Shareholders Activism constitutes one of the main corporate governance phenomena of modern times, with Hedge Funds playing a key role. This paper, using a sizeable hand-collected dataset, explains the causes and the effects of Hedge Funds Activism on Target Companies over the years between 2013 and 2016, with a focus on United States, acting as trail-blazer for other countries. Starting from the existing agency problems between management and owners and between majority and minority shareholders, we examined different forms of Activism, whose purpose is to monitor managers and improve companies’ performances. An Event-Study of over one thousand Hedge Funds’ strategic, operational, and financial Active Interventions (called also Events), shows the short-term impact of such efforts, with abnormal returns around the announcement of activism of approximately 3%. The goal of the thesis is to study the statistical relations between abnormal returns of Target Firms’ stock price and several characteristics and objectives of Active Interventions to understand how those actions are perceived by the markets. The manifestations of public Activism are certified by filings available on the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) database. On the basis of the results of this research, it can be concluded that, since the announcement of the entrance of an active Hedge Fund in a company, the market reacts positively, provoking abnormal returns, especially when the fund has corporate governance and M&A objectives. In the subsequent activist phases, the most successful forms of Activism are the release of Letters and increases of ownership percentage of targeted firms, while the event showing the highest relation with the abnormal return is the achievement of an agreement regarding M&A issues.
L’Azionariato Attivo rappresenta uno dei fenomeni principali dei nostri tempi in materia di governance aziendale, che vede come attori chiave i Fondi Speculativi. Questa ricerca, utilizzando un campione da noi costituito, spiega le cause e gli effetti dell’Attivismo che i Fondi Speculativi applicano su aziende target, negli anni tra il 2013 e il 2016, focalizzandoci sugli Stati Uniti, in quanto essi rappresentano il Paese trainante. Partendo dai problemi di opportunismo esistenti tra i manager e gli azionisti e gli azionisti di maggioranza e quelli di minoranza, abbiamo esaminato le diverse forme di Attivismo, nato dall’esigenza di monitorare i manager le performance aziendali. La metodologia di Studio dell’Evento, applicata su più di 1000 interventi di tipo strategico, operativo e finanziario da parte dei Fondi Speculativi, mostra l’impatto di breve termine di questi sforzi, con ritorni anormali medi nell’arco di tempo attorno all’evento del 3%. Lo scopo della tesi è stato studiare la relazione statistica esistente tra il ritorno anormale del prezzo dell’azienda target e le varie caratteristiche e obiettivi di attivismo, per capire quali azioni sono percepiti dal mercato. Le manifestazioni di Attivismo Pubblico sono certificate da documenti disponibili sul database governativo americano (SEC). Sulla base dei risultati ottenuti dalla ricerca, si può concludere che, sin dalla dichiarazione di ingresso del Fondo Speculativo nell’azienda, il mercato reagisce positivamente, provocando ritorni anormali, specialmente quando il Fondo ha obiettivi riguardanti la governance o fusioni e acquisizioni. Nelle fasi successive, le forme di Attivismo di maggior successo si sono rivelate essere la pubblicazione di Lettere e aumenti nel capitale posseduto nelle aziende target, mentre l’evento che dimostra la più alta correlazione con i ritorni anormali è il raggiungimento di un accordo su fusioni e acquisizioni.
The effects of hedge fund activism on target companies returns
CHIAVARI, ALESSANDRO;CARINI, FRANCESCA
2016/2017
Abstract
Shareholders Activism constitutes one of the main corporate governance phenomena of modern times, with Hedge Funds playing a key role. This paper, using a sizeable hand-collected dataset, explains the causes and the effects of Hedge Funds Activism on Target Companies over the years between 2013 and 2016, with a focus on United States, acting as trail-blazer for other countries. Starting from the existing agency problems between management and owners and between majority and minority shareholders, we examined different forms of Activism, whose purpose is to monitor managers and improve companies’ performances. An Event-Study of over one thousand Hedge Funds’ strategic, operational, and financial Active Interventions (called also Events), shows the short-term impact of such efforts, with abnormal returns around the announcement of activism of approximately 3%. The goal of the thesis is to study the statistical relations between abnormal returns of Target Firms’ stock price and several characteristics and objectives of Active Interventions to understand how those actions are perceived by the markets. The manifestations of public Activism are certified by filings available on the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) database. On the basis of the results of this research, it can be concluded that, since the announcement of the entrance of an active Hedge Fund in a company, the market reacts positively, provoking abnormal returns, especially when the fund has corporate governance and M&A objectives. In the subsequent activist phases, the most successful forms of Activism are the release of Letters and increases of ownership percentage of targeted firms, while the event showing the highest relation with the abnormal return is the achievement of an agreement regarding M&A issues.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10589/131085