The right allocation of decision authority at the Top Management Team (TMT) level is a key issue for firm strategic decision-making and performance. For this reason, in the last decades the delegation of decision authority has lied at the heart of academic debate. This thesis aims at contributing to this debate by focusing on the factors that induce the person at the head of the company (i.e., the Chief Executive Officer, CEO) to delegate strategic decisions to the TMT members. Specifically, first we focus on the stylized fact according to which the increase in the CEO span of control leads to a higher delegation of decision authority. Second, we study the impact of CEO skills and decisions strategic importance on delegation and on the relation between CEO span of control and delegation. To test the hypotheses developed in the thesis, we used data collected through the administration of a structured questionnaire to a sample of CEOs of Italian companies (StiMa Project). In so doing, we created a database including data on 197 Italian firms and their CEOs. In particular, using information provided in the questionnaire and data included in firms balance sheet and in CEOs curriculum vitae, we studied how the factors cited above (i.e., CEO span of control, CEO skills, and decisions strategic importance) affect the delegation of 21 firm strategic decisions. Data analysis provided evidence that CEOs delegate more when they deal with a high number of TMT members, when they have not the skills needed to make the right choice, and when the decision is not strategic for the firm. In other words, the results of the thesis prove that the CEO span of control is positively and significantly associated with the delegation of decision authority and that the CEO skills and decisions strategic importance are negatively and significantly related to delegation. Lastly, CEO skills and decisions strategic importance do not significantly influence the positive relation between CEO span of control and delegation of decision authority.
La corretta allocazione dell’autorità decisionale ai vertici aziendali rappresenta una questione fondamentale per il processo decisionale strategico e per le performance dell’azienda. Per questo motivo, negli ultimi decenni la delega dell’autorità decisionale è stata al centro del dibattito accademico. Questa tesi vuole contribuire a questo dibattito focalizzandosi sui fattori che inducono colui che è a capo di un’azienda (i.e., il CEO, Chief Executive Officer) a delegare le decisioni strategiche ai manager che compongono il Top Management Team (TMT). Nello specifico, in primis la tesi si focalizza sul fatto stilizzato secondo il quale all’aumentare dell’ampiezza del controllo del CEO (i.e., span of control) aumenta la delega dell’autorità decisionale. Successivamente, si studia il ruolo che le conoscenze del CEO e l’importanza strategica della decisione hanno sulla delega e sulla relazione tra span of control e delega. Le ipotesi sviluppate nella tesi sono testate grazie a un database costruito tramite la somministrazione di un questionario strutturato ai CEO di un campione di aziende italiane (Progetto StiMa). Il database utilizzato nella tesi include dati riguardanti 197 aziende italiane e i rispettivi CEO. In particolar modo, utilizzando le informazioni fornite direttamente dai CEO tramite la compilazione del questionario, i dati di bilancio e le informazioni riportate nei curricula dei CEO a capo delle aziende incluse nel database è stato studiato come i fattori sopra descritti (i.e., span of control, competenze del CEO e importanza strategica della decisione) impattino sulla delega di 21 decisioni strategiche all’interno di un’azienda. Dall’analisi dei dati è emerso che i CEO ricorrono maggiormente alla delega dell’autorità decisionale quando devono interfacciarsi con un numero elevato di manager appartenenti al TMT, quando non sono in possesso delle competenze necessarie per prendere una scelta accurata e quando la decisione in oggetto non ha elevata strategicità per l’impresa. In altre parole, i risultati della tesi evidenziano un impatto positivo e significativo dello span of control del CEO sulla delega dell’autorità decisionale e un effetto negativo e significativo delle competenze del CEO e della strategicità delle decisioni sulla decentralizzazione. Non emergono invece effetti statisticamente significativi delle competenze del CEO e del grado di strategicità delle decisioni sulla relazione esistente fra ampiezza del TMT e delega dell’autorità decisionale.
Ampiezza del controllo e delega dell'autorità decisionale al vertice delle aziende italiane : il ruolo delle competenze del CEO e della strategicità delle decisioni
BAZZERLA, GIULIA;BONANOMI, MARTINA
2014/2015
Abstract
The right allocation of decision authority at the Top Management Team (TMT) level is a key issue for firm strategic decision-making and performance. For this reason, in the last decades the delegation of decision authority has lied at the heart of academic debate. This thesis aims at contributing to this debate by focusing on the factors that induce the person at the head of the company (i.e., the Chief Executive Officer, CEO) to delegate strategic decisions to the TMT members. Specifically, first we focus on the stylized fact according to which the increase in the CEO span of control leads to a higher delegation of decision authority. Second, we study the impact of CEO skills and decisions strategic importance on delegation and on the relation between CEO span of control and delegation. To test the hypotheses developed in the thesis, we used data collected through the administration of a structured questionnaire to a sample of CEOs of Italian companies (StiMa Project). In so doing, we created a database including data on 197 Italian firms and their CEOs. In particular, using information provided in the questionnaire and data included in firms balance sheet and in CEOs curriculum vitae, we studied how the factors cited above (i.e., CEO span of control, CEO skills, and decisions strategic importance) affect the delegation of 21 firm strategic decisions. Data analysis provided evidence that CEOs delegate more when they deal with a high number of TMT members, when they have not the skills needed to make the right choice, and when the decision is not strategic for the firm. In other words, the results of the thesis prove that the CEO span of control is positively and significantly associated with the delegation of decision authority and that the CEO skills and decisions strategic importance are negatively and significantly related to delegation. Lastly, CEO skills and decisions strategic importance do not significantly influence the positive relation between CEO span of control and delegation of decision authority.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10589/117024