he assumed the role of director at the Oslo Architects' Association, solidifying his presence in the architectural community. That same year, he also embarked on his role as the editor of the architectural magazine *Byggkunst*, a position he held for fifteen years until 1978. During this time, Norberg-Schulz contributed extensively to the magazine, sharing his thoughts, research, and insights on architecture with a broader audience.<sup>90</sup>

In 1964, Norberg-Schulz obtained his Ph.D. from the Norwegian Institute of Architecture and Design. His doctoral dissertation, titled "Intentions in Architecture," aimed to establish an open theory of architecture adaptable to various contexts. Drawing inspiration from Gestalt psychology, he emphasized the significance of visual perception in architectural design. Norberg-Schulz's book, published the same year, garnered international recognition, establishing him as an esteemed architectural theorist.<sup>91</sup>

In 1965, Norberg-Schulz ventured into academia as a professor at Yale University, where he shared his wealth of knowledge and mentored countless aspiring architects. He continued to expand his academic endeavors by accepting a visiting professorship at Cambridge

87. "Norberg-Schulz's House," architecture norway, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://www.architecturenorway.no/questions/histories/otero-pailos-planetveien/>.

88. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Large Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June 10, 2023, [https://snl.no/Christian\\_Norberg-Schulz/](https://snl.no/Christian_Norberg-Schulz/).

89. "Norberg-Schulz's House," architecture norway, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://www.architecturenorway.no/questions/histories/otero-pailos-planetveien/>.

90. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Large Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June 10, 2023, [https://snl.no/Christian\\_Norberg-Schulz/](https://snl.no/Christian_Norberg-Schulz/).

91. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Architectuul, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://architectuul.com/architect/christian-norberg-schulz/>.

University in the United States in 1966. Ultimately, he returned to his alma mater, the Oslo School of Architecture and Design, where he held a professorship from 1966 until his retirement in 1994, leaving an indelible mark on generations of students.<sup>92</sup>

One of Norberg-Schulz's most notable contributions to architectural theory was his 1980 book, "Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture." In this seminal work, he introduced a method of phenomenological analysis of cities, exploring the essence and character of different places. Norberg-Schulz drew heavily from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, pioneering the fields of "phenomenology of place" and "architectural phenomenology." His writings sparked debates and played a crucial role in the development of post-modern architectural theories.<sup>93</sup>

Throughout his career, Norberg-Schulz also made significant contributions to the study of Baroque architecture and classical Italian architecture, earning recognition for his meticulous research and insightful analysis. His expertise and nuanced understanding of architectural history allowed him to shed new light on these architectural styles, enriching the scholarly discourse and inspiring fellow architects and researchers.<sup>94</sup>

While Norberg-Schulz embraced the possibilities of expression offered by the postmodern movement, particularly influenced by Charles Jencks's book "The Language of Postmodern Architecture," he later became disillusioned with its growing isolation and loss of original values in the 1990s. In response, he embarked on a profound study of the theoretical foundations of modernity, resulting in his book "Principles of Modern Architecture." This work aimed to reestablish the fundamental principles that underpin modern architecture, providing a renewed framework for architectural thought and practice.<sup>95</sup>

Despite his numerous achievements and international acclaim, Norberg-Schulz remained grounded and dedicated to the pursuit of architectural excellence. His passion for the field extended beyond his academic and professional endeavors, as he continually sought to enrich the experience of architecture, making it more profound and meaningful for both practitioners and the general public.

Tragically, Christian Norberg-Schulz's life was cut short by cancer, and he passed away in 2000 in Oslo, leaving behind a remarkable legacy in the world of architecture. His writings, teachings, and ideas continue to inspire architects, shaping the discourse and practice of architecture, and his contributions will forever be cherished as a testament to his remarkable intellect, vision, and dedication to the field he loved.

92. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Large Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June 10, 2023, [https://snl.no/Christian\\_Norberg-Schulz/](https://snl.no/Christian_Norberg-Schulz/).

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," Architectuul, Accessed June 10, 2023, <https://architectuul.com/architect/christian-norberg-schulz/>.

## THOUGHTS IN GENERAL - ALDO ROSSI

Aldo Rossi is one of the first theorists that popularized the term “archetype” in the architecture of modern times. Rossi was a multidirectional architect who expressed and explained himself in different mediums, such as drawing, writing, and architectural practice.

Despite the fact that these are not all his written works, Rossi has written two books: “The Architecture of the City” in 1966 and “A Scientific Autobiography” in 1981. However, Rossi’s life in literature started way before these books in the late 1950s with Casabella-Continuità. Italian architect Robin M. Graziadei says “Paradoxically, Rossi believed that through this disassociation of techniques he would be able to get closer to an identification of the creative process with the project in question than if he were to write purely physical descriptions of projects.”<sup>96</sup>

In his book, “The Architecture of the City”, he says “I use the term architecture in a positive and pragmatic sense, as a creation inseparable from civilized life and the society in which it is manifested. By nature, it is collective.”<sup>97</sup> Therefore, for Rossi, collectiveness is a fundamental element of, not only archetypes as we mentioned before but architecture as well. Graziadei says “What art and architecture have in common, says Rossi, is that they are both born in unconscious life. By reaching into a deep well of personal memories, he describes his projects not simply as objects, but as labours of love rooted in his personal history.”<sup>98</sup> Here, we can understand, for Rossi, another definitive element of architecture is memory.

Rossi was influenced by numerous authors and architects. In her article in 1981, Micha Bandini sums the main influences by a reference from Vittorio Gregotti and she says:

“Vittorio Gregotti, then a staff editor at the magazine, described its ideological perspective as coming under the influence of three separate sources: first, there was G.C. Argan’s historicist-Marxist book *Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus*, the second, the critique by T.W. Adorno of the *Consumer Society* and the third was the reading of Marx by the phenomenological school of Enzo Pace. While Rossi’s writings do not directly comment on this source material, its influence can be found in most of the 31 articles he wrote for *Casabella-Continuità* during this period.”<sup>99</sup>

Another important influence was by Ludovico Quaroni. Rossi had taught architecture as his assistant at the University of Arezzo in 1963.

96. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiography,” *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 63.

97. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 21.

98. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiography,” *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 60.

99. Micha Bandini, “ALDO ROSSI,” *AA Files*, no. 1 (1981): 106.

Bandini says “Ludovico Quaroni had a special part to play in Rossi’s thinking.”<sup>100</sup> However, despite the influence, Rossi’s perspective differentiates from Quaroni. Bandini points this out and says “So for Rossi, to be an architect meant to think about architecture as a field in which only precise theoretical constructions were permissible, and by saying this he reduces the lyrical quality of Quaroni’s writing to a few principles which can hardly capture Quaroni’s rich thought on a human flexible architecture and its place in the life of a city, an ancient “more beautiful” city” Whose memory should help us to design for the present.”<sup>101</sup>

Rossi was also influenced by Carl G. Jung, a Swiss psychologist and founder of analytical psychology, who also brought the term “archetype” to modern use. Bandini mentions this influence of Jung on Rossi as well and uses this example about “Analogous City”, a collage signifies the idea that cities are analogues of collective thought and that each city is connected to one another in a discursive chain by Rossi, as a reference:

“Rossi himself had quoted Jung’s definition in his ‘Analogical Architecture’ article in which he discussed, amongst others, those two projects. Jung had said, in defining analogy:

I have explained that “logical” thought is what is expressed in words directed from the outside world in the form of discourse. ‘Analogical’ thought is sensed yet unreal, imagined yet silent; it is not a discourse but rather a meditation on themes of the past, an interior monologue. Logical thought is ‘thinking in words’. Analogical thought is archaic, unexpressed, and practically inexpressible in words.

The ending words of this quote must be seen as particularly appropriate for the design phase Rossi was experiencing. The clarity of the Analogous City collage measured against the written explanations of it would have reflected this ‘practically inexpressible in words’ quality.”<sup>102</sup>

Later in the book, Rossi also says “Generally, the most difficult historical problems of the city are resolved by dividing history into periods and hence ignoring or misunderstanding the universal and permanent character of the forces of the urban dynamic; and here the importance of a comparative method becomes evident.”<sup>103</sup> Firstly, he mentions two other main characteristics of archetypes here: universality and permanency. However, more importantly, he points out that there is a methodological disparity in our approach to under-

100. Ibid.

101. Micha Bandini, “ALDO ROSSI,” *AA Files*, no. 1 (1981): 106.

102. Ibid, 109.

103. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 27.

standing the history of architecture. One of our most efficient tools to understand a particular era or place is to atomize and categorize the subject. This kind of practice is mostly focused on the difference between things. However, since we are looking for similarities and permanences of differently categorized as we try to understand archetypes, our mainstream approach doesn't give proper outcomes and even creates a perception that all the information comes from this differentiation ignoring the information that is inherent in the subject.

One of the most important elements of Rossi's literature is "city". His definition of architecture depends on the concept of "city". In the introduction of his book, he mentions the relationship between the city and architecture. He says, "Architecture came into being along with the first traces of the city; it is deeply rooted in the formation of civilization and is a permanent, universal, and necessary artifact. With time, the city grows upon itself; it acquires consciousness and memory."<sup>104</sup> In this description, he gives us the most important keywords of his architectural theory: permanency, universality, necessity, consciousness, and memory. All these words are the cornerstones of his world of thought. Seungkoo Jo refers to this notion in his article "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory", and says "As a diverse totality, the city is haunted by meaning which the collective memory extracts from the traces. These traces are called permanence by Rossi, the urban artifacts that preserve the history of the city as built form."<sup>105</sup> Later in the same article, Jo also says "Rossi(1982) defined the city: By architecture I mean not only the visible image of the city and the sum of its different architectures, but architecture as a construction, the construction of the city over time."<sup>106</sup>

Rossi considers "city" as a synthesis of two opposing philosophical perspectives which are Aristotelian and Platonic stances. Rossi mentions these with these words:

"In the beginning of a study of the city, we find ourselves confronted with two very different positions. These are best exemplified in the Greek city, where the Aristotelian analysis of urban reality is counterposed to that of Plato's Republic."<sup>107</sup>

Later in the book, Rossi while explaining the relationship between urban artifacts and the individual, says "All these experiences, their sum, constitute the city."<sup>108</sup> Graziadei mentions this idea of Rossi and says "For Rossi, it is the event that takes place in a building that is architecture, not the inert object."<sup>109</sup> We can understand that he considers the city, not as a physical object, but as a perceptual result of physical experiences, which gives us a hint about how he understands the architecture and the city.

104. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 21.

105. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 232.

106. Ibid, 234.

107. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 23.

108. Ibid 29.

109. Robin M. Graziadei, "The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi's Autobiography," *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 63.




Figure 3.2: The Collage of Analogous City, Aldo Rossi.

As we can see Rossi's understanding of architecture can be related to social life and human activity as well as archetypes. He underlines the relation by saying "I believe that the importance of ritual in its collective nature and its essential character as an element for preserving myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of monuments and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the city and of the transmission of ideas in an urban context."<sup>110</sup> Rossi implies the similarity between myths and architecture by saying that "Myths come and go, passing slowly from one place to another; every generation recounts them differently and adds new elements to the patrimony received from the past; but behind this changing reality, there is a permanent reality that in some way manages to elude the action of time."<sup>111</sup> Therefore, he says, "For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible."<sup>112</sup> and describes the similar role of rituals and monument in the context of collective memory of a community.

Memory is another significant element of Rossi's literature. He says, "The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these problems and invests all of man's inhabited and constructed realm with value. It arises inevitably because it is so deeply rooted in the human condition."<sup>113</sup> Jo mentions this notion and says "Rossi argues the city is the locus of collective memory, and by this means that the city acts as a wax tablet that gathers up the traces of lived experience in order to create its monuments."<sup>114</sup> Jo also says "Rossi employed memory as a valuable means, a starting point for creating architectonic structure rich with meaning and rich with potential which exploits thinking, reading, and responding."<sup>115</sup> About this notion, Jo gives the example of Rossi's famous collage:

"The drawing of the Analogous City(1976) by Rossi shows how the city can be depicted, using the meaning that resided within the identifiable or referenced forms. For Rossi's Analogous City, there is no real site existing. Michel Foucault's(1974) type of history throws light on the analogous city: for he defines a history of ruptures, interruptions, and discontinuities, a history that searched among the strata and layers of time for the points where concepts were displaced and transformed, or the moments where history was moved."<sup>116</sup>

Rossi also mentions about the memory as "an inseparable whole" and says "This inseparable whole is at once the natural and the artificial homeland of man, and suggests a definition of natural which also applies to architecture."<sup>117</sup> Later in the same chapter, he quotes

110. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 24.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 27.

114. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 234.

115. Ibid, 236.

116. Ibid, 234.

117. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 27.



from Francesco Milizia: "Although architecture in reality lacks a model in nature, it has another model derived from man's natural labor in constructing his first house."<sup>118</sup> Especially, here in the last quotation, we can observe how he relates the concept of "memory" and "archetype".

Here, it is important to mention the role of "teatro" and its relation with memory in Rossi's understanding of architecture. Jo says "Rossi (1982) sees the city as the theater of human events, ...".<sup>119</sup> He also says "The locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space, time, form, and site of a succession of both ancient and more modern events."<sup>120</sup> We can see that the allegory of theater has a significant role in Rossi's understanding of architecture. This notion becomes clear with this passage from Jo's article:

"Rossi argues in his book, *A Scientific Autobiography* (1981), that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespear's Globe Theater, revealing the similarity even in the common names of Theaters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespear's dictum, All the World's stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would have searched for a way to express the space of theater."<sup>121</sup>

Here, we can see, much more clearly, Rossi perceives the world as a theater and considers a deep relation between city and theater since they are both "locus" of the collective memory. This notion underlines the importance of a work of Rossi, *Teatro del Mundo*, which was a temporary theater building built in 1979 for 1980 Venice Biennale. Jo says "In the Venice of modern times, Aldo Rossi tried to grasp the highest reality through a magically activated imagination in his project, *Teatro del Mundo*(1979), where the mind and memory of man was considered divine."<sup>122</sup>

118. Ibid.

119. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 233.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid, 234.

124. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 130.

Rossi often points out connections between architecture and psychology. Jo says "Rossi stated, the idea of analogy can never be fully possessed by the conscious and rational mind, this is what makes it real to the human psyche."<sup>123</sup> Rossi mentions about "collective memory" as "the deepest structure of urban artifacts":

"With these considerations we approach the deepest structure of urban artifacts and thus their form -the architecture of the city. "The soul of the city" becomes the city's history, the sign on the walls of the municipium, the city's distinctive and definitive character, its memory."<sup>124</sup>

Here, we can see a direct connection with the term “deep-structure” in Jungian psychology, which is defined as the fundamental information of the Jungian archetypes by Carl Gustav Jung. In the first chapter of the book “Four Archetypes”, Jung refers to Plato’s “idea” as a similar concept to this “deep structure”. As between Plato’s world of ideas and the world of forms, the “collective memory” and the “city” can be confused in Rossi’s work. Rossi responds this confusion with this passage:

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is associated with object and places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This relationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.

Thus we consider locus the characteristic principle of urban artifacts; the concepts of locus, architecture, permanences, and history together help us to understand the complexity of urban artifacts. The collective memory participates in the actual transformation of space in the works of the collective, a transformation that is always conditioned by whatever material realities oppose it.”<sup>125</sup>

Rossi recognizes the value of individuality as well as collectiveness in the context of “urban artifacts”. He says “Within this idea exist the actions of individuals, and in this sense not everything in urban artifacts is collective; yet the collective and the individual nature of urban artifacts in the end constitutes the same urban structure. Memory, within the structure, is the consciousness of the city; it is a rational operation whose development demonstrates with maximum clarity, economy, and harmony that which has already come to be accepted.”<sup>126</sup> He also relates this notion with the concepts of “event” and “sign”, which we will examine later.

“This individuality ultimately is connected to an original artifact -in the sense of Cattaneo’s principle; it is an event and a form. Thus, the union between the past and the future exists in the very idea of the city that it flows through in the same way that memory flows through the life of a person; and always, in order to be realized, this idea must not only shape but be shaped by reality. This shaping is a permanent aspect of a city’s unique artifacts, monuments, and the idea we have of it. It also explains why in antiquity the founding of a city be-

125. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 130.

126. *Ibid.*, 131.




Figure 3.3: Drawings of "Teatro del Mundo", Aldo Rossi.

came part of the city's mythology."<sup>127</sup>

"Urban artifact" is another important concept of Rossi's literature. In his book, he mentions it as "...like the city itself are characterized by their own history and thus by their own form."<sup>128</sup> He also mentions about four characteristics of an "urban artifact":

"We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban artifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory."<sup>129</sup>

127. Ibid, 131.

128. Ibid, 29.

129. Ibid, 32.

130. Ibid, 29.

131. Ibid, 29.

He also talks about the relationship between urban artifacts and collectiveness, and says "At this point, we might discuss what our idea of the building is, our most general memory of it as a product of the collective, and what relationship it affords us with this collective."<sup>130</sup> Another point he makes about urban artifacts is about the functionality of the urban artifacts: "In an urban artifact, certain original values and functions remain, others are totally altered; about some stylistic aspects of the form we are certain, others are less obvious."<sup>131</sup> Here, he points




Figure 3.4: Drawings of Monument to the Resistance, Aldo Rossi.

out that the original and first functionality of an urban artifact is not an inherent feature. Jo mentions this notion and says "Rossi(1982) makes the observation that forms have an autonomous life which supersedes the functions for which they were designed."<sup>132</sup> Later in the same article, Jo also says "Rossi argued that architecture should achieve formal autonomy, to gain identity, in order to meaningfully relate and to convey meaning."<sup>133</sup> Later, he talks about the relationship between urban artifacts and the individual: "If one takes any urban artifact -a building, a street, a district- and attempts to describe it, the same difficulties arise which we encountered earlier with respect to the Palazzo della Ragione in Padua. Some of these difficulties derive from the ambiguity of language, and in part these difficulties can be overcome, but there will always be a type of experience recognizable only to those who have walked through the particular building, street or district."<sup>134</sup> As he pointed out while he was defining the "city", he underlines the phenomenological aspect of this interaction between the artifacts and the subject. In the following sentence, he also mentions about the subjectivity of this kind of experience: "Thus, the concept that one person has of an urban artifact will always differ from that of someone who "lives" that same artifact."<sup>135</sup> Graziadei mentions this idea and says "For Rossi, it is to childhood that the phenomenological separation between

132. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 234.

133. Ibid.

134. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 33.

135. Ibid, 33.

the self and the world can be traced, and this is the separation experienced by the architect between the project as merely a representation and the project as a completed and lived building.”<sup>136</sup>

While he describes the “city”, he quotes from Lévi-Strauss and, says “Setting forth the problem in this manner, Claude Lévi-Strauss brought the study of the city into a realm rich with unexpected developments. He noted how, more than other works of art, the city achieves a balance between natural and artificial elements; it is an object of nature and subject of culture.”<sup>137</sup> Here, he mentions this notion of balance between naturality and artificiality, nature and culture. This notion is later mentioned in another paragraph: “It is in this sense not only the place of the human condition, but itself a part of that condition, and is represented in the city and its monuments, in districts, dwellings, and all urban artifacts that emerge from inhabited space.”<sup>138</sup> Here, there is an important point. He points out that “urban artifacts” emerge from “inhabited space”. Thus, he describes “urban artifacts” as a perceptual thing that is surrounded by the life, not as a physical object of its own. Also, this point also can be related to Heidegger’s concept of “dwelling” and “building”.

One of the most important concepts in Rossi’s architecture is “type”. Architectural historian Maria Louise Lobsinger mentions the importance of “type” in Rossi’s architecture in her article “That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi”:

“We know that by the early 1960s Rossi employed a more precise understanding of the architectural -design and analytical- equivalents of literary type. Type as discussed above gave Rossi a scientific means -that is, a logic with both material and conceptual dimensions- to transcribe the literary idea of typicality and a realist critical method into a theory of architecture. Collaborative studies on typology based on analytical drawings that traced morphological change in Italian cities put in place the physical evidence to support a materialist critical apparatus. A teoria della progettazione and a teoria dell’architettura, a theory and a practice of architecture, could now be defined. The studies from this period form the backbone of Rossi’s *The Architecture of the City*.”<sup>139</sup>

He describes the “type” as “... developed according to both needs and aspirations to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely from society to society.”<sup>140</sup> Thus, he relates the “type” with form and cul-

136. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiography,” *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 63.

137. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 33.

138. Ibid.

139. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 52.

140. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 40.

ture. In the article we mention below, Lobsinger says “For Rossi, type stood as a totalizing gesture against the modality of the new, aesthetic expressions based on subjective inclinations or on psychological experience. His conception of type was grounded on Lukacs’s characterization of the typical in literature.”<sup>141</sup> Later, Rossi also comes up with a definition: “I would define the concept of type as something that is permanent and complex, a logical principle that is prior to form and that constitutes it.”<sup>142</sup> Here, there are two important points he underlines. One is the concept of permanency, which later he related to history. The other point is that the “type” is “a logical principle that is prior to form”. Later, he explains what he meant by “logical principle” is not a precise prescription by a quotation from Quatremère de Quincy: “Everything is precise and given in the model; everything is more or less vague in the type.”<sup>143</sup> Here, he points out the difference between “model” and “type” as well. Jo says “Rossi(1982) suggests that in architecture type is the product of the history, the spatial composition and the use of Building. This interpretation does not contradict the definition of type in Quatremère de Quincy’s treatise. Rossi’s interpretation of Quatremère’s type, however, is both literal and idiosyncratic.”<sup>144</sup> Jo also says “For Rossi, type is something that precedes the form; it is the principle that remains unaltered in spite of the changes of the form. In this sense, type is seen as an objective, logical principle.”<sup>145</sup> Lobsinger underlines the influence of Quatremère and Argan in her article as well:

“Following Quatremère, Argan contended that type was not a preset image or a model to be copied and thus relevant to the practical making of objects. In contrast to a model, type was notional, a schema carrying the residue of all previously made forms. Type was an “interior structure” where all specific value, character, and quality had been sublimated. Type contained infinite formal possibilities and thus when put into practice by an architect would always produce different results or architectures with “no obvious resemblance to each other.” The influence of Argan on Rossi is clear when Rossi writes in the Autobiography: “Nothing can yield more unforeseen results than a repetitive mechanism. And no mechanisms seem more repetitive in their typological aspects than the house, public buildings and the theater.”<sup>146</sup>

Here, it is important to mention Italian art critic Giulio Carlo Argan as well. Argan departs from Quatremère’s insistence on deriving principles from nature as an ideal. For Argan, “type” is derived from various building in a timeline. He mentions this with these words:

141. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 47-48.

142. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 40.

143. Ibid.

144. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory,” *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 235.

145. Ibid.

146. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 46.




Figure 3.5: School-Cemetery [montage] Left: Fagnano Olona School, Right San Cataldo Cemetery, Both drawings by Aldo Rossi.

"The birth of a "type", therefore dependent on the existence of a series of buildings having between them an obvious formal and functional analogy."<sup>147</sup>

Argan also mentions the "vagueness" of type with a quotation from Quatremère. Then, he comments on this notion with these words:

"The notion of the vagueness or generality of the "type" -which cannot therefore directly affect the design of buildings or their formal quality, also explains its generation, the way in which a "type" is formed. It is never formulated a priori but always deduced from a series of instances."<sup>148</sup>

147. Giulio C. Argan, "On the Typology of Architecture," translated by J. Rykwert, in *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory*, ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 246.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

Here, we can understand that Argan considers "type" as a vague and derived concept which is developed from a "series of instances". He also mentions "type" as a "reduced" concept:

"The "type" therefore, is formed through a process of reducing a complex of formal variants to a common root form."<sup>149</sup>

For Argan, "type" reduces "complex" variants of history to a specific




Figure 3.6: Façade and Plan Drawings of "Colonnades de la Place Louis XV", Paris, Quatremère de Quincy

"form". Lobsinger also gives us details about Argan's understanding of "type" in this passage:

"Argan argued for a positive conception of type as an abstraction but not merely as such. Type was useful to architects because it had the capacity to bring together the sociohistorical moment and the absolute past. Since architectural types had been passed down through centuries by means of treatises, it was "legitimate to postulate the question of typology as a function of both the historical process of architecture and also of the thinking and working processes of the individual architect.". In other words, type displayed both the arc of total history and the specificity of the historical moment. Argan argued that type presented and synthesized social-historical and individual experience in the concrete present."<sup>150</sup>

Here, we can sense the roots of the concept of "event" and "sign" in Rossi's architectural perspective. We can see it in a more direct manner in Lobsinger's these words: "For Argan, the past is neutralized in type as an "absolute within the present," and thus type presents the past as a historical abstract form in the present."<sup>151</sup> Graziadei

150. Mary L. Lobsinger, "That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi," *Grey Room*, no. 8 (2002): 46.

151. *Ibid.*



mentions this notion and says "For Rossi, cities are places for both the living and the dead, where fragments and elements of the dead act as signals and warnings to the living."<sup>152</sup>

Bandini mentions this relation among Quatremère, Argan and Rossi as well and she says:

"Quatremère de Quincy's definition of type was first introduced by Argan in his essay *Suf concetto di tipologia architettonica* which is considered fundamental by Rossi for his discussion of type. Almost paraphrasing Quatremère, Rossi writes,

...type is a constant, it is recognisable in all architecture, it is also a cultural element and as such can be researched in different architectures. Typology then, becoming largely the analytical moment of architecture is even better individuated at the urban level.

Again and again Rossi stresses the importance of typology at the urban level."<sup>153</sup>

Here, we can understand that, despite the influence, there is a significant difference in Rossi's perspective. He grasps the notion of "typology" on an urban scale, unlike Quatremère and Argan.

There is another significant point to conclude the "type" section of this chapter and that is to understand the relation between "history" and "type" in Rossi's understanding of architecture. Seungkoo Jo explains this notion with these words:

"Rossi(1982) recognizes historical process: type reacts dialectically with technique, function and style. As an example, he cites the house with a loggia: the basic plan of organization has existed for centuries, but changes in social customs, construction techniques, and family hierarchies have caused many variations in its actual design. In this sense, Rossi's interpretation of building is both acultural and ahistorical. Type is the abstraction of memory to which will be referenced, and type is an abstract principle concerning basic needs and beauty while specific forms depend on historical circumstances and social context."<sup>154</sup>

152. Robin M. Graziadei, "The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi's Autobiography," *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 63.

153. Micha Bandini, "ALDO ROSSI," *AA Files*, no. 1 (1981): 109.

154. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 235.

While Rossi is describing further the "urban artifact", he rejects the function as an essential feature of the "urban artifacts". He says "We have indicated the principal questions that arise in relation to an ur-

ban artifact -among them, individuality, locus, memory, design itself. Function was not mentioned. I believe that any explanation of urban artifacts in terms of function must be rejected if the issue is to elucidate their structure and formation."<sup>155</sup> Later, he explains his point further: "More specifically, we reject that conception of functionalism dictated by an ingenuous empiricism which holds that functions bring form together and in themselves constitute urban artifacts and architecture."<sup>156</sup> He explains his stance in this paragraph:

"Although the doctrine of functionalism has earlier origins, it was enunciated and applied clearly by Bronislaw Malinowski, who refers explicitly to that which is man-made, to the object, the house: "Take the human habitation... here again the integral function of the object must be taken into account when the various phases of its technological construction and the elements of its structure are studied." From a beginning of this sort one quickly descends to a consideration solely of the purposes which man-made items, the object and the house, serve. The question "for what purpose?" ends up as a simple justification that prevents an analysis of what is real."<sup>157</sup>

He also underlines the fact that we consider the function as a primary and essential feature of an urban artifact causes us to undervalue the importance of the "meaning" that a particular artifact embodies. He says "For if urban artifacts present nothing but a problem of organization and classification, then they have neither continuity nor individuality. Monuments and architecture have no reason to exist; they do not "say" anything to us."<sup>158</sup> Later, he quotes from Milizia:

"With respect to function itself, Milizia writes, "... because of its enormous variety functional organization cannot always be regulated by fixed and constant laws, and as a result must always resist generalizations. For the most part, the most renowned architects, when they wish to concern themselves with functional organization, mainly produced drawings and descriptions of their buildings rather than rules that could then be learned." This passage clearly shows how function is understood here as a relationship and not a scheme of organization; in fact, as such it is rejected. But this attitude did not preclude a contemporaneous search for rules that might transmit principles of architecture."<sup>159</sup>

Here, he criticizes the existing understanding of function as a scheme of organization and rejects it. Instead, he proposes Milizia's understanding which is a non-generalizable relationship between archi-

155. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 46.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid, 48.

159. Ibid, 54-55.



Figure 3.7: Doric Order, "Principi di architettura civile", Francesco Milizia.

ecture and the individual.

Rossi opens up the concept of "urban artifact". Firstly, he explains the concept of "structure" and the relation between form and function by the reference to Lavedan's work:

"Structure, as Lavedan understands it, means the structure of urban artifacts, and in this way it resembles Poete's concept of the persistence of the plan and the plan as a generator. As this generator is by nature both real and abstract, it cannot be catalogued like a function. Moreover, since every function can be articulated through a form, and forms in turn contain the potential to exist as urban artifacts, one can say that forms tend to allow themselves to be articulated as urban elements; thus if a form is articulated at all, one can assume that a specific urban artifact persists together with it, and that it is precisely a form that persists through a set of transformations which constitutes an urban artifact par excellence."<sup>160</sup>

Then he explains the notion of his perspective to this relation between form and function:

160. Ibid, 55.




Figure 3.8: A Drawing of Aldo Rossi.

"I have already made a critique of naive functionalist classifications; I repeat, at times they are acceptable, so long as they remain within the handbooks of architecture to which they are appropriate. Such classifications presuppose that all urban artifacts are created to serve particular functions in a static way and that their structure precisely coincides with the function they perform at a certain moment. I maintain, on the contrary, that the city is something that persists through its transformations, and that the complex or simple transformations of functions that it gradually undergoes are moments in the reality of its structure."<sup>161</sup>

Here, we can understand that function is not a major element of an urban artifact from Rossi's perspective. As a matter of fact, it "persists" through its transformations. Thus, he describes the value of an urban artifact as what persists after a functional transformation. This kind of rejection of function, certainly, gets a lot of criticism, especially about the "rationality" of his stance. In the book, Rossi responds to these critiques as well:

"The terminology of the so-called rationalist variety is no less

161. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 55-56.

imprecise. To speak of rational urbanism is simply a tautology, since the rationalization of spatial choices is by definition a condition of urbanism. "Rationalist" definitions have the undoubted merit, however, of always referring to urbanism as a discipline (precisely because of its character of rationality) and thus offer a terminology of clearly superior usefulness."<sup>162</sup>

Later, Rossi examines the role of persistence with a question: "In what way did the ancient city become the origin of the modern city?"<sup>163</sup> This comparison leads him to an answer, "Such a transformation could not have occurred except within or around the ancient cities, since these represented a man-made complex, a halfway point between artifice and nature, meaning to give permanences: they are a past that we are still experiencing."<sup>164</sup> Then he explains his perspective through the theory of Poète in the context of "persistences":

"Poète's theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will try to summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number of hypotheses among which are economic considerations that relate to the evolution of the city, it is in substance a historical theory centered on the phenomenon of "persistences." These persistences are revealed through monuments, the physical signs of the past, as well as through the persistence of a city's basic layout and plans. This last point is Poète's most important discovery. Cities tend to remain on their axes of development, maintaining the position of their original layout and growing according to the direction and meaning of their older artifacts, which often appear remote from present-day ones. Sometimes these artifacts persist virtually unchanged, endowed with a continuous vitality; other times they exhaust themselves, and then only the permanence of their form, their physical sign, their locus remains. The most meaningful permanences are those provided by the street and the plan. The plan persists at different levels; it becomes differentiated in its attributes, often deformed, but in substance, it is not displaced. This is the most valid part of Poète's theory; even if it cannot be said to be completely a historical theory, it is essentially born from the study of history."<sup>165</sup>

162. Ibid, 56.

163. Ibid, 57.

164. Ibid, 57-59.

165. Ibid, 59.

Here we understand many points of his perspective. One of which is that we understand, on a deeper level, he relates the "persistences" with historicity. He considers Poète's "most important discovery" as the persistence of a city's "basic layout" and "plans". Here, we see that his understanding of "persistence" is an informational value, rather than a physical one.

Rossi points out another important notion of his perspective, later in the book. This is the relation between persistences and the continuity of urban change and development. He says "In contextual preservation there is a sort of urban naturalism at work which admittedly can give rise to suggestive images -for example, a visit to a dead city is always a memorable experience- but in such cases we are well outside the realm of a past that we still experience. Naturally, then, I am referring mainly to living cities which have an uninterrupted span of development."<sup>166</sup> Here we can understand that what he means by "persistence" is not a static state-of-being, but rather a dynamic and adaptable nature of urban artifacts. We can see this notion later in this chapter: "I mainly want to establish at this point that the dynamic process of the city tends more to evolution than preservation, and that in evolution monuments are not only preserved but continuously presented as propelling elements of development."<sup>167</sup> Later, he starts to explore specifically which features serves for this purpose of evolution in the urban development process. He says "We have called these urban elements, which are of a dominant nature, primary elements because they participate in the evolution of the city over time in a permanent way, often becoming identified with the major artifacts constituting the city. The union of these primary elements with an area, in terms of location and construction, permanence of plan and permanence of building, natural artifacts and constructed artifacts, constitutes a whole which is the physical structure of the city."<sup>168</sup> Jo mentions this notion and says "For Rossi, within an urban environment there are some primary elements(monuments) with the collective memory of the urban populace."<sup>169</sup> He points out the primary functions of a city to search a definition for "primary elements": "When we study a city, we find that the urban whole tends to be divided according to three principal functions: housing, fixed activities, and circulation."<sup>170</sup> One of these functions is, later, he relates with "primary elements". This function is "fixed activities". He explains this term: "'Fixed activities" include stores, public and commercial buildings, universities, hospitals, and schools. In addition, the urban literature also speaks of urban equipment urban standards, services, and infrastructures."<sup>171</sup> Later, he explains the relation between "fixed activities" and "primary elements" as well:

"I use the term fixed activities because the notion is generally accepted. But even if in speaking of fixed activities and primary elements we partly refer to the same thing, the two terms presuppose entirely different ways of conceptualizing the urban structure. What they have in common is that both refer to the public, collective character of urban elements, to the characteristic fact of public things that they are made by

166. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 60.

167. *Ibid.*, 60.

168. *Ibid.*, 86.

169. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 235.

170. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 86.

171. *Ibid.*



Figure 3.9: Untitled Architectural Drawing, Aldo Rossi.

the collective for the collective and are by nature essentially urban. Whatever reduction of urban reality we make, we always arrive at the collective aspect; it seems to constitute the beginning and end point of the city."<sup>172</sup>

Here, he underlines the collective nature of these primary elements which we already mentioned are, by definition, persistent in the evolution of the city. Actually, it is not only a matter of persistence, these elements also are fertile and generative in the context of the creation of the new city. Rossi mentions this notion in the latter part of the same chapter: "In this sense a historical building can be understood as a primary urban artifact; it may be disconnected from its original function, or over time take on functions different from those for which it was designed, but its quality as an urban artifact, as a generator of a form of the city, remains constant. In this sense, monuments are always primary elements."<sup>173</sup>

In the context of value among primary elements, Rossi puts "monuments" before anything else. He explains this with these words: "A monument stands at a center. It is usually surrounded by buildings and becomes a place of attraction. We have said that it is a primary

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid, 87.




Figure 3.10: Application of écorché to architectural drawings, examples from the Dictionnaire, Viollet-le-Duc, 1875.

element, but of a special type: that is, it is typical in that it summarizes all of the questions posed by the city, but it is special because by virtue of its form its value goes beyond economics and function.”<sup>174</sup> The reasoning behind this is later explained in the “Locus” chapter of Rossi’s book. However, before this explanation, the importance of the relation between the city and the history in Rossi’s work should be understood:

“The history of the city is always inseparable from its geography; without both we cannot understand that architecture that is the physical sign of this “human thing”. “The art of architecture,” wrote Viollet-le-Duc, “is a human creation,” and again, “Architecture, this human creation, is, in fact, only an application of principles born outside us and which we appropriate to ourselves by observation.” These principles are in the city; the stone landscape of building -of “brick and mortar,” in C.B. Fawcett’s expression- symbolizes the continuity of a community.”<sup>175</sup>

Later, he explains further this notion in the “The Locus” chapter. He says “The locus is a relationship between a certain specific location

174. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 92.

175. *Ibid.*, 97.



and the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and universal.”<sup>176</sup> This singularity and universality, naturally, create a unique value to a place that is nourished by its memory and history. He explains this with these words: “In his general theory of architecture, the locus participates as a unique and physical place.”<sup>177</sup> Later, he also mentions this value and says “The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions and qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary for understanding an urban artifact.”<sup>178</sup> Then, he underlines the relation between “locus” and “history” and says “As is evident, the substitution of Gothic art as place for Gothic landscape is of enormous importance. In this sense, the building, the monument, and the city become human things par excellence; and as such, they are profoundly linked to an original occurrence, to a first sign, to composition, permanence, and evolution, and to both chance and tradition. As the first inhabitants fashioned an environment for themselves, they also formed a place and established its uniqueness.”<sup>179</sup> This relation is not a modern relation we create. This is embedded in the necessity of architecture throughout history. He makes this point in this passage:

“The comments of the theoreticians on the framing of the landscape in painting, the sureness with which the Romans repeated certain elements in their building of new cities, acknowledging in the locus the potential for transformation -these and many other facts cause us to intuit the importance of certain artifacts; and when we consider information of this type, we realize why architecture was so important in the ancient world and in the Renaissance. It shaped a context. Its forms changed together with the larger changes of a site, participating in the constitution of a whole and serving an overall event, while at the same time constituting an event in itself. Only in this way can we understand the importance of an obelisk, a column, a tombstone. Who can distinguish anymore between an event and the sign that marks it?”<sup>180</sup>

Now, we can see the reasoning behind the importance of “monuments” among other primary elements in Rossi’s perspective. In the essence of the city, he defines two main elements that create the city as a man-made object:

“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has marked the event.”<sup>181</sup>

176. Ibid, 103.

177. Ibid, 103.

178. Ibid, 103.

179. Ibid, 106.

180. Ibid, 106.

181. Ibid, 106.

This understanding of “what a city is” coincides with the understanding of “what architecture is” in Rossi’s thought world. He explains this notion in this passage:

“It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf Loos: “If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide in the forest, formed into a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we become serious and something in us says, “someone lies buried here.”. That is architecture.” The mound six feet long and three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure architecture precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is only in the history of architecture that a separation between the original element and its various forms occurred. From this separation, which the ancient world seemingly resolved forever, derives the universally acknowledged character of permanence of those first forms.”<sup>182</sup>

Another important primary element in Rossi’s perspective is “plan”. Before he starts describing the role of plan as a primary element in the city, he explains the architectural and urban stance towards the “plan”: “We know that many geographical or urbanistic texts classify cities into two large families: planned and unplanned. “In urban studies it is usual to emphasize as primary the difference between planned and unplanned towns. The former has been conceived and founded as towns, whereas the latter have emerged without conscious planning. They are settlements that have grown and been adapted to discharge urban functions. Their urban character has appeared in the course of their growth, and their layout is essentially the product of accretion of buildings about some pre-urban nucleus.” Thus writes Arthur E. Smailes in his text on urban geography, as have many others.”<sup>183</sup> After this short explanation, he explains his perspective: “Consequently, I consider the plan to be a primary element, the equal of a monument like a temple or a fortress. The nucleus of a planned city is itself also a primary element; it does not matter whether it initiates an urban process or characterizes it, as in Leningrad or in Ferrara. The notion that the existence of a plan makes for a rigidly defined spatial solution of a city from an overall perspective is very much debatable; the plan is always but one moment of the city in the same way that any other primary element is.”<sup>184</sup> Here, we can understand that the value of the plan is not directly related to the order it brings to the city, rather its value comes from the epochal and temporal features of the plan which marks a specific timeframe in the city as it continues to change and develop. He underlines this notion with these words:

“Whether the city grows around an ordered or disordered

182. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 107.

183. *Ibid*, 99.

184. *Ibid*, 99.




Figure 3.11: A Child's Grave, Hale County, Alabama, 1936, Photo by Walker Evans.

nucleus or around a single artifact, then, does not make much difference (although it surely raises different morphological issues); both these conditions tend to constitute characteristic artifacts."<sup>185</sup>

Rossi values the relation between the human and the urban artifact whether it is ordered or not. He says "Once again, all these considerations are important only because behind them are artifacts that show their direct connection to man. For the elements constituting the city -these urban artifacts which are by nature characteristic and characterizing and as much a product of human activity as a collective artifact- are among the most authentic human testimonies. Naturally when we speak of these artifacts we are speaking of their architecture, their meaning as a human creation."<sup>186</sup> In this relation between the urban artifacts and humankind, we understand a relation that works in both ways. Rossi describes this notion with a quotation from a French scholar who was criticizing the French university: "It is the architectural nothingness of the French university which made me understand its intellectual and spiritual nothingness."<sup>187</sup> Here, we can understand that Rossi perceives architecture as a reflection of the representation of humankind. Graziedei says "For Rossi, the pursuit of

185. Ibid, 99-100.

186. Ibid, 100.

187. Ibid, 101.

architectural representation is in itself a way of addressing the issue of mortality.”<sup>188</sup> Rossi sums this up in this passage: “I am not speaking of the monumental character of these works of architecture, nor of their stylistic aspects: I refer to their presence, their construction, their history, in other words, to the nature of urban artifacts. Urban artifacts have their own life, their own destiny.”<sup>189</sup>

We can see Rossi goes on particular patterns over and over again. There are two main concepts in his understanding of the city: “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”.

“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of certain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repository of history. In this book we have made use of the historical method from two different points of view. In the first, the city was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built over time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology, the history of architecture, and the histories of individual cities- the city yields very important information and documentation. Cities become historical texts; in fact, to study urban phenomena without the use of history is unimaginable, and perhaps this is the only practical method available for understanding specific urban artifacts whose historical aspect is predominant. We have illustrated this thesis, in part the foundation of this study, in the context of the theories of Poete and Lavedan as well as in relation to the concept of permanence.

The second point of view sees history as the study of the actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is complementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically disappeared.”<sup>190</sup>

One may ask “What is the relation between “urban artifacts” and “city as a work of art”?” or “in which context are these related?”. He explains how he relates the “urban artifacts” and “city as a work of art” in the first chapter of the book:

188. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiography,” *Architectural Design*, 89 (2019): 63.

189. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 101.

190. *Ibid*, 127-128.

"How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art? All great manifestations of social life have in common with the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life. This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but this is only a secondary difference because one is a product of the public and the other is for the public: the public provides the common denominator."<sup>191</sup>

Here, there is a significant notion of Rossi's work. He also mentions this relation between "life" and "architecture" later in the chapter named "How Urban Elements Become Defined". He says "The principles of architecture are unique and immutable; but the responses to different questions as they occur in actual situations, human situations, constantly vary. On the one hand, therefore, is the rationality of architecture; on the other, the life of the works themselves."<sup>192</sup> Here, we can see that the value Rossi gives to this relation is equivalent to the value he gives to the rationality of architecture. This is why Rossi stands separately from the Early Modernists and Functionalists, on the fundamental intellectual level. He says "To consider city and buildings separately, to interpret purely organizational functions in terms of representation, is to return the discourse to a narrow functionalist vision of the city. This is a negative vision because it conceives of buildings merely as scaffolding for functional variations, abstract containers that embody whatever functions successively fill them."<sup>193</sup> He brings a new paradigm to the discourse of architecture. He says, "I believe that we will not transcend functionalist theory until we recognize the importance of both form and the rational processes of architecture, seeing in form itself the capacity to embrace many different values, meanings, and uses."<sup>194</sup>

191. Ibid, 33.

192. Ibid, 116.

193. Ibid, 118.

194. Ibid, 116.

## THOUGHTS IN GENERAL – CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ

Christian Norberg-Schulz was an architectural theorist who was often related to architectural phenomenology and archetypes. Apart from a few projects he participated in in the earlier years of his career, he did not practice during his lifetime. Instead, he mostly focused on theoretical and conceptual aspects of architecture, producing numerous written works.

During his lifetime, Norberg-Schulz has written and contributed to the writing of numerous books. These books were published mainly in English or Norwegian. Among these books, a few of which were quite popular and also significant: "Existence, Space and Architecture" (1971), "Genius Loci, Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture" (1980), "The Concept of the Dwelling" (1985), and "Principles of Modern Architecture" (2000). In the article "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project in Architecture", Lebanese architect Elie Haddad sums up the role of these books in Norberg-Schulz's world of thought: "While Norberg-Schulz started out with Intentions in Architecture (1963), a work that was clearly influenced by structuralist studies, he soon shifted to a phenomenological approach with Existence, Space and Architecture (1971), and then with Genius Loci (1980) and The Concept of Dwelling (1985). He attempted through this trilogy to lay down the foundations of a phenomenological interpretation of architecture, with an underlying agenda that espoused certain directions in contemporary architecture."<sup>195</sup>

Norberg-Schulz was influenced by several architects, theorists, and philosophers. Without any doubt, the greatest impact on his work came from German philosopher Martin Heidegger. He frequently referred to Heidegger's writings on architecture in his writings. Haddad mentions this situation in his article and says "It was this later Heidegger who would become influential among a number of architectural theorists, namely Christian Norberg-Schulz, who was among the first to attempt to translate this phenomenological approach in architecture."<sup>196</sup> In the article "The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz's Writings on Heidegger and Place", Rowan Wilken underlines this reference to the term "dwelling" in Heidegger's approach: "The role of architecture, according to Norberg-Schulz, is to provide a "means to visualize the genius loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he [sic] helps man to dwell"."<sup>197</sup> Norberg-Schulz was also heavily influenced by Swiss architectural historian and critic Sigfried Giedion who was his tutor at ETH Zurich. He was also affected by Walter Gropius and Mies van der Rohe, especially in this early career.

195. Elie Haddad, "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project in Architecture," *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 88.

196. *Ibid*, 89.

197. Rowan Wilken, "The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz's Writings on Heidegger and Place," *Architectural Theory Review* 18, no. 3 (2013): 342.




Figure 3.12: Diagrams of "Space cells. Closure, guiding walls", Christian Norberg-Schulz.

In Norberg-Schulz's work, the effect of "psychology" can be observed as well. He was specifically interested in "Gestalt psychology" which is a school of psychology founded in 20th century. It provided the foundation of the modern study of "perception". In the dictionary of Britannica, it is described with these words:

"Gestalt theory emphasizes that the whole of anything is greater than its parts. That is, the attributes of the whole are not deducible from analysis of the parts in isolation. The word Gestalt is used in modern German to mean the way a thing has been "placed," or "put together." ."<sup>198</sup>

198. "Gestalt psychology," Britannica, Accessed June 2, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/science/Gestalt-psychology>.

199. Akkelies van Nes, "The Heaven, the Earth and the Optic Array: Norberg-Schulz's Place Phenomenology and its Degree of Operationability," *Footprint* 3 (2008): 114.

200. Elie Haddad, "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture," *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.

In the article "The Heaven, the Earth and the Optic Array", Akkelies van Nes mentions this interest and says "Literature and art, phenomenology, and Gestalt Psychology influence Norberg-Schulz's work."<sup>199</sup> Haddad also mentions this interest in his article and says "Norberg-Schulz's discussion of perception was largely influenced by Gestalt psychology, to which were also added the socialization of perception and the process of "schematization", that is the way in which perception leads to the construction of an understanding of the world, based on the pioneering studies of Jean Piaget in child psychology."<sup>200</sup> As Haddad mentions, Norberg-Schulz's works are also affected by Swiss psychol-



Figure 3.13: Bruder Klaus Field Chapel, Peter Zumthor.

ogist Jean Piaget. Thus, Piaget is often referred to in Norberg-Schulz's texts. He was also affected by "semiology" which means "the study of signs and sign-using behaviour" according to Britannica Dictionary.<sup>201</sup> In the article, Haddad says "This theory, influenced to a large extent by Charles Morris's interpretation of semiotics, constituted a similar attempt to develop a comprehensive structure—that is, an "architectural totality" that would account for all the dimensions of architecture: the technical structure, environment, context, scale and ornament."<sup>202</sup> In the book review of "Architecture: Meaning and Place", Linda Krause sums up Norberg-Schulz's interests with these words: "He consults Gestalt psychology, German existentialism, and, especially, elements from Heideggerian phenomenology."<sup>203</sup>

In the later years of his career, he was also influenced by the book "The Language of Architecture Postmodern" which was published in 1977 by Charles Jencks. With this impact, he joined Po-Mo with enthusiasm and excitement for new possibilities of expression. However, his excitement didn't last long. In the 1990s, due to the growing isolation of Po-Mo, by pronouncing that Po-Mo "was dissolved in playful superficiality", he returned to a major study of fundamentals of modernity which we later see in his last book "Principles of Modern Architecture".<sup>204</sup>

201. "semiotics," Britannica, Accessed June 2, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/science/semiotics>.

202. Elie Haddad, "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture," *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.

203. Linda Krause, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 50, no. 2 (1991): 197.

204. "Christian Norberg-Schulz," *Architectuul*, Accessed June 2, 2023, <https://architectuul.com/architect/christian-norberg-schulz>.



Here, we need to underline the importance of this book "Principles of Modern Architecture". Although this is not the most known book of Norberg-Schulz, it has a different value among his books because of the fact that this is the ultimate book he talks about and responds to various Modernist arguments and sums up his stance in this context. Also, we can see how concepts like "genius loci" takes a role in the context of other areas of discussion. Thus, we will examine this book with additional attention.

The terms "archetypes" and "phenomenology" can be considered as two main themes of Norberg-Schulz's architectural writings. In the "Free Plan" chapter of his last book, he mentions this notion and says:

"Our discussion of the phenomenology of the free plan has shown that it may be subject to many interpretations which are equally valid. In some cases a particular interpretation has been worked out as a consistent "grammar" of design. This is for instance the case in the works of Mies van der Rohe, which illustrate implicit "rules" for the juxtaposition of walls, openings, and furnishings, relative to a structural skeleton. A grammar which covers all the various versions of the free plan, is however hardly possible."<sup>205</sup>

Here, we can understand his recognition of this "grammar" of design as well as the difficult possibility of such grammar. However, later in the same chapter, he also says:

"In the daily work of the architect that means to have understood the phenomenology of the free plan, and to have been trained in the use of its "grammar".<sup>206</sup>

Therefore, despite the difficulty, he considers "phenomenology" and "grammar" as crucial necessities of architectural practice.

In the book "Existence, Space and Architecture", Norberg-Schulz defines 5 different concepts of space. He says "We have so far distinguished between five space concepts: the pragmatic space of physical action, the perceptual space of immediate orientation, the existential space which forms man's stable image of his environment, the cognitive space of the physical world and the abstract space of pure logical relations."<sup>207</sup> Then, he further explains these concepts and says: "Pragmatic space integrates man with his natural, "organic" environment, perceptual space is essential to his identity as a person, existential space makes him belong to a social and cultural totality, cognitive space means that he is able to think about space, and logical space, finally, offers the tool to describe the others."<sup>208</sup> He describes the "existential space" in another paragraph:

205. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editio, 1988), 43.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid, 11.

208. Ibid, 11.

"... we have within the psychological dimension to distinguish between immediate perceptual space and the more stable space schemata. The latter are composed of elements which have a certain invariance, such as universal elementary structures (archetypes) and socially or culturally conditioned structures, and, of course, some personal idiosyncrasies. Together these make up man's "image" of this environment, that is, a stable system of three-dimensional relations between meaningful objects. We will therefore unify the schemata in the concept existential space."<sup>209</sup>

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers "existential space" as a stable image of the environment which contains universal/archetypal structures, social/cultural structures, and personal features. In the article "Heidegger and The Architecture of Projective Involvement", Kevin Berry describes "existential space" with similar quotations from Norberg-Schulz and Frampton:

"Norberg-Schulz provides an example when he argues that bodily orientation - which architecture shapes - produces an orientation of a higher order: existential orientation. In one passage, he succinctly explains how "existential space" is built up from bodily experiences:

The vertical direction represents a rising-up or falling-down, and has since remote times been considered the sacred dimension of space. It represents a path towards a reality which is higher or lower than daily life. The vertical axis, the axis mundi, is therefore an archetypal symbol of a passage from one cosmic region to another. If verticality has something surreal about it, the horizontal directions represent man's concrete world of action . . . The simplest model of man's existential space is then a horizontal plane pierced by a vertical axis. On the plane man chooses and creates paths which give his existential space a more particular structure.

Similarly, Frampton writes, "Man is not a dualistic being . . . Since man has an asymmetrical physical structure with a top and a bottom, a left and a right, and a front and a back, the articulated world, in turn, naturally becomes a heterogeneous space."<sup>210</sup> (Figure 3.14)

Later, Norberg-Schulz defines "architectural space" as an addition to this system. He defines the "architectural space" and says "On the basis of a theory of "existential space", I therefore develop the idea

209. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 11.

210. Kevin Berry, "Heidegger and The Architecture Of Projective Involvement," *Log*, no. 42 (2018): 111.




Figure 3.14: The difference between vertical and horizontal dimension can be observed on a Renaissance façade. Palazzo Medici Riccardi, Michelozzo di Bartolomeo, 1396-1472.

that architectural space may be understood as a concretization of environmental schemata or images, which form a necessary part of man's general orientation or "being in the world".<sup>211</sup> In the article "On Being Moved by Architecture", Jenefer Robinson describes Norberg-Schulz's approach with these words:

"In *Genius Loci*, Norberg-Schulz maintains that good architecture creates a "place," an environment that has a meaningful location (beside a river, surrounding a hilltop, or even clinging to a mountain like La Paz, Bolivia), a sense of orientation given by paths and foci such as the central piazza in an Italian village or town, and a distinct character that establishes an identity both for itself and those who congregate in it. Like Merleau-Ponty and Pallasmaa, Norberg-Schulz distinguishes between space as "mathematical concept" and space with an "existential dimension".<sup>212</sup>

211. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 7.

212. Jenefer Robinson, "On Being Moved by Architecture," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 70, no. 4 (2012): 341.

213. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 12.

In another paragraph, Norberg-Schulz says "Architectural space, therefore, can be defined as a concretization of man's existential space."<sup>213</sup> These descriptions not only helps us to understand what is "architectural space" according to Norberg-Schulz but also helps us to understand what is "existential space" as well. Haddad underlines



Figure 3.15: An example given by Norberg-Schulz, Palomba Sabina, Lazio.

the importance of this in the book and says "...this work betrayed a shift which would be translated later into a move towards a phenomenological approach. In the foreword, Norberg-Schulz announced, in fact, a "new approach to the problem of architectural space", attempting to "develop the idea that architectural space may be understood as a concretization of environmental schemata or images, which form a necessary part of man's general orientation or "being in the world".<sup>214</sup> As we can see Haddad understands this notion of "being in the world" as a "move towards a phenomenological approach".

"Locality" is a frequently repeating concept in Norberg-Schulz's architecture. In the "New Regionalism" chapter of his book, he explains the importance of "locality" and regional character, responding to the opposing stance modernist architecture takes. He starts this chapter with these words: "As all buildings form part of a concrete "here", they cannot be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality has been recognized as the genius loci, and historical buildings normally had a distinct local flavor, although they often belonged to a general "style".<sup>215</sup> Later, he points out the necessity for a "New Regionalism" and says, "We understand, thus, that the "new regionalism" implies something which goes beyond the demand for "context"; primarily it

214. Elie Haddad, "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture," *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 90.

215. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 135.

means to become part of a tradition, in the sense of offering a new interpretation of certain objects of human identification."<sup>216</sup> Here, we can see he points out the new opportunities for a different paradigm of locality by saying "new interpretation of certain objects of human identification". By "object", he does not mean a form, he means an "element" or a "character". To better understand this notion, we can observe this passage:

"What, then, are these objects? We have already suggested the answer with the notion of *genius loci*. It follows from what has been said above that the *genius loci* comprises more than what is close at hand. "The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.", Heidegger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-made place, is an "inhabited landscape".<sup>217</sup>

Here, we can understand he points out an internal value rather than an external being. Also in this passage, we see the two important concepts of Heidegger's writings, "nearness" and "dwelling", which are key elements in Norberg-Schulz's perspective towards architecture as well. Later, he explains "inhabited landscape" further and says "A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is a "lived space" between earth and sky. First of all it reveals itself as a certain *Stimmung*. This German word means something like "atmosphere" or "character", and moreover it says that man is *gestimmt*, "tuned", by his environment."<sup>218</sup> Here, we encounter with a new term "*Stimmung*" which is a German word for "atmosphere" as it says in the passage as well. This term for "atmosphere" is also a commonly used word in the phenomenological approach in architecture. In the article "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture", Norberg-Schulz explains the term "inhabited landscape" and says "An inhabited landscape obviously is a known landscape, that is, something that is *gewohnt*. This landscape is brought close to us by the buildings, or in other words, the landscape is revealed as what it is in truth."<sup>219</sup> In the book "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Interpretation of Heidegger's Philosophy", Hendrik Auret says "Christian Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* mined the poetic depths of understanding lived space in terms of Heidegger's notion of place. However, when it came to understanding the nature of lived time, he relied on Sigfried Giedion's formulation of time as continuity and change."<sup>220</sup> Thus, we can observe here how Norberg-Schulz brings together the "locality" and "phenomenology" with the "bridge" of Heidegger's ideas. This notion will be clearer later in his book.

Here, we need to better understand the term "*genius loci*" to under-

216. Ibid.

217. Ibid.

218. Ibid.

219. Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture," *Perspecta* 20 (1983): 65.

220. Hendrik Auret, *Christian Norberg-Schulz's Interpretation of Heidegger's Philosophy: Care, Place and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2019), 127.

stand how Norberg-Schulz realizes the concept of “locality”. In his book, “Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz explains “Genius loci is a Roman concept. According to ancient Roman belief every “independent” being has its genius, its guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to people and places. It accompanies them from birth to death, and determines their character or essence. Even the gods had their genius, a fact which illustrates the fundamental nature of the concept’’.<sup>221</sup> Here, Norberg-Schulz explains the etymological roots of the term “genius loci”. In his review of “Genius Loci”, Harris Forusz mentions this notion and says “Our need to expand into the “meaning” of architecture, to understand this spiritual quality that Norberg-Schulz perceives as being imbedded in the context of place, is the central theme of this book.”.<sup>222</sup>

In the article “The “Genius Loci” of Hamar”, Ivo Strecker underlines the deepness and complexity of the concept of “genius loci” and says “Nothing would be easier than to put Norberg-Schulz down, asking him what he literally means by genius loci and to define precisely, possibly even in mathematical terms, the “spirit” of a particular place. Yet this would be nothing but the “odious” tactic pointed up by Tyler above. The communicative intentions of Norberg-Schulz would be obstructed and his potentially fruitful ideas would be lost.”.<sup>223</sup> To better understand and analyze the meaning of the word, Wilken refers to the work of Gunila Jiven and Peter Larkham:

“According to Gunila Jiven and Peter Larkham’s reading of Genius Loci, four “thematic levels” can be recognized in Norberg-Schulz’s treatment of the concept of genius loci. These are:

1. “the topography of the earth’s surface”;
2. “the cosmological light conditions and the sky as natural conditions”;
3. “buildings”;
- and
4. “symbolic and existential meanings in the cultural landscape”.<sup>224</sup>

Norberg-Schulz explains the nature of “genius loci” and says “How, then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically in two ways, which we may call “visualization” and “complementation”.”.<sup>225</sup> These two methods, “visualization” and “complementation” are the key elements to understanding his approach. In this passage, he explains these both terms in several aspects:

“The two modes may also be combined. Visualization is exemplified by Italian hilltop towns which reveal the inherent topographical structure, and complementation by an en-

221. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18.

222. Harris Forusz, *JAE* 34, no. 3 (1981): 32.

223. Ivo Strecker, “The ‘Genius Loci’ of Hamar,” *Northeast African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2000): 93–94.

224. Rowan Wilken, “The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Writings on Heidegger and Place,” *Architectural Theory Review* 18, no. 3 (2013): 343.

225. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 135.



Figure 3.16: Ancient Greek Temple at Paestum, Mahaffy John Pentland, 1890.

closed man-made settlement, an “artificial oasis”, in the infinite desert. It is important to realize that neither of the modes are cases of symbolization. Visualization and complementation produce forms which do not represent anything else, and therefore may be considered fundamental architectural acts. Vernacular architecture is in general based on these modes, but the same also holds true for the great “monuments” of the early civilizations. Thus Heidegger uses a Greek temple to show how a building “opens up a world and gives to things their look”. The forms which are related to a particular region evidently possess similar properties, and become elements of a tradition or “way of building”. Symbolization is therefore a derivation from the original act of revelation, and a meaningful language of architecture is not an arbitrary system of conventional “sign”, but an interrelated set of visualizations and complementations. Place is hence the point of departures of architecture, as well as its goal.”<sup>226</sup>

Here, several points are made. Firstly, he explains their relation with “symbolization” in the conventional definition, which is a weak relation since “Visualization and complementation produce forms which do not represent anything else...”. Then, he explains their relation with

226. Ibid.




Figure 3.17: The Roman division in quarters, *The Concept of Dwelling*, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

"typology" by saying "elements of a tradition" or "way of building". After this, he points out an interesting point. By redefining the term "symbolization", he establishes the relation between these two methods and "symbolization". To Norberg-Schulz, "symbolization" is not an "arbitrary system of conventional sign" but is an "interrelated set of visualizations and complementations". Thus, the point he makes in the first sentences of the passage was directly aiming the conventional understanding of "symbolization" and he proposes a new approach.

One of the concepts which take an important role in Norberg-Schulz's architecture is "nearness". The term was first popularized by philosopher Martin Heidegger as we already mentioned. Norberg-Schulz often uses Heidegger's vocabulary to express the relation of his thoughts with Heidegger's. In the "New Regionalism" chapter of his last book "Principles of Modern Architecture", he says "Things bring the world close to man, and make it palpable and real. When we say that "life takes place", we thus imply that life has to be related to an immediate "here".<sup>227</sup> Here, we can see his understanding of the relation between "life" and "place". The point he makes is as "life" needs a "place" to be, the "place" needs a "living" around itself to become a place. This relation works both ways. Later, he underlines the importance of "imagination" to make place and explains it in this passage:

227. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 137.



“The word “imagination” is certainly of fundamental importance when we consider architecture as a making of places. To keep and embody an environmental character is not an intellectual problem; it rather depends openness to the qualities of the surroundings, and furthermore the ability to “translate” what is “seen” into meaningful images. We could also say that the new regionalism demands a phenomenological rather than a scientific approach. Phenomenology is concerned with what is “near”, and thus it links up with the aim of giving architecture a new foundation in man’s immediate being-in-the-world.”<sup>228</sup>

Here, he gives us an important hint. He approaches the concept of “locality” as a “perceptual” term, rather than a “rational” one. Thus, new regionalism should be shaped around the phenomenological approach, rather than scientific, according to Norberg-Schulz. Norberg-Schulz also mentions this notion about phenomenology in his book, “Intentions in Architecture” as well. He explains this and says “Spontaneously, the world consists of the phenomena, or our experiences.” We define according to Jorgensen: “The word “phenomenon” designates every “something” which may be experienced, and its contrary “nothing” does not designate anything, but expresses that I do not experience anything, that is, that nothing is present to me.”.<sup>229</sup> Here, we can understand his basis of a “thing” is an interaction or a reflection it creates with the subject.

Later, Norberg-Schulz explains “New Regionalism” further and starts to give us details about his approach. He says “A study of folk architecture reveals a series of basic typologies. The spatial layout of farms and villages, thus, in general derives from three basic modes of organization: centralization, succession and clustering.”.<sup>230</sup> After this, he explains these terms in a detailed manner in this passage:

“If we indicate the types on maps of the respective countries, a meaningful relationship between the layout of the settlements and the regions reveals itself. Clusters, thus, tend to belong to hilly and topographically complex landscapes, row formations are usually found in valleys (or along rivers and roads), and regular enclosures (round or square) on flat, extended lands. Thus architecture visualizes and complements the spatial properties of the natural place.”<sup>231</sup>

Here, he explains the relation between “dwelling” and the environment in terms of visualization and complementation. He continues to explain with another example:

“The interior spaces of folk architecture mostly represented a complement to the natural environment. The white rooms of the

228. Ibid, 137.

229. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Intentions in Architecture* (Cambridge Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1968), 28.

230. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 137.

231. Ibid, 139.

south offer a necessary relief in a hot and dry climate, whereas the “rosepainted” interiors of the Norwegian peasant cottages make life possible during a long, cold and colorless winter.”<sup>232</sup>

Here, we can understand that he sees a great value in the cultural and geographical traditions of building knowledge which is accumulated over a long time by the collective experience of the communities. After this passage, he directly points out his stance on this notion:

“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have profited more from a study of these things, than from the abstract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”<sup>233</sup>

Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz considers the “phenomenological” approach as a better alternative to the “analytic” and “abstractive” approach like Bauhaus. In his review of “Genius Loci”, Harris Forusz underlines this notion with these words:

“The appeal that Christian Norberg-Schulz makes is that after decades of abstract, “scientific” theory it is urgent that we return to a qualitative, phenomenological understanding of architecture. The intent of this theoretical approach, which draws on Norberg-Schulz’s broad experiences and extensive knowledge base, is to reveal the “spirit of place,” which he names from Classical Roman sources, “genius loci”.”<sup>234</sup>

Later, Norberg-Schulz points out an important notion about this stance by a quotation on Sigfried Giedion on Alvar Aalto’s works: “When Giedion called attention to the regional qualities in Alvar Aalto’s works, he introduced the discussion with a few pages on the Finnish landscape and architectural tradition of the country. Here we read: “Finland covered with its network of lakes and forests, suggests in its structure the days of Creation, when water and earth were first separated.”. And, indeed, hardly any other European country has preserved a stronger sense of its origins. This sense does not only consist in a love for the local landscape, but also in traditions which relate the natural environment to human life.”<sup>235</sup> Here, he underlines the value of the traditional and geographical ways of building embedded in their relation with human life. After this, he gives an example of Italian architect Paolo Portoghesi to explain further. Firstly, he says “Already in his first works Paolo Portoghesi wanted to re-interpret some of the basic themes of the Italian tradition. The ENPAS-offices in Lucca (1958-62) recall the wall articulation of a Baroque palazzo, whereas his Casa Baldi (1959-61) at the outskirts of Rome also shows references to the local landscape

232. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 139.

233. *Ibid*, 139.

234. Harris Forusz, *JAÉ* 34, no. 3 (1981): 32.

235. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 141.



Figure 3.18: A photo of Casa Baldi, Paolo Portoghesi.

and the traditional building materials of the region."<sup>236</sup> Then, he specifies his point in the example of Casa Baldi in this passage:

"Casa Baldi, thus, represents a new kind of eclecticism, and Portoghesi himself explained that he wanted to design an "ambiguous building, open to many interpretations". In his explanatory text he also emphasized the "value of memory", and pointed out that a true work of architecture cannot exist outside the tradition. He furthermore maintained that the historical references present in Casa Baldi do not consist in isolated motifs, but in methods of spatial organization and characterization which are still valid because they are "deeply rooted in each of us."<sup>237</sup>

Here, he makes two important points mainly. Firstly, he explains the significance of the interpretation of Portoghesi in the context of historical references. The other point is the aspect of understanding these historical references as the spatial organization and characterization in the means of an "idiosyncrasy" which is "deeply rooted in each of us". Later, he says "Together with Robert Venturi, Portoghesi certainly was one of the first to point out the need for a new relationship to place and history..."<sup>238</sup> Later, he gives the example of Ricardo Bofill

236. Ibid, 143.

237. Ibid, 143.

238. Ibid, 147.



Figure 3.19: A photo of “Les Espaces d’Abraxas”, Ricardo Bofill.

and says “Thus Bofill demonstrates that regional character resides in how things are, and that a work of architecture may bring them close to man by revealing their essence. In his book “L’architecture d’un homme” Bofill emphasizes the importance of localization, and characterizes his own work as a “brutal protest” against the international style.”<sup>239</sup> Then, he gives the example of Jorn Utzon: “As visualizations of earth and sky, they give back to architecture its basic “dimension” as an art. The platforms of Utzon makes the earth become alive as a concrete ground, which simultaneously offers a sense of belonging and possibilities of movement.”<sup>240</sup> As you can see Norberg-Schulz often uses this kind of point examples to introduce the vocabulary of Heidegger for our understanding and explain his vision.

Later, Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of “New Regionalism” by examining the works of his former professor, Sigfried Giedion: “When Giedion launched the idea in 1954, he had already ten years earlier published an article entitled “The Need for a New Monumentality”. Evidently he considered regionalism and monumentality two aspects of one general problem: the need for meaning in architecture.”<sup>241</sup> After this, he underlines an important notion in Sigfried Giedion’s approach to regionalism in this passage:

239. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 151.

240. *Ibid*, 151.

241. *Ibid*, 151.

"Giedion, however, emphasizes that the new regionalism should not be confounded with the German Heimatstil based on the "Blut und Boden" ideology of the Nazis. And, in fact, there is a basic difference. Whereas the Nazis and similar totalitarian regimes excluded the dimension of time, reducing architecture to a set of "eternal" forms, the new regionalism aims at ever new interpretations of the given environmental qualities. Giedion therefore did not talk about a return to regionalism, but about a new regionalism. The new regionalism is in other words creative rather than nostalgic."<sup>242</sup>

Another outstanding chapter in Norberg-Schulz's book "Principles of Modern Architecture" is "New Monumentality". He starts this chapter with these words: "The term monumentality implies that we expect something more from our buildings than more "functional" fulfillment. We also want that architecture should "mean" something. "The walls rise towards heaven in such a way that I am moved.", Le Corbusier wrote, "that is architecture."."<sup>243</sup> He starts by drawing our attention to the necessity of "meaning" in architecture. Wilken underlines this notion and says "Norberg-Schulz's overarching claim is that "when all the components seem to embody basic existential meanings, we may talk about a 'strong' place"."<sup>244</sup> Forusz mentions this notion with these words: "Norberg-Schulz believes that beyond the pragmatic and the experiential aspects of architecture there is a specific need for a metaphysical belief in architecture, an aspect which can contribute to the architect's understanding of the existential "meaning" of place."<sup>245</sup> Almost referring to these "metaphysical" aspect of architecture, Norberg-Schulz continues with a quotation from Giedion:

"Monumentality springs from the eternal need of people to create symbols for their activities and for their fate or destiny, for their religious beliefs and for their social countries where modern architecture has monumentality."<sup>246</sup>

After this, he explains the etymology of the word "monumentality" and says "The Latin monumentatum simply means "things that remind," or, in other words, things that have an enduring significance."<sup>247</sup> Underlining this kind of definition gives us a hint about his understanding of monumentality which is similar to the concepts of "event" & "sign" in Rossi's understanding. Then, he says "If one however prefers to use a less loaded expression, one might say "meaning in architecture". The quotation from Giedion suggests that meanings are expressed by means of "symbols", and symbolization has in fact become a primary concern of the present. As we already pointed out, symbolization implies the need for a consistent language of "images"."<sup>248</sup> Here, he directly points out this relation with "meaning in architecture". He

242. Ibid, 151.

243. Ibid, 153.

244. Rowan Wilken, "The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz's Writings on Heidegger and Place," *Architectural Theory Review* 18, no. 3 (2013): 344.

245. Harris Forusz, *JAE* 34, no. 3 (1981): 32.

246. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 153.

247. Ibid.

248. Ibid.

also gives us a new term that we will often come across in his writings, "language of images". He already mentioned "grammar" of design in the previous chapter, and now he mentions "language" of images. As you can see there is a degree of similarity he sees between literature and architecture. This notion can be seen in the term "universal grammar" which was presented by linguist Noam Chomsky to explain the term "deep structure" of Carl Jung in linguistics. Chomsky describes "universal grammar" as the knowledge of human beings inherent in language, immanent in language, common in all languages.

Later, Norberg-Schulz asks a question: "What is for instance the meaning of words such as "sign", "symbol" and "image" in relation to architecture, and what is the role of "memory" and "enduring significance" in a world of openness and change?".<sup>249</sup> Then, he responds with a quotation by Heidegger: "The poetical understanding which is manifest in the image, is preserved in language. "Language is the house of Being", Heidegger says, and, "man speaks only as he responds to language".<sup>250</sup> Thus, he considers "language" as kind of a reference system to "be" and to "express", in the most general terms.

Norberg-Schulz also talks about "archetypes" in this chapter. Right after explaining "language of images", he makes quite important points in this passage:

"Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality of the world. The architectural language consists of archetypal images that reveal those structures which are invariant with respect to place and time. The archetypes are not forms which exist in some distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich. Rather they represent basic modes of being in the world, or "existential structures". As a matter of fact the archetypes do not exist at all, only their various manifestations. A "typical" tower, thus, does not exist, but "townerness" is revealed in its multifarious aspects by means of ever new tower-images. Thus the work of architecture becomes "an offering to Architecture". These words of Louis Kahn suggest that it is possible and meaningful to talk about architecture in general, although only single works exist."<sup>251</sup>

Here, there are a few points that need explanation. One of which is the meaning of "Ding an sich". It is a term in Kantian philosophy that means "the-thing-in-itself" in German. Another point is the fact that Norberg perceives the "archetype" as an abstract idea, rather than a material being. Then, he explains his stance on architectural language and style:

"There can only be one architectural language, since there is

249. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 153.

250. Ibid.

251. Ibid.




Figure 3.20: Engravings, "In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?", Heinrich Hübsch.

only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is basically only one spoken language, although there are many "tongues".) The styles represent different choices within the one and same language, or, in Heidegger's terms, different responses to Language. Thus we have three systems of images: language, which consists of invariant archetypes, style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes."<sup>252</sup>

Here, there is an important notion of Norberg-Schulz's perspective. As you can see, he considers all three systems of images as derivatives of "archetypes". This notion can be understood as Norberg-Schulz perceives archetypes as a fundamental component of architecture, like letters or words in literature. He also responds to a predictable question about how a tradition of a certain locality, or a style of a historical period can originate from a concept of universality like archetypes. He responds, "It may also happen that a tradition corresponds so closely to the archetypes, that it may be used outside the place or region where it originated."<sup>253</sup> Here, we assume that he is referring to specific cultures which gained universal value in the history of humankind, like Ancient Greek or Ancient Roman architecture. Also, traditional Japanese architecture can be an example, if we

252. Ibid.

253. Ibid.




Figure 3.21: Drawings of Ancient Egyptian Architecture, "De l'architecture égyptienne", Quatremère de Quincy.

consider its relation with Modern architecture. Then, he explains this notion about style and tradition further in this passage:

"Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as systems of types. In order to have an existential foundation, these types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the general language. Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation."<sup>254</sup>

Norberg-Schulz's perspective on this notion can create several questions in the definitive aspect of archetypes. To better understand this perspective, we need to get a grip on his understanding of archetypes. This was predicted by Norberg-Schulz. Thus, he explains his understanding of archetypes after the last passage. He specifically dwells on the archetype's being "a priori" feature and he explains his stance in this passage:

"One regards the types as something given a priori once for all, whereas the other considers the types a result of generalization and historical development. In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant

254. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editi, 1988), 153.



interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and changed through experience and experiment. The important point is however, as we have already asserted, that they receive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic meaning consists in their being variations on a "theme".<sup>255</sup>

Here, he underlines there are two main aspects to the understanding of "types". One of which is "something given a priori once for all", which takes us to a metaphysical field which is commonly related to Platonic philosophy. On the other hand, he mentions the other perspective which is a "result of generalization and historical development", which takes us to a materialistic understanding of this notion which can be related to Aristotelian philosophy. Here, he takes a dualist stance on this notion and says, "In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct.", which is an important point to understand. In his explanation, on the one hand, archetypes are "interworldly" structures that are not present in the physical world, just like Plato's world of ideas. On the other hand, types are "developed" and "changed" with "experience" and "experiment". Later, he says "Modern architecture wanted to return to the "beginning as if nothing had ever been done before". One did not recognize, however, that this can only mean a new interpretation of the archetypes."<sup>256</sup> Here, we can see that his understanding of archetypes are as a fundamental component of architecture as we mentioned before. Thus, he criticizes "functionalism" for denying this notion, and says: "Functionalism, thus, did not accept the existential roots which give architecture its meaning."<sup>257</sup>

This notion is an important point in Norberg-Schulz's perspective. However, when we discuss and examine it in the conceptual field, it can easily become quite a complex discourse. This is why this passage is important to understand his stance since he is explaining his understanding of types with a direct example of an existing situation:

"In Egypt the conditions of the land itself suggests a comprehensive, "cosmic" order. Hardly any other country possesses a geographical structure of such simplicity and regularity. The lifegiving Nile flowing from the south to the north and the ever present sun rising in the east and setting in the west, are the basic elements. A pair of orthogonal axes is thus indicated. The south-north direction is furthermore emphasized by the long and narrow Nile valley delimited by deserts on either side. The climate is dry and stable, and together with the regular flooding of the river, it seems to indicate eternal permanence. "Order" and "constancy" in fact denote the fundamental properties of the Egyptian world, and architecture served to

255. Ibid, 155.

256. Ibid, 155.

257. Ibid, 155.

give it concrete presence. Stone was selected as the main building material, because it is hard and resistant to decay, and its natural character was enhanced by smooth surfaces and sharp edges. A general system of symbolic organization was developed, in which the horizontal axes are combined with the vertical direction to form a regular and uniform space. In the pyramid this understanding of the world was set into work as a balanced synthesis of vertical and horizontal forces. At the same time its incomparably massive and solid construction seems to embody strength and permanence. The pyramid, however, was the goal of a spatial sequence which comprised two other typical images: the regular hypostyle hall, where orthogonal space is fixed and visualized, and the axial causeway, which gives directed movement concrete presence. Finally, Egyptian architecture realized the obvious complement to the desert: the artificial oasis of the walled enclosure. A comprehensive inventory of archetypal forms is thus set into work: grid, path, center and enclosure."<sup>258</sup>

Here, the important notion is the relation between the values of a culture and the conditions this culture was in. Haddad underlines this view with these words: "Specifically, Norberg-Schulz stressed the connection between the man-made world and the natural world, historically evident in various places and environments from around the world."<sup>259</sup> To Norberg-Schulz, this is directly related to the "order" of the community as the means of organization. Krause underlines this and says "...meaning for Norberg-Schulz springs from certain of our physical and psychological predispositions. Citing Gestalt psychology and Jean Piaget, he claims that the built environment expresses the innate and precognitive human activity of ordering and sorting. Thus, meaningful architecture expresses order, hierarchy, and classification."<sup>260</sup> After this passage, he starts to compare the values and conditions of Ancient Egypt with the values and conditions of Ancient Greek and explains his understanding behind the reasoning of the differences between these two cultures and geographies. Then, he focuses on the Greek temple:

"The existential understanding which is expressed by the Greek pantheon, was visualized by the temple. Basically, all Greek temples belong to the same "family", and may be described as plastic bodies, where the articulation and detailing determine an appropriate character. The character is "condensed" in the "order", that is, the column and its entablature."<sup>261</sup>

Here, he underlines the "order" as a well-known feature of Ancient Greek architecture. He relates the "order" in architecture to the or-

258. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 157.

259. Elie Haddad, "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture," *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 93.

260. Linda Krause, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 50, no. 2 (1991): 197.

261. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 157.




Figure 3.22: Drawing of Ancient Greek Homes, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand,1800.

der of a culture. This order is deeply related to the “meaning”. Norberg-Schulz explains this notion and he says, “In the temple, the order plays a constituent role, that is, the character it embodies is given a “pure”, dominant presence. In other Greek buildings the orders are rather used as “characterizing elements” which do not constitute the structure, but relate it to a world of meanings.”.<sup>262</sup> Norberg-Schulz considers this notion as a significant point to understanding the relation between “locality” and “universality” of architecture. He explains this with a quotation from Heidegger:

“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”, Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”.<sup>263</sup>

Here, we can see that Norberg-Schulz understands this “order” in Greek architecture as an element of “locality” and an element of “universality” at the same time. He says, “Greek orders are rooted in concrete places, but their meaning is universal.”.<sup>264</sup> Then, he concludes this subject with these words in this passage:

262. Ibid.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid.




Figure 3.23: Ancient Roman House, Georg Rehlander, 1894.

"We understand that the spatial types remain mute until they are "set back on earth" and given presence by means of the orders. Thus "the temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves", Heidegger says."<sup>265</sup>

After these points Norberg-Schulz made on Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greek architecture, he draws our attention to Ancient Roman architecture. Firstly, he mentions Etruscan necropolises and their excavated rooms with "cave-like" interiors. He explains the importance of these "entire cities for dead" with a quotation from Austrian archaeologist Kaschnitz von Weinberg: "The man who excavates a space in the soft rock does not construct an "opposite" which, like the Greek temple, faces him.", Kaschnitz von Weinberg wrote, "he rather penetrates into amorphous matter, and his creative activity consists in making for himself an existential space."."<sup>266</sup>

A few passages ago, at the end of the passage on Ancient Egypt, Norberg-Schulz says "A comprehensive inventory of archetypal forms is thus set into work: grid, path, center and enclosure."<sup>267</sup> Norberg-Schulz uses this inventory as a template to understand these Ancient civilizations' architecture. He underlines the "order" he understands in Ancient Roman architecture:

265. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 157.

266. *Ibid*, 161.

267. *Ibid*, 157.

"The Romans thus imagined the world as a total, embracing space, organized by means of an orthogonal set of horizontal and vertical axes, and characterized by applied Greek orders. The Pantheon in Rome (120 A.D.) visualizes this conception in a grand and easily comprehensible way. Here an archetypal image as powerful as the Greek temple makes itself manifest, and the Pantheon therefore became one of the prototypes of western architecture."<sup>268</sup>

Here, he underlines the relation between Greek and Roman architecture. He also creates a continuous connection from Ancient Greek architecture to Western architecture which he will further develop later in the book. Then, he explains the importance of "basilica" in the context of this continuity:

"The basilica is another Roman type of basic importance. Here the content is not the structure of the world as such, but man's being in this world as destiny and project, understood as a path which leads him along, on the earth and under the sky. The basilica, thus, consists of two superimposed zones which accompany the longitudinal axis; the lower is "populated" by anthropomorphic columns while the upper is related to the sky by means of decoration and light entering from above."<sup>269</sup>

Here, he explains the main features and orders of a basilica. After explaining the importance of the basilica, he underlines its connection with churches in the context of his "inventory of archetypal forms":

"From the very outset a few profoundly symbolic spatial structures were used for the building of churches: the concept of "center" and "path", which were imagined in terms of the Roman rotunda and basilica. The church proper was based on the longitudinal basilica which was interpreted as an expression of the "path of salvation", whereas a centralized space was used when the building task was a baptistry, mausoleum or martyrrium, that is, the "before" and "after" of earthly life."<sup>270</sup>

Here, we can see there are several features and orders of the Roman "basilica" and "rotunda" that inspired the Christian churches. Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers there is a great value in such relation in architecture in the course of history. He underlines this notion with these words: "Thus a temporal understanding of a complete world of earth, sky, man and divinity is concretized, and architecture becomes a true imago mundi."<sup>271</sup> Here, we understand Norberg-Schulz sees architecture as a tool that "concretizes" the periodical understanding and meaning of existence and carries it through time, thus, giving us a chance to see the whole. After this standpoint, he continues to example:

268. Ibid, 161.

269. Ibid, 161.

270. Ibid, 163.

271. Ibid, 163.

"The "logic" of Gothic architecture visualizes the hierarchy of parts explained by scholastic philosophy, whereas in Renaissance buildings we encounter the logic of an eternal geometrical order. Perfection of form thus replaced symbolic integration. According to Alberti, the most perfect and therefore most divine form is the circle, and centralized buildings therefore came to visualize cosmic order."<sup>272</sup>

As we see in this passage as well as the passage about Ancient Egypt, he underlines the reference of "cosmic order" which is not a certain matter of fact, but rather a concept that periodically changes in the course of history. Thus, he creates the relation between "order" and "type":

"A type was not considered a fixed ideal, but a kind of living, complex thing which, within certain limits, offered an infinite possibility of variation. When the analytic-scientific attitude of the Enlightenment was adopted by architects and theorists, an important change took place. For J.N.L. Durand, architecture became a mechanical putting together of fixed elements of a quasi-abstract nature. These parts constitute a set of models to be imitated, and are arranged with the aid of similarly abstract axes and networks of such. The notions of character and image are thus abandoned and superseded by mere quantification. The classical orders were degraded into superficial decoration, and "style" became something arbitrarily added to the building a posteriori."<sup>273</sup>

To Norberg-Schulz, another feature of "monumentality" which is lacking in Modern architecture is the "architectural image". He explains this by giving examples of Modern era architects and their connections with the traditional architecture, and he says in this passage:

"Furthermore, we have mentioned that the pioneers of the modern movement in many cases had a positive attitude to history. Le Corbusier repeatedly referred to the past in "Vers une Architecture", Mies van der Rohe praised the "wooden houses of old", Frank Lloyd Wright was profoundly influenced by the Japanese house. Giedion, finally, introduced the concept of "constituent fact" to show how modern architecture had been prepared for by Borromini, Guarini and other masters of the past. But a basic element was still lacking: the architectural image."<sup>274</sup>

Here, we can understand that he recognizes these connections and the interpretations of Modern architects to be nourished and influenced by the past. However, he points out the fact that all these interpretations mainly lack "the architectural image" which he sees as essential for

272. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 165.

273. Ibid.

274. Ibid, 169.



Figure 3.24: A photo of Ronchamp chapel, Le Corbusier.

meaning in architecture. Furthermore, he mentions Le Corbusier's Ronchamp chapel and says "Ronchamp is undoubtedly a great work of art because it gathers a rich world of meanings and is capable of moving us, but still, it remains unique solution without typological value."<sup>275</sup> Thus, he accepts there were interpretations to create an "architectural image", however, it remained in unique solutions which we cannot benefit from in a typological way, as exemplified in Ancient Greek architecture. He determines the problem of Modern architecture on the "architectural image" as lack of holistic approach in architecture and he says "Thus modern architecture tended to oscillate between abstract generalization and atypical particularization."<sup>276</sup>

Later, he asks the question "What, then, is the nature of a universally valid architectural image?"<sup>277</sup> Explaining this, he says "We have mentioned the pyramid, the dome, the pediment and the arch as examples of such images. They reveal general relationships between down and up, here and there, outside and inside, and are at the same time easily recognizable."<sup>278</sup> Furthermore, he says "We could also say that the above-mentioned form are images because they possess a place-creating potentiality. Any place reveals a particular relationship of earth and sky, and is constituted by architectural images. The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence

275. Ibid, 169.

276. Ibid, 169.

277. Ibid, 169.

278. Ibid, 169.




Figure 3.25: Drawings of Trenton Bathhouse, Louis I. Kahn.

a “loss of life”.<sup>279</sup> Haddad mentions this notion and says “Here Norberg-Schulz presented a pragmatic assessment of the problem, from the destruction of the “urban fabric” to the loss of character and place.”<sup>280</sup> Thus, Norberg-Schulz underlines the necessity of archetypes in such architecture through a quotation by Louis I. Kahn:

“Kahn used to say that the only volume of an encyclopedia that really interested him was “volume number zero”. He also said that he “loved beginnings”. It seems fair to interpret these statements as expressions of a wish for a return to archetypes, that is, for a return to what was there “before” history and “before” styles.”<sup>281</sup>

However, although he gives Kahn as an example in the context of his approach to architecture, he also criticizes Kahn’s architecture and points out the deficiencies he observes:

“And still, something is lacking. Kahn’s images are certainly related to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they do not constitute any symbol system which responds to the language of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow for variation, combination and translocation of meanings.”<sup>282</sup>

279. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 169.

280. Elie Haddad, “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In Architecture,” *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 95.

281. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 169.

282. *Ibid.*



In this manner, Norberg-Schulz mentions two architects that he admires their works in this context in this sentence:

“Two architects have contributed in a particularly decisive way to the recovery of the typical image, the American Robert Venturi and the Italian Aldo Rossi.”<sup>283</sup>

Haddad mentions this connection and says “...he joined Venturi, Jacobs, and Rossi in criticizing Modern Architecture for its shortcomings, especially at the level of the urban environment.”<sup>284</sup> He, later, explains the value he sees in their works. Firstly, he explains the value of Venturi’s work, and he says “The resulting independence of form and function is in the interest of a more effective functionalism, because our “allowing form and function to go their separate ways permits function to be truly functional.”<sup>285</sup> Thus, he considers there is a great value and potential for a typical architectural image in the separation of “form” and “function”. Also, there are methodological similarities in Norberg-Schulz’s work to Venturi’s. Haddad says “As in the case of Venturi, but using a different approach, Norberg-Schulz returned to history in its wider sense to give comparative examples of buildings, towns and landscapes as examples that naturally incorporate these qualities of “existential space”, creating meaningful and wholistic environments.”<sup>286</sup>

Later, Norberg-Schulz underlines the work of Rossi and says “His point of departure is a wish for a typology which is commonly understandable and which may help us to recover the city as a “work of art”.”<sup>287</sup> He also underlines the importance of the distinction between “type” and “model” which was pointed out by Rossi for the first time. Also, in a previous passage, Norberg says “When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part of a work of architecture.”<sup>288</sup> This term “architectural thing” is quite relatable when we consider Rossi’s term “urban artifact”.

However, Norberg-Schulz also criticizes Rossi and explains the imperfections he sees: “Although some of them are given slight overtones of local memories, they are not articulated with reference to earth and sky. Rather they seems to exist in a realm which is outside time and place.”<sup>289</sup> Then, he also says “The embodiment in the here and now is almost entirely lacking, and thus his compositions do not allow for orientation and identification, and for life to take place.”<sup>290</sup> Here we can understand Norberg-Schulz considers the relation with the place as an essential value in architecture, and he opposes an approach that abstracts and isolates the architecture from the place. He ends this chapter of “New Monumentality” underlining this stance:

“Typology is not architecture, and before it can become a useful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from the

283. Ibid.

284. Elie Haddad, “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In Architecture,” *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 91.

285. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 169.

286. Elie Haddad, “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In Architecture,” *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 91.

287. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 169.

288. Ibid, 153.

289. Ibid, 175.

290. Ibid, 175.

rationalists' world of abstractions and brought back to the concrete world of phenomena. This does not mean that we consider the language of types a matter of mere feeling, but rather that it ought to get an existential foundation, where thinking and feeling are united, through a phenomenological understanding of the world which relates the given to the archetypes."<sup>291</sup>

Underlining the importance of "place" for Norberg-Schulz, we come across another important chapter in Norberg-Schulz's book, "Principles of Modern Architecture". This chapter is the chapter of "New Place" in which he talks about the new forms of understanding the place. He starts the chapter by explaining the norm of "honesty" in Modern architecture:

"Modern architecture from the very beginning was concerned about meaning. Early pioneers such as Frank Lloyd Wright, Henry van de Velde, Adolf Loos and Hendrik Petrus Berlage, denounced the "lies" of historicism, and demanded a new, authentic architecture. The point of departure of the modern movement, therefore, was not primarily problems of function and technology, but the demand for "honesty". Thus Giedion wrote: "According to the easy explanation that was advanced later, the movement developed as the application of two principles: the abandonment of historical styles, and -consequent upon this- the use of "fitness for purpose" as a criterion."<sup>292</sup>

Here, we can see that he manifests the opposition between "historicism" and "modern movement" as an opposition between "honesty" and "lies". Norberg-Schulz also mentions this notion of honesty while talking about "image" in a later chapter and says "... house ought to look like house, and nothing else."<sup>293</sup> Thus, the whole discourse turns into a matter of "morality". He mentions this notion in this passage:

"As a consequence, the modern movement gave much attention to questions of "honesty" and "morality", and in general aimed at the recovery of authentic and original forms which could substitute the "devaluated symbols" of historicism. Thus the movement developed the general principles of "functionalism" and "structuralism", believing that the expression of function and structure would generate new meaningful forms. To some extent the promise was fulfilled."<sup>294</sup>

Here, after underlining "honesty" and "morality" as we mentioned, he talks about "functionalism" and "structuralism" as a tool to create a new domain of meaning in architecture, and he also says that was partially successful but not sufficient. Later, he considers post-modernism in this manner and says:

291. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 153.

292. *Ibid*, 177.

293. *Ibid*, 185.

294. *Ibid*, 177.




Figure 3.26: Plans of "Unité d'Habitation", Marseille, France, Le Corbusier.

"Post-modern architecture therefore concentrates its attention on the problem of meaning. So far, it seems to be of general agreement that meaning has to do with images rather than functional or structural forms. A form is meaningful because it "represents" something, and because it tells us something, and because it helps our orientation in and identification with the world in which we live."<sup>295</sup>

Here, we can see the approach of post-modern architecture is to use "image" as a tool to represent "meaning" in architecture. However, Norberg-Schulz criticizes this approach that reduces the meaning of architecture to "sign":

"The nature of the image is however hardly understood. Many post-modernists regard it as a "sign", that is, an arbitrarily chosen element which "signifies" something else. According to semiological theory the language of architecture becomes "a system of agreed-upon rules to communicate". Evidently, architectural forms may function as signs, but their meaning cannot be reduced to a mere matter of "agreement", and their purpose to interpersonal communication. Basically, an image is not a sign. An image reveals rather

295. Ibid, 177.




Figure 3.27: Models of sign and symbols, Charles Jencks.

than communicates, it illuminates and explains."<sup>296</sup>

After this criticism, Norberg-Schulz thinks of the necessity of an explanation on the value of "image", in the deeper sense. Thus, he starts to explain his point of view with a quotation from Heidegger: "Only image formed keeps the vision. Yet image formed rests in the poem."<sup>297</sup> Here, what Heidegger means by "vision" is a key point to understand. Thus, Norberg-Schulz explains: "A vision, a perception, in the widest sense of the word, needs an image to become "real"."<sup>298</sup> After this explanation, he says: "The image, hence, reveals a world."<sup>299</sup> Then, he explains this notion "In general the image keeps what has been seen, and is therefore a recollection."<sup>300</sup> To make it clear, he adds "We ought to emphasize that the image does not "imitate" reality. The work of art "is" reality."<sup>301</sup>

At this point of the chapter, Norberg-Schulz points out the most important notion to understand what he means by "visualization" and "complementation". He starts with a poem of Heidegger, named "The Thinker as Poet":

"Forests spread  
Brooks plunge  
Rocks persist

296. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 177.

297. Ibid.

298. Ibid.

299. Ibid.

300. Ibid.

301. Ibid, 179.

Mist diffuses  
Meadows wait  
Springs well  
Winds dwell  
Blessings muses<sup>302</sup>

Then, he explains the importance of this poem:

“... Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily understood meanings. Thus they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.<sup>303</sup>

Here, he explains “visualization”, which is a coherent and self-explanatory term for an architect. His explanation only adds a number of nuances to the general understanding of this term. However, the next passage takes the discourse to a quite interesting ground:

“When man makes language speak about the thing, however, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or “project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”<sup>304</sup>

Here, we can understand that he considers “image” as a tool not only resonating with the memory of the past but also projecting a dream of an ideal. This notion brings us back to the discourse we’ve mentioned and connects with the archetype as a Platonic “idea”.

Then, Norberg-Schulz goes back to the discourse about “place” with this well-explained terminology. He says “The local structures are variations on the archetypes. To allow human life to take place in this structured emptiness, architecture has to adapt to the spatiality of human life itself.”<sup>305</sup> Here, he underlines the importance of the living and the rituals around a built environment. Also, he considers that architecture should adapt to such a living. Then he connects this notion with the concept of “place” in this passage:

“When a work of architecture visualizes the structure of earth and sky and complement its lacks, a total world is brought

302. Ibid, 179.

303. Ibid, 179.

304. Ibid, 179.

305. Ibid, 179.

into presence, and the site is transformed into a place. That is the meaning of Heidegger's words: "The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky." <sup>306</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz points out two main points. A work of architecture not only "visualizes" as an object in the physical world, but also "complements" as an object perceived and completed by a subject. This notion underlines the essentiality of the presence of the subject in architecture. Norberg-Schulz points out this and says: "Thereby the momentary action becomes part of life, it gets a "measure" and a meaning, and man may say that he dwells. To create places which permit dwelling is the profound task of architecture." <sup>307</sup> Here, obviously, the word "dwell" is not a random selection of a word. It is directly referring to Heidegger's "dwell" as the way of "building".

In the book, "The Concept of Dwelling", Norberg-Schulz explains this notion of "dwelling". As we mentioned before this Heideggerian term is a quite important concept in Norberg-Schulz's architecture as well. Wilken explains the etymology of the word and its relation with Norberg-Schulz's definition with these words:

"Dwelling is a decidedly opaque and elusive term in Heidegger's writing. The meaning of dwelling—or, more precisely, the meaning of its Germanic root *bauen*—appears to shift with each application, sometimes referring, it would seem, to a kind of fundamental ontological category, and sometimes taking on a more instrumental sense of cultivation and construction— an ambiguity which raises a number of issues that will be returned to later in this discussion. Both senses of dwelling inform Norberg-Schulz's statement: "Dwelling [...] implies something more than 'shelter'. It implies that the spaces where life occurs are places, in the true sense of the word" <sup>308</sup>

In the book, Norberg-Schulz defines the "four modes of dwelling". One of which is "settlement" which Norberg-Schulz says "Man, thus, finds himself when he settles, and his being-in-the-world is thereby determined." <sup>309</sup> He also says "When settling is accomplished, other modes of dwelling which concern basic forms of human togetherness, come into play." <sup>310</sup> Thus, "settlement" is the fundamental mode of dwelling that opens up the possibility of other modes. Another mode of "dwelling" is "collective dwelling" which is represented by "urban space" in the book. Norberg-Schulz says "In urban space man "dwells" in the sense of experiencing the richness of a world. We may call this mode collective dwelling, using the word "collec-

306. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 179.

307. Ibid.

308. Rowan Wilken, "The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz's Writings on Heidegger and Place," *Architectural Theory Review* 18, no. 3 (2013): 343.

309. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *The Concept of the Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1985), 13.

310. Ibid.




Figure 3.28: Sections (Area I, A–C, 11–7) of the Great Naqane rock. This shows a number of houses raised on pile foundations (nos. 175, 207, 255) as well as the great maze (no. 270), *The Idea of a Town*, Joseph Rykwert.

“dwelling” in the original sense of gathering or assembly.”<sup>311</sup> Another mode of “dwelling” is “public dwelling” which is represented by “institution” in the book. Norberg Schulz says “Agreement thus implies common interests or values, and forms the basis for a fellowship or society. An agreement also has to “take place,” in the sense of possessing a forum where the common values are kept and expressed. Such a place is generally known as an institution or public building, and the mode of dwelling it serves we may call public dwelling, using the word “public” to denote what is shared by the community.”<sup>312</sup> Last but not least, another mode of “dwelling” is “private dwelling” which is represented by “house” in the book. Norberg-Schulz explains this and says “Choices, however, are also of a more personal kind, and the life of each individual has its particular course. Dwelling therefore also comprises that withdrawal which is necessary to define and develop one’s own identity. We may call this mode private dwelling, intending those actions which are secluded from the intrusion of others.”<sup>313</sup> Thus, we can understand how Norberg-Schulz categorizes

311. Ibid.

312. Ibid.

313. Ibid.

## "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" by Martin Heidegger




Figure 3.29: A Diagram of Heidegger's Concept of Dwelling.



different types of “dwelling” processes.

Then, Norberg-Schulz brings everything he mentioned in this chapter together on the “house” as an example. He explains this notion in this passage:

“The house serves daily, personal life. Its nature is circumstantial, and its form is related to local and temporal conditions. This does not mean, however, that all houses are entirely different. Any situation represents a variation on the general structures of the world, and it is therefore meaningful to consider the house an *imago mundi*.”<sup>314</sup>

Here, we can see Norberg-Schulz understands the “house” presents the locality and condition of a landscape as a specific being with universally shared values that refers to the idea of the world. Haddad says explains Norberg Schulz’s understanding of “house” with a reference from Heidegger in this passage:

“In discussing the house, Norberg-Schulz referred to Heidegger’s essay on dwelling and the etymological roots of “building” which go back to “dwelling”, stressing the role of the house as the “central place of human existence”:

The House, therefore, remains the central place of human existence, the place where the child learns to understand his being in the world, and the place from which man departs and to which he returns.”<sup>315</sup>

He further explains this notion with the elements he presented in this chapter and brings everything together in this passage:

“Thus the house primarily complements the lacks of the site and makes what is close at hand emerge. It constitutes a concrete, individual “here”, and allows life to take place “now”. In the past, however, the concrete “here” became typical, because “neighbourly dwelling” implied the sharing of a site and a way of life. Vernacular houses therefore appear as variations of types, and visualize a particular “inhabited landscape”. Together they make up a meaningful place, and their constituent parts, floor, roof and wall, possess the quality of images.”<sup>316</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz connects the concepts of “place”, “neighbourly dwelling”, “type” and “inhabited landscape”. This passage sums up the topography of his world of thoughts on the subject of “place”. He uses the “house” as the simplest representation of these concepts.

Then, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between “type” and

314. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 179.

315. Elie Haddad, “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In Architecture,” *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 90.

316. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 179.

“house” as the essential necessity of enclosure. He says “On the human side we find the simultaneous needs for refuge (shelter) and point of departure. The first need is in general satisfied by enclosure, and generous embracing roofs have in fact always been distinctive human dwellings. The shape of the roof varies in relation to the given environment, and serves to adapt the house to its surroundings through visualization or complementation.”<sup>317</sup> Here, we can understand that he considers “type” as an adaptation to the environment through visualization or complementation. This notion supports the idea of “type” not as a stable and constant state, but an ever-changing and developing phenomenon.

After talking about the “house” as the most personal and individual architectural being, Norberg-Schulz begins to talk about the other side of the medallion, the “public institution”. As “house” represents the individuality of architectural experience, “public institution” takes the role of the sociocultural representation. Norberg explains this with these words:

“The public institution serves the agreements of a fellowship. That is, it is not just a functional container, but should offer an “explanation” which relates the way of life of the community to the general structures of the world.”<sup>318</sup>

Here, we understand that a “public institution” is not only a functional organization but also a way of communicating in the community that expresses the characteristics of the collective living of a particular community. This expression, naturally, happens to be quite clear and transparent to gather and reinforce the community. What is hidden or subtle in “house” becomes clear and direct in “public institution”. Norberg-Schulz explains this and says “When institutions are added to the dwellings, what is faintly suggested becomes a significantly and clearly revealed, and the place emerges as a forum for the life of a fellowship.”<sup>319</sup> Later, Norberg-Schulz explains this in a much more practical manner: “The basic images of the institutions are, as we have already pointed out, the great unitary hall (centralized, longitudinal or gridded), and the distinct volume, such as the tower and the dome. In the past, public buildings were generally conceived as compositions of such volumes... We do not have to expand on what has already been said about the modes of standing etc., but should emphasize that the articulate built form of the public institution reveals how a historical epoch understands its being between earth and sky.”<sup>320</sup> Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz referred to the “earth” and “sky” which are two of the four fundamental elements of Heidegger’s philosophy, when he was saying “...what is faintly suggested becomes a significantly and clearly revealed...”.

317. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 179.

318. Ibid, 181.

319. Ibid, 181.

320. Ibid, 181.




Figure 3.30: Longitudinal section of the old basilica, Rome, Il Tempio Vaticano, Carlo Fontana, 1694.

After talking about “public institution” as a representation of collective life, Norberg-Schulz begins to talk about the “city” as a larger-scale manifestation of this collectivity. He starts to explain his interpretation with these words:

“The city gathers the various existential interpretations of a collectivity. It is therefore pluralistic rather than unitary, and when we say that it constitutes a goal in existential space, it is because it offers possibilities rather than a particular explanation.”<sup>321</sup>

Here, he underlines the “flexibility” for the interpretation of the “city” as a collective being. However, he also considers the “city” as a reference point. He explains this notion and says “But also has to be rooted in a locality and constitute a center which makes a region emerge as what it is.”<sup>322</sup> We can see he considers the source of its reference as “locality” and “centricity”. He further explains this notion with these words:

“Because of its local rootedness, the city may be considered a “large house” (Alberti), but this definition does not grasp its quality as a meeting place.”<sup>323</sup>

321. Ibid, 181.

322. Ibid, 181.

323. Ibid, 181.

Here, we can see he underlines an important feature of the “city”. This



Figure 3.31: "İki", Bursa, Turkey, Yıldız Moran, 1955.

feature is fundamentally its being a “meeting place”.

Another important notion of this chapter of the book is the criticism of “place” in Modern architecture. Norberg begins to explain his criticism by going through several fundamental points. Firstly, he describes modern architecture as a whole in this passage:

“Together, pre-modern, modern and post-modern architecture make up the new tradition. The first phase gave primary importance to a reinterpretation of the phenomena of nature and human life by means of an art nouveau, at the same time as the new conception of space was emerging. The second phase concentrated its attention on the setting into work of this conception in terms of free plan and open form.”<sup>324</sup>

Here, he points out the new approaches of pre-modern and modern. On the other hand, he criticizes the late modern and uses this to link the reasoning of rise of the post-modern architecture. He explains this in these words:

“The second, modern, phase therefore tended to degenerate into “late-modern” structural expressionism, at the same time as the free plan was reduced to “functional patterns” and the city to a mere question of “planning”. In order to conquer these shortcomings and recover some of the values of pre-modern architecture, the third, post-modern, phase of the new tradition has returned to the phenomenological approach, and moreover added a new concern for past “memories”. This does not imply a revival of the academic approach, but simply a wish for again becoming part of history.”<sup>325</sup>

We can see that he considers post-modern architecture as a movement that came into being to solve the problems of modern architecture. Then, he underlines the importance of the new approaches to recover the “language” of architecture:

“The expected recovery of the language of architecture makes it possible to substitute the ever new inventions which are dominant today with creative work within a living tradition. Since language is the “house of Being” and therefore contains “everything”, it may in fact be used directly to reveal previously hidden aspects of reality, or, if one prefers, to offer reinterpretations of reality.”<sup>326</sup>

Here, we can see he considers the presence of “language” as an essential element of consistent creativity and discovery of new aspects of reality. However, he also criticizes the new approaches in this context:

324. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editi, 1988), 193.

325. *Ibid.*

326. *Ibid.*

"The new tradition, however, does not really correspond to the styles or the traditions of the past, as it is neither of temporal nor local nature. Rather it shows how modern architecture is "on the way to language".<sup>327</sup>

After this criticism of "place" in modern architecture, Norberg-Schulz further explains his point in the section named "From space to place". He underlines the problem of the "loss of the image" with these words:

"This proposition may not seem convincing to everybody, since we are no longer used to thinking of architecture in terms of images. Too long we have been giving exclusive attention to function and structure. Without images, however, our environment is reduced to a mere spatial container."<sup>328</sup>

Here, we can see that he considers the contemporary approach of architecture to be reduced to "function" and "structure". Then, he talks about the relationship between modern and post-modern architecture in the context of "image" and says "We cannot accept, however, that this implies the "failure" of modern architecture. Neither can we support the view that post-modernism represents a break with the new tradition. Post-modernism rather evolves out of modernism, and its success depends on its being able to combine the free plan and the open form with the meaningful image."<sup>329</sup> Here, he criticizes post-modern architecture since the movement separates itself from modern architecture. However, Norberg-Schulz thinks they are complementary parts of an evolving whole. Then, he points out a psychological aspect of this need and he says "When the modern world becomes overwhelming and frightening, it is more important than ever to master it emotionally, and to learn to grasp it through what we have called a "poetical vision". Only through love and respect for things, and thus be able to "save the earth"." In terms of architecture this means the creation of true places, and thus the recovery of the built image."<sup>330</sup> Here, we can see that Norberg-Schulz considers "places" as a representation of "built image" and he also relates these with living in a meaningful narrative. He also criticizes our daily vision to things in the Modern world with these words:

"Our daily environment consists of things, rather than abstractions such as molecules and atoms. Present-day education is almost exclusively based on abstraction, and as a result we have lost the sense of things and the ability to keep them by means of images."<sup>331</sup>

Here, he points out the lack of the role of images in the Modern way of thinking in comparison to abstraction. He explains deeper this notion more through the Greek word "techne" and the German word

327. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 193.

328. Ibid.

329. Ibid.

330. Ibid.

331. Ibid.

“Andenken” in this passage:

“To the Greeks *techne* meant “bringing-forth”, and belonged to *poiesis*, revealing. “The essence of technology is by no means technological”, Heidegger says, because “technology is a mode of revealing. Technology come to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where *aletheia*, truth, happens.”. A phenomenological approach may give back to technology its true significance, and thus restore architecture as building, in the true sense of the word. Thus Heidegger says: “Only of we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.”. Here “dwelling” means a poetical or phenomenological relationship to the world, or what Heidegger calls *Andenken*.”<sup>332</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between Greek word “*techne*” and Heidegger’s term “dwelling”. This connection is an important point to understand Heidegger’s and also Norberg-Schulz’s perspectives. Thus, he explains further this notion about “dwelling” and says “Dwelling presupposes a poetic, phenomenological attitude to everything. The understanding which is obtained through this attitude must be kept in images.”.<sup>333</sup>

Norberg-Schulz ends this chapter of “New Place” with these words: “The new place is new as well as old, in the sense that it presents a new interpretation of the archetypes of existential spatiality. On the urban level the new place will be varied and pluralistic, on the domestic level varied and familiar, and on the institutional level explicitly symbolic.”.<sup>334</sup>

332. Ibid.

333. Ibid, 195.

334. Ibid, 195.

# RESEMBLANCE & DIVERGENCE



As we see in the previous chapter, there are numerous subjects that are related to Rossi and Norberg-Schulz. Authors have multiple subjects in common. On the other hand, there are also many points that they have different perspectives or approaches. Among these similarities and differences, there are several which have different degrees of importance and priority, due to their connection with the other subjects or the position of the concept in the context of the author's perspective. Thus, we will examine the major intersections and variations in the texts. There are also differences in the approach on a fundamental level, which is also quite important.

Before we start examining the major concept and issues, it is better to understand where these two authors stand in the context of the intellectual approach. Both authors partly criticize the "status quo" and underline the need for a new understanding and new approach to architecture and the process of design. This criticism has several common points with the other authors and architects of the period which later led to the Post-Modern movement. One of the major ones is the criticisms of American architect Robert Venturi. He underlines the necessity of image and complexity in architecture and criticizes Modern architecture's plainness as a stylistic approach. There is also the influence of Charles Jencks' and Sigfried Giedion's writings in the criticism of these authors.

The most fundamental difference between the two authors is the difference between their intellectual approaches. Rossi mentions many times the necessity of a scientific approach to architecture in both of his books. Thus, he mainly aims to keep his arguments in the scientifically or at least logically debatable area of thought. On the other hand, although at first sight Norberg-Schulz's approach seems quite scientific, as we went through details, we can observe there are numerous references to the Heideggerian terminology which is vaguely defined. This notion makes Norberg-Schulz's arguments quite unclear and lowers the strength of his arguments.

This difference between their intellectual approaches also corresponds to their stance in architecture as well. Rossi logically bases his approach on a reference to psychology and typology. On one hand, he approaches the "city" as "a man-made object" to understand it as a collection of the historical heritage of objects and information. On the other hand, he approaches the "city as "a work of art" to understand it as a product of collective memory and imagination. He perceives the physical environment as "urban artifacts" which as abstracted objects of the city. On the contrary, Norberg-Schulz often criticizes this abstractive and scientific approach. Instead, he proposes a phenomenological and quantitative approach to architecture.




Figure 4.1: Drawing of San Cataldo Cemetery, Aldo Rossi.

Another important notion about these two authors is that they are both interested in the mental process and perception of the subjects of architecture. We can easily observe the influence of psychology and phenomenology on both architects.

Rossi was mainly influenced by Swiss psychologist Carl Jung. The terminology he uses often coincides with Jungian terminology. Rossi often uses the terms "collective memory" and "consciousness" which are quite important terms in Jungian psychology as well. Also, the term "archetype" which is often used by Rossi is also a word which is popularized by Carl Jung in psychology. Although it is not a strong standpoint in Rossi's world of thought, he also mentions the phenomenological aspect of the architecture from time to time.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, was mostly influenced by Gestalt psychology and Jean Piaget. The influence of Piaget is especially apparent in his book "Existence, Space and Architecture". Specifically, the term "process of schematization" and "socialization of perception" are relatable to such terminology. Also, we can see that Norberg-Schulz was also influenced by Heideggerian phenomenology. He often uses the Heideggerian terminology. Most important terms in

this sense are “nearness” and “dwelling” which are strongly related to the perceptual and cognitive aspects of the architectural process.

One of the common subjects of these authors is the “meaning” in architecture. This need for meaning translates into different concepts in their writings.

One of which is “image”. Rossi relates the need for “image” to “memory” and “history”. To Rossi, “image” is one of the most important tools to understand our context in terms of time. It helps us to understand the references by revealing “persistences” and “permanences” in the city. Rossi considers the most crucial notion of architecture is to reveal the “history” and “memory” with the “event” and the “sign”. He says “I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has marked the event.”<sup>335</sup> Thus, he describes the main necessity of architecture as “event & sign”, in other words, memory.

Norberg-Schulz relates the necessity of “image” to the necessity of “meaning”. Here, we can observe the influence of Giedion since he was the professor of Norberg-Schulz at ETH Zurich. He also relates “image” to “locus”. He repeatedly underlines the connection between “image”, “place” and “life”. He says, “The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence a “loss of life”.”<sup>336</sup> Thus, we can understand Norberg-Schulz aims to find the “meaning”, which is lacking in architecture, in “image” and in “locus”. These two elements most powerfully intersect in one physical element: monuments. Thus, monuments play an important role in Norberg-Schulz’s search for “meaning”. As in Rossi’s perspective, Norberg-Schulz also acknowledges “the event & the sign” notion as a reference to the past. However, he also criticizes this point of view as a reduction of the definition of the “image” to “sign”. He mentions the more important role of “monuments” to reveal the meaning by “visualization” and “complementation” which has deeper connections with the consciousness of the subject and also with the “image”.

Another common subject of the authors is their interpretation of “physical elements” in the built environment. In their writings, both of them often refer to “type” and “typology”. Also, they attribute an additional value to certain physical elements.

Rossi defines the physical elements of the city as “urban artifacts”. According to Rossi, these “urban artifacts” have four main features:

335. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 106.

336. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 169.

individuality, locus, design, and memory. Among these urban artifacts, Rossi prioritizes certain artifacts and names them as "primary elements". In his writings, he examples these "primary elements" as monuments, plans of the city, and basic layouts of the city. Rossi does not consider the "function" of these artifacts as their fundamental feature. Thus, to Rossi, these artifacts are a part of the city, even though their function changes over time. Rossi has two main perspectives to understand "city": "a man-made object" and "a work of art". Thus, we can understand Rossi's thinking of urban artifacts is mainly abstractive and analytical. As "a man-made object", he considers the city and the urban artifacts as "traces of time". This perspective leads him to consider types as "logical principles" which are "permanent" and "complex". On the other hand, as "a work of art", he considers the city and the urban artifacts as a result of "collective imagination".

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, defines the physical elements as "architectural things" which can be related to the term "architectural space" in his book "Existence, Space and Architecture. The notion we need to understand about this term is "architectural space" is defined as a phenomenological concept. Heideggerian phenomenology plays a strong role in Norberg-Schulz's perspective on physical elements of the built environment, as it played a role in his general perspective on architecture. Thus, Norberg-Schulz defines the physical elements and forms of architecture with their phenomenological relation with the subject. Among these elements, he attributes an additional value to "monuments". To better understand his understanding of physical elements, we need to understand how he considers monuments. To Norberg-Schulz, the most crucial feature of "monuments" is their potential to reveal "image" by "visualization" and "complementation". Both acts interact with the subject. Norberg-Schulz describes "visualization" as a revelation of images that can be related to the past. He says "...they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images "visualization".<sup>337</sup> On the other hand, he describes "complementation" as a "dream" or a "project" which can be related to an imagination of a future. He says, "To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are "lacking". A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also "complementation". It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary."<sup>338</sup> Thus, we can see Norberg-Schulz fundamentally defines every physical element of the built environment by its phenomenological projection of the subject.

Another common subject of the authors is how they relate daily activities and rituals, in other words, living, with architecture. Both have different

337. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 179.

338. Ibid.




Figure 4.2: Diagrams of Space, Intentions in Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

perspectives on this subject with some similarities and common points.

There are numerous points that Rossi's perspective coincides with daily life and rituals. On the fundamental level, as we mentioned before, Rossi has two main understandings of the "city": "a man-made object" and "a work of art". As we can see here, both of these definitions are derived from human activities fundamentally. Thus, the presence of daily life and rituals can be found in the foundation of Rossi's understanding. We can better understand Rossi's aspect, if we understand his relation with "teatro". Rossi considers "city" as a "teatro" in which human events take place. Also, he often underlines the importance of "collectiveness" which is not only related to daily life but also related to the social interactions of individuals. This notion of "collectiveness" is quite important. It is related to other important concepts of Rossi such as "collective memory" and "collective imagination". Another important notion is Rossi's description of "type". He relates "type" with the form and the way of life of certain timeframe. He explains this and says "as "... developed according to both needs and aspirations to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely from society to society."<sup>339</sup> Thus, he associates the "logical principle" of the "type" as a

339. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 40.

**Aldo  
Rossi**



**Christian  
Norberg-Schulz**

Figure 4.3: Diagram of Resemblances & Divergences of Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz.

knowledge which is obtained through experiences of the past. Most importantly, Rossi describes the fundamental objective of architecture as revealing the "memory" with the "event" and "sign". Thus, we can understand the crucial role of human events in Rossi's architecture.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, has a quite different approach. As his fundamental approach to architecture is phenomenological, he considers the relation between daily life and architecture to emerge from this phenomenological aspect. To Norberg-Schulz, the process of "building" starts in the mind. We can see the first sign of this thought in his relatively early book "Existence, Space and Architecture". He explains various types of spaces. Specifically, "existential space" is relatable with the term "being in the world" which is a frequently used term in Norberg-Schulz's books and writings. Also, "architectural space" is directly related to the built environment as it was defined as the "concretization of the environmental schemata or images".<sup>340</sup> This mental process of "building" can be understood better in the concept of "nearness" which we will examine later. Also, interactive acts of "visualization" and "complementation" which is related to "monuments" and "image", can be related to the phenomenological experience of the subject. Another fundamental point is Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the process of building. As we mentioned before, Heideggerian phenomenology plays an important role in Norberg-Schulz's architecture. Both Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz consider the process of "building" as a process of "dwelling". This process of "dwelling" can be described as the simultaneous and parallel progress of living and building. Thus, both consider the process of "building" as a never-ending process that follows the routines and the rituals of daily life.

As we can understand from these examples, there are numerous similarities and differences in these authors' understanding of architecture. Thus, we will examine these notions in a more detailed and deeper sense.

340. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 7.

## PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Considering the impact, the most significant subject that directs the thoughts and writings of Rossi and Norberg-Schulz is presumably psychology. Both writers create connections between their works and various psychological fields in their writings. Although there are common points, most of the time, they mention different works of psychology.

Rossi was influenced by many names and movements in psychology. He describes this influence with these words: "That the study of collective psychology has an essential part in the study of the city seems undeniable. Many of the authors to whom I feel closest in this work base their studies on collective psychology, which in turn is linked to sociology."<sup>341</sup> Later, he also gives specific examples of Gestalt psychology in architecture and says "Valuable information also may be obtained from the experiments conducted under the banner of Gestalt psychology, as undertaken by the Bauhaus in the domain of form and as proposed by the American school of Lynch."<sup>342</sup> Thus, we understand Rossi also values the role of Gestalt psychology in the works of Bauhaus and Kevin Lynch. Later Rossi underlines the importance of the role of psychology in architecture in this passage:

"But what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individual sees the city in one way and that other individuals see it in another? And how can this private and uncultivated vision be related to the laws and principles from which the city first emerged and through which its images were formed? If we are concerned with the city architecturally from more than a stylistic point of view, it does not make sense to abandon architecture and occupy ourselves with something else. Indeed, no one would entertain the idea that when the theoreticians tell us that buildings must respond to criteria of firmness commodity, and delight, they must explain the psychological motives behind this principle."<sup>343</sup>

For Rossi, the main influence was from the Swiss psychologist and founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung. The term "archetype" was popularized in psychology by Carl Jung, long before introduced to architecture. Jung defines and describes the term "archetype" in his works, in many ways. These traces of these various definitions and descriptions can be observed in the writings of Rossi. Clearly, Jung's approach to this term inspires Rossi to adapt and use the term in the architectural vocabulary. The architectural description of Rossi has many fundamentally common points with Jung's description despite the difference between the two disciplines. Defining the "archetype" is not the

341. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 112.

342. *Ibid.*

343. *Ibid.*, 114.






Figure 4.4: The Map of Psyche, Carl Gustav Jung.

only point of connection among their works. In an article, Micha Bandini mentions how Jung influenced Rossi's understanding of "analogy" and, through this, his work "Analogous City" in this passage:

"Rossi himself had quoted Jung's definition in his 'Analogical Architecture' article in which he discussed, amongst others, those two projects. Jung had said, in defining analogy:

I have explained that "logical" thought is what is expressed in words directed from the outside world in the form of discourse. 'Analogical' thought is sensed yet unreal, imagined yet silent; it is not a discourse but rather a meditation on themes of the past, an interior monologue. Logical thought is 'thinking in words'. Analogical thought is archaic, unexpressed, and practically inexpressible in words.

The ending words of this quote must be seen as particularly appropriate for the design phase Rossi was experiencing. The clarity of the Analogous City collage measured against the written explanations of it would have reflected this 'practically inexpressible in words' quality."<sup>344</sup>

Another important common point is the terms "collective memory" and "collective imagination" which are quite important and fundamental concepts in Rossi's architecture. These terms can be traced back to the term "collective unconscious" which is one of the most important works of Jung. Rossi mentions "collective memory" as "the deepest structure of urban artifacts":

"With these considerations we approach the deepest structure of urban artifacts and thus their form -the architecture of the city. "The soul of the city" becomes the city's history, the sign on the walls of the municipium, the city's distinctive and definitive character, its memory."<sup>345</sup>

Here, we can see a direct connection with the term "deep-structure" in Jungian psychology, which is defined as the fundamental information of the Jungian archetypes by Carl Gustav Jung. In the first chapter of the book "Four Archetypes", As between Plato's world of ideas and the world of forms, the "collective memory" and the "city" can be confused in Rossi's work. Rossi responds to this confusion with this passage:

"One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is associated with object and

344. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 27.

345. *Ibid*, 130.

places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This relationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the city's predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas flow through the history of the city and give shape to it."<sup>346</sup>

Here, we can see that Rossi clearly describes his understanding of "collective memory" not as a physical element like "urban artifacts" of the city, but as an "idea" of these elements which is completely a mental projection.

Norberg-Schulz also has numerous references to psychology in his writings. He was mostly influenced by Gestalt psychology and the works of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. Also, we can observe the effect of German Existentialism and Heideggerian phenomenology on Norberg-Schulz's perspective on the relation between architecture and psychology. We can observe the first sign of these influences in one of his early books "Existence, Space and Architecture". In the first chapter of the book, Norberg-Schulz explains the concept of space. He starts to the chapter with this sentence: "Man's interest in space has existential roots."<sup>347</sup> Thus, he gives first hints about his understanding of space. He continues with these words: "It stems from a need to grasp vital relations in his environment, to bring meaning and order into a world of events and actions."<sup>348</sup> Thus, the roots of this relation are fundamentally connected to the survival of the subject through "meaning" and "order". Later, he starts to specify different types of spaces in his perspective. Firstly, he mentions "pragmatic space" which is directly related to this survival necessity, and says, "While the pragmatic space of animals is a function of inborn instincts, man has to learn what orientation he needs in order to act."<sup>349</sup> Then, he examples from African and ancient Egyptian languages to explain these pragmatic relations. However, he makes another important point and says, "In both cases it is clear that a cognitive concept of space had not been abstracted from the direct experience of spatial relations.". Thus, he starts to define "cognitive space".<sup>350</sup> Then, he gives numerous examples to explain further this "cognitive space" and its relation with perception.

To be able to structure this relation, Norberg-Schulz refers to Gestalt psychology and the works of Jean Piaget. Firstly, he explains the similarly static nature of early physics and early psychology. He says "Like those used in physics, early psychological concepts had a static, absolute character, but recently a more dynamic approach has been introduced. The absolute "laws" of Gestalt psychology, for instance, have been replaced by Piaget's more flexible "schemata".". Thus, he considers the works of Piaget as an update to Gestalt

346. Ibid, 130.

347. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 9.

348. Ibid.

349. Ibid.

350. Ibid.

psychology. Then, he explains “schemata” with these words: “A schema may be defined as a typical reaction to a situation.”<sup>351</sup> Then, he mentions different concepts of Piaget’s terminology in the passage:

“Piaget describes the process as a combination of “assimilation” and “accommodation”, “assimilation” referring to the action of the organism on surrounding objects, and “accommodation” to the opposite state... Piaget ends by defining “adaptation” as “an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation”.”<sup>352</sup>

Later, he connects these concepts of Piaget and cognitive space to the perceptual space and existential space in this passage:

“We thus see that the synthetic space of primitive man has been split into several specialized constructs which serve us in our orientation and adaptation to different aspects of the environment. In addition to the cognitive spaces, we have within the psychological dimension to distinguish between immediate perceptual space and the more stable space schemata. The latter are composed of elements which have a certain invariance, such as universal elementary structures (archetypes) and socially or culturally conditioned structures, and, of course, some personal idiosyncrasies. Together these make up man’s “image” of this environment, that is, a stable system of three-dimensional relations between meaningful objects. We will therefore unify the schemata in the concept existential space.”<sup>353</sup>

As we mentioned before in the previous chapter, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers “existential space” as a stable image of the environment which contains universal/archetypal structures, social/cultural structures, and personal features. Then, he defines “architectural space” with these words: “Architectural space, therefore, can be defined as a concretization of man’s existential space.”<sup>354</sup> Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers architecture as a tool to concretize this multiple-step psychological process. Here, another important notion can be observed. This is the influence of German Existentialism on how he understands the “human psyche” through interaction with space. Thus, we can understand that fundamentally there is Existentialism under Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of psychology.

This is a crucial point if we consider the repetitive reference to the concept of “being-in-the-world” in Norberg’s writings. This concept is the main connection between German Existentialism and Heideggerian phenomenology in Norberg-Schulz’s writings as well. Thus, in a way, psychology plays a fundamental role that bringing together

351. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 10.

352. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

353. *Ibid.*, 11.

354. *Ibid.*, 12.




Figure 4.5: Principles of Gestalt Psychology.

different systems of thought in Norberg-Schulz's work. We can observe this role in the references to Heideggerian philosophy in his work. To better understand this relation, we need to take a look at Heidegger's understanding of the psychological processes related to the interaction of an individual with space:

"Spaces, and with them space as such—"space"—are always provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through spaces in such a way that we already experience them by staying constantly with near and remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it."<sup>355</sup>

355. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155.



Figure 4.6: Aerial photo of Göbeklitepe, oldest permanent human settlements, Şanlı Urfa, Turkey.

Here, specifically “going through spaces” and “going toward the door” are quite important examples of how Heidegger thinks about the phenomenological and psychological process which we go through in interaction with space. Thus, the act of “going toward the door” starts in the mental processes before the physical action. This notion is also present in Norberg-Schulz’s writings as well. We can observe the traces of this notion if we examine how Norberg-Schulz explains the interaction between subject and space. As we mentioned before in the previous chapters, Norberg-Schulz explains this interaction with two terms:

“How, then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically in two ways, which we may call “visualization” and “complementation”.<sup>356</sup>

Here, we can see that Norberg-Schulz does not directly refer to “space”, but he refers to “place”. However, as we will explain further in the next chapter, Norberg-Schulz does not consider “space” as an abstract concept from the context in general. Thus, we can understand as well as Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz also thinks of this relation of “subject” and “space” as a psychological process at the fundamental level.

356. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 135.

Another significant point that is related to the role of Heideggerian phenomenology in the relation between psychology and Norberg-Schulz's works is two terms that are frequently referred to in his writings. These are "nearness" and "dwelling". In the book "Poetry, Language, Thought", Heidegger explains "nearness" and underlines the notion that what he means by "nearness" is not the distance:

"Man puts the longest distances, behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness."<sup>357</sup>

Here, we can see Heidegger describes "nearness" as a cognitive and perceptual concept rather than a physical one. In the article "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", he explains the relation between "building" and "dwelling" as he reminds us of their etymological roots, and brings back their former and richer meanings. As he does this, he follows these roots and claims that, in fact, the concept of "building" is inherent to the concept of "dwelling". Later, he takes a step further and claims that "thinking" as well represents the same act. These relations can be understood better in an example of the "bridge" he gives in the article:

"In what way does building belong to dwelling?"

The answer to this question will clarify for us what building, understood by way of the nature of dwelling, really is. We limit ourselves to building in the sense of constructing things and inquire: what is a built thing? A bridge may serve as an example for our reflections. The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood.

357. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 163.

...

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for.”<sup>358</sup>

Here, Heidegger sums up all of the connections between “building”, “dwelling” and “thinking”. As we can observe, there are numerous references to the cognitive and perceptual interactions and psychological elements in the passage. Most importantly, he reasons the existence of “place” as a result of a cognitive process.

Last but not least, there is another notion that reveals the role of psychology in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture. This notion occurs in the chapter in which he describes “type”. He mentions different ways of understanding “type” in this passage:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for all, whereas the other considers the types a result of generalization and historical development. In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and changed through experience and experiment. The important point is however, as we have already asserted, that they receive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic meaning consists in their being variations on a “theme”.”<sup>359</sup>

Here, we can see he recognizes the two different understandings of “types”. One of which is “something given a priori once for all”, which takes us to a metaphysical field which is commonly related to Platonic philosophy. On the other hand, he mentions the other perspective which is a “result of generalization and historical development”, which takes us to a materialistic understanding of this notion which can be related to Aristotelian philosophy. Here, he takes a dualist stance on this notion and says, “In a certain sense both hy-

358. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 149-152.

359. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 155.






Figure 4.7: Interference leads to what Egon Brunswik has called 'intermediary objects'. The phenomena perceived are intermediary objects, while science aims at the abstraction of 'pure' objects. Christian Norberg-Schulz.

potheses are correct.", which is an important point to understand. On the other hand, Carl Jung underlines a similar point in his book "Four Archetypes". In the chapter named "On the Concept of the Archetypes", Carl Jung describes the concept of "archetype" and its features. In the chapter, he describes "archetype" as the same concept as the "idea" of Platonic philosophy. Considering what he later says about "idea", this becomes a significant point:

"Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary and derived."<sup>340</sup>

Here, we can understand Jung also considers "archetype" as a concept that can be a result of a development process. Although we cannot directly relate these two interpretations of Jung and Norberg-Schulz in the context of an influence or inspiration, we can still appreciate the fact that they show parallelism with each other. This notion is not just a simple coincidence that we just realized. This notion, in fact, is a direct marker of the resemblance between Jung's and Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "archetype".

Taking everything into consideration, we can determine that Rossi and Norberg-Schulz both have numerous points that influenced or inspired by the discipline of psychology, in their works. The two authors also have several common points in this manner. The influence of Gestalt psychology and Jungian psychology is the major similarity in their works. Also, psychology plays an important role in the definition of the process of fundamental concepts of their works.

340. Carl G. Jung, *Four Archetypes*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8.

## MEANING: IMAGE, MEMORY, AND LOCUS

Another significant subject that directs the works of Rossi and Norberg-Schulz is "meaning" in architecture. The lack of "meaning" in Modern architecture was a norm that was recognized by Rossi, Norberg-Schulz, and also other architects of the era. Norberg-Schulz points out this by explaining the main intention of his professor, Sigfried Giedion: "When Giedion launched the idea in 1954, he had already ten years earlier published an article entitled "The Need for a New Monumentality". Evidently he considered regionalism and monumentality two aspects of one general problem: the need for meaning in architecture."<sup>341</sup> This norm would eventually play an important role in the Post-Modern Movement and various individual responses.

Rossi and Norberg-Schulz as well often underline the significance of "meaning" in architecture in their writings. Although he does not often directly point out, Rossi frequently refers to the importance of "meaning" while he explains other concepts. For instance, in the book "Architecture of the City, while he was talking about the quality of architecture, he says "The quality of architecture -the quality of the human creation- is the meaning of the city."<sup>342</sup> In the same chapter, while he talks about "urban artifacts", he underlines the necessity of meaning with these words:

"Once again, all these considerations are important only because behind them are artifacts that show their direct connection to man. For the elements constituting the city -these urban artifacts which are by nature characteristic and characterizing and as much a product of human activity as a collective artifact- are among the most authentic human testimonies. Naturally when we speak of these artifacts we are speaking of their architecture, their meaning as a human creation."<sup>343</sup>

Rossi also gives us an important hint about his understanding of "meaning" in architecture in the preface of the book. He finishes the preface with these words:

"Perhaps, as I said at the beginning, this is the meaning of the architecture of the city; like the figure in the carpet, the figure is clear but everyone reads it in a different way."<sup>344</sup>

Here, we can understand Rossi does not think of "meaning" as a static or absolute concept, but as a dynamic and open-ended concept that every individual interprets for themselves, like a work of art.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, has a more direct approach

341. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 151.

342. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 101.

343. *Ibid*, 100.

344. *Ibid*, 19.




Figure 4.8: Diagram of "The Theory of Evolution", Charles Jencks.

to the necessity of "meaning" in architecture. Firstly, he recognizes the previous effort of Modern architecture to create such a world of meaning in this passage:

"Modern architecture from the very beginning was concerned about meaning. Early pioneers such as Frank Lloyd Wright, Henry van de Velde, Adolf Loos and Hendrik Petrus Berlage, denounced the "lies" of historicism, and demanded a new, authentic architecture. The point of departure of the modern movement, therefore, was not primarily problems of function and technology, but the demand for "honesty". Thus Giedion wrote: "According to the easy explanation that was advanced later, the movement developed as the application of two principles: the abandonment of historical styles, and -consequent upon this- the use of "fitness for purpose" as a criterion."<sup>345</sup>

Here, we can see that he manifests the opposition between "historicism" and "modern movement" as an opposition between "honesty" and "lies". Thus, the whole discourse turns into a matter of "morality". He mentions this notion in this passage:

345. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 177.




Figure 4.9: A Manifest Drawing and Writing on "The Room", Louis I. Kahn.

"As a consequence, the modern movement gave much attention to questions of "honesty" and "morality", and in general aimed at the recovery of authentic and original forms which could substitute the "devaluated symbols" of historicism. Thus the movement developed the general principles of "functionalism" and "structuralism", believing that the expression of function and structure would generate new meaningful forms. To some extent the promise was fulfilled."<sup>346</sup>

Here, after mentioning "honesty" and "morality", he talks about "functionalism" and "structuralism" as a tool to create a new domain of meaning in architecture, and he also says that was partially successful but not sufficient. Later, he considers post-modernism in this manner and says:

"Post-modern architecture therefore concentrates its attention on the problem of meaning. So far, it seems to be of general agreement that meaning has to do with images rather than functional or structural forms. A form is meaningful because it "represents" something, and because it tells us something, and because it helps our orientation in and identification with the world in which we live."<sup>347</sup>

346. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 177.

347. Ibid.

Here, we can see, to Norberg-Schulz, the approach of post-modern architecture is to use "image" as a tool to represent "meaning" in architecture. Norberg-Schulz agrees with the fact that "image" is the essential tool to represent the "meaning". He relates the "image" with various concepts in architecture. In this manner, he mentions most frequently "monumentality". However, it is important to understand what he means by "monumentality". He starts with an etymological explanation of the word monumentum which is the Latin word "monument" comes from:

"The Latin monumentatum simply means "things that remind," or, in other words, things that have an enduring significance. Hence there is no reason for being afraid of "monumentality". If one however prefers to use a less loaded expression, one might say "meaning in architecture"."<sup>348</sup>

In this passage, there are two major crucial points. One of which is the meaning of the word monumentum, "things that remind". This is a direct reference to "memory". The other point is Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the term "monumentality" which he describes as "meaning in architecture". Thus, he creates a connection between memory, monumentality, and meaning.

Another concept Norberg-Schulz frequently mentions as a part of the problem of "image" is the place, in other words, locus. He says "The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence a "loss of life"."<sup>349</sup> This kind of reasoning is quite often in various points in his writings. Thus, he sees a great value in "place" in order to solve the problem of "image" and also "meaning".

Lastly, Norberg-Schulz sees "typology" as a tool to solve the problem of the "meaning". He says "Typology is not architecture, and before it can become a useful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from the rationalists' world of abstractions and brought back to the concrete world of phenomena."<sup>350</sup> Later, he explains what kind of a role "typology" can take in this manner and he says "And still, something is lacking. Kahn's images are certainly related to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they do not constitute any symbol system which responds to the language of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow for variation, combination and translocation of meanings."<sup>351</sup> Thus, he defines the notion which he later calls "typical image" that is open to "variation, combination and translocation of meanings".

348. Ibid, 153.

349. Ibid, 169.

350. Ibid, 175.

351. Ibid, 169.

Both authors responded to this necessity of "meaning" in their own ways. However, there were numerous common points in the approach to the solution of this problem. These common points can be gathered under three subjects: image, locus, and memory.

## IMAGE, MEMORY, LOCUS

The concept of "image" takes a significant place in both Rossi's and Norberg-Schulz's works. As we mentioned in the previous section, numerous architects recognized the lack of "meaning" in Modern architecture in the second half of the twentieth century. Although there have been various interpretations to resolve the problem of "meaning", by that time, the general approach was through reference to "image" and "historicism" which also refers to "image" fundamentally. Parallel to these movements, Rossi and Norberg-Schulz were mostly focused on the "image" as well.

Rossi mentions "image" at various points in his writings. Rossi first underlines the importance of image on the urban scale. He points out this with these words:

"The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these problems and invests all of man's inhabited and constructed realm with value. It arises inevitably because it is so deeply rooted in the human condition."<sup>352</sup>

Here, there are two major points in this statement. One of which is his understanding of "architecture" as an equivalent concept to "urban image". Thus, we can say that Rossi considers "urban image" as a crucial part of architecture. The other point is that he considers "urban image" as a notion that is "deeply rooted in the human condition". We can relate this to the existential perspective of Norberg-Schulz who frequently refers to the term "human existence".

Later, in the chapter "Collective Memory" of his book, Rossi relates "image" with the "memory" with a quotation from Halbwachs with these words:

"As Halbwachs writes in *La Mémoire Collective*, "When a group is introduced into a part of space, it transforms it to its image, but at the same time, it yields and adapts itself to certain material things which resist it. It encloses itself in the framework that it has constructed. The image of the exterior environment and the stable relationships that it maintains with it pass into the realm of the idea that it has of itself."<sup>353</sup>

Here, we can see how Halbwach relates "image" with "memory". After this, Rossi describes his perspective on "collective memory" to clear possible misunderstandings:

352. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 27.

353. *Ibid*, 130.



Figure 4.10: Urban Scene: Scena Per il Teatrino, Aldo Rossi, 1978. Magic marker and paint on board, 730 × 1073 mm.

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is associated with object and places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This relationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.”<sup>354</sup>

Here, the first point Rossi makes is the fact that he considers “memory” as an abstract notion which later mentions as an “image”, not as a physical being which he calls “permanences and persistences” later in the book to differentiate. The other point he makes is the relation between “locus” and “collective memory”. We can understand he considers “locus” as a place where “collective memory” takes place. However, the most important point is that he considers this relation between “locus” and “memory” as the source that creates the predominant “image” of the city. Later, he mentions “memory” as “consciousness of the city” in this passage:

354. Ibid, 130.

“Memory, within the structure, is the consciousness of the city;




Figure 4.11: Untitled Drawing, Aldo Rossi. Watercolor and ink on paper, 36.6 x 50.5 cm.

it is a rational operation whose development demonstrates with maximum clarity, economy, and harmony that which has already come to be accepted."<sup>355</sup>

Later, Rossi relates "memory" to two notions: "myth" and "ritual". Through these two concepts, Rossi separates the notion of "memory" from the place and physical elements for a deeper understanding of "memory". He explains his point with these words:

"I believe that the importance of ritual in its collective nature and its essential character as an element for preserving myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of monuments and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the city and of the transmission of ideas in an urban context."<sup>356</sup>

Here, we can see that Rossi examines the relation between "myth" and "ritual" to render a deeper understanding of "memory". Later, he compares this relation with "monument":

"For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment

355. Ibid, 131.

356. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 24.



that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible."<sup>357</sup>

Here, we can understand that Rossi considers "monument" as a tool to carry "memory" through time, as "ritual" does for "myth". Later, Rossi explains the importance of "monument" in this manner:

"I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has marked the event."<sup>358</sup>

This notion of "event & sign" can be related to the "image" through "memory". Rossi mentions this notion with a quotation from Adolf Loos:

"It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf Loos: "If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide in the forest, formed in to a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we become serious and something in us says, "someone lies buried here.". That is architecture." The mound six feet long and three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure architecture precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is only in the history of architecture that a separation between the original element and its various forms occurred. From this separation, which the ancient world seemingly resolved forever, derives the universally acknowledged character of permanence of those first forms."<sup>359</sup>

However, Rossi does not limit "image" to only "memory". As we mentioned before, Rossi mainly uses two complementary perspectives to understand the "city. These are the concepts of "city as a man-made object" and "city as a work of art". The concept of "memory" coincides with the "city as a work of art". On the other hand, Rossi gives "image" a value beyond this. He points out the value of the image in case we think of it as a result of "collective imagination":

"The second point of view sees history as the study of the actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is complementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their

357. Ibid.

358. Ibid, 106.

359. Ibid, 107.

physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically disappeared.”<sup>360</sup>

Here, we can understand that Rossi values the “image” of the city as a concept beyond its “memory” and its “permanences”.

Last but not least, mentioning Rossi’s drawings would help us to understand his relation with “image”. One of which is the drawing of “Analogous City” which can be considered as a visual representation of the values mentioned in the book “Architecture of the City”. “Analogy” is an important tool of Rossi. He mentions this notion in the “Introduction to the First American Edition” section of the book:

“This overlapping of the individual and the collective memory, together with the invention that takes place within the time of the city, has led me to the concept of analogy. Analogy expresses itself through a process of architectural design whose elements are preexisting and formally defined, but whose true meaning is unforeseen at the beginning and unfolds only at the end of the process. Thus, the meaning of the process is identified with the meaning of the city.”<sup>361</sup>

Norberg-Schulz has a different approach in the context of “image”. However, there are also points that intersect with Rossi’s approach. Inspired by Heidegger, Norberg first defines three systems of images. These systems are “language”, “style” and “tradition”. He mentions and explains this with these words:

“There can only be one architectural language, since there is only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is basically only one spoken language, although there are many “tongues”.) The styles represent different choices within the one and same language, or, in Heidegger’s terms, different responses to language. Thus we have three systems of images: language, which consists of invariant archetypes, style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes.”<sup>362</sup>

There is an interesting point in this statement. Norberg-Schulz describes these three systems of images through “archetypes”. Thus, in his perspective, “archetypes” plays an important role in the context of “image”. He explains this notion with these words:

“Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as

360. Ibid, 128.

361. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 18.

362. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edit, 1988), 153.



Figure 4.12: Life in a Norwegian, "tun" at the end of the nineteenth century, *The Concept of Dwelling*, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

systems of types. In order to have an existential foundation, these types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the general language. Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation."<sup>363</sup>


Here, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between "type" and "image" fundamentally. He later points out the importance of the "adaptation" and "variation" of the "image" through a new term: "typical image". He explains the necessity of "typical image" with these words:

"And still, something is lacking. Kahn's images are certainly related to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they do not constitute any symbol system which responds to the language of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow for variation, combination and translocation of meanings."<sup>364</sup>

Norberg-Schulz also details his understanding of "language". Firstly, he describes the relation between "language" and "architecture" in this passage:

363. Ibid.

364. Ibid, 169.



73. "Long Island Ducking" from *God's Own Junkyard*



74. Road scene from *God's Own Junkyard*



75. Duck



76. Decorated shed

Figure 4.13: The Duck and the Decorated Shed Diagrams, Robert Venturi.

"Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality of the world. The architectural language consists of archetypal images that reveal those structures which are invariant with respect to place and time. The archetypes are not forms which exist in some distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich. Rather they represent basic modes of being in the world, or "existential structures". As a matter of fact the archetypes do not exist at all, only their various manifestations. A "typical" tower, thus, does not exist, but "towerness" is revealed in its multifarious aspects by means of ever new tower-images. Thus the work of architecture becomes "an offering to Architecture". These words of Louis Kahn suggest that it is possible and meaningful to talk about architecture in general, although only single works exist."<sup>365</sup>

Here, there are three main points. First of all, Norberg-Schulz defines "architecture" as a "language" previously described as "which consists of invariant archetypes". The second point is parallel to this notion. He describes "architectural language" through "archetypal images". Thus, he brings together these four concepts. Another point is how he defines "archetypes". He defines it as "basic modes of being in the world" or

365. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editra, 1988), 153.

“existential structures”, not as abstract forms as an ideal “Ding an sich”. Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers “archetypes” as being strongly connected to “context” and “existence”. In this passage, he also makes a point about the term “typical image” we mentioned before.

Here, there is an important point which is the point Norberg-Schulz directly comments about Rossi. Firstly, he mentions Rossi as one of the two architects who contributed to the recovery of the “typical image” with these words:

“Two architects have contributed in a particularly decisive way to the recovery of the typical image, the American Robert Venturi and the Italian Aldo Rossi.”<sup>366</sup>

After this, Norberg-Schulz starts to explain Venturi’s significance in this sense which is also worth mentioning:

“The resulting independence of form and function is in the interest of a more effective functionalism, because our “allowing form and function to go their separate ways permits function to be truly functional.”<sup>367</sup>

Here, we can clearly see that Norberg-Schulz considers a value in the independency of form and function, and admires Venturi in this manner. Later, he mentions Rossi’s contribution in his point of view with these words:

“His point of departure is a wish for a typology which is commonly understandable and which may help us to recover the city as a “work of art”.”<sup>368</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz underlines Rossi’s aim for a clear “understandable” typology. He sees a great value in this notion in the aim of recovering the “city as a work of art”.

In the chapter “New Monumentality” of the book “Principles of Modern Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz points out the relation between “image” and “symbolization” with a quotation from Sigfried Giedion:

““Monumentality springs from the eternal need of people to create symbols for their activities and for their fate or destiny, for their religious beliefs and for their social countries where modern architecture has monumentality.”.

366. Ibid, 169.

367. Ibid, 169.

368. Ibid, 169.

...

The quotation from Giedion suggests that meanings are expressed by means of “symbols”, and symbolization has in fact become a primary concern of the present. As we already pointed out, symbolization implies the need for a consistent language of “images”.<sup>369</sup>

Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz recognized a necessity for a consistent “language of images” for “symbols” and “symbolization”. In Norberg-Schulz’s approach to architecture, “symbols” and “signs” plays an important role. Elia Haddad mentions this importance in his article:

“This theory, influenced to a large extent by Charles Morris’s interpretation of semiotics, constituted a similar attempt to develop a comprehensive structure—that is, an “architectural totality” that would account for all the dimensions of architecture: the technical structure, environment, context, scale and ornament.”<sup>370</sup>

Here, we can understand that “semiotics” inspired Norberg-Schulz to aim for a “comprehensive structure” which he calls “architectural totality”. In his first book “Intentions in Architecture”, he gives two following chapters for these two concepts.

Later, Norberg-Schulz examples “typical image” through ancient civilizations. He starts with Ancient Egyptian architecture and underlines the importance of grammar which consists of “order”, “hierarchy” and “classification” and its relation with the values and environmental conditions of Egyptians. He explains how the route of the Sun and the direction of the Nile River shapes the general orientation of the civilization through “grid”, “path”, “center” and “enclosure”. Then, he starts to example it through Ancient Greek architecture. He underlines the “universality” of the “image” of Ancient Greek architecture with a quotation from Heidegger:

“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”, Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”<sup>371</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz underlines the value of Ancient Greek architecture in the aspect of how it brings together “locality” and “universality” of “image”. He reinforces this notion by saying “Greek orders are rooted in concrete places, but their meaning is universal.”<sup>372</sup> This

369. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 153.

370. Elie Haddad, “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In Architecture,” *Architectural Theory Review* 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.

371. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 157.

372. Ibid.



Figure 4.14: The Egyptian grid towns.

notion of connecting particular “local” or “specific” elements with “universality” is a repetitive pattern in Norberg-Schulz’s works. Another example can be observed in the part he talks about “house” in this passage:

“The house serves daily, personal life. Its nature is circumstantial, and its form is related to local and temporal conditions. This does not mean, however, that all houses are entirely different. Any situation represents a variation on the general structures of the world, and it is therefore meaningful to consider the house an *imago mundi*.”<sup>373</sup>

In various parts in his writings, he mentions this aspect with the term “*imago mundi*”. However, before examining “*imago mundi*”, we need to understand what an “architectural thing” is. He explains the term “architectural thing” with these words:

“When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part of a work of architecture.”<sup>374</sup>

373. Ibid, 179.

374. Ibid, 153.



Figure 4.15: "On the way to figurative architecture", Michael Graves. From *The Concept of Dwelling*, Norberg-Schulz.

Here, we can understand that the term "architectural thing" can be related to Rossi's "urban artifact". However, this rises another question about what "architectural image" is. Norberg-Schulz responds to this with these words:

"What, then, is the nature of a universally valid architectural image?...We have mentioned the pyramid, the dome, the pediment and the arch as examples of such images. They reveal general relationships between down and up, here and there, outside and inside, and are at the same time easily recognizable."<sup>375</sup>

Here, he gives some hints about the "gathering" he will later mention, with the words "relationships between down and up, here and there, outside and inside". What he means by "achieving imago mundi" is that when a subject interacts with a complete work that "gathers the Fourfold" in Heideggerian terms, the specific image of the "architectural thing" expands and gives a glimpse of a deeper understanding of the world. Norberg mentions this notion with these words:

"Thus a temporal understanding of a complete world of earth, sky, man and divinity is concretized, and architecture becomes a true imago mundi."<sup>376</sup>

375. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 169.

376. *Ibid*, 163.



Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers one of the objectives of an “architectural thing” as a connection to the general understanding of the world.

After this passage, Norberg-Schulz gives us another important concept to understand his perspective on “image”. He mentions this concept with these words:

“We could also say that the above-mentioned forms are images because they possess a place-creating potentiality. Any place reveals a particular relationship of earth and sky, and is constituted by architectural images. The loss of the image therefore brings about a loss of place, and hence a “loss of life”.<sup>377</sup>

Here, he underlines the fact that he values the forms he mentioned as images due to their “place-creating potentiality”. He reinforces this statement by equating “loss of images” with “loss of place” and “loss of place” with “loss of life”. This statement repeats several times in various books by Norberg-Schulz. It fundamentally underlines the value of “locus” in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “image”. Thus, it opens a new path for us to pursue.

“Locus” is one of the most important concepts in Norberg-Schulz’s world of thought. It is a key to understanding his perspective. Before we start diving into the “locus”, we need to understand a fundamental point of Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “place”. Norberg-Schulz frequently mentions the statement “life takes place” in his various writings. This statement is deeply related to the Heideggerian philosophy. Heidegger has an immense influence on Norberg-Schulz’s perspective on “space” and “place”. Thus, we should examine his approach to “space”. Heidegger explains an individual’s interaction with the “space” in this passage:

“Spaces, and with them space as such—“space”—are always provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through spaces in such a way that we already experience them by staying constantly with near and remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encap-

377. Ibid, 169.

sulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it."<sup>378</sup>

Here, as we can observe, Heidegger considers "space" as a notion that starts in the cognitive process of the individual. Thus, he thinks of "space" as a concept before a physical emptiness. This point of view is important to understand other elements of Heidegger's perspective. One of which is "nearness". He briefly explains "nearness" with these words:

"Man puts the longest distances, behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness."<sup>379</sup>

We can again observe the same notion. To Heidegger, "nearness" is also a spatial concept that is fundamentally related to cognitive and perceptual processes, rather than a physical distance. However, the most important point Heidegger makes on "place-creating" is when he explains how "dwelling" and "building" are related to each other in this passage:

"In what way does building belong to dwelling?"

The answer to this question will clarify for us what building, understood by way of the nature of dwelling, really is. We limit ourselves to building in the sense of constructing things and inquire: what is a built thing? A bridge may serve as an example for our reflections. The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood.

...

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers

378. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155.

379. *Ibid.*, 163.



Figure 4.16: A View of Walton Bridge, Canaletto, 1753–1755

the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for.”<sup>380</sup>

In the first paragraph, we can see that Heidegger relates not only the connection but also the opposing banks not existing before the “bridge”. The realization of the “bridge” created the connection as well as the two sides of the river as places. Especially in the last paragraph, we can see that Heidegger directly considers “dwelling” as a tool to define a “location”.

Another important notion of Heidegger’s terminology is the “neighbourly dwelling” which is a rarely mentioned concept in his writings.

380. Ibid, 149-152.



Figure 4.17: Therme Vals, Peter Zumthor, Photo by Fernando Guerra.

However, the importance of this concept is recognized by Norberg-Schulz. In the article "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture", Norberg-Schulz points out this importance with a quotation from Heidegger in this passage:

"In the Hebel essay Heidegger says:

The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time place the nearness of neighbourly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.

This statement offers a clue to the problem of architectural gathering. What is gathered, Heidegger says, is the "inhabited landscape." An inhabited landscape obviously is a known landscape, that is, something that is *v*. This landscape is brought close to us by the buildings, or in other words, the landscape is revealed as what it is in truth."<sup>381</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz interprets Heidegger's statement. This interpretation can be considered as a connection between "locus" and "memory" in Heidegger's work.

381. Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture," *Perspecta* 20 (1983): 61–68.

Now, we can examine the term "locus". This term directly appears in the term "genius loci" which is one of the most important terms in Norberg-Schulz's writings. The word "loci" comes from the word "locus" which means "place" or "locality".<sup>382</sup> Norberg-Schulz introduced the term "genius loci" in the book "Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture". He describes the term in the book with these words:

"Genius loci is a Roman concept. According to ancient Roman belief every "independent" thing has its genius; its guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to people and places. It accompanies them from birth to death, and determines their character or essence. Even the gods had their genius, a fact which illustrates the fundamental nature of the concept."<sup>383</sup>

In the chapter "New Regionalism" of the book "Principles of Modern Architecture", he describes the meaning of "genius loci" with these words:

"As all buildings form part of a concrete "here", they cannot be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality has been recognized as the genius loci, and historical buildings normally had a distinct local flavor, although they often belonged to a general "style"."<sup>384</sup>

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers "genius loci" as unique "qualities" of a specific place. Also, he understands "locus" by examining the relation between "building" and "place". He explains this relation with a quotation from Heidegger:

"The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.", Heidegger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-made place, is an "inhabited landscape".<sup>385</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of the term "inhabited landscape". This concept of "inhabited landscape" can be related to the term "inhabited space" in Rossi's writings. Later, he explains this term in this passage:

"A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is a "lived space" between earth and sky. First of all it reveals itself as a certain Stimmung. This German word means something like "atmosphere" or "character", and moreover it says that man is gestimmt, "tuned", by his environment."<sup>386</sup>

382. Harper Douglas, "Etymology of locus," Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed May 21, 2023, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/locus>.

383. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18.

384. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edit, 1988), 135.

385. Ibid.

386. Ibid.

Here, there are two important concepts in this statement. One of which is "lived space" which can be related to the term "lived time" in Sigfried Giedion's terminology. This notion of "lived space" was once more referred to previously in this chapter with the word "gewohnt" while we were examining "neighbourly dwelling". Another important concept of the statement is the term "Stimmung" which means "atmosphere" as Norberg-Schulz also mentions. Norberg-Schulz describes the "first" feature of the "lived space" as "atmosphere" which gives us an idea about his phenomenological understanding of the space. He also describes "Stimmung" with these words: "Let us so far only point out that the Stimmung of the locality evidently influences the general languages of form, just as it "tunes" the people who live there."<sup>387</sup> After these descriptive statements about "genius loci", Norberg-Schulz explains one of the most important elements of his understanding of locus with a question and an answer:

"How, then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically in two ways, which we may call "visualization" and "complementation".<sup>388</sup>

These two terms "visualization" and "complementation" are key elements to understanding Norberg-Schulz's approach to "locus". Later, he explains these terms further:

"Visualization is exemplified by Italian hilltop towns which reveal the inherent topographical structure, and complementation by an enclosed man-made settlement, an "artificial oasis", in the infinite desert. It is important to realize that neither of the modes are cases of symbolization. Visualization and complementation produce forms which do not represent anything else, and therefore may be considered fundamental architectural acts. Vernacular architecture is in general based on these modes, but the same also holds true for the great "monuments" of the early civilizations. Thus Heidegger uses a Greek temple to show how a building "opens up a world and gives to things their look". The forms which are related to a particular region evidently possess similar properties, and become elements of a tradition or "way of building". Symbolization is therefore a derivation from the original act of revelation, and a meaningful language of architecture is not an arbitrary system of conventional "sign", but an interrelated set of visualizations and complementations. Place is hence the point of departures of architecture, as well as its goal."<sup>389</sup>

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers "visualization" and "complementation" as fundamental acts of architecture.

387. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 141.

388. *Ibid*, 141.

389. *Ibid*, 135.



Figure 4.18: Ayub National Hospital, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Louis I. Kahn, 1962. Photo by Cemal Emden.

Also, he separates these acts from “symbolization” to clear potential misunderstandings. He also gives hints about how he understands “visualization” and “complementation”. Later he mentions a poem from Heidegger, he starts explaining with “visualization” in this passage:

“Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.<sup>390</sup>

Here, we can understand “visualization” is mostly about what the “thing” represents with its existence through time and space. With this in mind, the term “visualization” coincides with “memory” or the past of the “thing”. After this, Norberg-Schulz explains “complementation” with these words:

“When man makes language speak about the thing, however, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also

390. Ibid, 179.

how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or “project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”<sup>391</sup>

Here, we can understand “complementation” is mainly related to what the “thing” could be potentially. Hence, the term “complementation” coincides with “dream” or “project” as Norberg also mentions, in other words, the potential future of the “thing”. This potentiality was mentioned previously in our writings as well while we were examining how Norberg-Schulz relates “loss of image” to “loss of place” and “loss of place” to “loss of life”. He states that he considers some “forms” he mentioned as “images” due to their “place-creating potentiality”.

The term “locus” is present in Rossi’s writings as well. Although his approach to “locus” does not consist of the rich understanding of Norberg-Schulz, Rossi also underlines the value of “locus”. He defines it with these words:

“The locus is a relationship between a certain specific location and the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and universal.”<sup>392</sup>

Here, we can understand Rossi understands “locus” as the relation between “building” and the “location”. Later, he explains further with these words:

“The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions and qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary for understanding an urban artifact.”<sup>393</sup>

Here, we can observe that Rossi considers “locus” as “conditions” and “qualities” of the space which are necessary to understand “urban artifacts”.

This is an important point when we consider Norberg-Schulz defines “genius loci” as unique “qualities” of a specific place, as we mentioned before. Thus, we can understand what Rossi means by “locus” is similar to what Norberg-Schulz means by “genius loci”. Rossi underlines the importance of “locus” to understanding “urban artifact” by describing it as one of its four main features of it:




Figure 4.19: The simplest model of man's existential space, Existence, Space and Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

391. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 179.

392. *Ibid*, 103.

393. *Ibid*, 103.



"We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban artifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory."<sup>394</sup>

Another point he makes about "locus" is, as we previously mentioned, when Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between "city" and "collective memory". He describes "city" as the "locus" of the "collective memory" in this passage:

"Thus we consider locus the characteristic principle of urban artifacts; the concepts of locus, architecture, permanences, and history together help us to understand the complexity of urban artifacts. The collective memory participates in the actual transformation of space in the works of the collective, a transformation that is always conditioned by whatever material realities oppose it."<sup>395</sup>

Here, it is important to mention the analogy of "teatro" to understand how Rossi understands the "city" in the context of "locus". This is well explained in the article by Seungkoo Joo with these words: "Jo says 'Rossi(1982) sees the city as the theater of human events, ...'."<sup>396</sup> He also says "The locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space, time, form, and site of a succession of both ancient and more modern events."<sup>397</sup> He describes further with this passage:

"Rossi argues in his book, *A Scientific Autobiography* (1981), that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespeare's Globe Theater, revealing the similarity even in the common names of Theaters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespeare's dictum, All the World's stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would have searched for a way to express the space of theater."<sup>398</sup>

Here, we can understand that Rossi considers "city" as a "theater" in which "human events" takes place. Thus, "city" is the "locus" of these events as "theater" works in the same way.

394. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 32.

395. *Ibid.*, 130.

396. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 233.

397. *Ibid.*

398. *Ibid.*

## PHYSICAL ELEMENTS AND TYPES

Examining how Rossi and Norberg-Schulz approach “physical elements” and “types” is another major subject to understanding the similarities and differences between their works. Both authors have different approaches in this context. However, there are various points that these two different approaches intersect. We will examine these approaches to understanding the intersections with their reasoning.

As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main perspectives to understand the “city” which complement each other: “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”. These two main perspectives are Rossi’s fundamental understanding of “physical elements” in the city. He sums up his understanding of the “city as a man-made object” in this passage:

“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of certain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repository of history. In this book we have made use of the historical method from two different points of view. In the first, the city was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built over time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology, the history of architecture, and the histories of individual cities- the city yields very important information and documentation. Cities become historical texts; in fact, to study urban phenomena without the use of history is unimaginable, and perhaps this is the only practical method available for understanding specific urban artifacts whose historical aspect is predominant. We have illustrated this thesis, in part the foundation of this study, in the context of the theories of Poete and Lavedan as well as in relation to the concept of permanence.”<sup>399</sup>

Here, we can understand “city” as a man-made object “built over time” which retains “traces of time”. He states that in this perspective “cities become historical texts” which is related to the “locality” and “history” of the city. This concept coincides with the term “visualization” in Norberg-Schulz’s terminology. After this, Rossi sums up his understanding of the “city as a work of art” in this passage:

“The second point of view sees history as the study of the actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is complementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately linked,

399. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 127.



Figure 4.20: Aphrodisias, Ara Güler, 1958.

so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically disappeared.”<sup>400</sup>

Here, Rossi underlines the perspective that understands the city as a result of “collective imagination” which “represents ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form” and creates an urban image that reflects the “universal” understanding of the city. This notion coincides with the concept of “complementation” in Norberg-Schulz’s terminology.

Rossi considers the “city” to consist of “urban artifacts”. According to Rossi, “urban artifacts” have four main features: individuality, locus, design and memory. He explains this in this passage:

“We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban artifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory.”<sup>401</sup>

400. Ibid, 127-128.

401. Ibid, 32.




Figure 4.21: Monument to Sandro Pertini, Milan, Aldo Rossi, 1988-90.

Later, he defines “primary elements” as urban artifacts which have permanent participation in the city. He explains this notion in this passage:

“We have called these urban elements, which are of a dominant nature, primary elements because they participate in the evolution of the city over time in a permanent way, often becoming identified with the major artifacts constituting the city. The union of these primary elements with an area, in terms of location and construction, permanence of plan and permanence of building, natural artifacts and constructed artifacts, constitutes a whole which is the physical structure of the city.”<sup>402</sup>

Here, we can understand Rossi considers “primary elements” as “major” artifacts that play a stronger role in the “evolution” of the city. He explains further and examples of “monuments” as primary elements in this passage:

“In this sense a historical building can be understood as a primary urban artifact; it may be disconnected from its original function, or over time take on functions different from those for which it was designed, but its quality as an urban artifact, as a

402. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 86.

generator of a form of the city, remains constant. In this sense, monuments are always primary elements."<sup>403</sup>

After defining "monuments" as "primary elements" of the city, Rossi describes the importance of "monuments" in this context. He values "monuments" as "primary elements" to a different degree. He explains this in this passage:

"A monument stands at a center. It is usually surrounded by buildings and becomes a place of attraction. We have said that it is a primary element, but of a special type: that is, it is typical in that it summarizes all of the questions posed by the city, but it is special because by virtue of its form its value goes beyond economics and function."<sup>404</sup>

Here, we can see that "monuments" is considered as a "special type" of "primary element. Considering also the notions of "event" and "sign" which we previously mentioned, this statement leads us to the conclusion that "monuments" plays a significant role in Rossi's architectural perspective. Rossi describes the importance of "monuments" in the context of "event" and "sign" with these words:

"I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has marked the event."<sup>405</sup>

Thus, Rossi considers "event" and "sign" which marks the event as a fundamental *raison d'être* for "urban artifacts". Rossi underlines this objective of the "monuments" that will carry the "memory" through time with these words at another point of his book:

"For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible."<sup>406</sup>

He underlines the importance of this notion with a quotation from Adolf Loos in this passage:

"It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf Loos: "If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide in the forest, formed into a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we become serious and something in us says, "someone lies buried here.". That is architecture." The mound six feet long and

403. Ibid, 87.

404. Ibid, 92.

405. Ibid, 106.

406. Ibid, 24.

three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure architecture precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is only in the history of architecture that a separation between the original element and its various forms occurred. From this separation, which the ancient world seemingly resolved forever, derives the universally acknowledged character of permanence of those first forms."<sup>407</sup>

Here, in this passage which we previously mentioned as well, this time I would like to draw your attention to another part of this passage. Rossi describes a separation that "derives the universally acknowledged character of permanence of those first forms". This notion directly coincides with the term "archetype". Thus, we can observe how Rossi relates "event & sign" with the "archetype".

Later, Rossi explains and describes this concept of "permanence" with Poète's theory which he mentioned before while he was explaining "city as a man-made object". He briefly summarizes his theory in this passage:

"Poète's theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will try to summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number of hypotheses among which are economic considerations that relate to the evolution of the city, it is in substance a historical theory centered on the phenomenon of "persistences." These persistences are revealed through monuments, the physical signs of the past, as well as through the persistence of a city's basic layout and plans. This last point is Poète's most important discovery. Cities tend to remain on their axes of development, maintaining the position of their original layout and growing according to the direction and meaning of their older artifacts, which often appear remote from present-day ones. Sometimes these artifacts persist virtually unchanged, endowed with a continuous vitality; other times they exhaust themselves, and then only the permanence of their form, their physical sign, their locus remains. The most meaningful permanences are those provided by the street and the plan. The plan persists at different levels; it becomes differentiated in its attributes, often deformed, but in substance, it is not displaced. This is the most valid part of Poète's theory; even if it cannot be said to be completely a historical theory, it is essentially born from the study of history."<sup>408</sup>

Here, there are several points that we need to realize. One of which is how Rossi describes "persistences". He says "persistences" reveal through "monuments" which he describes as "physical signs of the

407. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 107.

408. *Ibid.*, 59.



Figure 4.22: Stonehenge, Wiltshire, England.

past” as well as through the persistence of a city’s “basic layout” and “plan”. Thus, Rossi considers not only physical objects like “monuments” but also general morphological features of the city as a tool for “persistence”. However, Rossi accredits a greater value to “monuments” in this manner. He explains this with these words:

“In fact, I am inclined to believe that persistence in an urban artifact often causes it to become identified as a monument, and that a monument persists in the city both symbolically and physically. A monument’s persistence or permanence is a result of its capacity to constitute the city, its history and art, its being and memory.”<sup>409</sup>

Another important point that we should understand from Rossi’s brief explanation of Poète’s theory is that he considers “persistence” as an informational value rather than a physical object. Considering this, we can understand what Rossi means by “permanences” and “persistences” coincides with what he means by “types”. He defines “type” with these words:

409. Ibid, 60.

“I would define the concept of type as something that is per-

manent and complex, a logical principle that is prior to form and that constitutes it."<sup>410</sup>

Here, Rossi points out that he considers "type" as a "logical principle" which is "permanent" and "complex". Later, he explains his understanding of how "type" is constituted with these words:

"The type developed according to both needs and aspirations to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely from society to society."<sup>411</sup>

Here, it is important to understand Rossi's relates "type" with a "form" and a "way of life". He explains the aspect of "form" with an examination of Quatremère's statements about "type" and "model" in this passage:

"One of the major theoreticians of architecture, Quatremère de Quincy, understood the importance of these problems and gave a masterly definition of type and model:

"The word 'type' represents not so much the image of a thing to be copied or perfectly imitated as the idea of an element that must itself serve as a rule for the model... The model, understood in terms of the practical execution of art, is an object that must be repeated such as it is; type, on the contrary, is an object according to which one can conceive works that do not resemble one another at all. Everything is precise and given in the model; everything is more or less vague in the type. Thus we see that the imitation of types involves nothing that feelings or spirit cannot recognize...

"We also see that all inventions, notwithstanding subsequent changes, always retain their elementary principle in a way that is clear and manifest to the senses and to reason. It is similar to a kind of nucleus around which the developments and variations of forms to which the object was susceptible gather and mesh. Therefore a thousand things of every kind have come down to us, and one of the principal tasks of science and philosophy is to seek their origins and primary causes so as to grasp their purposes. Here is what must be called 'type' in architecture, as in every other branch of human inventions and institutions ....

410. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 40.

411. *Ibid.*, 40.



We have engaged in this discussion in order to render the value of the word type-taken metaphorically in a great number of works-clearly comprehensible, and to show the error of those who either disregard it because it is not a model, or misrepresent it by imposing on it the rigor of a model that would imply the conditions of an identical copy."

In the first part of this passage, the author rejects the possibility of type as something to be imitated or copied because in this case there would be, as he asserts in the second part, no "creation of the model"-that is, there would be no making of architecture. The second part states that in architecture (whether model or form) there is an element that plays its own role, not something to which the architectonic object conforms but something that is nevertheless present in the model. This is the rule, the structuring principle of architecture."<sup>412</sup>

Here, there are two major points that are important to understand. One of which is the difference between "model" and "type". Rossi as well as Quatremère considers "model" as a "precise" and "given" concept which can be considered as the information to produce a specific form, and type as a "vague" concept which can be considered as the principles and rules that manifest that form. Rossi explains this notion with these words:

"Type is thus a constant and manifests itself with a character of necessity; but even though it is predetermined, it reacts dialectically with technique, function, and style, as well as with both the collective character and the individual moment of the architectural artifact."<sup>413</sup>

Here, Rossi relates "type" with the various aspects of architecture like "technique", "function" and "style". He also states that he considers "type" as a "character of necessity" in architecture. He underlines this notion with these words:

"Ultimately, we can say that type is the very idea of architecture, that which is closest to its essence. In spite of changes, it has always imposed itself on the "feelings and reason" as the principle of architecture and of the city."<sup>414</sup>

412. Ibid, 40.

413. Ibid, 41.

414. Ibid, 41.

In comparison to Rossi's understanding of "physical elements", Norberg-Schulz has a similar approach. He defines physical objects of architecture as "architectural thing". This notion coincides with Rossi's



Figure 4.23: In Morning on the River, Jonas Lie, 1911-12.

concept of “urban artifact”. He explains this concept of “architectural thing” with these words:

“When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part of a work of architecture.”<sup>415</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz points out that an “architectural thing” consists of a gathering of “image”, “space” and “form”. This explains a previously mentioned issue as well. As we mentioned before, Norberg-Schulz explains the qualities of “genius loci” with two fundamental acts which are “visualization” and “complementation”. He explains these two acts in these passages:

“...Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,

415. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 153.

each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images "visualization".

...

When man makes language speak about the thing, however, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a "dream" or "project" is generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are "lacking". A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also "complementation". It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary."<sup>416</sup>

Here, there is an important detail. Norberg-Schulz explains an abstract concept which is "genius loci", yet he explains it through the word "thing". This notion gives an idea about how he considers "architectural thing" as a gathering of "image", "space" and "form". Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "architectural thing" as a gathering can be related to Heideggerian philosophy. In the example of "bridge", Heidegger describes this assembly of "image", "space" and "form":

"The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood.

...

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows

416. Ibid, 179.

a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for."<sup>417</sup>

Here, we can observe how Heidegger merges these three concepts together in the example of "bridge". However, this poetical narration makes it hard to understand what Heidegger specifically means. Thus, we need to examine another statement in Norberg-Schulz's understanding which he explains with a quotation from Heidegger:

"The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.", Heidegger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-made place, is an "inhabited landscape".<sup>418</sup>

Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz considers "building" as a "man-made place" and "inhabited landscape". This gives us an idea about the continuity between Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "form" and "space".

On the other hand, the relation between "form" and "image" in Norberg-Schulz's perspective can be observed in the concept of "type". Firstly, we need to understand how he defines "type". He points out that in this passage:

"A type was not considered a fixed ideal, but a kind of living, complex thing which, within certain limits, offered an infinite possibility of variation."<sup>419</sup>

This notion of possibilities of variation was also mentioned before in the section we were talking about "typical image". Thus, it would be a good approach to inspect the "image" in this manner. As we mentioned before, Norberg-Schulz considers there are three systems of "images":

"There can only be one architectural language, since there is only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is basically only one spoken language, although there are many "tongues".) The styles represent different choices within the one and same language, or, in Heidegger's terms, different responses to language. Thus we have three systems of images: language, which consists of invariant archetypes, style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes."<sup>420</sup>

Here, as we can see, these three systems of "images" are "lan-

417. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 149-152.

418. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 179.

419. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 165.

420. Ibid, 153.




Figure 4.24: The Repetitive images of the German Tudor facades.

guage", "style" and "tradition". However, the more important point is all three of these systems are defined through "archetypes". Later, Norberg-Schulz explains further the concepts of "style" and "tradition" in this passage:

"Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as systems of types. In order to have an existential foundation, these types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the general language. Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation."<sup>421</sup>

Norberg-Schulz underlines the fact that he considers "style" and "tradition" as "systems of type". Also, he underlines that he considers "type" as a "gathering of a world" which is open to "adaptation" and "variation". Considering the similarity between this statement and the statement about the previously mentioned description of "building", the difference between Norberg-Schulz's understanding of a "form" and a "type" becomes vague and uncertain. This uncertainty may be cleared by another statement he makes when he explains "typical image":

"Kahn's images are certainly related to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they do not constitute any

421. Ibid, 153.



Figure 4.25: "The Ideal City", Fra Carnevale, 1480–1484.

symbol system which responds to the language of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow for variation, combination and translocation of meanings."<sup>422</sup>

Thus, we can observe that Norberg-Schulz understands "image", "form" and "type" in a continuity. "Type" and "image" resonate in the "form". Later, Norberg-Schulz explains the aspect of "language" in this passage:

"Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality of the world. The architectural language consists of archetypal images that reveal those structures which are invariant with respect to place and time. The archetypes are not forms which exist in some distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich. Rather they represent basic modes of being in the world, or "existential structures". "<sup>423</sup>

Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz considers "architecture" as a "language" that "consists of invariant archetypes" as he previously described. Thus, he continues with a description of "archetypes" in the passage. He considers "archetypes" not as ideal "forms" like "Ding an sich", the-thing-in-itself, but as a "representation" of fundamental structures of existence. He continues with a wider description of "archetypes":

422. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 169.

423. *Ibid*, 153.

"As a matter of fact the archetypes do not exist at all, only their various manifestations. A "typical" tower, thus, does not exist, but "towerness" is revealed in its multifarious aspects by means of ever new tower-images. Thus the work of architecture becomes "an offering to Architecture". These words of Louis Kahn suggest that it is possible and meaningful to talk about architecture in general, although only single works exist."<sup>424</sup>

What Norberg-Schulz points out here is that "archetypes" are not physically existing forms, but rather "manifestations" of an ideal being. He also gives another aspect of "archetypes" with another quotation from Kahn:

"Kahn used to say that the only volume of an encyclopedia that really interested him was "volume number zero". He also said that he "loved beginnings". It seems fair to interpret these statements as expressions of a wish for a return to archetypes, that is, for a return to what was there "before" history and "before" styles."<sup>425</sup>

Thus, "archetypes" are what we have left when we separate the temporary tendencies in architecture. Then, he relates this fact with the intention of a "new architecture" in Modern architecture:

"Modern architecture wanted to return to the "beginning as if nothing had ever been done before". One did not recognize, however, that this can only mean a new interpretation of the archetypes."<sup>426</sup>

This leads us to another important issue of Norberg-Schulz's perspective which is also a concern of Carl Jung. This is the question if "archetypes" are "a priori" or not. First of all, we need to understand how Jung considers "archetypes". He explains that with these words:

"Archetype, far from being a modern term, was already in use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with "Idea" in the Platonic usage."<sup>427</sup>

424. Ibid, 153.

425. Ibid, 169.

426. Ibid, 155.

427. Carl G. Jung, *Four Archetypes*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 7-8.

Jung considers the term "archetype" as a synonym of the term "Idea" in Platonic philosophy. Then, he answers this question of "a priori" with these words:

"Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change




Figure 4.26: Ancient Greek Orders.

was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary and derived.”<sup>428</sup>

Here, Jung points out that he considers “archetypes” not “a priori” but “secondary” and “derived”. This approach coincides with Norberg-Schulz’s approach to the issue. He describes his approach with these words:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for all, whereas the other considers the types a result of generalization and historical development. In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and changed through experience and experiment. The important point is however, as we have already asserted, that they receive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic meaning consists in their being variations on a “theme” .”<sup>429</sup>

428. Carl G. Jung, *Four Archetypes*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8.

429. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editi, 1988), 155.



These statements raise a new question: Where these “types” can be derived from? We can understand this by examining what Norberg-Schulz states about “typical image” previously. Norberg-Schulz examples “typical image” through ancient civilizations. He starts with Ancient Egyptian architecture and underlines the importance of grammar which consists of “order”, “hierarchy” and “classification” and its relation with the values and environmental conditions of Egyptians. He explains how the route of the Sun and the direction of the Nile River shapes the general orientation of the civilization through “grid”, “path”, “center” and “enclosure”. These elements of “grammar” and “orientation” mainly derived from civilization’s interaction with the “environmental conditions”, in other words, the interaction between “culture” and “nature”. Naturally, the outcomes of these interactions are strongly dependent on the “locality”. However, Norberg-Schulz states that in specific cases, it can have outcomes that is beyond their geography:

“It may also happen that a tradition corresponds so closely to the archetypes, that it may be used outside the place or region where it originated.”<sup>430</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz mentions the aspect of “universality” of the “archetypes”. He underlines this notion with an example of Greek architecture:

“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”, Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”<sup>431</sup>

Lastly, Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of “typology” in the pursuit of “meaning”. He states this in this passage:

“Typology is not architecture, and before it can become a useful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from the rationalists’ world of abstractions and brought back to the concrete world of phenomena. This does not mean that we consider the language of types a matter of mere feeling, but rather that it ought to get an existential foundation, where thinking and feeling are united, through a phenomenological understanding of the world which relates the given to the archetypes.”<sup>432</sup>

430. Ibid, 153.

431. Ibid, 157.

432. Ibid, 175.

As we can understand here, Norberg-Schulz states that “typology” is not “architecture”, but a tool to search for meaning in architecture.

## LIVING AND RITUALS

Another significant subject that directs the works of Rossi and Norberg-Schulz is the role of "living" and "rituals" in architecture. For both authors, "living" has a crucial role in architecture which is beyond the Modernist understanding that is limited to "function" and "circulation". Both authors point out different deeper relations between "life" and "architecture". We will examine these to understand the intersection of both perspectives.

For Rossi, "life" takes a fundamental role in architecture. We can understand the importance of living in Rossi's perspective in his definition of "architecture". He defines it with these words:

"I use the term architecture in a positive and pragmatic sense, as a creation inseparable from civilized life and the society in which it is manifested. By nature it is collective."<sup>433</sup>

Here, we can see that he considers "architecture" as a "creation inseparable from civilized life and society". He also underlines its "collective" nature. However, Rossi does not consider this creation as a completely "collective" occurrence. He also describes "individual" creations of "civilized life" and "society" as well in this passage:

"Within this idea exist the actions of individuals, and in this sense not everything in urban artifacts is collective; yet the collective and the individual nature of urban artifacts in the end constitutes the same urban structure. Memory, within the structure, is the consciousness of the city; it is a rational operation whose development demonstrates with maximum clarity, economy, and harmony that which has already come to be accepted."<sup>434</sup>

On another point, Rossi says "The changes in housing and in the land on which houses leave their imprint become signs of this daily life."<sup>435</sup> Thus, he underlines the role of "daily life" in architecture. Rossi also describes "architecture" through two main points: "Aesthetic intention and the creation of better surroundings for life are the two permanent characteristics of architecture."<sup>436</sup> Thus, Rossi considers the objective of architecture as the creation of better surroundings "for life".

As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main approaches to "city". These are "city as a man-made object" and "city as a work of art". We can clearly see that both of these approaches are fundamentally connected to "human creation" as Viollet-le-Duc calls it. This is not a conscious process of creation. This is a creation mostly as a

433. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 21.

434. Ibid, 131.

435. Ibid, 22.

436. Ibid, 21.



Figure 4.27: "Road to Power" , Serge Najjar, 2011.

result of "living" and "rituals". Thus, Rossi's two main approaches are fundamentally derived from "living" and "rituals". Rossi mentions this connection with these words:

"How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art? All great manifestations of social life have in common with the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life. This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but this is only a secondary difference because one is a product of the public and the other is for the public: the public provides the common denominator."<sup>437</sup>

Here, we can understand that Rossi considers the "city as a work of art" as an outcome of "unconscious life". He also mentions that this "unconscious life" is primarily collective.

Another important concept to understanding this relation between "architecture" and "living" in Rossi's perspective is the term "inhabited space". Rossi considers "inhabited space" as a source where various urban elements emerge. He underlines this consideration with these words:

437. Ibid, 33.



Figure 4.28: Sukhala Houses, Gurunsi Villages, Tiebele, Burkina Faso.

“It is in this sense not only the place of the human condition, but itself a part of that condition, and is represented in the city and its monuments, in districts, dwellings, and all urban artifacts that emerge from inhabited space.”<sup>438</sup>

Here, we can see that Rossi relates “city”, “monuments”, “districts”, “dwellings” and “urban artifacts” to “inhabited space” and “human condition”. Rossi underlines these two elements in another point which he describes “urban image”:

“The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these problems and invests all of man’s inhabited and constructed realm with value. It arises inevitably because it is so deeply rooted in the human condition.”<sup>439</sup>

Here, Rossi points out that he considers “urban image” gives value to “inhabited space” which he considers it is deeply connected to the “human condition”. However, these statements do not give a clue about what is exactly the “human condition” or “inhabited space”. We can find an answer to this question in this sentence of Rossi:

438. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 34.

439. *Ibid*, 27.

"All these experiences, their sum, constitute the city."<sup>440</sup>

Here, we can understand Rossi's perspective on this issue. He considers "city" as a sum of "experiences" which can be considered phenomenologically related to "daily life", "routines" and "rituals". Later, he describes this notion with these words:

"One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of its people, and like memory it is associated with object and places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This relationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the city's predominant image, both of architecture and of landscape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory, new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas flow through the history of the city and give shape to it."<sup>441</sup>

As we can clearly understand Rossi points out that he considers "city" as locus of the collective memory. In the article "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory", Seungkoo Jo explains this notion with these words: "Rossi argues the city is the locus of collective memory, and by this means that the city acts as a wax tablet that gathers up the traces of lived experience in order to create its monuments."<sup>442</sup> Thus, Joo points out that what Rossi means by "collective memory" can be understood as "traces of lived experience".

Another aspect of how Rossi considers the role of human actions in the city can be observed the allegory of "teatro". In his article, Jo says "Rossi(1982) sees the city as the theater of human events, ..."<sup>443</sup> He also says "The locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space, time, form, and site of a succession of both ancient and more modern events."<sup>444</sup> We can see that the allegory of theater has a significant role in Rossi's understanding of architecture. This notion becomes apparent with this passage from Jo's article:

"Rossi argues in his book, *A Scientific Autobiography* (1981), that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespeare's Globe Theater, revealing the similarity even in the common names of Theaters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespeare's dictum, All the World's stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would have searched for a way to express the space of theater."<sup>445</sup>

Thus, Rossi considers the "city" as a "theater" where "human events", in other words, "life" takes place. This is deeply connected to Norberg-Schulz's notion of "life takes place" which we will examine later.

440. Ibid, 29.

441. Ibid, 130.

442. Seungkoo Jo, "Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory," *Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering* 2, no. 1, (2003): 234.

443. Ibid, 233.

444. Ibid, 233.

445. Ibid, 233.

Another significant point Rossi makes about the role of daily life in architecture is through "primary elements". He describes the "primary elements" with these words:

"We have called these urban elements, which are of a dominant nature, primary elements because they participate in the evolution of the city over time in a permanent way, often becoming identified with the major artifacts constituting the city."<sup>446</sup>

After this description, Rossi relates "primary elements" with the major human activities and daily life in the city which he calls "fixed activities":

"I use the term fixed activities because the notion is generally accepted. But even if in speaking of fixed activities and primary elements we partly refer to the same thing, the two terms presuppose entirely different ways of conceptualizing the urban structure. What they have in common is that both refer to the public, collective character of urban elements, to the characteristic fact of public things that they are made by the collective for the collective and are by nature essentially urban. Whatever reduction of urban reality we make, we always arrive at the collective aspect; it seems to constitute the beginning and end point of the city."<sup>447</sup>

As we can clearly observe he considers "fixed activities" and "primary elements" as the same. Thus, we can say, for Rossi, the crucial feature of "primary elements" is their value as "activities". He also underlines the collective nature of these primary elements which we already mentioned are, by definition, persistent in the evolution of the city. It is not only a matter of persistence; these elements also are fertile and generative in the context of the creation of the new city.

After understanding the importance of "fixed activities", we can examine the persistences and permanences of the city. Rossi examples these elements primarily as "monuments", "plan" and "basic layout" of the city. However, we need to understand why Rossi considers these permanences of the city valuable fundamentally. We can find an answer to this question in this passage:

"I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has marked the event."<sup>448</sup>

446. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 86.

447. *Ibid.*

448. *Ibid.*, 106.

Figure 4.29: "A possible beginning for contacts at other levels", From "Life Between Buildings", Jan Gehl.



Here, Rossi reveals one of the most important points of his understanding of architecture which gives us an understanding of the role of "human events" in Rossi's architecture. He considers the fundamental *raison d'être* of an urban artifact as a "sign" of an "event". Thus, we can see that "human events" play a fundamental role in architecture in Rossi's perspective.

Another important notion is how Rossi relates "type" with "daily life". He points out that there are two main elements that define "type": "form" and "way of life". He underlines this notion with these words:

"The type developed according to both needs and aspirations to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely from society to society."<sup>449</sup>

Here, we can understand Rossi considers a "type" to be associated with a "form" and a "way of life". He also mentions the specific shape can vary from society to society.

Last but not least, Rossi directly mentions "rituals" in the book, while he was explaining the relation between "myth", "ritual" and "monuments". Firstly, he starts to talk about "myth" and he explains its reference to the past. Then, he underlines the importance of "rituals" as a tool to transfer myths from generation to generation. He mentions this notion with these words:

"I believe that the importance of ritual in its collective nature and its essential character as an element for preserving myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of monuments and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the

449. Ibid, 40.



Figure 4.30: House on an island, Ellidaey, Iceland.

city and of the transmission of ideas in an urban context.”<sup>450</sup>

Here, Rossi points out the “collective nature” of rituals and also its “essential character” that preserves “myth”. He also mentions the necessity of “myths” to understand the meaning of “monuments”. Later, he underlines this relation with these words:

“For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible.”<sup>451</sup>

Here, Rossi points out that “rituals” are similar to “monuments” in the context of “permanent” and “conserving” the myths which are our connection to the past.

The role of “life” is also quite important in Norberg-Schulz’s perspective. He considers “life” as the fundamental reference point of architecture. This can be understood in the sentence “life takes place” which he frequently uses in his writings. He underlines this notion with a quotation from Team MLTW with these words:

450. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 24.

451. *Ibid.*, 24.



“Rooms are unspecific spaces, empty stages for human action, where we perform the rituals and improvisations of living. They provide generalized opportunities for things to happen, and they allow us to do and be what we will.”<sup>452</sup>

Another frequently used term is “being in the world” which can be related to “life” as well in an existential and phenomenological context.

This phenomenological and existential aspect plays a significant role in Norberg-Schulz’s thoughts on the relation between “architecture” and “living”. Firstly, Norberg-Schulz does not approach “architecture” in an abstractive and scientific way. His approach is in a qualitative and phenomenological manner which he also suggests:

“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have profited more from a study of these things, than from the abstract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”<sup>453</sup>

With that being said, we can understand, for Norberg-Schulz, “architecture” is not separate from “life”. It is an inherent part of the “life” that we need to consider in the context.

Examining how Norberg-Schulz considers “space” fundamentally can improve our understanding of how he relates “human actions” to “space”. In the book “Existence, Space and Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz mentions various types of spaces. Firstly, he mentions “pragmatic space” which is directly related to this survival necessity, and says, “While the pragmatic space of animals is a function of inborn instincts, man has to learn what orientation he needs in order to act.”<sup>454</sup> Then, he examples from African and ancient Egyptian languages to explain these pragmatic relations. However, he makes another important point and says, “In both cases it is clear that a cognitive concept of space had not been abstracted from the direct experience of spatial relations.”<sup>455</sup> Thus, he starts to define “cognitive space”. Then, he gives numerous examples to explain further this “cognitive space” and its relation with perception. Thus, for Norberg-Schulz, the relation of an individual with space is pragmatically and cognitively connected to the “survival necessities” that shape human actions as well.

Understanding how Norberg-Schulz considers “type” can give us a perspective as well. Firstly, we can find hints at his understanding in his definition of “type”:

452. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 43.

453. *Ibid.*, 139.

454. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 9.

455. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 9.

“Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation.”<sup>456</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz points out that he fundamentally relates “type” with “adaptation” and “variation”. These two concepts are responses to the necessities in “daily life”. However, he underlines the most important notion while he explains “type” in this passage:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for all, whereas the other considers the types a result of generalization and historical development. In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and changed through experience and experiment.”<sup>457</sup>

As we can observe here, Norberg-Schulz relates “types” with “experience” and “experiment”. These two concepts are directly related to the information that the individual extracts from the different conditions of “life”.

Another important point to understand is how Norberg-Schulz describes the “two fundamental acts” of architecture: “visualization” and “complementation”. These two acts are mentioned frequently in Norberg-Schulz’s writings. He describes “visualization” after a quotation from Heidegger in this passage:

“Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.”<sup>458</sup>

After this description, he mentions “complementation”. Then, he describes it as well in this passage:

“When man makes language speak about the thing, however, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or “project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It

456. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editia, 1988), 153.

457. *Ibid.*, 155.

458. *Ibid.*, 179.



Figure 4.31: "Tour de France", Robert Capa, 1939.

is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary."<sup>459</sup>

Here, we can clearly understand that "visualization" is about the past and the current reality of a "thing". On the other hand, "complementation" is about the "lacking" part and the future of a potentially completed "thing". However, the importance of these two concepts is not directly related to their meaning. The most important point of these concepts in the context of relation between "architecture" and "living" is the fact that these are both interactive acts. The subject of architectural interaction does not take a passive stance in Norberg-Schulz's understanding. Rather, he takes an active role in a cognitive manner, projecting and shaping the architectural experience.

The Heideggerian term "dwelling" plays an important role in Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "architecture". This concept is also related to "daily life" and "rituals". In the article "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", Heidegger describes "building" as a continuous act of organization and reorganization of space. In his perspective, the process of "building" does not end with the completion of the structure. As the subjects of the structure and the space live around it, every addition,

459. Ibid, 179.




Figure 4.32: Nebelivka Hypothesis, David Wengrow, 18th International Architecture Exhibition of the Biennale di Venezia.

subtraction, or change redefines the space. Thus, the process of “building” never ends. Later, he explains the relation between “building” and “dwelling” as he reminds us of their etymological roots and brings back their former and richer meanings. As he does this, he follows these roots and claims that, in fact, the concept of “building is inherent to the concept of “dwelling”. Thus, the term “dwelling” is deeply related to “living” in a place. Actually, “living” is the only notion to create this “dwelling”.

In the book “The Concept of Dwelling”, Norberg-Schulz mentions four main categories of “dwelling”. These are “settlement”, “collective dwelling”, “public dwelling” and “private dwelling”. He introduces these categories starting with the term “settlement”. To Norberg-Schulz, the first step of any kind of “dwelling” is to “settle”. He underlines the importance of this notion with these words:

“Thus the settlement interprets the site and transforms it into a place where human life may take place.”<sup>460</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz underlines the fact that the act of “settlement” transforms the “site” and allows “human life” to take “place”. This statement also points out that when “human life” comes to a site by “settling”, the

460. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *The Concept of the Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1985), 31.

"site" turns into a "place". This is the fundamental and existential change Norberg-Schulz considers happening as the result of "settlement".

This notion can be observed in another point in Norberg-Schulz's work. The term "inhabited space" coincides with this change from "site" to "place. He mentions this term firstly in this passage with a quotation from Heidegger:

"What, then, are these objects? We have already suggested the answer with the notion of *genius loci*. It follows from what has been said above that the *genius loci* comprises more than what is close at hand. "The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.", Heidegger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-made place, is an "inhabited landscape".<sup>461</sup>

As we can observe here, Norberg-Schulz describes "inhabited landscape" with the term "man-made place". Thus, we can see that he considers a direct relation between "dwelling", "life" and "place". Later, this relation is also mentioned with these words:

"A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is a "lived space" between earth and sky."<sup>462</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz directly points out the relation between "place" and "life". He also mentions the term "lived space" with can be related to Giedion's term "lived time". Later Norberg-Schulz examples these notions in a statement about "house":

"Thus the house primarily complements the lacks of the site and makes what is close at hand emerge. It constitutes a concrete, individual "here", and allows life to take place "now". In the past, however, the concrete "here" became typical, because "neighbourly dwelling" implied the sharing of a site and a way of life. Vernacular houses therefore appear as variations of types, and visualize a particular "inhabited landscape".<sup>463</sup>

461. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Editio, 1988), 135.

462. *Ibid.*

463. *Ibid.*, 179.

464. *Ibid.*, 169.

Here, we can observe that Norberg-Schulz considers "house" as a marker of a particular place and time. This way, it allows "life" to take "place". This notion frequently gets mentioned by a specific sentence in Norberg-Schulz's writings:

"The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence a "loss of life".<sup>464</sup>

# CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, both Rossi and Norberg-Schulz were in search of a better approach to a new understanding of architecture. Although there were differentiating and contrasting points, both have approaches that are consistent within themselves. This shows us a richer understanding of different possibilities to approach a problem.

The most important difference between the authors is their fundamental approach. Norberg-Schulz directly refers to this in this passage:

“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have profited more from a study of these things, than from the abstract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”<sup>465</sup>

Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz prefers a “phenomenological” approach rather than an “analytic” and “scientific” one. He also criticizes the “abstract” methods of the Bauhaus. Norberg-Schulz’s stance on this situation is not a surprise considering the fact that he is quite influenced by “Gestalt psychology” which is a school of thought that looks at the human mind and behavior as a whole. “Gestalt theory” emerges against the “structuralism” of the time which is fundamentally connected to “atomism”, “sensationalism” and “associationism”. Thus, the structuralist approach views that more complex ideas arise from the association of simpler ideas. Gestalt theory, on the other hand, views complex ideas are more than their simpler parts, thus, cannot be understood by atomizing and disengaging.

On the other hand, Rossi’s main intention is to create a “scientific” base for architecture. Thus, his tools to create such architecture often coincide with the structuralist approach. Both on the urban scale and architectural scale, his approach consists of a degree of “abstraction” and “atomization”. He also often uses repeating “isolated” shapes, forms, and elements in his designs. In a way, Rossi’s architectural design approach can be understood as a “collage” of architectural objects and elements. However, Rossi also considers “city” as a whole frequently in his writings. Two main columns of his work, “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”, can be great examples of such consideration. Thus, Rossi occasionally rearranges his approach.

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant similarities between Rossi and Norberg-Schulz is their numerous references to the discipline of psychology. Both authors frequently mention the psychological aspects of the architecture. Rossi’s relation with psychology can be understood majorly through the works of Carl Gustav Jung. Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, often refers to Gestalt psychology

465. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 139.




Figure 5.1: Drawings of Gallarate Housing Complex, Aldo Rossi.

and the works of Jean Piaget.

In the book "The Architecture of the City", Rossi directly refers to the importance of psychology in this passage:

"But what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individual sees the city in one way and that other individuals see it in another? And how can this private and uncultivated vision be related to the laws and principles from which the city first emerged and through which its images were formed? If we are concerned with the city architecturally from more than a stylistic point of view, it does not make sense to abandon architecture and occupy ourselves with something else. Indeed, no one would entertain the idea that when the theoreticians tell us that buildings must respond to criteria of firmness commodity, and delight, they must explain the psychological motives behind this principle."<sup>466</sup>

Rossi considers psychological motives as the base principle of the criteria of architecture. Rossi often refers to Jungian psychology in this respect. Firstly, one of the most important concepts of Rossi's architecture, "collective memory", is a term taken from Jungian psychology.

466. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 114.



Rossi also refers to Jung through the term “collective imagination” as well. Rossi also often uses Jung’s definitions in various points in his works. An example of this is in Rossi’s article “Analogical Architecture” in which he mentions Jung’s definition of “analogy”. Another example can be the definition of “archetype”. Rossi refers to Jung’s definition of “archetype” in his book.

“Gestalt psychology” has an immense influence on Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture. However, he also criticizes it and considers it “static” and “absolute”. He considers Jean Piaget’s work as an update to Gestalt psychology which brings “dynamism”. He mentions this notion with these words:

“Like those used in physics, early psychological concepts had a static, absolute character, but recently a more dynamic approach has been introduced. The absolute “laws” of Gestalt psychology, for instance, have been replaced by Piaget’s more flexible “schemata”.”<sup>467</sup>

Norberg-Schulz uses Gestalt psychology and Piaget’s concept of “schemata” to have a better understanding of space. In the book “Existence, Space and Architecture”, he structures a system of spaces through these two elements of psychology. His understanding of the interaction between subject and space is mostly shaped by the psychological and phenomenological experiences of the subject.

In this respect, Norberg-Schulz often refers to Heideggerian phenomenology as well. He underlines the points of Heidegger’s references to the psychological aspect of this experience. One of the most important references to this notion can be found in this passage:

“Spaces, and with them space as such—“space”—are always provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through spaces in such a way that we already experience them by staying constantly with near and remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it.”<sup>468</sup>

467. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Existence Space & Architecture* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 10.

468. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155.

Here, we can understand the value Norberg-Schulz gives to the cognitive aspects of the spatial experience by referring to this passage of Heidegger. He points out that the act of "going through" happens in the mind of the subject before the physical act and he considers this cognitive process as the essence of the act.

Before we go through a deeper understanding of these cognitive processes in Norberg-Schulz's understanding of architecture and its relation with Rossi's understanding of architecture, we need to underline and point out a few terminological similarities between both authors. One of which is the similarity between Rossi's "urban artifact" and Norberg-Schulz's "architectural thing". These two terms are the terms they use to describe an architectural form or a physical object. Rossi first mentions "urban artifact" in his description of architecture with these words:

"Architecture came into being along with the first traces of the city; it is deeply rooted in the formation of civilization and is a permanent, universal, and necessary artifact."<sup>469</sup>

Then, he explains the concept of "urban artifact" further with these words:

"We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban artifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory."<sup>470</sup>

Norberg-Schulz on the other hand defines "architectural thing" with these words:

"When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic qualities, it becomes an "architectural thing" which forms part of a work of architecture."<sup>471</sup>

Here, Norberg-Schulz points out that an "architectural thing" consists of a gathering of "image", "space" and "form". As we can see in both cases, there is a reference to "locality", "form" and "memory" of the physical object.

Another important similarity is between the terms Rossi's "locus" and Norberg-Schulz's "genius loci". Although Norberg-Schulz as well uses the term "locus", he usually uses it to point a "place" or a "locality". However, Rossi uses the term "locus" in the same way Norberg-Schulz uses the term "genius loci". Rossi defines the term "locus" with these words:

"The locus is a relationship between a certain specific location and the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and universal."<sup>472</sup>

469. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 21.

470. Ibid, 32.

471. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 153.

472. Ibid, 103.

Here, we can understand Rossi understands "locus" as the relation between "building" and the "location". Later, he explains further with these words:

"The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions and qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary for understanding an urban artifact."<sup>473</sup>

Here, we can observe that Rossi considers "locus" as "conditions" and "qualities" of the space which are necessary to understand "urban artifacts".

In the chapter "New Regionalism" of the book "Principles of Modern Architecture", he describes the meaning of "genius loci" with these words:

"As all buildings form part of a concrete "here", they cannot be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality has been recognized as the genius loci, and historical buildings normally had a distinct local flavor, although they often belonged to a general "style"."<sup>474</sup>

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers "genius loci" as unique "qualities" of a specific place. Also, he understands "locus" by examining the relation between "building" and "place".

This is an important point when we consider Rossi defines "locus" as "conditions" and "qualities" of the space and Norberg-Schulz defines "genius loci" as unique "qualities" of a specific place. Thus, we can understand what Rossi means by "locus" strongly coincides with what Norberg-Schulz means by "genius loci". This concept which Rossi names "locus" and Norberg-Schulz names "genius loci" is quite important in the process of formation of archetype which we mentioned in the introduction. Because the "locus" determines the "physical conditions" which will test the "form" for better optimization and fitness. Thus, the features of the "locus" will be represented in the "form" and this will eventually alter the "image".

After we pointed out these terminological differences, we can now examine the role of cognitive processes in Norberg-Schulz's understanding of architecture and its relation with Rossi's understanding of architecture. The importance of cognitive processes in Norberg-Schulz's understanding of spatial experience can be observed in the two acts he mentions as the "fundamental acts of architecture". These are "visualization" and "complementation". These two acts strongly coincide with Rossi's two complementary understandings of the city: "city as a man-made object" and "city as a work of art". This

473. Ibid, 103.

474. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1988), 135.



Figure 5.2: A Drawing of Ancient Roman City.

proximity can be one of the most important points of this study, due to the importance of these concepts in the authors' understanding of architecture. These are the fundamental notions of both authors' studies and it shapes and touches all other segments of their works. Thus, we will deeply examine and reveal this similarity.

Firstly, we need to understand the proximity of these concepts. Thus, we need to go through the points which define and describe these concepts. Norberg-Schulz explains the concept of "visualization by mentioning a poem from Heidegger. Later, he comments on it:

"...Heidegger's words are therefore selective. But they are not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of things by means of images "visualization".<sup>475</sup>

Here, we can understand "visualization" is mostly about what the "thing" represents with its existence through time and space. This notion can also be observed in this passage:

475. Christian Norberg-Schulz, *Roots of Modern Architecture* (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edit, 1988), 179.

“Visualization and complementation produce forms which do not represent anything else, and therefore may be considered fundamental architectural acts. Vernacular architecture is in general based on these modes, but the same also holds true for the great “monuments” of the early civilizations. Thus Heidegger uses a Greek temple to show how a building “opens up a world and gives to things their look”. The forms which are related to a particular region evidently possess similar properties, and become elements of a tradition or “way of building”.<sup>476</sup>

As we can see, “visualization” is directly related to the existing properties of a form. With this in mind, the term “visualization” coincides with “memory” or the past of the “thing”.

On the other hand, Rossi explains the concept of “city as a man-made object” in a quite similar manner. He sums up his understanding of the “city as a man-made object” in this passage:

“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of certain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repository of history. In this book we have made use of the historical method from two different points of view. In the first, the city was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built over time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology, the history of architecture, and the histories of individual cities- the city yields very important information and documentation. Cities become historical texts; in fact, to study urban phenomena without the use of history is unimaginable, and perhaps this is the only practical method available for understanding specific urban artifacts whose historical aspect is predominant. We have illustrated this thesis, in part the foundation of this study, in the context of the theories of Poete and Lavedan as well as in relation to the concept of permanence.”<sup>477</sup>

Here, we can understand “city” as a man-made object “built over time” which retains “traces of time”. He states that in this perspective “cities become historical texts” which is related to the “locality” and “history” of the city.

Depending on these statements, we can understand that both of these concepts refer to the existing position of an architectural form in the context of “time” and “space”. Norberg-Schulz relates the “genius loci” of a place with its “past” and “memory” and considers “visualization” as an act to acknowledge this information through the interaction of the subject with the place. On the other hand, Rossi considers

476. Ibid, 135.

477. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 127.

the "city" as a "man-made object" and in this perspective, he interacts with "collective memory" which consists of the historical and local values of the space and the urban artifacts which form the city.

A similar situation applies to the relation between the terms "complementation" and "city as a work of art". Norberg-Schulz explains "complementation" in this passage:

"When man makes language speak about the thing, however, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a "dream" or "project" is generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to add something they are "lacking". A lack, however, is not only mean visualization, but also "complementation". It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary."<sup>478</sup>

Here, we can understand "complementation" is mainly related to what a form could be potentially. Hence, the term "complementation" coincides with "dream" or "project" as Norberg also mentions, in other words, the potential future of the form.

On the other hand, Rossi sums up his understanding of the "city as a work of art" in this passage:

"The second point of view sees history as the study of the actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is complementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically disappeared."<sup>479</sup>

Here, Rossi underlines the perspective that understands the city as a result of "collective imagination" which "represents ideas of the city that extend beyond their physical form" and creates an urban image that reflects the "universal" understanding of the city.

These statements show that both of these concepts refer to an imaginary projection of a form. Norberg-Schulz underlines the creative process of the interaction between the subject and the form. He

478. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 179.

479. *Ibid.*, 127-128.




Figure 5.3: "The Tower of Babel", Pieter Bruegel, 1563.

points out that the subject finds a "lacking" aspect of the form and interprets it in his mind. This perspective is deeply related to Gestalt psychology. The result of the process is a "dream" or "project" of the form which gives us an idea about what the form could be. On the other hand, Rossi underlines the "representative" aspect of this creative process. He points out that the information formed due to the "collective imagination" gives us an idea about the "universal" and "timeless" understanding of the form.

As we underlined the similarities between these concepts of Rossi and Norberg-Schulz, we can examine the role of these concepts in their understanding of architecture. One of the first and most obvious points is the fact that both authors refer to the physical elements in the city while defining and describing these concepts. Norberg-Schulz uses the word "thing" for this description. Undoubtedly, the word "thing" is related to the term "architectural thing" in Norberg-Schulz's terminology of architecture. As we mentioned before, this term coincides with Rossi's term of "urban artifact". Rossi, on the other hand, describes the city as a man-made "object" and a "work" of art. Thus, he underlines the physicality of these concepts. He underlines the notion that the city is fundamentally a cluster of physical objects. This notion is important due to its role in the process of the formation of archetypes. As we



Figure 5.4: "The Persistence of Memory", Salvador Dali, 1931.

mentioned in the introduction, "creating subject" creates the "form" to satisfy particular necessities. The fact that both authors base their definitions and description of the concept on the basis of "forms" reinforces our statement about this process of formation of archetypes.

Another important notion is the fact that these concepts directly or indirectly refer to the other fundamental concepts like "locus", "image", and "memory". As we mentioned before, Rossi relates the point of view that he names the "city as a man-made object" with the "collective memory" of the city. This collective memory is related to the historical and local values of the city. The locality aspect of the term "city as a man-made object" may not be distinct in Rossi's description. However, if we examine the theory of Poète which he directly referred in the text, we can understand the connection:

"Poète's theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will try to summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number of hypotheses among which are economic considerations that relate to the evolution of the city, it is in substance a historical theory centered on the phenomenon of "persistences." These persistences are revealed through monuments, the physical signs of the past, as well as through the persistence of



a city's basic layout and plans. This last point is Poète's most important discovery. Cities tend to remain on their axes of development, maintaining the position of their original layout and growing according to the direction and meaning of their older artifacts, which often appear remote from present-day ones. Sometimes these artifacts persist virtually unchanged, endowed with a continuous vitality; other times they exhaust themselves, and then only the permanence of their form, their physical sign, their locus remains. The most meaningful permanences are those provided by the street and the plan. The plan persists at different levels; it becomes differentiated in its attributes, often deformed, but in substance, it is not displaced. This is the most valid part of Poète's theory; even if it cannot be said to be completely a historical theory, it is essentially born from the study of history."<sup>480</sup>

As we can observe here, explaining Poète's theory, Rossi often refers to the importance of "locus". We can also understand that Rossi relates the concept of "city as a man-made object" to the "persistences" and "permanences" of the physical elements of the city, like monuments, plans, or basic layout of the city.

On the other side, Rossi relates the other point of view "city as a work of art" with the "collective imagination" of the city. The term "collective imagination" is related to the "image" of the city which goes beyond the "memory" and "permanences".

Norberg-Schulz values these two acts through their potential. This potentiality was mentioned previously in our writings as well while we were examining how Norberg-Schulz relates "loss of image" to "loss of place" and "loss of place" to "loss of life".

"We could also say that the above-mentioned forms are images because they possess a place-creating potentiality. Any place reveals a particular relationship of earth and sky, and is constituted by architectural images. The loss of the image therefore brings about a loss of place, and hence a "loss of life"."<sup>481</sup>

He states that he considers particular "forms" he mentioned as "images" due to their "place-creating potentiality". He underlines the fact that he values the forms he mentioned as images due to their "place-creating potentiality". He reinforces this statement by equating "loss of images" with "loss of place" and "loss of place" with "loss of life". This statement repeats several times in various books by Norberg-Schulz. It fundamentally underlines the value of "locus" in Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "image". However, another important notion about

480. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 59.

481. *Ibid.*, 169.

this quotation is the part where he relates the “loss of place” through the “loss of image” with the “loss of life”. This statement gives out the hierarchical order in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture which is fundamentally based on “life”. Thus, this statement underlines the fact that Norberg-Schulz as well considers the main intention of the architectural production process to maintain and protect the “essential act” which we mentioned in the introduction. However, due to the influence of Heideggerian philosophy, Norberg-Schulz understanding of the “essential act” overlaps with the “creative act” and “derivative act”. Thus, the living itself creates the form, place, and image. The fact that Norberg-Schulz expresses his thoughts on architecture through two acts reinforces this statement.

Rossi, on the other hand, has a separate understanding of this notion. As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main approaches to “city”. These are “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”. We can clearly see that both of these approaches are fundamentally connected to “human creation” as Viollet-le-Duc calls it. This is not a conscious process of creation. This is a creation mostly as a result of “living” and “rituals”. Thus, Rossi’s two main approaches are fundamentally derived from “living” and “rituals”. Rossi mentions this connection with these words:

“How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art? All great manifestations of social life have in common with the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life. This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but this is only a secondary difference because one is a product of the public and the other is for the public: the public provides the common denominator.”<sup>482</sup>

Here, we can understand that Rossi considers the “city as a work of art” as an outcome of “unconscious life”. He also mentions that this “unconscious life” is primarily collective. Thus, Rossi considers the urban artifacts which form the city as an outcome of the unconscious life.

In conclusion, although Rossi and Norberg-Schulz have quite different fundamental philosophies of architecture, they have a similar basis to understand architecture. This similarity can be unclear at first sight. However, under serious examination, it is obvious that this intersection of their interpretations is strongly related to the elements that shape the process of formation of archetypes. This process of formation is fundamentally based on the intention to maintain and protect the “essential act” which is the living and the rituals. Hence, Rossi and Norberg-Schulz understand the main intention of architecture is to let “life take a place”.

482. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), 33.



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