Financial markets are adaptive systems of heterogeneous interacting agents with bounded rationality. Traditional models based on equilibrium, efficiency, and prob- abilistic assumptions face difficulty in explaining major empirical features, such as volatility clustering, fat-tailed distribution of returns and long-lasting out-of- equilibrium dynamics. An evolutionary perspective provides a modeling framework in which market behavior is shaped by selection processes, adaptation and stochastic perturbation rather than from fully rational coordination. This work proposes the studies of financial markets with evolutionary game-theoretic models and highlights the strategic interaction behind dynamically evolving market outcomes. Concepts like evolutionary stability, regular equilibria, and stochastically stable sets are used to analyze the persistence of configurations over time, even in the presence with en- vironmental noise, mutations, or strategic innovation. In fact, in this context, insta- bility and fluctuation are not a disturbance of the system but its structural feature. Special interest is devoted to Minority Games as agent-based models that reflect the typical patterns observed in financial markets such as price volatility, crowding effects and other statistical regularities observed in real financial time series. The crowd–anticrowd mechanism links individual strategic decisions to overall market volatility, in this work is shown how randomness in strategy choice can improve collective outcomes and change market behavior. Through representative applica- tions—including coordination problems under bounded rationality, socially driven consumption dynamics, and adaptive trading models—this study shows how evolu- tionary dynamics can produce realistic market behavior without relying on static equilibrium assumptions or exogenous shocks. Overall, the evolutionary framework provides a statistically and conceptually robust interpretation of financial markets as evolving, path-dependent systems.
I mercati finanziari sono sistemi adattivi di agenti eterogenei interagenti con razionalità limitata. I modelli tradizionali basati su ipotesi di equilibrio, efficienza e assunzioni probabilistiche incontrano difficoltà nello spiegare le principali caratteristiche empiriche, come il clustering della volatilità, la distribuzione a coda grassa dei rendimenti e le dinamiche dall'equilibrio di lunga durata. Una prospettiva evolutiva fornisce un quadro di modellizzazione in cui il comportamento del mercato è plasmato da processi di selezione, adattamento e perturbazioni stocastiche piuttosto che da un coordinamento pienamente razionale. Questo lavoro propone lo studio dei mercati finanziari con modelli evolutivi di teoria dei giochi e mette in luce l'interazione strategica alla base dell'evoluzione dinamica dei risultati di mercato. Concetti come stabilità evolutiva, equilibri regolari e insiemi stocasticamente stabili vengono utilizzati per analizzare la persistenza delle configurazioni nel tempo, anche in presenza di rumore ambientale, mutazioni o innovazione strategica. Infatti, in questo contesto, instabilità e fluttuazione non sono una perturbazione del sistema, ma una sua caratteristica strutturale. Particolare interesse è dedicato ai Minority Games come modelli basati su agenti che riflettono i pattern tipici osservati nei mercati finanziari, come la volatilità dei prezzi, gli effetti di affollamento e altre regolarità statistiche osservate nelle serie temporali finanziarie reali. Il meccanismo folla-antifolla collega le decisioni strategiche individuali alla volatilità complessiva del mercato; in questo lavoro viene mostrato come la casualità nella scelta strategica possa migliorare i risultati collettivi e modificare il comportamento del mercato. Attraverso applicazioni rappresentative, tra cui problemi di coordinamento in condizioni di razionalità limitata, dinamiche di consumo socialmente guidate e modelli di trading adattivo, questo studio mostra come le dinamiche evolutive possano produrre comportamenti di mercato realistici senza basarsi su ipotesi di equilibrio statico o shock esogeni. Nel complesso, il quadro evolutivo fornisce un'interpretazione statisticamente e concettualmente solida dei mercati finanziari come sistemi in evoluzione e dipendenti dal percorso.
Some applications of evolutionary games and minority games to financial markets
FALCONI, NERI
2025/2026
Abstract
Financial markets are adaptive systems of heterogeneous interacting agents with bounded rationality. Traditional models based on equilibrium, efficiency, and prob- abilistic assumptions face difficulty in explaining major empirical features, such as volatility clustering, fat-tailed distribution of returns and long-lasting out-of- equilibrium dynamics. An evolutionary perspective provides a modeling framework in which market behavior is shaped by selection processes, adaptation and stochastic perturbation rather than from fully rational coordination. This work proposes the studies of financial markets with evolutionary game-theoretic models and highlights the strategic interaction behind dynamically evolving market outcomes. Concepts like evolutionary stability, regular equilibria, and stochastically stable sets are used to analyze the persistence of configurations over time, even in the presence with en- vironmental noise, mutations, or strategic innovation. In fact, in this context, insta- bility and fluctuation are not a disturbance of the system but its structural feature. Special interest is devoted to Minority Games as agent-based models that reflect the typical patterns observed in financial markets such as price volatility, crowding effects and other statistical regularities observed in real financial time series. The crowd–anticrowd mechanism links individual strategic decisions to overall market volatility, in this work is shown how randomness in strategy choice can improve collective outcomes and change market behavior. Through representative applica- tions—including coordination problems under bounded rationality, socially driven consumption dynamics, and adaptive trading models—this study shows how evolu- tionary dynamics can produce realistic market behavior without relying on static equilibrium assumptions or exogenous shocks. Overall, the evolutionary framework provides a statistically and conceptually robust interpretation of financial markets as evolving, path-dependent systems.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/10589/250826