This thesis aims to demonstrate how an official email from a university can be transformed into a digital credential, capable of attesting anything from the payment of a tuition fee to the completion of a degree. The work explores how cryptographic techniques, specifically zero-knowledge proofs, can securely attest to various aspects of a student’s status based on verifiable information extracted directly from institutional emails. Using zk-Email technology and a decentralized identity framework, the approach provides a way to create and verify a tamper-proof credential without exposing sensitive data. For our demonstration, by utilizing zero-knowledge proofs (zk-proofs), specifically zk-SNARKs, the system enables students to prove their enrollment at the university without disclosing sensitive information. The email from which the flow starts is sent by Politecnico di Milano to students, it includes the payment of university fees and it’s signed with DKIM method. The proposed solution generates a zk-SNARK that has multiple advantages: • The proof is simpler and more efficient to verify on a blockchain smart contract than an entire digital signature. • The mathematical circuit that generates the proof verifies the email’s DKIM signature, ensuring the authenticity of the message. • The proof contains only the essential fields, allowing sensitive information about the student to remain confidential and preserving privacy. Using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) to bridge the cryptographic proof’s anonymity to the user, the system employs the Verifiable Credentials Data Model, allowing the students to generate verifiable declarations on their enrollment. The Verifiable Credential (VC) is embedded in a Verifiable Presentation (VP) that allows to disclose only part of the information contained in the VC. Three implementation models are explored: (1) the student as a self-sovereign issuer, (2) Polimi as the issuer using either a DKIM pubkeyhash or a custom DID, and (3) a hybrid model in which Polimi certifies the user’s email through a signed VC, while the student generates a second VC containing the zk-proof.
Questa tesi mira a dimostrare come una email ufficiale ricevuta da un’università possa essere trasformata in una credenziale digitale, in grado di attestare diversi aspetti della carriera universitaria, dal pagamento di una tassa di iscrizione fino al conseguimento della laurea. Il presente lavoro esplora come tecniche crittografiche, in particolare le prove a conoscenza zero (zero-knowledge proofs), possano fornire una verifica sicura su vari aspetti dello status di uno studente, basandosi su informazioni verificabili estratte direttamente da email istituzionali. Utilizzando la tecnologia di zk-Email e un framework di identità decentralizzata, l’approccio permette di creare e verificare una credenziale non falsificabile, senza esporre dati sensibili. Per la nostra dimostrazione, attraverso l’uso di prove a conoscenza zero (zk-proofs), in particolare zk-SNARKs, il sistema permette agli studenti di dimostrare la loro iscrizione all’università senza divulgare informazioni riservate. L’email da cui ha inizio il processo è inviata dal Politecnico di Milano agli studenti e include la conferma del pagamento delle tasse universitarie, firmata con il metodo DKIM. La soluzione proposta genera una prova zk-SNARK che offre diversi vantaggi: • La prova è più semplice ed efficiente da verificare su uno smart contract blockchain rispetto all’intera firma digitale. • Il circuito matematico che genera la prova verifica la firma DKIM dell’email, garantendo l’autenticità del messaggio. • La prova contiene solo i campi essenziali, consentendo di mantenere riservate le informazioni sensibili sullo studente e preservandone la privacy. Utilizzando Identificatori Decentralizzati (DIDs) per legare l’anonimato della prova crittografica all’utente, il sistema impiega il Verifiable Credentials Data Model, permettendo agli studenti di presentare dichiarazioni verificabili sulla propria iscrizione. La Verifiable Credential (VC) è inserita in una Verifiable Presentation (VP) che consente di divulgare solo una parte delle informazioni contenute nella VC. Sono esplorati tre modelli di implementazione: (1) lo studente come emittente autonomo della VC, (2) il Polimi come emittente utilizzando il pubkeyhash DKIM o un DID personalizzato, e (3) un modello ibrido in cui il Polimi certifica l’email dell’utente tramite una VC firmata, mentre lo studente genera una seconda VC contenente la zk-proof.
From email data to verifiable credential: a zk-SNARK-based framework for university enrollment verification
CARBONE, FRANCESCO;SIMONETTI, SHANTI
2023/2024
Abstract
This thesis aims to demonstrate how an official email from a university can be transformed into a digital credential, capable of attesting anything from the payment of a tuition fee to the completion of a degree. The work explores how cryptographic techniques, specifically zero-knowledge proofs, can securely attest to various aspects of a student’s status based on verifiable information extracted directly from institutional emails. Using zk-Email technology and a decentralized identity framework, the approach provides a way to create and verify a tamper-proof credential without exposing sensitive data. For our demonstration, by utilizing zero-knowledge proofs (zk-proofs), specifically zk-SNARKs, the system enables students to prove their enrollment at the university without disclosing sensitive information. The email from which the flow starts is sent by Politecnico di Milano to students, it includes the payment of university fees and it’s signed with DKIM method. The proposed solution generates a zk-SNARK that has multiple advantages: • The proof is simpler and more efficient to verify on a blockchain smart contract than an entire digital signature. • The mathematical circuit that generates the proof verifies the email’s DKIM signature, ensuring the authenticity of the message. • The proof contains only the essential fields, allowing sensitive information about the student to remain confidential and preserving privacy. Using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) to bridge the cryptographic proof’s anonymity to the user, the system employs the Verifiable Credentials Data Model, allowing the students to generate verifiable declarations on their enrollment. The Verifiable Credential (VC) is embedded in a Verifiable Presentation (VP) that allows to disclose only part of the information contained in the VC. Three implementation models are explored: (1) the student as a self-sovereign issuer, (2) Polimi as the issuer using either a DKIM pubkeyhash or a custom DID, and (3) a hybrid model in which Polimi certifies the user’s email through a signed VC, while the student generates a second VC containing the zk-proof.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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2024_12_Carbone_Simonetti_Tesi_01.pdf
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Descrizione: Tesi Magistrale Computer Science and Engineering
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2024_12_Carbone_Simonetti_Executive Summary_02.pdf
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Descrizione: Executive Summary
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https://hdl.handle.net/10589/231242